UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

STEEL RACKS FROM CHINA

) Investigation Nos.:
) 701-TA-608 AND 731-TA-1420 (FINAL)

Pages: 1 - 223

Place: Washington, D.C. Date: Tuesday, July 16, 2019



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| 1 | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
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| 2 | BEFORE THE |
| 3 | INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION |
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| 5 | IN THE MATTER OF:) Investigation Nos.: |
| 6 | STEEL RACKS FROM CHINA) 701-TA-608 and 731-TA-1420 (FINAL) |
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| 12 | Main Hearing Room (Room 101) |
| 13 | U.S. International Trade |
| 14 | Commission |
| 15 | 500 E Street, SW |
| 16 | Washington, DC |
| 17 | Tuesday, July 16, 2019 |
| 18 | |
| 19 | The meeting commenced pursuant to notice at 9:30 |
| 20 | a.m., before the Commissioners of the United States |
| 21 | International Trade Commission, the Honorable David S. |
| 22 | Johanson, Chairman, presiding. |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |

| 1 | APPEARANCES: |
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| 2 | On behalf of the International Trade Commission: |
| 3 | Commissioners: |
| 4 | Chairman David S. Johanson (presiding) |
| 5 | Commissioner Irving A. Williamson |
| 6 | Commissioner Meredith M. Broadbent |
| 7 | Commissioner Rhonda K. Schmidtlein |
| 8 | Commissioner Jason E. Kearns |
| 9 | |
| 10 | |
| 11 | |
| 12 | Staff: |
| 13 | William R. Bishop, Supervisory Hearings and Information |
| 14 | Officer |
| 15 | Tyrell Burch, Management Analyst |
| 16 | Sharon Bellamy, Records Management Specialist |
| 17 | |
| 18 | |
| 19 | Stamen Borisson, Investigator |
| 20 | Karl Tsuji, International Trade Analyst |
| 21 | Cindy Cohen, International Economist |
| 22 | Karen Driscoll, Attorney/Advsior |
| 23 | Elizabeth Haines, Supervisory Investigator |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |

| 1 | APPEARANCES: |
|----|---|
| 2 | Opening Remarks: |
| 3 | Petitioner (Christopher T. Cloutier, Schagrin Associates) |
| 4 | Respondent (Gregory S. Menegaz, DeKieffer & Horgan, PLLC) |
| 5 | |
| 6 | In Support of the Imposition of Antidumping and |
| 7 | Countervailing Duty Orders: |
| 8 | Schagrin Associates |
| 9 | Washington, DC |
| 10 | on behalf of |
| 11 | Coalition of Fair Rack Imports |
| 12 | Jay Anderson, President, Steel King Industries, Inc. |
| 13 | Dave S. Olson, National Sales & Marketing Manager, |
| 14 | Ridg-U-Rak, Inc. |
| 15 | Paul Neal, Vice President of Sales, UNARCO Material |
| 16 | Handling, Inc. |
| 17 | Eric Quist, Executive Vice President, Speedrack |
| 18 | Products Group LTD. |
| 19 | Ryan Young, President, Wireway Husky Corp. |
| 20 | Elizabeth J. Drake and Christopher T. Cloutier - Of |
| 21 | Counsel |
| 22 | |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |

| 1 | APPEARANCES (Continued): |
|----|---|
| 2 | In Opposition to the Imposition of Antidumping and |
| 3 | Countervailing Duty Orders: |
| 4 | DeKieffer & Horgan, PLLC |
| 5 | Washington, DC |
| 6 | on behalf of |
| 7 | United Materials Handling, Inc. ("UMH") |
| 8 | Ryan Bartlett, President, United Materials Handling, |
| 9 | Inc. |
| 10 | Bruce Malashevich, Economic Consulting Services, LLC |
| 11 | Susannah Perkins, Economic Consulting Services, LLC |
| 12 | Gregory S. Menegaz - Of Counsel |
| 13 | |
| 14 | Rebuttal/Closing Remarks: |
| 15 | Petitioner (Elizabeth J. Drake, Schagrin Associates) |
| 16 | Respondent (Gregory S. Menegaz, DeKieffer & Horgan, PLLC) |
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| 10 | Dave S. Olson, National Sales & Marketing Manager, | |
| 11 | Ridg-U-Rak, Inc. | 21 |
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| 13 | Paul Neal, Vice President of Sales, UNARCO Material | |
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| 1 | PROCEEDINGS 9:31 a.m. |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. BISHOP: Will the room please come to order? |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Good morning. On behalf of |
| 4 | the U.S. International Trade Commission I welcome you to |
| 5 | this hearing on the final phase of Investigation Nos. |
| 6 | 701-TA-608 and 731-TA-1420 involving steel racks from China. |
| 7 | The purpose of these final investigations is to |
| 8 | determine whether an industry of the United States is |
| 9 | materially injured or threatened with material injury or the |
| 10 | establishment of an industry in the United States is |
| 11 | materially retarded by reason of imports of steel racks from |
| 12 | China. |
| 13 | Schedule setting forth the presentation of this |
| 14 | hearing, notices of investigation and transcript order forms |
| 15 | are available at the public distribution table. All |
| 16 | prepared testimony should be given to the Secretary. Please |
| 17 | do not place testimony directly on the public distribution |
| 18 | table. |
| 19 | All witnesses must be sworn in by the Secretary |
| 20 | before presenting testimony. I understand that parties are |
| 21 | aware of the time allocations. Any questions regarding the |
| 22 | time allocations should be given directly to the Secretary. |
| 23 | Speakers are reminded not to refer in their remarks or |
| 24 | answers to questions to business proprietary information. |
| 25 | Please speak clearly into the microphones and |

| 1 | state your name for the record for the benefit of the court |
|----|--|
| 2 | reporter. If you will be submitting documents that contain |
| 3 | any information you wish classified as business confidential |
| 4 | your request should comply with Commission Rule 201.6. |
| 5 | Mr. Secretary, are there any preliminary matters? |
| 6 | MR. BISHOP: Mr. Chairman, I would note that all |
| 7 | witnesses for today's hearing have been sworn in. There are |
| 8 | no other preliminary matters. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Very well. Let us begin with |
| 10 | opening remarks. |
| 11 | MR. BISHOP: Opening remarks on behalf of |
| 12 | Petitioner will be given by Christopher T. Cloutier of |
| 13 | Chagrin Associates. Mr. Cloutier, you have five minutes. |
| 14 | STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER T. CLOUTIER |
| 15 | MR. CLOUTIER: Good morning, Chairman Johanson |
| 16 | and Members of the Commission, I'm Chris Cloutier of Chagrin |
| 17 | Associates here today on behalf of the Coalition for Fair |
| 18 | Rack Imports. |
| 19 | Chinese and Domestic Steel Racks are highly |
| 20 | interchangeable and compete largely on the basis of price. |
| 21 | Demand for steel racks increased over the Period of |
| 22 | Investigation, growing together with the economy generally |
| 23 | and also E-Commerce specifically, especially in 2018. |
| 24 | Increasing volumes of imported steel racks from |
| 25 | China however robbed the Domestic Industry of the |

| 1 | opportunity to prosper during this period, using dumping and |
|----|--|
| 2 | subsidies to undersell the Domestic Industry and rapidly |
| 3 | gain market share. Unfortunately, the low level |
| 4 | of participation by Chinese interests in the final phase of |
| 5 | this investigation resulted in only a limited number of |
| 6 | companies submitting data to the Commission so we can't talk |
| 7 | about actual numbers here today. |
| 8 | It is clear from the confidential version of the |
| 9 | staff report however that Chinese Imports grabbed increasing |
| 10 | shares of the U.S. Market from 2016 to 2018. The rapid |
| 11 | increase is of course even more impressive in light of the |
| 12 | tonnages reported by Chinese interests to the Commerce |
| 13 | Department. Rising volumes of low-priced imports resulted |
| 14 | in lost sales and lost revenues for the Domestic Industry |
| 15 | and also prevented it from fully passing through rising raw |
| 16 | material costs. |
| 17 | As reflected in the responses to the |
| 18 | questionnaires, 16 out of 20 purchasers reported that |
| 19 | Subject Imports were priced lower than the domestic like |
| 20 | product. In addition, 14 purchasers reported buying Chinese |
| 21 | instead of Domestic Racks, 13 of those reported that the |
| 22 | Chinese product was priced lower and 12 reported the lower |
| 23 | prices as the reason they bought the Chinese Racks. |
| 24 | These responses highlight that the pricing data |
| 25 | compiled in the Staff report do not comport with the overall |

| 1 | picture in the U.S. Market and we have in our brief |
|----|--|
| 2 | addressed certain aberrations that we believe skew the data. |
| 3 | The increase in demand for steel racks over the Period of |
| 4 | Investigation occurred at the same time raw material costs |
| 5 | were increasing for the Domestic Industry. |
| 6 | In most circumstances with eager customers such |
| 7 | increased costs could be expected to be passed on. Here, |
| 8 | however, low-priced imports from China were entering the |
| 9 | U.S. at ever increasing volumes. These imports prevented |
| 10 | the Domestic Industry from raising prices to a level equal |
| 11 | to the increase in raw material costs. |
| 12 | Thus, while the Domestic Industry's unit sales |
| 13 | revenue for U.S. shipments increased by about 6 percent from |
| 14 | 2016 to 2018, its unit cogs increased by a much more rapid |
| 15 | 20 percent. Increased volumes of steel racks from China |
| 16 | suppress prices and the Domestic Industry's ratio of cogs to |
| 17 | revenue began to rise in 2017 and has not stopped. |
| 18 | As reflected in the Staff Report, the Domestic |
| 19 | Industry's operating income dropped by 72 percent from 2016 |
| 20 | to 2018 and kept falling in the interim. Net income dropped |
| 21 | even further. The Domestic Industry is clearly injured and |
| 22 | it is just as clear that the sharp increase in imports of |
| 23 | low-priced racks from China is a major reason why. |
| 24 | Regrettably, the boon times for steel racks |
| 25 | during the Period of Investigation are at an end. The rate |

| 1 | of growth appears to have topped out in 2018 and growth is |
|----|--|
| 2 | projected to slow or stop in the imminent future. This |
| 3 | means that the threat posed by Chinese Imports to the |
| 4 | Domestic Industry is even more pronounced. |
| 5 | The Commission's threat analysis should take into |
| 6 | account that the Chinese steel industry is enormous, |
| 7 | producing well in excess of that country's and even the |
| 8 | world's needs and also ignoring market signals in order to |
| 9 | maintain employment. In the face of increased |
| 10 | duties around the world on Chinese products like the |
| 11 | hot-rolled steel used to make racks, it is increasingly |
| 12 | likely that China's excess capacity will be exported as |
| 13 | downstream products like racks. Imports of Chinese racks |
| 14 | have already demonstrated that they have the ability to |
| 15 | rapidly penetrate the U.S. Market at the expense of Domestic |
| 16 | Producers. |
| 17 | Although 301 duties may provide some relief, the |
| 18 | duration of those duties is unclear and would be no |
| 19 | substitute for orders. Primary subsidy rates, for example, |
| 20 | range from about 5 to 150 percent and preliminary dumping |
| 21 | margins ranged from about 18 to 140 percent. The 301 duties |
| 22 | therefore do not even remotely provide sufficient relief to |
| 23 | address all of the dumping and subsidization. |
| 24 | In conclusion, we ask the Commission to grant |
| 25 | relief from any further injury so that the Domestic Industry |

| Τ | can resume competing on a level playing fleid and reap the |
|----|--|
| 2 | rewards of its investment and hard work. Thank you. |
| 3 | MR. BISHOP: Thank you, Mr. Cloutier. Opening |
| 4 | remarks on behalf of Respondent will be given by Gregory S. |
| 5 | Menegaz of Keiffer and Morgan. Mr. Menegaz, you have five |
| 6 | minutes. |
| 7 | STATEMENT OF GREGORY S. MENEGAZ |
| 8 | MR. MENEGAZ: Thank you and good morning |
| 9 | everybody. My name for the record is Gregory Menegaz from |
| 10 | Horigan Law Firm and I represent United Material Handling at |
| 11 | this hearing. |
| 12 | On behalf of UMH we oppose the Petitions. Our |
| 13 | client continues to maintain in this final phase as he did |
| 14 | in the preliminary staff conference, that the Chinese occupy |
| 15 | a modest minority of the U.S. Market. Instead, the market |
| 16 | is dominated by U.S. Production and imports of non-Subject |
| 17 | merchandise from Mexico by some of the largest U.S. |
| 18 | Producers who have affiliated operations there. |
| 19 | Now with respect to the coverage issue, |
| 20 | Petitioners have tried to make much of the coverage issue in |
| 21 | their prehearing brief. What their brief does not explain |
| 22 | is that the scope of these investigations at Commerce has |
| 23 | changed five times between the initiation of the case and |
| 24 | the preliminary determinations. So naturally, many |
| 25 | exporters and importers who may have been concerned at the |

1 outset are no longer concerned about this case because the scope issues they had at the beginning have been resolved. 2 The same would hold true for participants at the 3 4 ITC Preliminary Staff Conference, so you don't see any of 5 the lawyers and clients here for a reason because their 6 products are no longer in the scope of this case. With respect to volume, the Petitioners case is extremely weak, whereby there was a modest industry growth in the POI and 8 9 Chinese imports picked up a modest amount of market share, 10 we can all play games with the statistics. 11 If we had one percent share at the beginning, 12 that's a hundred percent increase, it's still a small volume 13 of share of the market. Now, with respect to price the 14 Staff Report's overselling of the significant majority of 15 Chinese volume there's no case of price depression therefore 16 and also no credible evidence of price suppression. AUVs 17 were increasing throughout the POI and the Chinese Imports 18 were overselling. 19 As for impact, whatever troubles have visited the 20 U.S. Industry in the POI they cannot be linked to the 21 Subject Imports. In our prehearing brief we performed 22 several modes of pro forma analysis that showed that even attributing all of the Chinese gains in market share to the 23 24 Petitioners barely moved the needle on their operating 25 income. We also did analysis intended to neutralize the

| 1 | shock of the 232 tariffs and when we did that, and that |
|----|--|
| 2 | affects obviously the cogs for the most important raw |
| 3 | material steel, the hot-rolled coil, that vastly improved |
| 4 | the condition of the U.S. Industry. |
| 5 | Also, when Subject Imports left the market in |
| 6 | interim 2019 data, the U.S. Industry did not see a recovery |
| 7 | even with tumbling HR coil prices globally so we think that |
| 8 | all that establishes no causal link between the Subject |
| 9 | Imports and injury to the U.S. Industry. |
| 10 | With respect to conditions of competition in |
| 11 | modern times business in general has become more and more |
| 12 | about speed of delivery, whether in goods or services. |
| 13 | Subject imports have a huge lead-time advantage, over U.S. |
| 14 | industry, as recognized by the staff and in its report. This |
| 15 | is a critical non-price factor, that has ranked very |
| 16 | important by almost all purchasers. You have to remember, |
| 17 | that purchasers here are not just waiting for a product. |
| 18 | They are waiting for their business to start, without the |
| 19 | racks, to put their goods on in the warehouse, they cannot |
| 20 | conduct business. This is not is not a normal lead time |
| 21 | issue in this case. Regardless, moreover, there are |
| 22 | significant differences in the products. And we're going to |
| 23 | go into that, in detail in the afternoon proceedings. Moving |
| 24 | on to the threat of injury, we don't believe there's a |
| 25 | threat of injury in the imminently foreseeable future. First |

| Τ | of all, there are very high 301 tariffs, that have |
|----|--|
| 2 | contributed to a sharp decline in Chinese imports into the |
| 3 | U.S. market. Now your data actually goes through interim |
| 4 | 2019, covers the tariffs, when they were at a ten percent |
| 5 | level. They moved to twenty five percent in May. And that is |
| 6 | really an enormous difference, when people might have to |
| 7 | bare some short term pain, on the ten percent, the twenty |
| 8 | five percent, is even more a substantial barrier, to further |
| 9 | participation by the Chinese in this market. We will be |
| 10 | presenting economic arguments, on material injury and threat |
| 11 | in our afternoon session, with the help of our colleagues |
| 12 | from ECS, Bruce Malashevich and Susannah Perkins. And we |
| 13 | will have our witness from UMH, Ryan Bartlett, who will be |
| 14 | able to speak to the conditions of competition, and to the |
| 15 | products at issue in this investigation. With that I |
| 16 | conclude my opening remarks. Thank you. |
| 17 | MR. BISHOP: Thank you, Mr. Menegaz. Would the |
| 18 | Panel in support of the imposition of the Antidumping and |
| 19 | countervailing duty orders please come forward and be |
| 20 | seated. Mr. Chairman, this Panel has 60 minutes for their |
| 21 | direct testimony. |
| 22 | MS. DRAKE: Good morning, Chairman Johanson and |
| 23 | Members of the Commission. My name is Elizabeth Drake of |
| 24 | Chagrin Associates here on behalf of the Petitioner, the |
| 25 | Coolition for Eair Book Imports Wold like to begin with |

| 1 | testimony from our witnesses today and then we will have a |
|----|---|
| 2 | short PowerPoint presentation. |
| 3 | I'd like to begin with Jay Anderson, the |
| 4 | President of Steel King Industries, Inc. |
| 5 | STATEMENT OF JAY ANDERSON |
| 6 | MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson, Steel King |
| 7 | Industries. Good morning, Chairman Johanson and members of |
| 8 | the Commission. My name is Jay Anderson and I'm the |
| 9 | President of Steel King Industries. |
| 10 | My father cofounded Steel King in 1970. I've |
| 11 | been with the company for 35 years, the past 18 as |
| 12 | President. Steel racks have been an important part of Steel |
| 13 | King's business since its founding. Today, we make steel |
| 14 | racks and accessories at three plants in the United States, |
| 15 | in Stevens Point, Wisconsin, New London, Wisconsin and in |
| 16 | Rome Georgia. |
| 17 | We make both roll form and structural racks. Our |
| 18 | input material for roll form rack is slit steel coils which |
| 19 | we roll form into upright frame columns, beams and upright |
| 20 | frame braces. While our input material for structural racks |
| 21 | are structural shapes such as channels and angles, the |
| 22 | production process is otherwise similar for both. |
| 23 | Upright frame columns are punched, members are |
| 24 | cut to length and upright frames are welded together. All |
| 25 | the components are painted on our paint lines. When the |

| 1 | racks are installed the beams and the uprights are securely |
|----|--|
| 2 | connected together with bolts, rivets and other connectors. |
| 3 | This process gives all steel racks similar essential |
| 4 | characteristics; strength, stability and the ability to |
| 5 | provide access to stored loads. |
| 6 | Many of you will be familiar with steel racks are |
| 7 | used in big box stores like Lowes and Home Depot. Steel |
| 8 | racks are also used for storage in manufacturing facilities, |
| 9 | warehouses, and fulfillment and distribution centers. |
| 10 | Chinese steel racks are highly interchangeable with |
| 11 | domestically produced steel racks. |
| 12 | The majority of the market is racks that are made |
| 13 | to standard industry dimensions and locking configurations |
| 14 | and both domestic and Chinese Producers make the full range |
| 15 | of different types of racks. Some Chinese Producers are |
| 16 | members of the same industry trade association that we are |
| 17 | and they advertise the ability to produce all the same types |
| 18 | of racks that we produce. |
| 19 | In addition, the armark developed by the Rack |
| 20 | Manufacturers Institute which most people refer to as RMI |
| 21 | signals to buyers that rack has been designed to RMI |
| 22 | standards. The armark is available to any producer that |
| 23 | meets the requirements, whether the producer is domestic or |

foreign and regardless of RMI membership. Thus, Chinese and

domestic racks of the same materials and configurations and

24

25

1 meeting the same standards compete largely on the basis of 2 price. The growth in E-Commerce over the past few years 3 4 has driven a large increase in demand for steel racks as 5 retailers like Amazon need ever increasing amounts of 6 warehouse space to store the goods they sell and make them available for quick packaging and delivery to customers all around the country. 8 9 Our company has been proactive in trying to make 10 the most of this boom in demand. We made our largest ever capital investment in 2016 which involved of major factory 11 12 expansion and production equipment purchase. At the time we 13 justified this investment on the basis that would allow us 14 to run at higher production levels and an increase in our 15 revenue. 16 The increase in imports of low-priced steel racks 17 from China prevented us from reaping the returns we anticipated from this investment. Our production has been 18 19 much lower than we projected, even though demand continued 2.0 to grow. Now that market demand is projected to slow we may never realize the benefits of this investment if remedial 21 22 duties are not imposed and the imports of steel racks from China once again flood into our market. 23 Since 2016, we've heard about the increased 2.4 25 availability of low-priced Chinese racks directly from our

1 distributors on a regular basis. Almost every distributor handles more than one manufacturer, even those who don't 2 sell Chinese product are competing against the distributors 3 4 that doe. Our distributors told us that 5 Chinese rack was priced 20 to 25 percent below domestic product. That price differential is simply impossible for 6 us to overcome. Steel is about two-thirds of the cost of manufacture and we are highly dependent on trends in the 8 9 steel market. The Chinese prices we heard from our 10 distributors during this period were close to our cost of production and not much higher than the cost of steel 11 12 itself. 13 Because we simply cannot meet the Chinese price 14 and still make a return we have seen our volumes sold 15 through distributors lag behind the rise in demand. In addition to what we hear from distributors about these low 16 prices I have been directly contacted by Chinese rack 17 companies almost every month since 2016. The prices they 18 offered were sometimes almost a 3rd less than our prices for 19 20 comparable products. 21 Since preliminary relief was imposed in December 22 and March, we have seen some importers of Chinese racks exit 23 the market. They were dumping at such significant margins 24 and benefitting from such large subsidies that they cannot 25 compete when duties offset these unfair trade practices.

| Τ. | The prefilminary refret has herped us to increase our safes |
|----|--|
| 2 | to distributors in 2019. |
| 3 | If orders are not imposed however we remain |
| 4 | highly vulnerable to renewed injury from Chinese rack |
| 5 | imports, even with the improvement this year we still need |
| 6 | time to optimize the return on a large investment that we |
| 7 | made in 2016 and despite a decline in imports, artificially |
| 8 | low-priced Chinese racks continue to distort the market. |
| 9 | Even after the imposition of preliminary relief I |
| 10 | still receive direct offers from Chinese manufacturers at |
| 11 | very low prices. There have been a few recent offers from |
| 12 | Chinese firms that are still barely above the domestic steel |
| 13 | cost and well below prices for domestic product. Enduring |
| 14 | relief is absolutely necessary to stem this aggressive and |
| 15 | widespread price undercutting. |
| 16 | Finally, our market forecast is for decreased |
| 17 | growth in demand for steel racks this year and an outright |
| 18 | contraction in 2020. The peak has passed and we missed out |
| 19 | on the opportunity to maximize the benefits of rising demand |
| 20 | due to the surge in Chinese Imports. Now is the time to |
| 21 | finalize these duties before a renewed flood of imports |
| 22 | harms us even more as the economy weakens. |
| 23 | I'm deeply concerned about our industry's future |
| 24 | if the surge in low-priced Chinese racks is not stemmed. |
| 25 | Investments we have made are in jeopardy if they cannot earn |

| 1 | a reasonable return. The company my father helped found has |
|----|---|
| 2 | survived for almost 50 years. With more than 500 employees |
| 3 | there are thousands of people whose livelihoods depend upon |
| 4 | our company. |
| 5 | It is on behalf of these workers and their |
| 6 | families that I urge the Commission to make an affirmative |
| 7 | determination. Thank you. |
| 8 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Mr. Anderson. Our next |
| 9 | witness is Dave S. Olson, National Sales and Marketing |
| 10 | Manager for Ridg-U-Rak, Inc. |
| 11 | STATEMENT OF DAVE S. OLSON |
| 12 | MR. OLSON: Good morning Chairman Johanson and |
| 13 | Members of the Commission. My name is Dave Olson. I am the |
| 14 | National Sales and Marketing Manager for Ridg-U-Rak. Our |
| 15 | company is located in Northeast Pennsylvania where it |
| 16 | employs about 320 people. I've been in the rack industry |
| 17 | for 27 years and I've been with Ridg-U-Rak the last twelve |
| 18 | and a half. |
| 19 | Ridg-U-Rak is one of the oldest rack |
| 20 | manufacturers in the United States. They've been in |
| 21 | business continuously for 77 years. We produce mostly |
| 22 | roll-form rack but also some structural rack. One of the |
| 23 | primary product lines of low-form pallet rack is called |
| 24 | "teardrop" because of the teardrop shaped poles along the |
| 25 | vertical upright columns into which the horizontal shelf |

| 1 | beams are connected. |
|----|--|
| 2 | Most U.S. rack manufacturers make a version of |
| 3 | teardrop racks. These common parts in the U.S. are |
| 4 | sometimes referred to as interchange rack or an |
| 5 | interchangeable system. Because parts from different |
| 6 | manufacturers are made so that they can be used together in |
| 7 | a single system. |
| 8 | Chinese Producers have closely duplicated the |
| 9 | teardrop style racks that are often used with domestic |
| 10 | components to complete a rack system configuration. While |
| 11 | we discourage mixing rack components from different |
| 12 | manufacturers, the practice became more commonplace during |
| 13 | the Period of Investigation. This made our market highly |
| 14 | susceptible to low-priced Chinese racks that can be used in |
| 15 | the same systems where our products are used. |
| 16 | Ridg-U-Rak is a national sales company and we |
| 17 | serve every corner of the country. Our racks are sold |
| 18 | primarily through two types of channels, most of our |
| 19 | industrial sales are through distributors and material |
| 20 | handling system integration companies. These distributors |
| 21 | and integrators sell the racks to the ultimate end users and |
| 22 | may install the racks for them as well. |
| 23 | The other portion of our sales are made direct to |
| 24 | national accounts of retailers and logistics companies. The |
| 25 | retailers may use our product on the sales floor of big box |

| 1 | stores like Lowes or Costco or in the back room of the store |
|----|--|
| 2 | or in their distribution warehouses. |
| 3 | Distributors often sell racks from a number of |
| 4 | manufacturers. Stocking distributors will carry |
| 5 | common-sized products in their warehouses to sell on a quick |
| 6 | ship basis. They also often place drop/ship custom designed |
| 7 | rack orders for specific projects. When they have a |
| 8 | specific project to bid we provide a quote with our prices |
| 9 | to them and they in turn provide a quote to their client. |
| 10 | Our competitors often quote the same projects |
| 11 | either directly or through other distributors. Because many |
| 12 | rack components are interchangeable prices play a very |
| 13 | important role in the bids of our distributors to choose |
| 14 | quote to their customers. Those distributors who have |
| 15 | stayed with our product even though it is higher priced have |
| 16 | lost substantial business as a result. When they lose |
| 17 | business, we lose business. |
| 18 | Our national retail accounts are typically set up |
| 19 | on a contract basis. Larger retail accounts will typically |
| 20 | contract with more than one rack manufacturer so our prices |
| 21 | have to be competitive in order to win and renew these |
| 22 | contracts, even if we do win a contract, a retailer will |
| 23 | typically give us just a share of the new projects for the |
| 24 | upcoming year. |
| 25 | The success of our business is highly dependent |

1 on our ability to pass along the cost of steel, which is by far our primary input cost. For our roll form product which 2 is the majority of our production, we buy master coils 3 4 direct. At any point in time we will have about three 5 months' supply of steel in the pipeline. 6 The coils may be in our warehouse, they may be 7 slit at a processer or on order. Steel typically accounts for about 65 percent of our product cost. Our dependence on 8 9 trends in the steel market make us highly vulnerable to 10 competition from low-priced Chinese Imports. While we do have steel indexing mechanisms in our contracts with most 11 12 direct customers the large majority of our businesses with 13 distributors where there are no such contracts or indexing 14 mechanisms that are in place. 15 Because of the need to compete with aggressively 16 priced Chinese Imports, there is no way we can pass along 17 our increase in steel cost dollar for dollar, even though the demand for steel racks is increasing. This growing 18 19 cost, the price squeeze has a direct, negative impact on our 2.0 business. Preliminary antidumping and countervailing duties 21 reduce Chinese Imports and directly benefitted our business. 22 Our overall business, including our volumes with our stocking distributors are up significantly so far in 23 24 2019 but these gains are at risk. If relief is not imposed 25 Chinese Imports will once again flood into our market.

| 1 | The Chinese steel industry continues to have |
|----|--|
| 2 | massive overcapacity and receive large government subsidies. |
| 3 | They will have every incentive to continue shifting |
| 4 | production and exports into the downstream steel products in |
| 5 | order to continue offloading their excess production in our |
| 6 | market. |
| 7 | Without orders, rising volumes of dumped and |
| 8 | subsidized imports will eat further into our market share, |
| 9 | our sales revenue and our profits. This will come at the |
| 10 | worst possible time as demand growth is projected to slow in |
| 11 | the second half of 2019 and contract in 2020. Chinese |
| 12 | Imports have already denied us the opportunity to fully |
| 13 | participate in the market growth that has occurred over the |
| 14 | past few years. |
| 15 | To avoid further harm to our industry we ask the |
| 16 | Commission to make an affirmative determination. Thank you. |
| 17 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Mr. Olson. Our next |
| 18 | witness is Paul Neal, Vie President of Sales for UNARCO |
| 19 | Material Handling, Inc. |
| 20 | STATEMENT OF PAUL NEAL |
| 21 | MR. NEAL: Good morning, Chairman Johanson, and |
| 22 | members of the Commission. For the record, my name is Paul |
| 23 | Neal. I am the Vice President of Sales for UNARCO Material |
| 24 | Handling, Inc. I have been with UNARCO for more than 15 |
| 25 | years, and the company has manufactured roll-formed and |

| 1 | structural racking for over 60 years. |
|----|--|
| 2 | UNARCO is headquartered in Springfield, |
| 3 | Tennessee, where our largest manufacturing facility is |
| 4 | located. We also have manufacturing plants in Lewisville, |
| 5 | Texas, and Pandora, Ohio. |
| 6 | UNARCO employs more than 600 people in the United |
| 7 | States. UNARCO produces a wide range of steel racks, |
| 8 | including carton flow, pallet flow, pushback rack, drive-in |
| 9 | rack, pick modules, and cantilever rack. Regardless of |
| 10 | whether the rack is roll-formed or structural, and |
| 11 | regardless of whether it is relatively simple static |
| 12 | selective rack or a more complex dynamic system, all rack is |
| 13 | made from the same basic materials and serves the same |
| 14 | function. |
| 15 | All steel racks are primarily made from steel, |
| 16 | and they all include vertical and horizontal members that |
| 17 | connect securely to provide strong, stable, and accessible |
| 18 | storage for industrial and commercial applications. |
| 19 | We sell our product nationwide, serving orders |
| 20 | from a few dollars to over \$10 million. We sell our product |
| 21 | directly to customers such as retail chains, and we also |
| 22 | sell through dealers that distribute the product to the |
| 23 | ultimate end user. |
| 24 | Distributors in the material-handling industry |
| 25 | routinely offer product from more than one manufacturer, and |

| 1 | many distributors will offer both domestic and Chinese |
|-----|--|
| 2 | racks. Their end-users typically will want three bids from |
| 3 | a single distributor for any one project that they can |
| 4 | compare prices and productscompare products and pricing. |
| 5 | The design usually is already set, and the bids |
| 6 | are based on meeting specs and on a price. Since most |
| 7 | manufacturers can meet standard specifications, price is by |
| 8 | far the biggest determinant in whether you can win the bid. |
| 9 | During the Period of Investigation, distributors |
| 10 | who did not offer Chinese product often were out-bid by |
| 11 | competing distributors who did. This pushed more and more |
| 12 | distributors to offer Chinese options to their customers |
| 13 | because of the lower prices. The domestic industry lost |
| 14 | sales and market share as a result. |
| 15 | Imports from China rapidly changed the U.S. |
| 16 | market for steel racks from 2016 to 2018. Importers used |
| 17 | very low pricing to gain market share at the expense of |
| 18 | domestic producers. While we at UNARCO tried to use |
| 19 | engineering and service as key selling points for our |
| 20 | customers, dealers and integrators who handle imported rack |
| 21 | also provide their own engineering and services to their end |
| 22 | user. |
| 23 | As a result, these dealers can compete with us |
| 24 | head-to-head for sales largely on the basis of price. We |
| 2.5 | lost significant sales valumes as the result. For example |

| 1 | one of our key dealer customers buys rack from us as well as |
|----|--|
| 2 | China. He told us that Chinese prices were so low that he |
| 3 | could still make a margin of 20 to 25 percent on the Chinese |
| 4 | product. |
| 5 | When prices are that low, there is no way for us |
| 6 | to match them and still make a reasonable return. There is |
| 7 | simply no room for us to lower prices that much and stay |
| 8 | profitable, particularly if raw material costs are on the |
| 9 | rise as they were during the Period of Investigation. |
| 10 | Since preliminary relief was imposed, we have |
| 11 | seen importers of Chinese rack exit the market and |
| 12 | experienced a noticeable pickup in our own business. A |
| 13 | number of dealers that handled Chinese rack have come back |
| 14 | to us now that they can no longer take advantage of the |
| 15 | dumped and subsidized Chinese prices without paying remedial |
| 16 | duties. |
| 17 | For these benefits to endure, it is essential |
| 18 | that orders be imposed. For all these reasons, we ask the |
| 19 | Commission to make an affirmative determination. Thank you. |
| 20 | MR. DRAKE: Thank you, Mr. Neal. Our next |
| 21 | witness is Eric Quist, Executive Vice President of Speedrack |
| 22 | Products Groupsexcuse me, Products Group, Limited. |
| 23 | STATEMENT OF ERIC QUIST |
| 24 | MR. QUIST: Good morning, Chairman Johanson and |
| 25 | members of the Commission. My name is Eric Quist. I am the |

| _ | Executive vice fleshdent of Speedrack floddets Gloup. |
|----|--|
| 2 | Speedrack is headquartered in Sparta, Michigan, and we |
| 3 | produce steel racks at two facilities, one in Quincy, |
| 4 | Michigan, and one in Litchfield, Michigan. |
| 5 | We employ more than 200 workers producing steel |
| 6 | racks. Speedrack has been in the storage products industry |
| 7 | for over 50 years. I have been with the company for over 16 |
| 8 | years. |
| 9 | The vast majority of what Speedrack produces are |
| 10 | the industry standard teardrop pallet racks. These are |
| 11 | roll-form racks made from slit coil. The standard |
| 12 | configuration of this type of rack allows components from |
| 13 | different manufacturers to fit together in a single system. |
| 14 | A standard beam from China would easily fit into |
| 15 | one of our standard uprights. They are basically |
| 16 | interchangeable. In 2016, Speedrack saw that demand for |
| 17 | steel racks was projected to grow, both because of the |
| 18 | growing economy and also as E-commerce companies were |
| 19 | building additional warehouses and distribution centers. |
| 20 | We started the process to open a second facility |
| 21 | in Litchfield, Michigan, with a state-of-the-art welding and |
| 22 | paint line. The plan was to create additional finishing |
| 23 | capacity in Litchfield to allow the roll-formers in Quincy |
| 24 | to increase production, resulting in increased sales for the |
| 25 | company overall. The new facility opened in Litchfield in |

| 1 | the spring of 2017. |
|----|--|
| 2 | The rapid increase in low-priced steel racks from |
| 3 | China prevented us from realizing the benefits of this |
| 4 | investment. Our capacity increased and there was growing |
| 5 | demand available to serve, but it was imports from China |
| 6 | that took the demand instead of us. As a result, our |
| 7 | production and shipments declined instead of improving. |
| 8 | Additional plans we had discussed to add a |
| 9 | roll-former or buy a plant outside of Michigan had to be |
| 10 | scheduledI'm sorryshelved due to the adverse market |
| 11 | conditions caused by imports from China. |
| 12 | Chinese imports didn't just take away volume, |
| 13 | they also hurt our pricing. I review all of the quotes that |
| 14 | come through our business and provide final approval. A |
| 15 | couple of years ago I started to see a lot more requests |
| 16 | from customers for upright-only orders. We could only |
| 17 | conclude that they were starting to buy the beams from China |
| 18 | instead of us. |
| 19 | The Chinese prices were so low that it wasn't |
| 20 | even worth their time to ask us for a quote on the beams. |
| 21 | It is important to understand that beams are the |
| 22 | high-volume, low-labor component of racks. And any rack |
| 23 | business needs to have sufficient beam volume in order to |
| 24 | viablyto be viably financially. |
| 25 | Other customers would quote the import prices to |

| Τ | us in an effort to get us to lower our own prices, but some |
|----|--|
| 2 | of the Chinese prices they were quoting us for finished |
| 3 | product were even lower than what we could buy steel coil |
| 4 | for. There is simply no way for us to match such low prices |
| 5 | and continue to stay in business. |
| 6 | Chinese imports have already forced us to lose |
| 7 | shipments and cut production, even as demand was increasing. |
| 8 | Chinese imports have already lowered the return on |
| 9 | investment we made in our new Litchfield facility in 2017. |
| 10 | These imports have also forced us to cancel and delay other |
| 11 | planned investments in the company. |
| 12 | While we have seen some improvements since |
| 13 | preliminary duties were imposed, we need more enduring |
| 14 | relief from Chinese imports in order to compete. Speedrack |
| 15 | provides hundreds of good-paying jobs to our employees. Our |
| 16 | unionized workers make good, family-supporting wages, have |
| 17 | full health-care benefits, and a 401K. |
| 18 | With the labor market as tight as it is right |
| 19 | now, we have had to raise wages significantly in order to |
| 20 | attract and retail skilled labor. Our competitors in China |
| 21 | not only benefit from government subsidies and dump their |
| 22 | product below market prices, but they are also able to take |
| 23 | advantage of non-market economy prices for inputs like |
| 24 | labor, land, and energy. |
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There is simply no way for us to keep generating

| 1 | the hundreds of family-sustaining jobs in the United States |
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| 2 | if we are forced to endure these unfair trade practices. |
| 3 | For all of these reasons, we ask that the |
| 4 | Commission make an affirmative determination to give our |
| 5 | company and our workers a chance to compete. Thank you. |
| 6 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Mr. Quist. Our last |
| 7 | witness is Ryan Young, President of Wireway Husky Corp. |
| 8 | STATEMENT OF RYAN YOUNG |
| 9 | MR. YOUNG: Good morning, Chairman Johanson and |
| 10 | members of the Commission. My name is Ryan Young, and I am |
| 11 | President of Wireway Husky Corp., doing business as Husky |
| 12 | Rack and Wire. |
| 13 | We are headquartered in Denver, North Carolina. |
| 14 | Our company was founded in Sterling, Massachusetts, back in |
| 15 | 1964 by my grandfather, Reginald Young. My father, Ron |
| 16 | Young, joined the company full-time straight out of college |
| 17 | in 1970. At that time, the company had a handful of |
| 18 | employees and manufactured only woven wire partitions. |
| 19 | My father moved our immediate family down to |
| 20 | North Carolina in 1981 where he expanded the company by |
| 21 | starting another branch of the wire manufacturing business. |
| 22 | In 1985, we bought a rack company called Husky out of |
| 23 | Lithonia, Georgia. |
| 24 | After a few years, we moved the rack company into |
| 25 | our newly expanded plant in North Carolina and have since |

| 2 | have close to 250,000 square feet of manufacturing space in |
|----|--|
| 3 | Denver, and employ well over 200 people. |
| 4 | To my knowledge, we are the only company in the |
| 5 | United States that produces steel racks and wire decking, as |
| 6 | well as other wire products under the same roof. Racks now |
| 7 | make up around 75 percent of our business. |
| 8 | I joined Husky five years ago, and I've had the |
| 9 | opportunity to work in all parts of the business, from the |
| 10 | factory floor to sales. I became president three years ago, |
| 11 | and am responsible for all operational aspects of the |
| 12 | business. My father is the CEO. My sister Deborah is the |
| 13 | Vice President of Sales. And my other sister, Rebecca, is |
| 14 | Vice President and General Counsel. |
| 15 | Our company has been family owned and run for |
| 16 | three generations, and the outcome of these cases will be |
| 17 | vital to the survival of our racks business for years to |
| 18 | come. All of the racks that Husky makes are selective |
| 19 | pallet racks, and all of them roll-formed. |
| 20 | We source all our steel domestically. The racks |
| 21 | we make are the high-volume standardized part of the market, |
| 22 | and we have been severely injured by imports from China over |
| 23 | the last few years. |
| 24 | Husky sells to distributors on a spot basis, and |

entered the deck-manufacturing business, as well. We now

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to one of our largest customers under contract. Our

| 1 | distributors have been very vocal in telling us that we have |
|----|--|
| 2 | to lower our prices to compete with the imports of steel |
| 3 | racks from China. They told us that they were losing |
| 4 | business to competing distributors that sell Chinese |
| 5 | product. One of our largest distributors lost major |
| 6 | portions of its business directly due to competition from |
| 7 | Chinese imports. Ultimately we had to provide this customer |
| 8 | with an increased discount so that they could try to stem |
| 9 | the losses and compete with offers for Chinese racks. |
| 10 | Chinese imports have also put price pressure on |
| 11 | our contract business. We do not have an automatic |
| 12 | surcharge or indexing mechanism for steel prices in our |
| 13 | biggest contract. When steel prices began to increase, we |
| 14 | had to try to find a way to pass along these increases, as |
| 15 | steel is far and away our largest cost of production. |
| 16 | After months of negotiations, we were only able |
| 17 | to pass along a fraction of our increased cost to this |
| 18 | contract customer. We believe that the much lower prices of |
| 19 | Chinese racks in the market was one of the factors that |
| 20 | restrained our ability to raise prices commensurate with our |
| 21 | costs. |
| 22 | Three years ago, in 2016, we were operating at |
| 23 | full capacity and had to determine whether to build more |
| 24 | capacity to produce racks or to produce wire. Ultimately we |
| 25 | decided to reject plans to open a new rack plant and opted |

| Τ | to open a new wire production facility instead. |
|----|--|
| 2 | We shelved the rack expansion plans in 2017, even |
| 3 | though demand for racks was continuing to grow. With large |
| 4 | volumes of low-priced Chinese racks rapidly entering the |
| 5 | market, there is simply no way for us to justify expanding |
| 6 | our rack capacity. |
| 7 | The imposition of preliminary antidumping and |
| 8 | countervailing duties has created a path to continued |
| 9 | viability for our company. While low Chinese pricing |
| 10 | continues to distort the market, we are seeing much lower |
| 11 | volumes and some moderation in prices. Our large |
| 12 | distributor with whom we were forced to further discount our |
| 13 | prices tells us things have gotten better for them since the |
| 14 | relief went into effect. But these gains will be only |
| 15 | temporary if orders are not imposed. |
| 16 | We are still providing this important customer |
| 17 | with that discount. It's clear we can't move forward with |
| 18 | restoring prices until this case goes through and there's |
| 19 | more certainty in the market. |
| 20 | The Commission's determination will thus make all |
| 21 | the difference for this customer, our company, and the |
| 22 | domestic industry as a whole. With an affirmative |
| 23 | determination, we will have a chance to compete. Without |
| 24 | it, I'm afraid imports from China will flood back into our |
| 25 | market and use low prices to once again take market share |

| Τ | from domestic producers like Husky. |
|----|---|
| 2 | On behalf of my family, our company, and our |
| 3 | employees, we respectfully ask that the Commission make an |
| 4 | affirmative determination. Thank you. |
| 5 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Mr. Young. |
| 6 | Once again, Elizabeth Drake from Schagrin |
| 7 | Associates for the Petitioner. We would like to move ahead |
| 8 | with a brief PowerPoint presentation that reviews some of |
| 9 | the key facts of record in this case. |
| 10 | (PowerPoint presentation follows:) |
| 11 | As a preliminary matter, I would like to take a |
| 12 | minute just to thank the Commission staff for all of their |
| 13 | hard work on this case in pulling together the record. We |
| 14 | very much appreciate that work and believe that the record |
| 15 | strongly supports relief. |
| 16 | We will briefly discuss the conditions of |
| 17 | competition that typify the domestic market for steel racks |
| 18 | look at the significant volume of subject imports, the |
| 19 | adverse price effects of those imports, the adverse impact |
| 20 | they've had on the domestic industry, and the threat of |
| 21 | further injury in the absence of relief. |
| 22 | Here is a picture of the teardrop or interchange |
| 23 | rack that a number of our witnesses mentioned. On the left |
| 24 | is an excerpt from Ridg-U-Rak's brochure showing its |
| 25 | toundness much. On the might is an august from a breaking |

| _ | Tronk Nat which is was a rarge importer of racks from China. |
|----|--|
| 2 | As you can see, the size of the specification, even the |
| 3 | colors, are exactly the same, and one beam could lock into |
| 4 | another upright interchangeably, and that's by design for |
| 5 | them to operate in that fashion. |
| 6 | And in fact importers advertise this fact. This |
| 7 | is from Nal's website back in the preliminary phase, and it |
| 8 | advertises that its racks are tested and meet standards such |
| 9 | as ANSI and the RMI, Rack Manufacturers Institute, |
| 10 | standards. And they also state that their pallet rack |
| 11 | products are designed for easy integration with other |
| 12 | leading manufacturers. So it's rare that you had a product |
| 13 | that's so interchangeable it's in fact used in the same |
| 14 | systems and same applications. |
| 15 | This is a picture from one of our coalition |
| 16 | members' facilities who couldn't be here today, just to give |
| 17 | the Commission a sense of the scale of some of these |
| 18 | products. These blue uprights here, after coming off the |
| 19 | paint line, and then on the right is a fully assembled rack |
| 20 | system. It looks like a very large warehouse with the blue |
| 21 | uprights and the orange beams. |
| 22 | As our witnesses discussed, the major input into |
| 23 | steel rack production is steel. On the left you'll see |
| 24 | pictures of the slit hot-rolled steel coil that goes into |
| 25 | the roll-form rack, and on the right you'll see pictures of |

| 1 | the structural channels which are some of the inputs that go |
|----|--|
| 2 | into the structural rack. And so the fact that that makes |
| 3 | up such a large portion of the cost makes the domestic |
| 4 | industry highly dependent on the volatile steel market. |
| 5 | The Commission's Prehearing Staff Report confirms |
| 6 | that domestic and Chinese steel racks are highly |
| 7 | interchangeable, with more than 75 percent of all firms |
| 8 | reporting that they are always or frequently |
| 9 | interchangeable. |
| 10 | In addition, when purchasers were asked about the |
| 11 | comparability of domestic and Chinese steel racks across 18 |
| 12 | purchasing factors, a plurality or majority reported that |
| 13 | they were comparable across 13 of those factors. On only 2 |
| 14 | factors did most purchasers report the U.S. product was |
| 15 | better. Only 1 factor did most purchasers report that the |
| 16 | Chinese product was better, and that factor, not |
| 17 | surprisingly, was price. That was a full 80 percent of |
| 18 | purchasers reporting that Chinese racks are lower in price |
| 19 | than domestic. And then on the remaining 2 factors, there |
| 20 | was a mixed response with no clear majority on either side. |
| 21 | We heard this morning from counsel in opposition |
| 22 | that there is a significant difference in lead times between |
| 23 | domestic and imported steel racks, and we believe the record |
| 24 | simply does not support that contention whatsoever. As the |
| 25 | Commission heard from our witnesses this morning, they sell |

| 1 | through distributors. They have distributors all throughout |
|----|--|
| 2 | the country that stock their product. And so the staff |
| 3 | report says the manufacturers lead times is very different |
| 4 | from the actual market lead times from distributors of |
| 5 | domestic racks who can ship it much more quickly and just as |
| 6 | quickly as importers can ship from their warehouses. And |
| 7 | the purchasers confirmed this fact. |
| 8 | A majority, 13 out of 20, purchasers report that |
| 9 | the U.S. is either comparable to China or superior in terms |
| 10 | of availability of steel racks. And an even larger |
| 11 | majority, 14 out of 19, report that the U.S. is comparable |
| 12 | or superior in terms of delivery times. |
| 13 | So there is simply no support for the contention |
| 14 | that these differences explain the increase in Chinese steel |
| 15 | racks at the expense of the domestic industry. |
| 16 | And just to give a sense of the reach of the |
| 17 | domestic industry, this next slide, which is faded, sorry, |
| 18 | shows distribution just of the manufacturing locations of |
| 19 | the domestic manufacturers that responded to the |
| 20 | Commission's questionnaires, but again they also have |
| 21 | distributors all over the country. So an ability to ship |
| 22 | and to ship quickly and to reach markets all across the |
| 23 | United States from this large domestic industry. |
| 24 | Given the high degree of interchangeability |
| 25 | hoticon domostic and Chinago racks, price is a warr |

| 1 | important factor in the market. 22 out of 26 purchasers |
|----|--|
| 2 | report that price is a very important factor. Nearly 85 |
| 3 | percent. And the remainder report that it's at least |
| 4 | somewhat important, and no purchaser reports that price is |
| 5 | not important. |
| 6 | Price was also the most frequently cited |
| 7 | top-three purchasing factor from purchasers, with quality |
| 8 | and availability being the second and the third most |
| 9 | frequently cited. But again, most purchasers reported that |
| 10 | domestic and Chinese racks were comparable with regard to |
| 11 | quality and availability, and price was the one factor where |
| 12 | there was a huge advantage for Chinese racks being much |
| 13 | lower priced than domestic racks. |
| 14 | So all of these conditions of competition |
| 15 | facilitated a rapid increase in low-priced Chinese steel |
| 16 | racks during the Period of Investigation. |
| 17 | Of course the Commission's volume data is |
| 18 | confidential, but just as a preliminary matter we did want |
| 19 | to emphasize that we believe the volumes that have been |
| 20 | reported are greatly under-stated due to the lack of |
| 21 | response from Chinese producers. |
| 22 | At the Commerce Department, Chinese producers |
| 23 | there were 40 different separate rate applications submitted |
| 24 | in the antidumping investigation, and 28 different quantity |
| 25 | and value responses submitted in the countervailing duty |

investigation. By contrast, only 6 Chinese producers have submitted responses to the Commission.

Counsel for those in opposition this morning suggested that this was because of changes to the scope from the initiation of the investigation and through the prelim and this final phase. There were some revisions to the scope, but we don't believe that would come close to explaining this very large discrepancy in response rates, and we would be happy to walk through that maybe in a little bit more detail looking at the individual companies that actually did response to both agencies, posthearing.

In any event, even based on the record that the Commission has, we believe it is clear that the volume of subject imports is significant by any measure. The volume of subject imports is significant absolutely, and increased absolutely. It's significant relative to consumption and production, and it increased relative to consumption and production.

In the interim period, the record shows that the volume of new imports fell sharply. And that, we believe, is due to the petitions, and particularly to the preliminary countervailing duty relief that was imposed in December of last year, and that the Commission's record supports that, and thus the Commission should give less weight to the interim period data as it reflects these post-petition

| 2 | We also believe that in terms of import volume in |
|----|--|
| 3 | the interim period, it's important for the Commission to |
| 4 | take into account that most imports are sold from inventory |
| 5 | and there were not insignificant inventories available at |
| 6 | the end of 2018 to supply additional shipments in interim |
| 7 | 2019 beyond what's available just in new import data or new |
| 8 | shipment data. |
| 9 | In short, we believe that the Commission should |
| 10 | find the volume of subject imports is significant by any |
| 11 | measure. |
| 12 | Turning to price effects, subject imports have |
| 13 | also had adverse price effects. We believe that the final |
| 14 | record will show significant underselling, as well as price |
| 15 | suppression. |
| 16 | In the preliminary phase of this investigation, |
| 17 | the record showed underselling in nearly 74 percent of |
| 18 | comparisons, covering more than 90 percent of import volume. |
| 19 | As Respondent's counsel mentioned this morning, the |
| 20 | Prehearing Staff Report shows more overselling than |
| 21 | underselling, but as we've pointed out in our prehearing |
| 22 | brief we believe that's due to some aberrational data; that |
| 23 | once it is corrected, it will correctly show the full extent |
| 24 | of underselling that existed in the market. |
| 25 | As our witnesses testified, they routinely hear |

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effects.

| 1 | of very, very low Chinese prices. And the rest of the |
|----|--|
| 2 | record supports this, as well. |
| 3 | There were some changes between the pricing |
| 4 | product descriptions in the preliminary phase and the final |
| 5 | phase, but as we explained in our prehearing brief these |
| 6 | changes do not appear to be driving the change in the |
| 7 | underselling data, and we instead think it's a difference in |
| 8 | the kinds of respondentsor the identity of the importers |
| 9 | that are reporting pricing data. |
| 10 | I would also note here that there may be some |
| 11 | level of trade issue with the pricing data, because a number |
| 12 | of the importers act as their own distributors. So their |
| 13 | first sale to an unaffiliated customer would include a |
| 14 | distributor markup. Whereas, our clients and our domestic |
| 15 | producers sales, their first sale may be to a distributor, |
| 16 | and often is to a distributor, and does not include a |
| 17 | distributor markup. |
| 18 | So we can do some work trying to quantify that, |
| 19 | if that would be helpful for the Commission, because that |
| 20 | likely understates the extent of underselling as well. |
| 21 | As I mentioned, the rest of the record supports a |
| 22 | finding of significant underselling. In terms of |
| 23 | purchasers' views on price, 16 out of 20, or 80 percent, |
| 24 | agreed that the Chinese product is priced lower than the |
| 25 | domestic product. And of the 14 purchasers that confirmed |

| 1 | that they'd switched from domestic to Chinese racks, the |
|----|--|
| 2 | vast majority, 13, stated that the Chinese product was |
| 3 | priced lower. And 12 of those 13 said that it was the lower |
| 4 | Chinese prices that were the primary reason for their |
| 5 | switch. |
| 6 | So we think this also supports a finding of |
| 7 | significant underselling. |
| 8 | Even if the Commission does not find significant |
| 9 | underselling, it should find adverse price effects on the |
| 10 | basis of price suppression by subject imports. This graph |
| 11 | shows unit cost of goods sold, and unit selling values for |
| 12 | U.S. shipments by the domestic industry. And it shows very |
| 13 | clearly that as unit costs increased in both years, the |
| 14 | portion that the domestic industry was able to pass on in |
| 15 | terms of final selling prices shrank quite significantly. |
| 16 | In 2016 the industry's ratio of cost of goods |
| 17 | sold to sales revenue was 80.5 percent, and by 2018 that had |
| 18 | hit 87.4 percent. And this was a period during which demand |
| 19 | was growing, so there was really no other reason why the |
| 20 | industry shouldn't have been able to pass on these |
| 21 | increasing prices to such a large extent except for the |
| 22 | growing presence of low-priced subject imports. |
| 23 | These imports also had a significant adverse |
| 24 | impact on the domestic industry during the Period of |
| 25 | Investigation. As our witnesses testified, at the beginning |

| 1 | of the period in 2016 many were optimistic about demand |
|----|--|
| 2 | trends going forward, and thus made a number of investments |
| 3 | in their business, either new plants or added capacity. And |
| 4 | the industry's capacity overall increased by more than 5 |
| 5 | percent from 2016 to 2018. |
| 6 | And even though demand did increase, the domestic |
| 7 | industry was not able to increase its other performance |
| 8 | indicators along with that increase in demand. The domestic |
| 9 | industry's production actually dropped. It's U.S. shipments |
| 10 | were basically flat, a less than one percent increase, and |
| 11 | its employment and hours worked were alsohad very low |
| 12 | increases of less than two percent during the period. |
| 13 | So all of these indicators support a finding of |
| 14 | injury in the sense that the domestic industry's performance |
| 15 | lagged far behind demand. And there was also a strong |
| 16 | negative financial trend for the domestic industry during |
| 17 | the Period of Investigation. |
| 18 | The red line on the right-hand axis is the ratio |
| 19 | of COGs to sales that, as we discussed, was increasing |
| 20 | because of price suppression due to subject imports. And |
| 21 | this had a very significant negative impact on the domestic |
| 22 | industry's operations. The blue line is return on assets, |
| 23 | which fell from over 17 percent to less than 5 percent. The |
| 24 | green line is operating income, which fell from 6.7 percent |
| 25 | of sales to just 1.7 percent. And the orange line is net |

| 1 | income, which also fell from 5.6 percent in 2016 to only 1 |
|----|--|
| 2 | percent of sales in 2018. |
| 3 | So clearly very significant adverse financial |
| 4 | trends, particularly in a market where demand was |
| 5 | increasing, yet Chinese imports increased even more rapidly |
| 6 | and took market share from the domestic industry and |
| 7 | suppressed prices. |
| 8 | We believe all of these elements strongly support |
| 9 | a finding of present material injury, but we believe that |
| 10 | subject imports threaten even further injury if relief is |
| 11 | not imposed. Despite the low response rate from foreign |
| 12 | producers, the Commission's record shows that Chinese |
| 13 | producers' production and exports are large and growing. |
| 14 | And as a number of us have already discussed, |
| 15 | existing duties on Chinese hot-rolled steel in the U.S. |
| 16 | market incentivized downstream exports, and this includes |
| 17 | not only Section 232 duties, but an antidumping order on |
| 18 | hot-rolled steel from China with very high margins of 60 to |
| 19 | 90 percent range. |
| 20 | The Section 301 duties that are currently in |
| 21 | effect will not prevent future increases in imports. First |
| 22 | of all, we don't know how long those duties will be in |
| 23 | effect. They can be eliminated at any time. And second of |
| 24 | all, the 25 percent duty rate is lower not only than most of |
| 25 | the preliminary antidumping and subsidy margins that |

| 1 | Commerce found, but also lower than the combined duty rate |
|----|--|
| 2 | that Chinese hot-rolled steel faces in the U.S. market. And |
| 3 | so that differential, that incentive to focus on the |
| 4 | downstream rack product, persists even with the Section 301 |
| 5 | duties in place. |
| 6 | MS. DRAKE: And as our witnesses testified, the |
| 7 | growth and demand of that has been seen during the period of |
| 8 | investigation, that rate is expected to slow in 2019 and |
| 9 | demand may actually contract in 2020 based on their |
| 10 | projections. So a domestic industry that's been denied the |
| 11 | opportunity to participate fully in growing demand will be |
| 12 | even more vulnerable as demand starts to slow, given their |
| 13 | already very tenuous financial performance and the |
| 14 | investments they've made that they haven't been able to reap |
| 15 | the full rewards that they expected. For all these |
| 16 | reasons, we respectfully ask the Commission to reach an |
| 17 | affirmative determination. Thank you very much. |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Thanks to all of you for |
| 19 | appearing today on this morning's panel. We will now begin |
| 20 | Commissioner questions with Commissioner Schmidtlein. |
| 21 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, thank you very |
| 22 | much, Chairman Johanson. I'd like to thank all of you for |
| 23 | being here today as well. And I wanna start with the |
| 24 | question about lead times. And I know Ms. Drake, you |
| 25 | addressed this I think in talking about the slides and I |

1 wonder if you could revisit this. On Page 8 and 9 of the respondents' brief, they 2 cite a number of purchasers who have reported that lead time 3 4 or delivery time was a problem for domestic suppliers. And 5 so I know that you were -- if you could just address that 6 argument more fully. And I do realize that the staff report 7 shows that purchasers, when asking to compare on different factors, found the U.S. and Chinese product to be comparable 8 9 or superior in some cases with regard to delivery time. So, 10 if you can respond to the argument and address the 11 discrepancy there between what's being reported and what we 12 have in the survey. 13 MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Commissioner Schmidtlein. 14 Yes, we were discussing this yesterday, and I think while 15 it's certainly true that there will be isolated examples 16 where all of the components of a rack system are not 17 delivered on the schedule that was agreed to, the industry works very hard to achieve high on-time delivery rates. It 18 is an important factor that all of our domestic producers 19 2.0 try to meet. I don't know if Mr. Young or Mr. Quist might 21 wanna address that. 22 MR. YOUNG: Sure, this is Ryan Young with Husky. The corner of our business is Quick Ship is what we call it, 23 24 and we ship in forty-eight hours, and these are the

standardized size uprights and beams we're talking about

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1 here with the Chinese imports. So I would say our business, it fluctuates between 25- to sometimes even 50% of the rack 2 business we do, are the parts we're talking about here. And 3 4 I don't know if I could schedule my entire factory with 5 these parts, I would do it. So availability of these parts 6 with low lead time is not a problem. MR. QUIST: Yes, Eric Quist with Speedrack. Yeah, we sell most of -- well, like Ryan said, 20-25% 8 9 through distributors and their stocking distributors and a 10 lot of this lead time, we have to understand that the beams that they are importing are very, very standard. They're 11 very easy to produce. I could produce those 5,000 a week, 12 13 maybe 10,000 a week. I could start tomorrow if I had to. 14 So we have warehouses full of these beams that are 96" 15 beams, 120" beams, 108" beams, and they're really the easy part of the rack to produce, so lead times are not, for the 16 17 type of stuff that they import, does not affect us. 18 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: So could you expand on 19 that a little bit? So are they just importing beams? Or are they importing the other components, as well, that take 20 additional time to manufacture? 21 22 MS. DRAKE: We see them offering imports of all 23 kinds of components with the uprights and the beams. I

more heavily into beams than domestic producers because that

think there is a sense that they started into the market

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- is the high volume, sort of low-labor, easy quick piece to
- ship. But they're certainly not restricted to beams. They,
- 3 I think, kind of entered the market starting with more beams
- 4 than other domestic producers would because they wanted to
- 5 seize that market share. But they carry the full line of
- 6 all different kinds of components.
- 7 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: So this is a side
- 8 question here. But in talking about these components, when
- 9 you are competing for sales, is it usually on a complete
- 10 set? Whether it's assembled or not assembled. Or are you
- 11 competing for, say, sales of beams within a set? And then a
- different purchase order may include the other components?
- 13 MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson from Steel King. We
- 14 primarily are providing complete sets.
- 15 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: And are they assembled
- or they, they don't come assembled?
- 17 MR. ANDERSON: They do not. They're assembled on
- 18 site.
- 19 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: They're assembled on
- 20 site. So in the staff report, there's a distinction between
- 21 components and complete sets. So can you explain that a
- 22 little bit then, what we're talking about?
- MS. DRAKE: So I think a lot of your
- 24 distributors, as I understand it, will have inventory of
- your components that they can provide just a single

| 1 | component or a set of components. But the direct orders |
|-----|--|
| 2 | that you're taking are for systems, is that correct? |
| 3 | MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson, Steel King. Yes, |
| 4 | it's true. We have dealers that stock both major types of |
| 5 | components that can fill orders very quickly out of that. |
| 6 | We also, as a company, maintain a fairly large inventory of |
| 7 | both components and stock for our dealers to buy and fulfill |
| 8 | orders and we ship those generally in forty-eight hours. |
| 9 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. Mr. Young? |
| 10 | MR. YOUNG: I just wanted to clarify. I'm sorry, |
| 11 | Ryan Young with Husky. We also do take orders for more |
| 12 | complex systems and sometimes the distributor is able to mix |
| 13 | and match uprights with our beams and things like that. |
| 14 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: So, are imports ever |
| 15 | mixed and matched with domestic beams then? |
| 16 | MR. YOUNG: Yes. |
| 17 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: It does happen? Okay. |
| 18 | Okay. And so would anyone else like to speak to this |
| 19 | question about lead time? Any other of the witnesses? |
| 20 | Okay. Mr. Olson, did you |
| 21 | MR. OLSON: Yes, Dave Olson. By and large, our |
| 22 | entire Quick Ship program, we do not hold inventory at our |
| 23 | facility. We produce make-to-order projects, large-scale, |
| 24 | fully-engineered projects from our warehouse. And those can |
|) 5 | have wariable load times. Jargely driven by weather get a |

| Τ | iot of engineering design work. You have professional |
|----|---|
| 2 | engineering reviews and seals that have to be done and |
| 3 | things like that. That drives the lead time on many |
| 4 | large-scale projects. |
| 5 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. |
| 6 | MR. OLSON: But on the day-to-day, what we refer |
| 7 | to as commodity-type business, where small warehouses or |
| 8 | manufacturers or clients are using standard 8-foot, 9-foot, |
| 9 | type beams and 12- to 16-foot, 20-foot type frames, those |
| 10 | are items that our stocking distributors have significant |
| 11 | volumes of inventory for. Those lead times are generally |
| 12 | short and competitive. It is the special projects so if |
| 13 | a distributor's got a client that has a fully-engineered |
| 14 | system, where he's doing a big warehouse and has got to get |
| 15 | municipal approvals, building official reviews, requires PE |
| 16 | seals, those are longer lead time types of projects. |
| 17 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: And do you find that |
| 18 | you're competing against subject imports for those types of |
| 19 | projects? |
| 20 | MR. OLSON: Not in general. It's more then |
| 21 | commodity-type business that our stocking distributors, |
| 22 | where they're selling those standard 8-foot, 9-foot type |
| 23 | beams out into the market, more of a commodity-type |
| 24 | business. And they have significant levels of inventory for |
| 25 | that I and time!a generally not an iggue in that market |

| 1 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. |
|----|--|
| 2 | MS. DRAKE: This is Elizabeth Drake. I would |
| 3 | just add that while a lot of the competition has been in the |
| 4 | way that Mr. Olson described, importers like UMH do |
| 5 | advertise that they provide services. Their brochure says, |
| 6 | "Let's build your warehouse," so they do have the ability to |
| 7 | compete in that part of the market as well. |
| 8 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. And for any of |
| 9 | the other companies here, is what Mr. Olson said, generally |
| 10 | applicable to what you are experiencing in the market? Just |
| 11 | for the record, you might wanna just identify yourself. |
| 12 | MR. QUIST: Eric Quist, Speedrack. Yes, that's |
| 13 | exactly how our company operates, the same way. |
| 14 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. |
| 15 | MR. QUIST: Yeah, through large products and then |
| 16 | Speed Ship programs to our distributors and that, and lead |
| 17 | times are not affected. |
| 18 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. Mr. Young? |
| 19 | MR. YOUNG: This is Ryan Young. Yes, same with |
| 20 | us, exact same business model. |
| 21 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Same? Mr. Neal? |
| 22 | MR. NEAL: This is Paul Neal with UNARCO. Yes, I |
| 23 | would agree with |
| 24 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. And Mr. |
| 25 | Anderson? |

| 1 | MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson, yeah, same model. |
|----|---|
| 2 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Same? So all of you |
| 3 | here are capable of producing customized, made-to-order |
| 4 | racks for a big project that requires engineering? Okay. |
| 5 | MS. DRAKE: And I would just add that at the |
| 6 | preliminary staff conference, Mr. Bartlett testified that |
| 7 | they were also able to do that. |
| 8 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, all right, |
| 9 | great. Okay. I don't have too much time left, but let me |
| 10 | just switch gears a little bit. Because this question about |
| 11 | the ability to pass on raw material increases seem to be a |
| 12 | big issue in the case. So I wonder if you all and I know |
| 13 | we've heard the testimony that there are not automatic |
| 14 | provisions, or not provisions in your contracts to |
| 15 | immediately pass on those, they're not automatic, there's |
| 16 | not an index or such. |
| 17 | Could you talk about how that's done typically? |
| 18 | And historically, are you able to pass along the entire |
| 19 | increase in your raw materials or other costs? |
| 20 | MS. DRAKE: I'll let the witnesses answer, sorry. |
| 21 | But just to clarify, there are some contracts that have |
| 22 | indexes and some contracts that do not. And the vast |
| 23 | majority is spot, but if folks wanna talk about how that |
| 24 | works. |
| 25 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. |

| 1 | MR. OLSON: Dave Olson with Ridg-U-Rak. Yes, |
|----|--|
| 2 | the, pretty much entirely all of our index projects where |
| 3 | we're able to pass on steel increases, are under a contract |
| 4 | where it's pegged to a publicly available index called the |
| 5 | American Metal Market. It's the most commonly used index |
| 6 | for hot-rolled steel in the U.S. And those contracts, we're |
| 7 | able to pass through cost increases. We usually make |
| 8 | adjustments on a quarterly basis, so there's volatility and |
| 9 | changes within a quarter, but by and large, follows the |
| 10 | trend. |
| 11 | On the day-to-day stocking programs, the |
| 12 | commodity-type markets, there are no indexes on those. |
| 13 | Also, many of the projects that are generally inside of a |
| 14 | three-month delivery window, there's no mechanism for |
| 15 | indexing or adjusting for steel in those cases, as well. |
| 16 | Those are mostly fixed-based bids on a |
| 17 | custom-engineered-type project. |
| 18 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: And so would you |
| 19 | expect to be able to pass along the entire increase in raw |
| 20 | materials on those types of projects? |
| 21 | MR. OLSON: Not when it's a competitive bid with |
| 22 | standardized-type products, where if we were to try to pass |
| 23 | on our increase in steel costs, we would not be competitive. |
| 24 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Because of the imports |
| 25 | is what you're |

| 1 | MR. OLSON: Correct. |
|----|--|
| 2 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: is what you're |
| 3 | arguing. And what about the competition with the other |
| 4 | domestic suppliers? Does that impact your ability to pass |
| 5 | along |
| 6 | MR. OLSON: We're competitive with U.S. domestic |
| 7 | suppliers that are, by and large, experiencing the same |
| 8 | steel costs volatility. |
| 9 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Right. Okay. We can |
| 10 | come back. My time is expired. Thank you. |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Kearns. |
| 12 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Thank you all again for |
| 13 | appearing before us today. I guess I wanted to address the |
| 14 | subject import volume issues first. Ms. Drake, in your |
| 15 | brief, you argue that subject import volume is significantly |
| 16 | understated, based on the fact that Chinese producers and |
| 17 | exporters reported higher aggregate export volumes in |
| 18 | Commerce's AD and CVD investigations. How do you propose |
| 19 | that we fix that? |
| 20 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Commissioner Kearns, |
| 21 | Elizabeth Drake, Schagrin Associates. I'm not sure how to |
| 22 | fix it, other than by getting a better response rate from |
| 23 | Chinese producers or from importers of Chinese product. We, |
| 24 | in our comments on the draft questionnaires, identified |
| 25 | quite a number of importers that were clearly importing |

| Τ. | chinese product. Most of those have still not responded. |
|----|--|
| 2 | know staff have done a wonderful job trying to follow up and |
| 3 | get better responses. |
| 4 | I guess at the end of the day, if there is a lack |
| 5 | of cooperation, what we would say, Number One, is we think |
| 6 | the record that the Commission has, supports an affirmative |
| 7 | volume finding. But Number Two, it certainly shouldn't be |
| 8 | the case that apparently low market share would be construed |
| 9 | against us, the petitioners, that the Commission should not |
| 10 | reward foreign producers or importers for failing to |
| 11 | cooperate by reaching a negative volume determination. |
| 12 | So while it's not quite as far as saying you |
| 13 | should apply adverse inferences, we don't think that that |
| 14 | should count against us that foreign producers and importers |
| 15 | failed to cooperate, especially when we, you know, worked |
| 16 | hard to try to identify as many as we could for the |
| 17 | Commission. |
| 18 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you. And you |
| 19 | had said in your opening, you responded to what the |
| 20 | respondents had said in their opening, about changes to the |
| 21 | scope. Can you elaborate any further now? You said that |
| 22 | basically that would only account for a very small share. |
| 23 | If there's more you can say now or post-hearing, that's be |
| 24 | helpful. |
| 25 | MS DRAKE: We'll have to do that post-hearing |

| 1 | because that was the first time that I heard that argument |
|----|--|
| 2 | this morning, that is, was the scope that explained the |
| 3 | difference in the response rate. We may be able to identify |
| 4 | individuals that responded at Commerce that were clearly |
| 5 | producing out-of-scope product, but we don't think that |
| 6 | that's going to account for this very large discrepancy we |
| 7 | see between the participation of Commerce when it was in |
| 8 | Chinese respondents' interest to participate and the |
| 9 | participation here at the Commission. |
| 10 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you. And some |
| 11 | of this is gonna overlap with the questions Commissioner |
| 12 | Schmidtlein had, but I wanted to address price suppression. |
| 13 | With regard to the industry's cost-price squeeze, |
| 14 | respondents argue that the most likely explanation for the |
| 15 | domestic industries' declining profitability is that |
| 16 | surcharge mechanisms typically operate with a time lag, |
| 17 | especially when the materials' price moves so abruptly and |
| 18 | dramatically as happened during the POI; can y'all respond |
| 19 | to that? Sounds like part of the response is, well, you |
| 20 | don't, most of these are spot sales. Anything else you'd |
| 21 | wanna say about that. |
| 22 | MS. DRAKE: Yeah, so thank you, Commissioner. |
| 23 | But the main response is that most of the industry sales are |
| 24 | spot sales where there is no sort of surcharge or indexing |
| 25 | mechanism and also even where there are contracts, not all |

| 1 | contracts have that indexing mechanism, as Mr. Young |
|----|--|
| 2 | testified. But if anyone else wants to talk about how the |
| 3 | prices are set, whether it's based in those spot markets or |
| 4 | contracts with surcharge mechanisms, they're welcome then to |
| 5 | |
| 6 | MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson. Almost none of our |
| 7 | projects have a tie to an index. Almost all of our spot |
| 8 | deals |
| 9 | MR. YOUNG: This is Ryan Young with Husky. We |
| 10 | have a cents-per-pound surcharge and we do our best to pass |
| 11 | through all the costs, but we got specific push-back because |
| 12 | of Chinese imports. And also our largest customers of |
| 13 | fixed-price contract, and we, as I mentioned in my |
| 14 | testimony, we negotiated with them for months and finally |
| 15 | got through a very small, single-digit percent increase in |
| 16 | price. |
| 17 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you. And I |
| 18 | guess, one interesting point here, going back to what you |
| 19 | said earlier, so with spot sales, of course, you don't have |
| 20 | indexing, obviously. And you're saying that that's where |
| 21 | you all compete most directly with subject imports as well, |
| 22 | right? Is in the spot sales? |
| 23 | MR. NEAL: This is Paul Neal with UNARCO. That |
| | |

COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. So this is kind of a

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would be correct.

1 just a more broad question. But, could one expect domestic prices to keep pace fully with the rising costs over the 2 period, given that there was only relatively modest growth 3 4 in apparent consumption? 5 Or maybe, probably the way to ask that, too, is, 6 historically, before the three-year period that we look at, 7 have there been big changes in your raw material costs and were you able to immediately convert that into changes to 8 9 the price of your product? Anything you can submit on the 10 record on that, but also just, you know, more generally here if you can help us understand, you know, how, before the 11 12 POI, were you able to immediately change your prices based 13 on raw material changes? 14 MS. DRAKE: Yeah, thank you, Commissioner Kearns. 15 Perhaps we could pull together some information post-hearing 16 on historic trends, in terms of maybe when the 201 was in effect or something of that nature. But I would just say 17 that it's not necessary that 100% of the price suppression 18 19 be due to subject imports. There may be lags, there may be 20 other market trends that caused the domestic industry to not 21 always be to pass along 100% of its costs, but I think the 22 extent of the cost-price squeeze that we saw over this period coinciding with the increase in imports at low 23 24 prices supports a finding that they contributed 25 significantly to price suppression.

| 2 | thoughts on that? Based on your experience in the industry |
|----|---|
| 3 | how is this period different in terms of responsiveness to |
| 4 | raw material price changes? |
| 5 | MR. OLSON: Mr. Kearns, this is Dave Olson with |
| 6 | Ridg-U-Rak. I would say that in the majority of my |
| 7 | twenty-seven years in this industry, we're almost always |
| 8 | able to pass on steel. We all buy steel from various |
| 9 | service centers and mills. We buy most of our steel from |
| 10 | the mills directly. |
| 11 | But we're all competing in the same steel market |
| 12 | and whether it's imported steel or domestic steel, but when |
| 13 | you have import pressures, pricing pressure on those costs, |
| 14 | it's very difficult in most cases to pass on, unless you |
| 15 | have an indexing mechanism in a contract, we're all in the |
| 16 | same boat. |
| 17 | And, so until the years where imports became a |
| 18 | significant issue in this country, we were able to pass on |
| 19 | those costs by and large and remain competitive with one |
| 20 | another. But imports came into the U.S., that game changed |
| 21 | quickly. Thank you. |
| 22 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you. And yes, |
| 23 | Ms. Drake, if you could follow up, and I think the 201's a |
| 24 | good example, that might be helpful. Thank you. |
| 25 | Turning to the product-pricing issue. Assuming, |

COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. Anyone else have any

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1 for the sake of argument that the pricing data does not change from its current state, what is your case for 2 underselling and price suppression? How should we think 3 4 about that? 5 MS. DRAKE: Excuse me. Thank you, Commissioner 6 Kearns. Assuming the pricing product data does not change, 7 we, first of all, do think there's a strong record of price suppression. The Commission has in the past found that, 8 9 even in cases where there is not enough to find significant 10 underselling, those imports could nonetheless suppress prices by perhaps creating a ceiling on prices. We don't 11 12 think that's the situation here, but that is intellectually 13 possible and legally defensible finding and the record here 14 does strongly support price suppression. 15 With respect to underselling, as I mentioned in 16 my presentation, there may be a level of trade issue that is 17 understating the amount of underselling in the sense that the importers act as their own distributors and their prices 18 19 include a distributors' markup, whereas the domestic 20 producers' reported prices do not. We can see if we can try 21 to quantify that post-hearing to see if that might explain 22 some of the apparent overselling and show that actually, when you go at a distributor-to-distributor basis, that 23 24 would be underselling in the market and that's why the 25 domestic industry has lost sales.

| 1 | And then all of the qualitative responses from |
|----|--|
| 2 | purchasers in terms of Chinese product being lower priced, |
| 3 | switching to Chinese product because of lower prices, all of |
| 4 | the price offers that have come directly to our clients that |
| 5 | are uniformly far below their prices, we think all support a |
| 6 | finding of significant underselling. |
| 7 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you. And just, |
| 8 | let me so first of all, on the level of trade issue, how |
| 9 | would you be able to quantify that? |
| 10 | MS. DRAKE: Well, we can work with our clients to |
| 11 | see if they have a sense of what a typical distributor |
| 12 | markup might be. We can also look at the importers' |
| 13 | responses in terms of the average unit values of their |
| 14 | imports and the average unit values of their shipments. |
| 15 | Maybe be able to identify which are the ones that are |
| 16 | themselves distributors versus shipping to a distributor and |
| 17 | see if we can find some support for this idea that their |
| 18 | pricing reflects a different level of trade, so we'll work |
| 19 | on that. |
| 20 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. And do you expect |
| 21 | this is true of all of the distributors? |
| 22 | MS. DRAKE: Of importers? |
| 23 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: All the importers or |
| 24 | distributors, yes. |
| 25 | MS. DRAKE: Off the top of my head, I can't give |

| Τ | you a good response to that, but maybe we can break them out |
|----|--|
| 2 | and try to get at that post-hearing. |
| 3 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. And then just to |
| 4 | follow up on your point about how we can find suppression |
| 5 | even without underselling. So you're saying, even if the |
| 6 | imported prices tend to be above the U.S. price, the U.S. |
| 7 | price may not be able to go above the imported price and so |
| 8 | that's suppression? |
| 9 | MS. DRAKE: Yes, Commissioner, that's |
| 10 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: But wouldn't you still see |
| 11 | the oversellinghow do I say thatdiminishing? I mean you |
| 12 | would think that the prices of the two would end up we |
| 13 | would it the ceiling, right? Wouldn't you expect that? |
| 14 | MS. DRAKE: Yeah, I'd have to look at the data. |
| 15 | I mean I guess the case I'm thinking of, I think it was wind |
| 16 | towers where the Commission made a finding of this nature |
| 17 | that there wasn't enough evidence of underselling, but there |
| 18 | was enough evidence of price suppression, so we can look at |
| 19 | the trends |
| 20 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. |
| 21 | MS. DRAKE: reflect that. |
| 22 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Thank you very much. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Thanks again to all of you |
| 24 | for appearing here today. I'm gonna follow up a bit on an |
| 25 | issue that was raised by Commissioner Kearns. Respondent |

| 1 | argues that subject imports oversold more than undersold the |
|----|--|
| 2 | domestic like product with respect to Product 1, the pricing |
| 3 | product with the largest sales quantity coverage. And this |
| 4 | is discussed at Page 27 of their brief and also at Table 5-3 |
| 5 | of the staff report. |
| 6 | Given that most of the reported pricing data was |
| 7 | for Product 1, should we place extra weight on the pricing |
| 8 | data for this product? And also, how do these data support |
| 9 | significant underselling? |
| 10 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Chairman Johanson. We |
| 11 | believe that the Commission should look at all of the |
| 12 | pricing data before it. The one concern that we have that |
| 13 | we raised in our post-hearing brief is that the data is |
| 14 | being skewed by very aberrational prices reported by one |
| 15 | importer. And we appreciate that Commission staff have been |
| 16 | working with that importer to confirm those prices, but a |
| 17 | number of items that we pointed out in our prehearing brief |
| 18 | indicate that there may be additional follow-up that's |
| 19 | needed to make sure those prices are actually correct. |
| 20 | We also, as I was discussing with Commissioner |
| 21 | Kearns, believe that there's a difference in level of trade, |
| 22 | that that is understating the amount of underselling that |
| 23 | has occurred and we will work to try to quantify that and |
| 24 | see what would be a more apples-to-apples comparison, would |
| 25 | it actually show the level of underselling that not only |

| 1 | domestic producers uniformly have experienced in the market |
|----|--|
| 2 | but that purchasers themselves confirm has to provide the |
| 3 | market during the period. |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Thank you, Ms. Drake. Yes, |
| 5 | clarification on that issue would be particularly helpful |
| 6 | for us, so any further clarification that you all can |
| 7 | provide would be beneficial. |
| 8 | Something of a similar nature was raised by the |
| 9 | respondents. How do you respond to the respondents' |
| 10 | position that non-subject imports are significantly |
| 11 | understated on this record as Frazier Industrial's data are |
| 12 | missing, as discussed at Page 7 of the respondent brief. |
| 13 | Respondents contend that this gap in data also means a |
| 14 | market share for subject imports is overstated. |
| 15 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Chairman. While it's |
| 16 | possible that non-subject imports are understated by one |
| 17 | importer that's missing, we don't think that is near to the |
| 18 | scale by which subject imports are understated by the fact |
| 19 | that we have so few responses from known importers and known |
| 20 | foreign producers. |
| 21 | And it may be helpful for some of our witnesses |
| 22 | to talk about the competition that they see from imports |
| 23 | from Mexico, which is the non-subject country that |
| 24 | respondents have focused on, versus the competition that |
| 25 | they see from imports from China to try to address this |

- 1 question.
- 2 MR. ANDERSON: This is Jay Anderson with Steel
- 3 King. In my experience, I have very few reports ever of
- 4 losing a project in our case to a Mexican importer. We hear
- 5 a lot more about Chinese imports.
- 6 MR. OLSON: This is Dave Olson, to dove-tail into
- 7 that response, I cannot name one project that we've lost to
- 8 Mexican imports in my career. It's almost non-existent for
- 9 us. Recognizing that we're in Pennsylvania and that we
- 10 compete more in a regional basis than we would along the
- 11 Mexico/U.S. border, but I hear of no competitive pricing
- 12 pressures in the United States coming from Mexico.
- 13 MR. NEAL: Thank you. This is Ryan Neal with
- 14 Husky and I completely agree with my two colleagues. I have
- 15 no knowledge of any Mexican imports or any pricing pressure
- 16 thereof.
- 17 MR. QUIST: Eric Quist for Speedrack. I agree
- 18 with Mr. Olson. In my 17 years I have never run up against
- 19 a Mexican manufacturer. I've lost jobs to all these
- 20 gentlemen here in the room but I've never lost, I haven't
- 21 even seen a quote from a Mexican manufacturer, only from the
- 22 Chinese.
- 23 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: And that all is the case, the
- 24 Mexican share of the market is not insignificant.
- MS. DRAKE: I believe that may be because of the

| 1 | difference in the pricing of the imports from Mexico and the |
|----|--|
| 2 | pricing of the Chinese Imports that the Chinese are so much |
| 3 | lower priced that they really do create this pressure that |
| 4 | everyone at these tables ahs felt and you also have the fact |
| 5 | that to the extent that the Mexican imports are being |
| 6 | imported by Domestic Producers they don't want to injure |
| 7 | themselves or injure the Domestic Industry whereas that's |
| 8 | certainly not the case with Chinese Imports that there's no |
| 9 | real connection with the Domestic Industry that would keep |
| 10 | them from injuring the Domestic Industry or reduce the |
| 11 | amount of that injury. |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Alright, thanks for your |
| 13 | responses. Now moving onto a different issue. Respondent |
| 14 | takes the position that Subject Imports and their change in |
| 15 | their share of consumption are so small as to make any claim |
| 16 | of a causal link to material injury which they claim would |
| 17 | be implausible on its face and this is discussed at page 15 |
| 18 | of their brief. Could you all please respond to this |
| 19 | contention of the Respondents? |
| 20 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Chairman. We think that |
| 21 | the increase in imports is significant on its face including |
| 22 | the increase in market share even given what we believe is |
| 23 | the understated nature of that market share data, the fact |
| 24 | that we have so many Domestic Producers that have joined |
| 25 | together to petition for relief from these imports so they |

| 1 | certainly don't think that this loss in market share is |
|----|--|
| 2 | insignificant and particularly that had occurred while |
| 3 | demand was rising and there were no other causes that would |
| 4 | account for all of the injury the Domestic Industry has |
| 5 | suffered we think shows that that volume, that market share |
| 6 | is significant enough for an affirmative determination, |
| 7 | especially when you pair it with the adverse price effects |
| 8 | that those imports have had. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Thanks, Ms. Drake. I'm going |
| 10 | to repeat another statement of the Respondents which is |
| 11 | similar but I would appreciate it if you would respond to |
| 12 | this as well. Do Subject Imports have "minimal if any" |
| 13 | market power in the United States as the Respondent contends |
| 14 | in page 14 of their brief? |
| 15 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Chairman. No. They have |
| 16 | much more than minimal impact on the market. I mean, first |
| 17 | of all there is no de minimis threshold for an affirmative |
| 18 | volume finding the Commission has reached affirmative |
| 19 | determinations on even smaller market shares in the past and |
| 20 | even the courts have said that especially with |
| 21 | commodity-type products that are very interchangeable and |
| 22 | that compete largely on price, even a very small gain in |
| 23 | market share can be very injurious to the Domestic Industry |
| 24 | and we believe that is the case here, given the strong |
| 25 | record of high interchangeability, strong price competition |

| Τ | and that increase in market share came directly at the |
|----|--|
| 2 | expense of the Domestic Industry as demand was growing. |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Thank you. Moving on to yet |
| 4 | another issue. The Coalition has noted that 42.3 percent of |
| 5 | purchasers reported usually or always buying the lowest |
| 6 | price product? This is at page 9 of their brief. The rest, |
| 7 | the majority of purchasers reported that they only sometimes |
| 8 | purchased lower priced product, as shown at Table 216 of the |
| 9 | Staff Report. |
| 10 | Don't these data suggest the importance of |
| 11 | non-price factors in the sale of steel racks? |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Thank you, Chairman. No we |
| 13 | believe they support the finding of the importance of price, |
| 14 | to have more than 40 percent of your purchasers say they |
| 15 | usually or always buy the lowest price product we think is a |
| 16 | very significant amount, demonstrating how important price |
| 17 | is. |
| 18 | Even those who say they usually or always buy the |
| 19 | lowest price product at least admit that they sometime buy |
| 20 | the lowest price product so we think that combined with all |
| 21 | of the other purchaser responses about the importance of |
| 22 | price and being the most frequently named top 3 purchasing |
| 23 | factor, support a finding that price is actually very |
| 24 | important in the market. |
| 25 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: What would be some of the |

| 1 | non-price factors which might drive sales? |
|----|--|
| 2 | MS. DRAKE: So the ones that the |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: If the products that are |
| 4 | completely interchangeable or are largely interchangeable. |
| 5 | MS. DRAKE: The ones that the purchasers |
| 6 | mentioned as their other two top three purchasing factors |
| 7 | were quality and availability. But quality we believe is |
| 8 | comparable and that's what the purchasers report and also on |
| 9 | availability they report comparability. |
| 10 | So while on any individual transaction there may |
| 11 | be some non-price differences as well as some price |
| 12 | differences. Overall, it appears to be price that's driving |
| 13 | a lot of the purchasing decisions and that's what we |
| 14 | understand from the producers as well that once you've got |
| 15 | the specs it really comes down to price and pretty much |
| 16 | anyone playing in the market can meet the specs. |
| 17 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Alright, thank you for your |
| 18 | response. My time is about to expire so we will now return |
| 19 | to Commission Williamson. |
| 20 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Thank you, Mr. |
| 21 | Chairman. I want to thank all the witnesses for coming |
| 22 | today and presenting their testimony. |
| 23 | I know we've already discussed this question of |
| 24 | lead time but I want to go back to it for a second. The |
| 25 | record suggests that the Domestic Industry importers operate |

| 2 | lower percentage sales from inventory than do importers. |
|----|--|
| 3 | This is Staff Report page 2-14. |
| 4 | So I want to know what does it suggest that they |
| 5 | operate differently and what would be that difference? |
| 6 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Commissioner Williamson. |
| 7 | I believe it's because, as our witnesses testified, their |
| 8 | distributors are the one who are doing the quick shipments |
| 9 | so it wouldn't make sense for a company to hold all of its |
| 10 | inventory in Pennsylvania for every shipment. |
| 11 | They send it out to their distributors so they |
| 12 | can hold it closer to the customers whereas the importers |
| 13 | already have their distribution warehouses as Mr. Bartlett |
| 14 | testified in the preliminary Staff Conference but that's |
| 15 | their business model that they already have their |
| 16 | distribution warehouses. |
| 17 | Here, it's just a step removed that the |
| 18 | distribution warehouses are not necessarily owned by the |
| 19 | domestic manufacturers but their distributors are holding |
| 20 | that product for a quick delivery and they have it built |
| 21 | into their production schedules, to keep those distributors |
| 22 | supplied so they can make those quick deliveries. |
| 23 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: So is it that the |
| 24 | distributors are the ones who are operating just in time and |
| 25 | they have to plan? Does anyone want to comment on that? |

differently since that the Domestic Industry has a much

| 1 | MR. OLSON: Commissioner Williamson, thank you. |
|----|--|
| 2 | This is Dave Olson with Ridg-U-Rack. Our company is modeled |
| 3 | where we do not build inventory for what we consider |
| 4 | standardized commodity type products, as I mentioned earlier |
| 5 | and our lead times are generally driven by projects. |
| 6 | For an example, a Wal-Mart Distribution Center |
| 7 | one million foot D.C. there requires professional |
| 8 | engineering. Those things take a lot of time but we have |
| 9 | reservations. Most of our large stocking dealers have |
| 10 | reservation orders that are placed three to four months in |
| 11 | advance so every two weeks, for example, I'm shipping stock |
| 12 | to a stocking distributor. That's already in my production |
| 13 | schedule. |
| 14 | So yes, our lead times might be stated to be |
| 15 | longer than three to four weeks at times but our stocking |
| 16 | distributors have direct entry into our production schedule |
| 17 | by placing those orders well in advance. So we're sending |
| 18 | that product out, stocking those commodity products in |
| 19 | multiple stock distributor locations. Those stocking |
| 20 | distributors are competing in that 48 hour delivery window |
| 21 | timeframe that many of the importers that have Chinese |
| 22 | product in their warehouses and they successfully compete on |
| 23 | a regular basis on lead-time. I never hear them losing, |
| 24 | from our stocking distributors, losing projects because of |
| 25 | lead time. It's always price. |

| 1 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay. Anyone else want |
|----|--|
| 2 | to comment on that? |
| 3 | MR. QUIST: Yes, so our model for our company, |
| 4 | this is Eric Quist with Speedrack Products Group is similar |
| 5 | to Mr. Olson's. We reserve a certain amount of weight for |
| 6 | our stocking dealerships to use and we always have something |
| 7 | in the pipeline for them. We do produce some of their stock |
| 8 | weight and do warehouse it for them so they can get it in a |
| 9 | hurry. We need 48 hours. |
| 10 | We also stock at our plant's speedship program |
| 11 | that can be delivered generally in two days, sometimes as |
| 12 | much as five days but we do have stock that we do produce on |
| 13 | a daily basis and we keep enough in the pipeline for the |
| 14 | dealers so that they can get it generally within 4-5 weeks |
| 15 | at the most but they're always stocking and they are always |
| 16 | reserving weight for them to make sure that they have that |
| 17 | capacity at our plant so lead times are very good through |
| 18 | the stocking dealers. |
| 19 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: We talked about |
| 20 | project. Has there been any shift over this Period of |
| 21 | Investigation of say the percentage of sales are going to |
| 22 | the large projects versus the commodity has there just |
| 23 | been a steady growth in new projects? |
| 24 | MR. OLSON: Dave Olson with Ridg-U-Rack. I would |
| 25 | say that our stock order volume business if I had to nick |

| 1 | one segment from 2016 to 2018 it took a pretty significant |
|----|--|
| 2 | hit in buying as where as our engineering projects remain |
| 3 | quite steady and actually grew some quite robust because of |
| 4 | the ecommerce and logistics expansion that's in the |
| 5 | industry. |
| 6 | Our day-to-day, what we again consider, I hate |
| 7 | using the word commodity but the standardized products that |
| 8 | stocking distributors are stocking took significant |
| 9 | reductions in the POI. |
| 10 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Thank you. Okay. |
| 11 | Good, thank you for those answers. |
| 12 | What explains the particular apparent U.S. |
| 13 | consumption pattern that we see? Particularly the |
| 14 | difference in growth between 2016 and 2017 which was kind of |
| 15 | flat, versus the faster growth between 2017 and 2018 and |
| 16 | then the change in the interim period? In other words, the |
| 17 | rates of growth were different in each of those periods and |
| 18 | is there an explanation for that? |
| 19 | MS. DRAKE: It does seem that there is an |
| 20 | industry consensus that demand peaked in 2018. Demand |
| 21 | growth peaked when you look at sources on new warehouse |
| 22 | space being built and things of that nature. |
| 23 | I think that the decline in the interim period |
| 24 | may be somewhat overstated because it's based just on new |
| 25 | imports of racks from China and doesn't include any |

| Τ | snipments from inventory that were being made in the market |
|----|--|
| 2 | that would more accurately reflect domestic consumption but |
| 3 | everything that we've looked at seemed to say that it really |
| 4 | shot up in 2018 and it's not going to reach that peak again |
| 5 | in terms of growth rates. |
| 6 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, thank you. Did |
| 7 | the Domestic Industry experience any difficulty in sourcing |
| 8 | raw materials given the rapid increase in prices in the wake |
| 9 | of the 232 duties? |
| 10 | MS. DRAKE: Any shortages of raw materials? I'm |
| 11 | sorry. |
| 12 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Any difficulty sourcing |
| 13 | raw materials given the rapid increase in prices, 232. |
| 14 | MR. ANDERSON: This is Jay Anderson with Steel |
| 15 | King. We have not experienced any difficulty in getting the |
| 16 | steel we need to manufacture the products that were ordered |
| 17 | from us. |
| 18 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, so even though |
| 19 | there was a sharp rise in steel prices, you deal with it? |
| 20 | MR. ANDERSON: The price went up, or the cost |
| 21 | went up as it may be but we were still able to procure it. |
| 22 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, thank you. What |
| 23 | is you capacity utilization rate in this industry and how |
| 24 | does the diversity of the product, you know different sizes, |
| 25 | different shapes, different finishes effect capacity |

| _ | defilizacion and what is the biggest inuit on capacity: |
|----|--|
| 2 | Anybody? |
| 3 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Would you rather do |
| 4 | that posthearing? |
| 5 | MR. NEAL: This is Paul Neal with UNARCO. We |
| 6 | concentrate a lot of our business on engineered, highly |
| 7 | engineered systems which would tend to have various sizes |
| 8 | and shapes that aren't maybe in that most commoditized group |
| 9 | of products. |
| 10 | I think you were asking if you didn't run a very |
| 11 | set, standardized set of products, how much would that |
| 12 | affect your utilization rather than if you just ran a |
| 13 | standard set of products? |
| 14 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Yes, correct. |
| 15 | MR. NEAL: Well it would affect the amount of |
| 16 | output you can do, quite a bit, due to the setups and run |
| 17 | rates and constantly going from one product to the other. |
| 18 | If you just set up for a very standardized product mix and |
| 19 | just concentrated on that, your output would be dramatically |
| 20 | higher. Does that answer your question? |
| 21 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Yeah. And I guess |
| 22 | what implications does that have for your competition with |
| 23 | the imports, which I assume are more commoditized? |
| 24 | MS. DRAKE: That's right. I think, as Mr. Quist |
| 25 | testified, that being denied volume in that commodity market |

| 1 | is particularly harmful to capacity utilization. He |
|----|--|
| 2 | addressed the issue of beams, that on a paint line you can |
| 3 | get a lot more beams painted in one blast of paint than |
| 4 | those upright frames with all the different holes and things |
| 5 | like that. So to lose that high-volume beam product that's |
| 6 | much more efficient to produce certainly would be more |
| 7 | harmful to capacity utilization. |
| 8 | MR. ANDERSON: This is Jay Anderson at Steel |
| 9 | King. I just wanted to share that in our case the |
| 10 | construction design of the upright frame, it's very custom |
| 11 | reinforced, with lots of options, it's a small fraction of |
| 12 | the throughput that we have with a more standard |
| 13 | commoditized upright frame such as was used in the examples |
| 14 | we needed to report our sales of. It's a very small |
| 15 | fraction but a major impact on our throughput on upright |
| 16 | frames. |
| 17 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay. Yes? |
| 18 | MR. NEAL: Just as a follow-up, if we only had |
| 19 | that more customized product to make, and you took all that |
| 20 | standardized product out, that would be very detrimental to |
| 21 | our overall financial well being because a lot of the volume |
| 22 | in overall output is tied to those very standard items, even |
| 23 | though that their overall output is lessened by more |

COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON:

Okay, thank you.

24

25

customized items.

| 1 | Anything further you want to add, posthearing, about |
|----|--|
| 2 | capacity utilization rates would be helpful. |
| 3 | And thank you for those answers. |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Broadbent? |
| 5 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Thank you. |
| 6 | I want to welcome the witnesses for coming from |
| 7 | so many different places to be with us today. We really |
| 8 | appreciate our participation. |
| 9 | Ms. Drake, there's a couple of large U.S. |
| 10 | producers that aren't part of your petitioning coalition. |
| 11 | Why is that? |
| 12 | MS. DRAKE: We might need to address that |
| 13 | posthearing in terms of developing that information, and |
| 14 | also looking at whether or not they have otherwise expressed |
| 15 | support for the Petition. But this was the group that was |
| 16 | pulled together. We've got 10 members, definitely the |
| 17 | majority of the domestic industry, in strong support. |
| 18 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. Mr. Anderson and |
| 19 | Mr. Quist, demand for steel rack is affected by the growth |
| 20 | in E-commerce, which we all know has exhibited significant |
| 21 | growth in recent years. However, apparent U.S. consumption |
| 22 | data does not show dramatic changes in demand from 2016 to |
| 23 | 2018, and apparent U.S. consumption decreased in the first |
| 24 | quarter of 2019. |
| 25 | How do you explain the trends in demand? Mr. |

- 1 Quist, or Mr. Anderson?
- MS. DRAKE: I'm sorry, Commissioner Broadbent,
- 3 this is Elizabeth Drake. Since they are not privy to the
- 4 Commission's consumption figures, they don't know. Because
- 5 it's APO, they wouldn't know what that shows. But I do know
- 6 that as an industry at least in 2016 there was a projection
- 7 of significant demand. Correct?
- 8 MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson. Yes, we had growth
- 9 in 2016. Slower rates of growth recently.
- 10 MS. DRAKE: And I believe, as we were
- 11 discussing, some of the increase in E-commerce is offset by
- 12 retail locations closing down. And so there's kind of a
- 13 give-and-take in that regard.
- 14 COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: That makes sense.
- Okay. It appears that domestic producers control the
- 16 majority of nonsubject import supply into the United States.
- 17 To what extent would the application of AD-CVD duties on
- 18 China lead to supply being entirely consolidated within the
- 19 domestic industry?
- 20 MS. DRAKE: It may be that some of the--not--the
- 21 domestic industry wouldn't get 100 percent of the gain if
- 22 Chinese imports exited the market. But we do see that there
- is a strong correlation between when the Chinese imports
- 24 gained market share and when the domestic industry lost
- 25 market share. So we do think that there would be

| 1 | appreciable benefit of seeing a reduction in that Chinese |
|-----|---|
| 2 | volume. |
| 3 | And as our witnesses testified, after preliminary |
| 4 | relief, kind of after the POI in terms of the antidumping, |
| 5 | really they have seen a number of customers come back and |
| 6 | see sales improve. So there has been a correlation between |
| 7 | the Chinese import volume and the ability of the domestic |
| 8 | industry to increase sales or lose sales. |
| 9 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: But if the duties go in |
| 10 | place permanently under the Order, basically it will be the |
| 11 | U.S. industry that's going to be controlling imports as |
| 12 | well, right? Because most of them are coming from Mexico. |
| 13 | MS. DRAKE: Correct. But I don't think that's |
| 14 | our group, so I'm not sure that they can speak to that. |
| 15 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. Alright. Ms. |
| 16 | Drake, the domestic industry lost some market share, but it |
| 17 | was a fairly small shift. Looking at apparent consumption |
| 18 | growth, it's difficult to argue that the domestic industry |
| 19 | lost out on a period of significant growth. |
| 20 | If you assume for the moment that the Commission |
| 21 | does not find significant price suppression or depression, |
| 22 | would a market share shift in this case be a strong enough |
| 23 | basis to reach an affirmative determination? |
| 24 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Commissioner Broadbent. |
|) 5 | You wo do heliowe that this shift in market share alone is |

| 1 | sufficient to support an affirmative determination. And |
|----|--|
| 2 | that's in part because these are largely interchangeable |
| 3 | products, and we believe that correct, full record would |
| 4 | show that the Chinese products are a much lower price. And |
| 5 | you have significantthat loss in market share also led to |
| 6 | a decline in production, flat sales, and then, we believe, |
| 7 | because of price pressure in addition to the negative |
| 8 | volume effects the very negative financial performance of |
| 9 | the domestic industry, even as demand was growing. Even |
| 10 | though it might not be, you know, a massive growth in |
| 11 | demand, it was a growth in demand. So the industry should |
| 12 | have expected to have improved its performance rather than |
| 13 | seeing this large downward trend in its financial |
| 14 | performance. |
| 15 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay, this is for the |
| 16 | industry witnesses. Respondent UMH argues that there's a |
| 17 | lack of correlation between subject imports and declining |
| 18 | domestic industry performance. And that, instead, rising |
| 19 | raw material costs have negatively impacted the industry's |
| 20 | financial performance. Please respond to this argument. |
| 21 | MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson with Steel King. |
| 22 | We've actually seen steel costs decrease quite a bit over |
| 23 | the course of this year, so that is not the same situation |
| 24 | with that input that it was last year. |
| 25 | MS. DRAKE: And I think, Mr. Anderson, since |

| 1 | that's after the Commission's POI, maybe you or one of the |
|----|--|
| 2 | other witnesses can talk about the relationship between |
| 3 | increased costs and prices. Was all the injury simply due |
| 4 | to rising costs? Or were there other factors? |
| 5 | MR. YOUNG: This is Ryan Young with Husky. |
| 6 | Typically we're able, and historically we're able to pass |
| 7 | through any material cost increases, but this time was |
| 8 | different. We got pushback. In one particular case, one I |
| 9 | referenced in my testimony, one distributor who is a top |
| 10 | three customer for us, we had to lower their prices. And |
| 11 | they tookit's probably a good idea to pass this |
| 12 | confidentially outside of this hearing how the numbers for |
| 13 | them, and particularly went down as far as sales, and now |
| 14 | sales have been restored since the duties wentI don't know |
| 15 | the jargon, but since the preliminary duties went into |
| 16 | place. |
| 17 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay, Ms. Drake, on |
| 18 | page 17 of your prehearing brief you state that if the |
| 19 | Commission determines that underselling was not significant, |
| 20 | it should nonetheless find that imports had significant |
| 21 | adverse price effects. |
| 22 | Can you point to any final investigation in which |
| 23 | the Commission has not found subject import underselling to |
| 24 | be significant but has found significant price depression or |
| 25 | suppression? I think the case you mentioned was a 3-2, and |

| | then one of those 3 5 was realry a threat. Is there any |
|----|--|
| 2 | where a Commission majority has found injury? |
| 3 | MS. DRAKE: Commissioner Broadbent, we'd be |
| 4 | happy to look at that posthearing to see if we can identify |
| 5 | some more cases. I think there's certainly some older court |
| 6 | cases where the court found underselling is not required; |
| 7 | price suppression or depression on its own can support an |
| 8 | affirmative finding. But we'd be happy to find some |
| 9 | additional cases posthearing. |
| 10 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. Ms. Drake, |
| 11 | confirmed lost sales accounted for less than one percent of |
| 12 | apparent U.S. consumption. Does this prove that the subject |
| 13 | imports undersold the domestic like product? |
| 14 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you. One issue that may exist |
| 15 | with the lost sales, and we can go through this posthearing |
| 16 | as well, is I believe some of the purchasers who purchase |
| 17 | from our domestic producers are themselves distributors. So |
| 18 | even if they are continuing to purchase from domestic |
| 19 | producers, those distributors themselves may be losing sales |
| 20 | to competing distributors that are distributing Chinese |
| 21 | product. So asking the distributors if they reduced their |
| 22 | sales is a little bit different than from the domestic |
| 23 | producers may not get at the full head-to-head competition |
| 24 | between distributors of domestic product and distributors of |
| 25 | Chinese product. |

| 1 | But we do think the fact that the vast majority |
|----|---|
| 2 | of those who did report lost sales either said the Chinese |
| 3 | product was priced lower, or in fact attributed the lost |
| 4 | the shift primarily to lower Chinese prices does support an |
| 5 | affirmative underselling finding. |
| 6 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. For the industry |
| 7 | witness, why did steel prices gradually decline after July |
| 8 | 2018, despite the continued application of the 232 tariffs? |
| 9 | MR. ANDERSON: This is Jay Anderson. We've seen |
| 10 | some steel producers adding capacity, firing up previously |
| 11 | shuttered production systems, and adding new furnaces. So |
| 12 | supply and demand came back and offset the increase. |
| 13 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Is that what the other |
| 14 | industry witnesses would agree with? |
| 15 | MR. OLSON: This is Dave Olson. Yes, I concur |
| 16 | with that. The steel industry in the period you mentioned |
| 17 | certainly has added capacity. And I think that's a |
| 18 | significant factor in the reduction in steel costs in the |
| 19 | past six months. Thanks. |
| 20 | MS. DRAKE: And perhaps we can put in |
| 21 | posthearing some more recent news articles about whether or |
| 22 | not that's reached a floor, or some of the producers are |
| 23 | trying to now put through price increases. So it's a very |
| 24 | volatile market. |
| 25 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay, thank you. My |

| 1 | time has expired. |
|----|--|
| 2 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Schmidtlein? |
| 3 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, thank you. |
| 4 | Can we go back for a second to this question |
| 5 | about lead times, and specifically the question about some |
| 6 | importers who are also distributors, right? So I'm just a |
| 7 | little bit confused, becauseand this is APO, so the |
| 8 | witnesses wouldn't have access to this, but, Ms. Drake, you |
| 9 | would. On page II-5 of the Staff Report where it shows the |
| 10 | channels of distribution and how much U.S. producers |
| 11 | shipments are going to distributors, and how much to end |
| 12 | users. And then U.S. importers from China going to |
| 13 | distributors, and then to end users, right? And so I'm |
| 14 | trying to understand this argument about thatwhen the |
| 15 | Staff Report reports that most U.S. producers are producing |
| 16 | made-to-order, right? But importers are selling out of |
| 17 | distributors' inventories. |
| 18 | But when you look at the ratios there, so are |
| 19 | most U.S. producers producing to order for distributors? Is |
| 20 | that the |
| 21 | MS. DRAKE: I'll have the industry witnesses |
| 22 | answer, but my understanding is that when you are producing |
| 23 | for your distributors it's based on a schedule that you have |
| 24 | that they put in an order that we're going to want this |
| 25 | volume in five weeks, or what have you, and that's put into |

| Τ | your production schedule. Correct? |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. OLSON: This is Dave Olson. Yes. As I |
| 3 | stated earlier, we have a production schedule already locked |
| 4 | in for most of our stocking distributors. Now our stocking |
| 5 | distributors are bringing in standardized products and |
| 6 | stocking those in volume. Very much the same way, |
| 7 | distributors that import Chinese manufactured rack into |
| 8 | their warehouses. So they're on a level playing field |
| 9 | competition wise in that market, but price is the main |
| 10 | differentiator. I hear it all the time from stocking |
| 11 | distributors. It's not a lead time issue for them; it's a |
| 12 | price issue. |
| 13 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: So I guess wouldn't |
| 14 | the distributors have the same situation with the Chinese, |
| 15 | with buying from thein other words, aren't thethe |
| 16 | importers are arguing that they'reI'm sorry, there are so |
| 17 | many levels of trade here, right? So when it's being |
| 18 | reported that the imports are being sold out of inventory |
| 19 | versus domestic suppliers are being made to order, can you |
| 20 | just explain why we see that discrepancy in the staff |
| 21 | report, given that the ratios are similar in terms of |
| 22 | workmanship to each type of buyer? |
| 23 | MS. DRAKE: Commissioner, I believe it's because |
| 24 | the importers are holding inventories in the U.S., whereas |
| 25 | domestic producers largely do not. Domestic producers rely |

| 1 | on their distributors to hold the inventory so they can |
|----|--|
| 2 | quick-ship to closer to market. Whereas, the importers do |
| 3 | have their own warehouses from which they can ship to |
| 4 | distributors as well as to end users. And so I believe |
| 5 | that that's the difference because obviously the lead time |
| 6 | across the ocean in China is not shorter than the lead time |
| 7 | in the United States; it's that the importers already have |
| 8 | the product here in the United States to ship to either |
| 9 | channel. |
| 10 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. Okay, and then |
| 11 | with regard to this question about importers being |
| 12 | distributors, as well, and that that's perhaps affecting the |
| 13 | pricing data. If I understood, that's the relevance of that |
| 14 | argument. Do you have any sense of how many? Maybe you've |
| 15 | already said you're going to go back and look at this? |
| 16 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Commissioner. Yes, we will |
| 17 | have to go back and look. I apologize I don't have that off |
| 18 | the top of my head, but there are some importers that you |
| 19 | can see they have their own internet portal, sort of |
| 20 | Amazon-type shopping available for racks. |
| 21 | There are other importers that when you look at |
| 22 | the markup between what they're importing and what their |
| 23 | U.S. shipment value is, it appears that they are acting as |
| 24 | distributors not just as importers. Even though there are |
| 25 | significant amounts of imports that are themselves shipped |

| 1 | to distributors, we believe that there are also importers |
|----|--|
| 2 | who act as their own distributors. But we will need to go |
| 3 | through that on an importer-by-importer basis to try to |
| 4 | substantiate that and see how it is affecting the pricing |
| 5 | data. |
| 6 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: And you think that it |
| 7 | could be? That's why subject import prices are being |
| 8 | reported higher? Because those importers are reporting the |
| 9 | price that they're selling as a distributor not just the |
| 10 | price |
| 11 | MS. DRAKE: Exactly. |
| 12 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: If you're right, then |
| 13 | they should have been reporting those as sort of direct |
| 14 | imports, with some estimate of cost. |
| 15 | MS. DRAKE: Rightwell, or it's just that we |
| 16 | know that all of the domestic producer sales are being |
| 17 | reported toyou know, some to distributors and some to end |
| 18 | users. And the importer sales are probably not at the same |
| 19 | level in terms of how much is to distributors and how much |
| 20 | is to end users. But I think we need to look at it at an |
| 21 | importer-by-importer basis to see if that really is what's |
| 22 | driving the difference. So I apologize for not |
| 23 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, no, I'm just |
| 24 | tryingit does get confusing. We've had this in other |
| 25 | cases obviously where although we're kind of looking at i |

| Τ | fromyou know, it's the same coin, just the opposite side |
|----|--|
| 2 | where you will have a distributor who is acting as an |
| 3 | importer, right? Or some sort of purchaser who is acting as |
| 4 | their own importer. And there we ask them to report the |
| 5 | purchase cost data with some estimate of how much it cost |
| 6 | them to be the importer. Versus here where this entity may |
| 7 | be mostly an importer but they're also acting as a |
| 8 | distributor, right? Soanywayokay. |
| 9 | Okay, so a couple of other questions here having |
| 10 | to do with the pricing data. First of alland these are |
| 11 | probably for Ms. Drake. Do you think that AUVs are a good |
| 12 | measure of pricing in the market? Is there a product mix |
| 13 | issue here that would suggest that we shouldn't look at AUVs |
| 14 | for price trends? |
| 15 | MS. DRAKE: I guess my answer would be two-fold, |
| 16 | Commissioner. To be honest, there will be some product mix. |
| 17 | A beam is going to be less complex than an upright. And you |
| 18 | can see that in the pricing data for the beams versus the |
| 19 | uprights. |
| 20 | But the difference in the AUVs for imports from |
| 21 | China and the AUVs for domestic shipments is so huge that |
| 22 | that can't be fully explained by product mix. |
| 23 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Well, and wouldn't the |
| 24 | trends be the same? I assume there's a cost differential, |
| 25 | but the trend in terms of what the price is doing for a beam |

1 and what the price is doing for the other part is moving in the same direction? 2 MS. DRAKE: It's dollars per pound, and most all 3 4 that pound is steel. 5 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Right. Okay. So when 6 you look at--here's one question. When I look at the export 7 AUVs for the U.S. industry, and you see those going down in '18, if you just look at the C Table, right? 8 You see them, 9 they go up by a fair amount from '16 to '17, but then they 10 go back down. And '18 is of course when steel costs go up the most, raw material costs go up the most. 11 12 So you don't have to do it here, but--unless you 13 have an answer--but I'm just curious as to why are export 14 AUV prices dropping in 2018. 15 Okay, you can do that in the posthearing. 16 Alright, another question. When you look at--this of course 17 goes back to this question about what are we going to point to? What would we point to to say that the domestic 18 industry should have been able to increase prices more than 19 20 they otherwise have, right? 21 MS. DRAKE: Um-hmm. 22 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: So when you look at the increase in subject imports from '16 to '17, and then 23

'17 to '18, it's roughly the same in terms of--at least in

terms of percentage increase, right? So they're going up in

24

| 1 | roughly the same amount. You have the bigger increase in |
|----|--|
| 2 | demand, at least by apparent consumption, in '18. Right? |
| 3 | Apparent consumption was sort of flat, but then went up some |
| 4 | in '18 for an overall increase. |
| 5 | When you look at the pricing products just in |
| 6 | terms of the trends, and of course we know that raw material |
| 7 | costs went up in '18, the 232 tariffs went on, pricing |
| 8 | products did go up in '18. And we've had a lot of questions |
| 9 | about looking at years before the POI. You know, given |
| 10 | that the volume from China was roughly the same in each of |
| 11 | the years, they were able to push through price increases at |
| 12 | least by the pricing products in '18, so what would we look |
| 13 | at? What would we point to to say well they should have |
| 14 | been able to increase it more? |
| 15 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Commissioner Schmidtlein. |
| 16 | I think we'll probably want to see if we can break it out |
| 17 | quarter by quarter, because you had so many things happen in |
| 18 | 2018. We had the 232 duties go on. We had the filing of |
| 19 | these cases. And they were all really close together. And |
| 20 | we saw changes not just in domestic prices, but I think in a |
| 21 | lot of the importer prices in the quarters after these cases |
| 22 | were filed. |
| 23 | So it's not only cost driver that's happening, |
| 24 | but also maybe a change in terms of the price pressure after |
| 25 | these Petitions were filed. So unfortunately we don't |

| 1 | really have true cost data on a quarterly basis, but we at |
|----|--|
| 2 | least have hot-rolled index or something that we can look at |
| 3 | and try to figure out what was driving. We do believe it |
| 4 | wasn't just costs flowing directly through to prices, but |
| 5 | also some initial relief from the fact that these cases were |
| 6 | filed in terms of less severe pricing pressure from subject |
| 7 | imports. |
| 8 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. Well I invite |
| 9 | you to address that in a posthearing brief. |
| 10 | And then my last question is: Mr. Young, you |
| 11 | have testified a couple times about the pushback you |
| 12 | received, and you mentioned a big client, and so forth, and |
| 13 | you were going to address that in the posthearing. I would |
| 14 | invite any of the other companies to also put on the record |
| 15 | any evidence of attempts that you've made to increase |
| 16 | prices, and that those have been hindered or thwarted by |
| 17 | purchasers using subject import prices to push back. |
| 18 | So if you have any evidence of that that you can |
| 19 | put on the record in the posthearing. I know that you did |
| 20 | put some of that type of contemporaneous evidence in the |
| 21 | prehearing brief, but, to be honest, it's a big confusing |
| 22 | and it's not sort of connected up. You know, it's not |
| 23 | really clear exactly what we're looking at when you look at |
| 24 | that. So if you want to cite to that, it would be helpful if |
| 25 | you could explain what exactly are we looking at. You |

| 2 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Commissioner. We will do |
|----|---|
| 3 | that posthearing. |
| 4 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. Thank you. |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Kearns? |
| 6 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: I wanted to talk about |
| 7 | complete systems versus components. Most of the quantity of |
| 8 | U.Sproduced steel racks are sold as complete rack sets, |
| 9 | whereas must subject imports are sold as components. Why is |
| 10 | this the case? And what does it mean for competition? |
| 11 | MS. DRAKE: I'll let the witnesses contribute. |
| 12 | This is Elizabeth Drake. I think one of the issues is that |
| 13 | I believe domestic producers are somewhat reluctant just to |
| 14 | sell an upright. They would want to sell the upright and |
| 15 | the beam. Because as we spoke about, the beam has a better |
| 16 | throughput. And you'll have, you know, many more beams per |
| 17 | upright. And so it's important to them to try to gain the |
| 18 | benefit of selling that whole complete set. |
| 19 | Whereas, if you have importers that are coming in |
| 20 | and really just trying to target that beam market, they |
| 21 | might have more components than uprights. Uprights are also |
| 22 | a little bit more unwieldy to import, though there are of |
| 23 | course uprights being imported as well. |
| 24 | Maybe some of our witnesses can talk about, over |
| 25 | the time period I believe there were a number of instances |

know, put this into context.

| 1 | where there were increasing orders that they received just |
|----|--|
| 2 | for uprights. So their customer is basically saying I don't |
| 3 | want your beams anymore. And that is not a viable situation |
| 4 | for domestic producers because they need to produce both to |
| 5 | have a good throughput. |
| 6 | MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson with Steel King. In |
| 7 | our case, for liability purposes we're very reluctant to |
| 8 | sell just one component, knowing that if we do that then |
| 9 | they will be intermingling different manufacturers' products |
| 10 | and we have no control over the quality of the design or |
| 11 | manufacture of other manufacturers. So we really resist |
| 12 | that pretty vigorously in our case. |
| 13 | MR. OLSON: This is Dave Olson with Ridg-U-Rak. |
| 14 | We talked about projects versus components. You know, we're |
| 15 | competing and building to order on the project side. The |
| 16 | commodity component type business again is an area where we |
| 17 | really don't have control in our case because we're sending |
| 18 | truckloads of beams, and truckloads of frames to stocking |
| 19 | distributors. And we're not privy to stocking distributor |
| 20 | that may be selling a lot of beams to one customer, and |
| 21 | frames to another. That's his operation, selling out of his |
| 22 | warehouse. So it's hard for us, for our company, to |
| 23 | differentiate that because we're selling, if you will, |
| 24 | truckloads of frames and beams in all cases. |
| 25 | And to dovetail into Mr. Anderson's statement, |

| 1 | our company likewise is on the watch-out for frame-only or |
|----|--|
| 2 | beam-only type orders because we discourage the mixing of |
| 3 | products for liability reasons, and capacity reasons on |
| 4 | frames because you don't ultimately know what the true |
| 5 | capacity of one manufacturer's component fitting in with |
| 6 | another manufacturer's component. The tolerances, the types |
| 7 | of rivets and connections that they use directly impact the |
| 8 | rated capacity of that system. And that can become a |
| 9 | liability issue. |
| 10 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: That's a good lead-in to my |
| 11 | next question. Are complete rack sets synonymous with |
| 12 | custom projects? Or are there a lot of commodity type sales |
| 13 | that take the form of complete sets? |
| 14 | I think what I'm hearing, especially from you, |
| 15 | Mr. Anderson, is that your sets are still the commodity-type |
| 16 | of thing. This isn't just like special engineering |
| 17 | projects. Because I think otherwise you might look at these |
| 18 | tables that we have, and it seems like the U.S. producers |
| 19 | make the custom high-end engineered systems, whereas the |
| 20 | imports are mostly the commodity and there's not that much |
| 21 | overlap for competition. But is that not the case? Are |
| 22 | your sets often commodity type of systems, as well? |
| 23 | MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson. Yes, we do a |
| 24 | substantial number of orders where it's complete sets of |
| 25 | standard product. We do custom-engineered work, and then we |

| Τ | do a lot of orders that are just plain frame-and-beam jobs. |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. BISHOP: Can you please get closer to your |
| 3 | microphone? |
| 4 | MR. ANDERSON: I'm sorry. We do a mixture of |
| 5 | engineered jobs, and we also do a lot of orders of what we |
| 6 | call standard orders where they're complete sets of very |
| 7 | commodity-like upright frames and beams. |
| 8 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. |
| 9 | MR. OLSON: This is Dave Olson with Ridg-U-Rak. |
| 10 | I concur with that completely. While we were talking about |
| 11 | projects, engineered projects, large-scale projects that |
| 12 | we're manufacturing and shipping direct, many, many of |
| 13 | thoseI can't put a percentage on itbut a fairly high |
| 14 | percentage of those projects are using those same commodity |
| 15 | size components. |
| 16 | For example, the most common horizontal beam in |
| 17 | the market is an 8-foot-long beam shelf that can hold a 2500 |
| 18 | pound pallets, or a 5,000-pound shelf capacity. A Walmart |
| 19 | distribution center, or an Amazon distribution center is |
| 20 | using those same types of components that our stocking |
| 21 | distributors are sending out to small manufacturers each and |
| 22 | every day. So, yes, they exist heavily in both arenas. |
| 23 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. And just to wrap |
| 24 | that up, are the subject import components generally just |
| 25 | gold as replacement parts to evicting systems? Or are they |

| Τ. | rearry and r know to some extent your distributors are |
|----|--|
| 2 | better able to answer this question than you arebut is |
| 3 | that the case? Or are they really just selling parts to a |
| 4 | new project? |
| 5 | MR. QUIST: Eric Quist with Speedrack. I'd say |
| 6 | the majority of them are to a new project, especially from |
| 7 | the distributor. And I have to concur with them that we |
| 8 | sell a lot of standard products to many customers, and what |
| 9 | I had saw was that I was seeing just upright-only orders, |
| 10 | knowing that they were buying the beams from somewhere. And |
| 11 | that's when we got involved in this. |
| 12 | So, yeah, we do sell complete standard components |
| 13 | to a project. |
| 14 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, great. Thank you. I |
| 15 | wanted to talk about interim 2019, our data there. You |
| 16 | argue that subject imports sold from inventory magnified the |
| 17 | impact of the reduced volume of imports in interim 2019. |
| 18 | Are you referring to inventories held by |
| 19 | importers, or by distributors? Or, I guess maybe from what |
| 20 | you've said before, it's one and the same? |
| 21 | MS. DRAKE: The only data we have is importer |
| 22 | inventories, so I think that's what we referred to in our |
| 23 | brief. But certainly there would be additional inventories |
| 24 | that could be held by distributors, but I don't think we |
| 25 | have good data on what that was in 2019 |

| 1 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. But with respect to |
|----|--|
| 2 | importers, our data do not show a draw-down of importer |
| 3 | inventories between the end of 2018 and the end of interim |
| 4 | 2019. Do you have any thoughts on that? |
| 5 | MS. DRAKE: Maybe I'll have to look at that |
| 6 | post-hearing, okay? |
| 7 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you. Staying |
| 8 | with the subject of interim 2019 and financial performance, |
| 9 | the industries' unit cost of goods sold increased steadily |
| 10 | from 2016 to 2018, and it was higher in interim 2019 than in |
| 11 | interim 2018. Why were your costs increasing interim 2019 |
| 12 | even as steel prices were declining? Was it due to |
| 13 | higher-priced inventory as respondents suggest? |
| 14 | MR. OLSON: This is Dave Olson with Ridg-U-Rak. |
| 15 | In our company's case, and I suspect it's the case for most |
| 16 | of the members of our coalition, our steel inventories, the |
| 17 | steel that we're shipping in First Quarter 2019, the lion's |
| 18 | share of that steel was purchased at the end of 2018, so |
| 19 | there's a lag effect that occurs in realizing the lower cost |
| 20 | steels that we're currently seeing the marketplace, we don't |
| 21 | buy steel on a spot market as a general rule, so that's one |
| 22 | of the reasons in our case that you see that phenomena. |
| 23 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Is that true for others as |
| 24 | well? |
| 25 | MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson with Steel King. We |

- 1 would generally cover about a quarters' worth of material on
- 2 blanket orders and then buy spot for things we didn't
- 3 anticipate or are out of the normal purchasing/sales
- 4 patterns.
- 5 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you.
- 6 MR. NEAL: This is Paul Neal from UNARCO. It
- 7 would be a big exception for us to buy on a spot market
- 8 basis. It would be just to fill a slight hole. We buy all
- 9 our stuff in advance and similar to Ridg-U-Rak.
- 10 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you. One other
- 11 quick question here. Again, on financial performance,
- 12 respondent argues that the domestic industries' financial
- 13 results were skewed downward by the performance of a
- 14 particular U.S. producer. Could you respond to this point
- now or in your post-hearing brief?
- 16 MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Commissioner. We'll
- 17 respond post-hearing.
- 18 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, great. Thank you
- 19 very much.
- 20 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: I also have a question
- 21 regarding the COGS to net sale ratio, which was something
- 22 which was raised by Commissioner Kearns. The COGS to net
- 23 sale ratio increased in comparing interim 2019 to interim
- 24 2018, yet the subject import volume declined, as shown at
- 25 Table C-1 of the staff report. How does this support a

| 1 | finding of price suppression by reason of subject imports? |
|----|--|
| 2 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Chairman Johanson. We |
| 3 | believe that the market in the first quarter of 2019 |
| 4 | continued to be adversely affected by subject imports, even |
| 5 | though the absolute volume of those imports went down. We |
| 6 | think part of that is due to continued inventories being |
| 7 | present in the market, which would continue to affect |
| 8 | prices, even as unit COGS continued to rise due to some of |
| 9 | the lag in the steel costs that was discussed. |
| 10 | As Mr. Young testified, the customer that he had |
| 11 | to make a deeper price concession to, still is not going to |
| 12 | allow him to restore pricing until the final results of this |
| 13 | case. So there continue to be uncertainty in the market. |
| 14 | There continue to be adverse effects of imports and import |
| 15 | inventories, even though the absolute volume of imports went |
| 16 | down. |
| 17 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Thanks, Ms. Drake. And |
| 18 | continuing the post-petition period, could you all please |
| 19 | explain in any post-petition effects the domestic industry |
| 20 | has experienced? And to what extent should we discount any |
| 21 | interim 2019 data in your view? |
| 22 | MS. DRAKE: I believe most of the examples that |
| 23 | the witnesses have told us about in terms of positive |
| 24 | effects, customers returning, things of that nature, |
| 25 | happened after the end of the Commission's POI here, after |

| 1 | the anti-dumping prelim in March of 2019, in terms of seeing |
|----|--|
| 2 | improvements. |
| 3 | And so, again, while the Commission should |
| 4 | continue to find that the volume was significant, even |
| 5 | though it went down after the petitions were filed, we think |
| 6 | that even that lower volume of imports continued to have |
| 7 | negative impacts on the market. And we do think that that |
| 8 | change in volume can be attributed to the petitioners. |
| 9 | There's some BPI information concerning the |
| 10 | behavior of a particular importer after the petitions were |
| 11 | filed that we think accounts for a lot of the decline in |
| 12 | apparent imports during that first quarter. |
| 13 | MR. QUIST: Eric Quist with Speedrack. Yes, |
| 14 | we've seen customers come back and going back again to my |
| 15 | testimony that we're not seeing the upright only orders |
| 16 | again. We're seeing a good blend and a good mix of beams |
| 17 | and uprights on the orders in any quotes. And the dealers |
| 18 | that are stocking, they're returning and buying those basic |
| 19 | 96" beams, again, in high volume. |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: All right, thanks for your |
| 21 | responses. Earlier today, respondent counsel brought the |
| 22 | issue of changes in the scope of the investigation. |
| 23 | Commerce modified the scope of these investigations since |
| 24 | the preliminary determinations. What were the most |
| 25 | important modifications to scope and why were they sought |

1 and made? MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Chairman. The scope 2 created a lot of confusion for everyone. And I think we 3 4 always knew what we thought the subject imports were, which 5 was the large industrial steel storage racks, and the 6 challenge was finding physical characteristics that could differentiate the steel racks of interest from other types of racks, like wire, garment racks or a rack you might see, 8 9 you know, at a Sears holding clothes, or log racks or tire 10 -- there're all kinds of racks that I never knew about that I got to learn about with importers filing a scope 11 12 clarification requests. 13 And the reason there were so many revisions is 14 because we really wanted to make sure that the language was 15 written in a way where it's based solely on the physical 16 characteristics and could fully distinguish the subject steel racks from racks that were never of interest to us in 17 these cases. And so we ended up, both adopting or creating 18 19 exclusion language in response to requests from imports and 2.0 in response to requests from Commerce, we defined some basic 21 parameters in terms of dimensions, height, etcetera, that 22 define what are the covered steel racks. 23 So we think that both of those combined helped to 24 clarify the scope. But we don't believe that those changes

in scope alone can fully explain why we have such higher

| 1 | volumes reported at Commerce than we have reported here to |
|----|--|
| 2 | the Commission. Because, honestly, those were, you know, |
| 3 | thinner, smaller kind of gauge things. We weren't excluding |
| 4 | larger products. We were excluding smaller, lighter |
| 5 | products. And so, again, we will try to work through that |
| 6 | post-hearing to respond to the argument made this morning |
| 7 | that the difference is solely due to changes to the scope. |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Thanks, Ms. Drake. I look |
| 9 | forward to seeing that. And something struck me very early |
| 10 | on when I began preparing for this hearing, and that was |
| 11 | that you all argue that the rate of demand growth is slowing |
| 12 | for steel racks, which I found somewhat surprising, given |
| 13 | the growth of e-commerce and the continued growth of |
| 14 | e-commerce. Why do you all contend that growth is slowing |
| 15 | down and will continue to slow down? |
| 16 | MS. DRAKE: Excuse me, Chairman. Part of the |
| 17 | reason is that there what information is publicly |
| 18 | available to us shows that the rate of growth is projected |
| 19 | to slow in 2019 because the rate of expansion of new |
| 20 | warehouses and fulfillment and distribution centers is |
| 21 | projected to slow, so 2018 really had a larger growth in |
| 22 | what is projected in 2019, and then as our witnesses |
| 23 | testified what they as an industry is projecting, that |
| 24 | demand will actually contract in 2020. |
| 25 | So, even though e-commerce is likely to continue |

| | 1 | growing, | it | may | just | be, | you | know, | in | the | part | of | the | growt |
|--|---|----------|----|-----|------|-----|-----|-------|----|-----|------|----|-----|-------|
|--|---|----------|----|-----|------|-----|-----|-------|----|-----|------|----|-----|-------|

- 2 cycle that we were in, the real height of it was 2018 and
- 3 then you also have some things that are reducing demand in
- 4 terms of whether there's gonna be a economic slowdown in
- 5 2020 or whether you have the reduction of kind of
- 6 brick-and-mortar stores that may be using those in some of
- 7 their shop floors.
- 8 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Yeah, I'm a little confused
- 9 on this, because respondents describe the domestic
- 10 industries' overall condition as strong and steady and
- 11 states that the future for this industry is bright. This is
- 12 argued at Page 29 of their brief. Considering your
- 13 contention is growth is slowing down, can you -- are there
- 14 any industry publications which would state this? I don't
- 15 recall from your brief, but if there are any, I'd appreciate
- it if you could get them to us.
- 17 MS. DRAKE: We will, Chairman, there was a
- 18 Deloitte study on projections in terms of warehouse
- 19 construction that showed that they were projecting that to
- 20 slow. There's some --
- 21 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: And that was mentioned in
- 22 your brief?
- MS. DRAKE: Yes. But we --
- 24 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay, I apologize for not
- 25 remembering.

| 1 | MS. DRAKE: We can look for additional sources to |
|----|--|
| 2 | include their I'm afraid that any information they have |
| 3 | as an industry association is confidential, but we will look |
| 4 | for some public sources. |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay, thanks, Ms. Drake. And |
| 6 | there's another issue that was raised by the respondents and |
| 7 | I wanted you all to perhaps provide some clarification for |
| 8 | this. They wrote at some length about the certification |
| 9 | process and how that is important. What is the |
| 10 | certification process for steel racks? And what role should |
| 11 | supplier certification play in our consideration of this |
| 12 | case? |
| 13 | MR. OLSON: The certification process that is |
| 14 | used in our industry is handled through the Rack |
| 15 | Manufacturers Institute, which we are all active members and |
| 16 | they provide a certification process. It basically |
| 17 | certifies that your load capacities that you rate your |
| 18 | products for in the calculation process are done in |
| 19 | accordance with the Rack Manufacturers Institute |
| 20 | specifications. |
| 21 | Basically, the process for getting certified is |
| 22 | if the company wants to be certified, they submit their |
| 23 | calculations and test data to demonstrate that they engineer |
| 24 | their systems in accordance with the specification. It's |
| 25 | reviewed by independent engineers and ultimately, if it |

| 1 | follows the guidelines of the specifications, then they get |
|----|---|
| 2 | certified. It's called a R-Mark certification. |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Would the certification |
| 4 | process play any role in this investigation? |
| 5 | MS. DRAKE: Chairman, we don't believe so. My |
| 6 | understanding is, any manufacturer is eligible to get the |
| 7 | R-Mark, even if they're not members of the RMI and even |
| 8 | there are foreign producers that are members of the RMI and |
| 9 | also I believe in the Commission's staff report, while most |
| 10 | purchasers say they do require certification, I think there |
| 11 | was only one instance where a supplier wasn't able to be |
| 12 | certified. So I think it's a very standard process that's |
| 13 | well-understood in the industry and wouldn't in any way |
| 14 | attenuate competition or affect the ability of Chinese |
| 15 | producers to compete. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: And just to clarify, I assume |
| 17 | that any purchaser would demand that this product be |
| 18 | certified? |
| 19 | MR. OLSON: Dave Olson, Ridg-U-Rak. While that |
| 20 | may be the case, there's many small operations throughout |
| 21 | the United States that perhaps aren't even aware of the |
| 22 | certification and don't have it in their bid specifications |
| 23 | or their requirements. Most of your large-scale projects, |
| 24 | that's an expectation to have the certification. But a lot |
| 25 | of the day-to-day business, I don't think the general |

| 1 | public's aware of that requirement to that level of detail. |
|----|--|
| 2 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay, yeah, my staff and I |
| 3 | were discussing this yesterday, and just the liability. And |
| 4 | these racks hold a lot of weight and walking around some of |
| 5 | these big box stores, it has occurred to me that, I hope |
| 6 | there's not an earthquake, 'cuz it could be awfully |
| 7 | dangerous. I would expect that any sizeable purchaser would |
| 8 | expect that these be certified. |
| 9 | MR. OLSON: That's correct, Commissioner. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay, thanks for your |
| 11 | responses. Commissioner Williamson. |
| 12 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Thank you. Just |
| 13 | following up on that are certifications renewed or |
| 14 | reviewed periodically? And if someone lost their |
| 15 | certification, how usually could it be regained? |
| 16 | MR. ANDERSON: This is Jay Anderson. I'm not |
| 17 | aware of anybody having their certification revoked per se. |
| 18 | I believe we have had to resubmit the certain cases when the |
| 19 | specification changed and required some testing, we had to |
| 20 | have testing done on our products and updated to the newest |
| 21 | version of the specification. |
| 22 | MR. OLSON: And this is Dave Olson with |
| 23 | Ridg-U-Rak. Currently there's not a process for |
| 24 | recertification or requirement to be recertified. It's been |
| 25 | discussed, I will say, in our trade meetings and things like |

1 that I can share with you. But I'm, likewise, not aware of anybody who's received certification having lost it or 2 having it be revoked for any reason at this point. 3 4 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, thank you. Okay, 5 please discuss the territorial limitations mentioned by UMH 6 at Page 30 of its prehearing brief and at Pages 2-10 and 2-26 of the prehearing staff report. I don't know if you wanna do that now or post-hearing, but --8 9 MS. DRAKE: If you don't mind, Commissioner, can 10 we answer that post-hearing? COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay. And also, are 11 12 there distributors that the industry has refused to supply? 13 This is raised at 2-10 of the staff report. 14 MS. DRAKE: I believe there are certain cases in which a producer will have a preferred distributor within a 15 16 certain region which is not an unusual situation, but there are other producers that will have multiple distributors 17 within a region and, even if they do have a preferred 18 19 distributor within a region, anyone can go to that 2.0 distributor. It's not like their product is inaccessible, 21 but maybe witnesses can add to that. 22 MR. NEAL: This is Paul Neal with UNARCO. have a dealer network that covers various territories, and 23 24 if a non-UNARCO dealer came to us wanting to buy product, we

would essentially give that to our UNARCO dealer in that

- 1 area, and they would serve that other dealer in that
- 2 fashion. So we don't refuse anyone any product. We
- 3 basically refer them to the dealer that covers that
- 4 territory.
- 5 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay.
- 6 MR. OLSON: Dave Olson with Ridg-U-Rak. Similar
- 7 to Mr. Neal's statement, maybe one difference is that many
- 8 of our distributors are fairly large-scale material-handling
- 9 houses. They're selling forklifts and many--what we refer
- 10 to as allied products related -- to material handling and
- 11 storage.
- 12 And their reach is quite large in some cases.
- 13 These are large forklift houses or large material-handling
- 14 dealers that are selling close to a national basis in most
- 15 cases. And then you have smaller regional, small
- 16 material-handling operations and distributors that sell into
- very regional, local markets, and they've got strong
- 18 relationships with manufacturers and warehouse operators in
- 19 their territory.
- 20 They can serve them, they can drive over to their
- 21 facility and provide quotations very quickly. So you kind
- of have the full gamut of different types of reach. But
- there certainly is no boundaries that we impose on any of
- our distributors as to where they can sell or not sell.
- 25 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Thank you. A major

| 1 | importer of subject merchandise has reportedly left the |
|----|--|
| 2 | market. Will that effect the volume of subject imports in |
| 3 | the imminent future? |
| 4 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Commissioner Williamson, |
| 5 | Elizabeth Drake. It certainly appears to have affected it |
| 6 | in the first quarter of 2019, but there's no reason that |
| 7 | other importers couldn't rapidly substitute for that volume |
| 8 | if the temporary relief that's currently in place were to |
| 9 | disappear, and I think that's clear. |
| 10 | And if you look at the import data with some of |
| 11 | the other large importers, how quickly they were able to |
| 12 | ramp up and that certainly could happen again, if orders are |
| 13 | not imposed here, despite the exit of that one importer. |
| 14 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, thank you. Just |
| 15 | one last question. We see it so often that you have direct |
| 16 | imports, particularly from the big boxes and stuff, |
| 17 | companies like that. We don't see that or any discussion of |
| 18 | that in this industry and I was just wondering why that's |
| 19 | the is there a reason why that's the case? We don't see |
| 20 | the end user being the direct importer. |
| 21 | MS. DRAKE: I'm not sure, Commissioner, it might |
| 22 | be partially the structure of the industry. It's |
| 23 | traditionally worked through distributors, rather than, say |
| 24 | a Walmart importing the steel racks. But it is more |
| 25 | one-step removed than the end user being the direct |

- 1 importer, but maybe witnesses have some light to shed on
- 2 that.
- 3 MR. OLSON: This is Dave Olson with Ridg-U-Rak.
- 4 I think the reason behind that is, is most of these large
- 5 companies, their staff just don't have the experience or the
- 6 knowledge to specify and determine, okay, I know what I
- 7 wanna go buy, I'm gonna go buy it and import it overseas.
- 8 So they reach out to an expert, a material-handling
- 9 distributor or, in some cases, the manufacturer itself, for
- 10 that expertise, to help them develop a solution that meets
- 11 their needs.
- 12 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: I know that I wanna put
- in my warehouse and what I want to distribute, but I let
- somebody else build it?
- 15 MR. OLSON: Yeah, I think it's much like, rack
- 16 systems in a warehouse aren't like going out and buying a
- 17 widget, you know, the same widget that I can buy in
- 18 Catalogue A, Catalogue B, it's much more complex than that,
- 19 and I think that's a big reason behind that, sir.
- 20 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, thank you. Good.
- 21 Thank you for those answers.
- 22 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Broadbent.
- 23 COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Yeah, I just had a
- 24 couple of last questions here. This is kind of a bit of a
- 25 rephrase from question you've already answered, but this is

| 1 | for Ms. Drake. How can we separate the post-petition effect |
|----|--|
| 2 | from the effects of the Section 301 tariffs? If the volume |
| 3 | of the subject imports was low in 2019 as a result of the |
| 4 | Section 301 tariffs, can we place less weight on this data |
| 5 | within our injury analysis? |
| 6 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Commissioner Broadbent. |
| 7 | It may be somewhat difficult to precisely quantify how much |
| 8 | of the impact is due to Section 301 versus the filing of the |
| 9 | petition. There are some confidential statements on the |
| 10 | record that we can talk about post-hearing. |
| 11 | In terms of the impact that the petitions had, |
| 12 | and I think the fact that the preliminary countervailing |
| 13 | duty rates were, in most cases, so much higher than the |
| 14 | Section 301 duties, weighs in favor of finding that the |
| 15 | petitioners in the preliminary determination in December did |
| 16 | have an appreciable effect on the market and therefore, |
| 17 | there should be less weight on the volume trends in the |
| 18 | interim period. |
| 19 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. Ms. Drake, does |
| 20 | the apparent uptick in subject import prices starting in Q4 |
| 21 | 2018 represent the effects of these petitions of the effects |
| 22 | of the 301 tariffs, and that's sort of the same question. |
| 23 | Okay, sorry about that. And finally, for the |
| 24 | industry witness, Interlake was identified as a price leader |
| 25 | for steel apps by four purchasers. How does Interlake's |

| | pricing compare with other sources in the o.s. market: |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. NEAL: This is Paul Neal with UNARCO. |
| 3 | Interlake Mecalux concentrates a lot of their activities on |
| 4 | the more standardized commoditized products that we're |
| 5 | talking about coming from China, so that is one reason they |
| 6 | would be a price leader, so to speak, of the domestic |
| 7 | manufacturers. They concentrate on that most standard type |
| 8 | product as well, and don't get involved in a more customized |
| 9 | solutions. |
| 10 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. Ms. Drake, as |
| 11 | subject imports exited the market in interim 2019, the |
| 12 | industries' COGS to net sales ratio continued to increase. |
| 13 | Was there price suppression in interim 2019? |
| 14 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Commissioner Broadbent. |
| 15 | We believe there was some continued price suppression in |
| 16 | 2019, even though the volume of new imports declined, we |
| 17 | believe that any inventories that were built up, either up |
| 18 | at importers or at distributors of product from China, could |
| 19 | continue to be sold at low prices and therefore continue to |
| 20 | prevent the domestic industry from passing on costs that |
| 21 | actually still continue to increase, given the lag in the |
| 22 | purchasing of the steel, and so it's 2018 steel being sold |
| 23 | as racks in 2019. |
| 24 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: So this would be right. |
| 25 | The domestic industries! gross income and operating income |

- declined in interim in 2019? Okay. All right. Well, that
- 2 concludes my questions, and I wanna thank the witnesses for
- 3 being here, I appreciate it.
- 4 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Schmidtlein?
- 5 Commissioner Kearns?
- 6 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Just one last question.
- 7 About your prices and whether or not they include
- 8 installation, do quoted prices typically include
- 9 installation? And do sellers of steel racks typically
- 10 perform the installation, or is it usually done by a third
- 11 party?
- MR. OLSON: This is Dave Olson with Ridg-U-Rak.
- 13 It depends on the project. If our client -- it may be a
- 14 distributor, it may be an end user -- requests a quotation
- for install, we'll include that, but it's usually a
- 16 separate, completely separate line item. It's not part of
- 17 the material quote. It's a separate line item for the
- installation of that product.
- 19 Many material-handling distributors handle their
- 20 own installations. I would say the lion's share of our
- 21 distributors request a quote for material and freight only,
- 22 and that they handle their own installation. There's quite
- 23 a large number of subcontractor installers around the
- 24 country that serve the needs to manufacturers, as well as
- distributors and even end users in some cases.

| 1 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, anyone else? |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson, Steel King. We do |
| 3 | not provide directly installation on any of our racking |
| 4 | systems. The times we do get involved tend to be the large |
| 5 | or more engineered projects where the customer wants a |
| 6 | package price and we will give them a price on that, but |
| 7 | it's subcontracted as a separate line item. Majority of the |
| 8 | number of sales that we do would be going through dealers or |
| 9 | distributors and they are usually handling their own |
| 10 | installation and presumably quoting it separately. |
| 11 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you. Anyone |
| 12 | else? |
| 13 | MR. OLSON: Yes, and if I could, this is Dave |
| 14 | Olson, just to clarify. We do not employ installers in our |
| 15 | company. We subcontract that, so when we're asked to quote |
| 16 | an installation for a project, that's a subcontracted |
| 17 | portion of our quotation, just to clarify. Thank you. |
| 18 | MR. YOUNG: Ryan Young with Husky. We don't get |
| 19 | involved in installations at all. It's always either the |
| 20 | distributor or another third party. |
| 21 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. |
| 22 | MR. QUIST: This is Eric Quist with Speedrack. |
| 23 | We handle it just as Mr. Young and Mr. Olson mentioned. |
| 24 | That we subcontract that on a separate line item. |
| 25 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. |

| 1 | MR. NEAL: Paul Neal with UNARCO. The same for |
|-----|--|
| 2 | us. It would be a separate line item. |
| 3 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, great. And just one |
| 4 | follow-up there. Mr. Anderson, you mentioned engineering. |
| 5 | Are engineering costs also included in the price, or is that |
| 6 | a separate line item as well? How does that work? |
| 7 | MR. NEAL: This is Paul Neal with UNARCO. As far |
| 8 | as we're concerned, we price that separately as well. That |
| 9 | is a separate line item outside of the material costs. |
| 10 | MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson with Steel King. |
| 11 | When we have engineering costs such as stamped calculations |
| 12 | and drawings required for a building permit, that would be a |
| 13 | separate line item. But we obviously has some internal |
| 14 | engineering costs in developing products and such, that's |
| 15 | kind of buried and not a line item. |
| 16 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Anybody have any different |
| 17 | answers from those? Okay. |
| 18 | MR. OLSON: This is Dave Olson. Just to clarify, |
| 19 | I think the difference between engineering and professional |
| 20 | engineering services is where the usually we add a |
| 21 | separate line item for professional engineering services, |
| 22 | because most manufacturers don't provide PE stamps in every |
| 23 | state in the country, so we do quote those as a separate |
| 2.4 | line item. |

But our design engineering services, where we

- develop the capacities of our products and we develop the
- design for a project, that's included in our overhead
- 3 structure and included in our pricing as a general rule.
- 4 It's not a separate line item in that case.
- 5 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, very good. Thank
- 6 you. I have no further questions.
- 7 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: I have just one question.
- 8 And this relates to a question that was asked earlier, but I
- 9 wanted to get into it just a little bit more. Respondents
- 10 noted that ten out of twenty-six purchasers reported supply
- 11 constraints during the period of investigation. And this is
- seen to Page 17 of their brief and also Page 29 of the staff
- 13 report. Could you all please discuss a bit further as to
- 14 whether or not the domestic industry has had difficulty
- 15 supplying customers?
- 16 MR. YOUNG: This is Ryan Young with Husky. I can
- 17 tell you throughout the period of investigation and before
- 18 are, as far as the commoditized products we're talking about
- 19 with this subject imports are Quick Ship lead time, never
- 20 came off forty-eight hours. It was always the same.
- 21 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: So is the staff report just
- 22 not right? The staff report states that almost one out of
- three purchasers experienced supply constraints.
- MR. ANDERSON: Jay Anderson with Steel King. I
- 25 think I mentioned in my testimony that we did have major

| 1 | expansion | of | our | plant | in | 2016 | and | we | have | not | been | able | to |
|---|-----------|----|-----|-------|----|------|-----|----|------|-----|------|------|----|
|---|-----------|----|-----|-------|----|------|-----|----|------|-----|------|------|----|

- 2 sell everything we're technically capable of making, so
- 3 while maybe our lead times ebb and flow over time, we still
- 4 would like to be doing more than what we're doing right now.
- 5 MR. OLSON: This is Dave Olson with Ridg-U-Rak.
- I think, as stated earlier, I think, I don't know if there
- 7 was misunderstanding, but we've had no problems with our
- 8 stocking distributors receiving their products, because we
- 9 preschedule all of their production slots to provide those
- 10 commodity products to them. The only constraint that I've
- 11 ever heard from any of our stocking distributors is price.
- 12 Thank you.
- 13 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay, thanks for your
- 14 responses. That concludes my questions. Do any other
- 15 Commissioners have questions for the panel? No
- 16 Commissioners do. Do staff have any questions for this
- 17 panel?
- 18 MR. BORISSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is
- 19 Stamen Borisson, Office of Investigations. Staff does have
- 20 one question.
- 21 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: All right.
- 22 MR. TSUJI: Good afternoon. I'm Karl Tsuji, the
- 23 Industry Analyst. Actually I have a question in two parts,
- 24 related to the Australian anti-dumping investigation on what
- 25 they refer to as steel pallet racking. In your post-hearing

| 2 | overlap between the subject product in the Australian |
|----|--|
| 3 | investigation and the subject product in this investigation. |
| 4 | That's the first part. |
| 5 | Second part is, please also in your post-hearing |
| 6 | briefs, provide any information about other ongoing |
| 7 | anti-dumping, countervailing duty investigations or orders |
| 8 | on steel racks in third country markets. And my final point |
| 9 | is that I will also ask the same question of the responding |
| 10 | panel members as well. Thank you very much. |
| 11 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Mr. Tsuji, we will do so. |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Do respondents have any |
| 13 | questions for this panel? |
| 14 | MR. MENEGAZ: Should it be respondent counsel?]: |
| 15 | No, we do not at this time. Thank you. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: All right, thank you. Okay, |
| 17 | then, let's now take a break for lunch. So we'll now recess |
| 18 | for lunch. Let's return here at 1:15. I would like to |
| 19 | remind parties not to leave any confidential business |
| 20 | information in the room as the hearing room is not secure. |
| 21 | And we'll see you back here at 1:15. |
| 22 | (Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., a lunch recess was had |
| 23 | to reconvene at 1:19 p.m.) |
| 24 | |
| | |

brief, please provide any comments about the degree of

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| 1 | AFTERNOON SESSION |
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| 2 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Mr. Secretary, are there any |
| 3 | preliminary matters? |
| 4 | MR. BISHOP: Mr. Chairman, I would note that the |
| 5 | Panel on Opposition to the Imposition of Antidumping and |
| 6 | countervailing duties have been seated. This panel has 60 |
| 7 | minutes for their direct testimony. |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: You all may proceed whenever |
| 9 | you like. |
| 10 | MR. MENEGAZ: Thank you. This is Gregory Menegaz |
| 11 | for the Panel in Opposition of the Law Firm Dick, Keefer, |
| 12 | Horgan. |
| 13 | I'd like to first start by explaining how we |
| 14 | organized our afternoon Panel. I'm going to speak first on |
| 15 | product coverage and then Bruce Malashevich it going to |
| 16 | speak on economic matters followed by Suzanna Perkins. |
| 17 | Then, I'm going to finish on the threat argument and our |
| 18 | last witness will be Ryan Bartlett of United Material |
| 19 | Handling and he will also present the sample products on the |
| 20 | table to my right. |
| 21 | So with that introduction, I'd like to pick up |
| 22 | the issue of product coverage again. As we noted in our |
| 23 | opening the Petitioners let off their prehearing brief and |
| 24 | this hearing complaining about product coverage and we |
| 25 | believe that their concerns are largely overblown. |

| 1 | As for the Exporters' coverage, the Petitioners |
|----|--|
| 2 | put on luminous exhibits in their brief with respect to |
| 3 | participation of Chinese exporters in the antidumping and |
| 4 | countervailing duty investigations. However, the pleadings |
| 5 | that the Petitioners rely on for evidence were due very |
| 6 | early in those investigations when the scope of the |
| 7 | investigations was very uncertain. |
| 8 | Petitioners changed the scope of the |
| 9 | investigations five times leading up to the preliminary |
| 10 | determinations of the Commerce Department and after the |
| 11 | preliminary determination of the ITC. So we're looking at a |
| 12 | very different scope and all those events were summarized in |
| 13 | the department scope memoranda which we would be glad to put |
| 14 | on the record in the post hearing brief. |
| 15 | But that was February of 2019. So, that was a |
| 16 | long time ago and a lot has changed and we believe that's |
| 17 | the reason why a lot of companies did not, have responded in |
| 18 | the investigations but have not responded in the final phase |
| 19 | of the ITC case. Many exporters would have dropped out of |
| 20 | the process when their racks were no longer relevant to the |
| 21 | case. |
| 22 | We would note that at least three mandatory |
| 23 | Respondents in the antidumping and countervailing duty cases |
| 24 | and we can make this all very clear in our post-conference |
| 25 | brief, posthearing brief, were fully investigated only for |

| 1 | the Commerce Department to conclude in both the |
|----|---|
| 2 | countervailing dumping cases that they were not selling |
| 3 | scope merchandise. |
| 4 | For the two mandatory Respondents that chose not |
| 5 | to cooperate in the antidumping and countervailing duty |
| 6 | cases that were ranked above them, these replacement |
| 7 | mandatories that were found not to be selling scope, that |
| 8 | means the next highest level exporters were found not to be |
| 9 | selling scope merchandise. |
| 10 | For Fwaday and Kingmore we've secured their |
| 11 | cooperation before the ITC. So we think you have full |
| 12 | export coverage or almost full export coverage here. You |
| 13 | know, to pick up a little bit of what was said in the |
| 14 | morning Panel, when you look at those you know many, many |
| 15 | responses to the initial questionnaires in Commerce and |
| 16 | compare them to the list of RMI certified companies and |
| 17 | their RMI website, most of them are not on that list. |
| 18 | In the original Staff Conference the Petitioner's |
| 19 | witnesses said RMI certification is actually extremely |
| 20 | important to be able to compete head-to-head with the |
| 21 | Petitioners in this industry. I don't think the ITC really |
| 22 | needs to speculate very much about that because there is a |
| 23 | robust record here that the ITC can rely on. |
| 24 | With respect to the importer coverage, it's a |
| 25 | little hit the same thing. It's very difficult to compare |

| 1 | importer responses in the preliminary phase of the ITC's |
|----|--|
| 2 | investigation to the responses in the final phase because of |
| 3 | all the changes in scope. Most of the witnesses at the |
| 4 | Staff Conference were concerned that their light duty racks |
| 5 | would be covered and they're not here anymore. So |
| 6 | obviously they are no longer concerned. |
| 7 | There was a point earlier that well that was |
| 8 | light duty and it can't account for the weight but obviously |
| 9 | if their market for light duty is very large it could easily |
| 10 | account for the weight. Just because an individual rack |
| 11 | might be lighter duty than these racks doesn't mean that a |
| 12 | huge quantity of potential merchandise did not leave this |
| 13 | market when the scope changed. |
| 14 | So, we just think that there is a reasonable and |
| 15 | maybe higher than average participation by exporters and |
| 16 | importers and the Staff wrote a robust report that can be |
| 17 | relied on for the final phase. With that, I'm going to pass |
| 18 | this microphone over to Bruce Malashevich. Thank you. |
| 19 | STATEMENT OF BRUCE MALASHEVICH |
| 20 | MR. MALASHEVICH: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. |
| 21 | Members of the Commission. I'm Bruce Malashevich President |
| 22 | of Economic Consulting Services, LLC and I'm joined by my |
| 23 | colleague, Suzanna Perkins the Staff Economist with our firm |
| 24 | and who has worked with me together throughout this final |
| 25 | phase. I'd like to point out that I |

| 1 | listened very carefully to the first Panel this morning and |
|----|---|
| 2 | noticed it was basically a regurgitation of their |
| 3 | affirmative case in the brief with practically no rebuttal |
| 4 | although they had some rather amazing testimony in response |
| 5 | to Commissioners' questions that I folded into my testimony |
| 6 | here this morning. |
| 7 | My impression is that Petitioners' entire case, |
| 8 | although not explicitly mentioning the 2015 amendments to |
| 9 | the statute is in fact relying upon the so-called "but for" |
| 10 | test. In practice, the Commission has invoked this |
| 11 | provision in a number of recent final determinations. I |
| 12 | read all such determinations and noticed several common |
| 13 | threads or tests you might say that emerged from the |
| 14 | Commission's reasoning. |
| 15 | One is whether the Domestic Industry failed to |
| 16 | perform better in an upturn of the relevant business cycle. |
| 17 | Another is whether widespread underselling by Subject |
| 18 | Imports prevented increases in domestic prices. Another is |
| 19 | the capacity utilization rate of the Domestic Industry and |
| 20 | its ability to have expanded to production if given the |
| 21 | chance. A fourth is the Domestic Industry's financial |
| 22 | experience. |
| 23 | The facts of record in this case fail each of |
| 24 | these "but for" tests. The plain language of the prehearing |
| 25 | report, Page 2-12 states "this industry is not driven by a |

| 1 | business cycle." So that test is not met. Aggregate |
|----|--|
| 2 | apparent consumption rose only modestly over the POI and did |
| 3 | not display any cyclical influences. |
| 4 | The trend in domestic selling prices, especially |
| 5 | those reported for products 1-4 is very positive with the |
| 6 | great majority of instances in sales volumes showing |
| 7 | overselling by Subject Imports. That test is not met. |
| 8 | On the subject of capacity utilization it is |
| 9 | instructive to review the prehearing report Table 3-4 |
| 10 | concerning capacity and production by producers. There are |
| 11 | certain anomalies that are called attention to in the |
| 12 | Respondents' brief and I was rather amazed when none of the |
| 13 | producers testifying this morning could answer a simple |
| 14 | question of what they believe a reasonable capacity |
| 15 | utilization is. |
| 16 | I can answer that for you in a posthearing |
| 17 | submission without a problem and it's addressed in |
| 18 | Respondents prehearing brief. But the fact that they |
| 19 | couldn't even answer the question should tell you something. |
| 20 | That test is not met. |
| 21 | In comparison with previous cases involving |
| 22 | fabricated products with a low level of fixed costs, in |
| 23 | aggregate this industry has been doing well with utilization |
| 24 | rates at respectable levels. But rates among certain |
| 25 | producers were much higher. Collectively, these companies |

accounted for a large share of total U.S. Production in 2018 1 in an industry with many more players. 2 3 A sign of capacity stress at some of the most 4 competitive players is sign of scarcity particularly since 5 total capacity increased between 2016 and 2018. They're also institutional constraints on expanding production 6 entirely unrelated to capacity or the presence of Subject Imports. 8 At Page Roman II-X of the prehearing report it 9 10 reports that Domestic Producers tend to place strict 11 territorial limits on purchasers deemed to compete with 12 established customers in the same region. Such practice 13 obviously constrains the Domestic Industry's available 14 opportunity to expand production sales and so limit its 15 potential to increase capacity utilization. The Domestic Industry's financial condition 16 17 indicates it is far from vulnerable. As discussed on page 35 or Respondents prehearing brief there are certain data 18 19 issues at play that are having a great impact on the 2.0 industry's overall profitability. These are discussed necessarily in the APO version of the brief. 21 22 Our team at ACS plotted the American Metal Market Price Index for hot-rolled steel against the U.S. Producers 23 24 reported weighted average price series for Product 1, the 25 highest volume product surveyed by the Commission over the

| Τ | POI. Petitioners claim that the domestic prices continue to |
|----|--|
| 2 | be suppressed in the later quarters of the POI despite the |
| 3 | dramatic decline in imports volume during that period. |
| 4 | That claim does not hold water. The reality is |
| 5 | that hot-rolled steel continued its sharply downward trend, |
| 6 | almost month to month from the middle of 2018 through the |
| 7 | first quarter while prices reported for the finished racks |
| 8 | to the Commission remained buoyant. This should have been a |
| 9 | perfect combination of falling costs and buoyant final |
| 10 | prices but it wasn't as found in the Staff Report in the |
| 11 | financial section. |
| 12 | The only reasonable explanations for this unusual |
| 13 | condition shown in the interim 2018 are discussed in |
| 14 | Respondents prehearing brief combined with timing effects in |
| 15 | recognizing for accounting purposes the sharp decline in |
| 16 | hot-rolled prices and accounting conventions affecting the |
| 17 | timing of when those declines are recognized for the purpose |
| 18 | of reporting financial information and the drawing down of |
| 19 | inventory with often the high-priced inventory pulled down |
| 20 | less so you have a lag effect between when prices for the |
| 21 | hot-rolled steel decline and when the industry benefits from |
| 22 | that decline owing to accounting interventions. |
| 23 | Now, at the time the Respondents' brief was |
| 24 | written the argument in this regard was based on the limited |
| 25 | information available and a lot of belief. I found it |

| 1 | rather astounding that this morning the domestic Panel |
|----|--|
| 2 | testified that basically our argument is right in explaining |
| 3 | the behavior of profitability and the lags associated with |
| 4 | pulling down high-priced inventory. |
| 5 | Indeed, even counsel for Petitioners conceded the |
| 6 | truth of that argument so we stand by it. Also in effect |
| 7 | was the prospect of the President's 25 percent tariff on |
| 8 | imports of racks from China that became reality in May but |
| 9 | the prospect was widely floated during the course of the |
| 10 | earlier months of that year. |
| 11 | Those are the real issues at play in explaining |
| 12 | the decline and the volume of Subject Imports in interim |
| 13 | 2019. Not DOC's preliminary determinations in December for |
| 14 | CVDs and in late March for the antidumping segment. |
| 15 | A few additional points that arose from the |
| 16 | testimony today. There was an extended discussion of what a |
| 17 | small market share means. How small is small? The market |
| 18 | share reported in the prehearing report, which I have no |
| 19 | reason to dispute is small in relation to what I have |
| 20 | observed in literally hundreds of Title 7 cases over the |
| 21 | years. But that's not the only point. |
| 22 | Reasonable people can argue whether that's small |
| 23 | or not in any particular industry however my point is a |
| 24 | little different. It is small, not only in relation to |
| 25 | consumption but in relation to the dominant share of |

| 1 | consumption dominated by domestic production. In most cases |
|----|--|
| 2 | you hear of consumption as supplied by some varying |
| 3 | combination of domestic production, Subject Imports, |
| 4 | non-Subject Imports in widely varying proportions. |
| 5 | It's not unusual for the Commission to hear cases |
| 6 | where the Domestic Industry occupies a minority share of |
| 7 | consumption or something not much more than a majority |
| 8 | though here it dominates particularly if you add in captive |
| 9 | imports from Mexico. |
| 10 | The Commission did something similar in a recent |
| 11 | case involving PET resin from various countries so it's not |
| 12 | unprecedented to add in the captive imports of Domestic |
| 13 | Producers, then the dominance is even greater. Details are |
| 14 | in the brief, so think about that. It is small not only in |
| 15 | absolute terms and truly tiny when considering the market |
| 16 | power of the Domestic Industry in the aggregate. |
| 17 | I read with interest the argument about level of |
| 18 | trade. Look at it this way. As you know, Petitioners have |
| 19 | huge amount of latitude and defining the pricing products |
| 20 | for a preliminary phase, in investigation typically with few |
| 21 | changes, if any made by staff. |
| 22 | MR. MALASHEVICH: I looked at the pricing |
| 23 | products from the preliminary. There's no distinction for |
| 24 | pricing requested as between end users and distributors. If |
| 25 | it was important why was it not requested in the |

| 1 | preliminary phase. And the plot thickens, so to speak, in |
|---|---|
| 2 | the final phase. |
| 3 | As you know, parties have lots of time to comment |
| 4 | on draft questionnaires in fashioning the final phase |

5 investigation. Well, the only changes made in the final

6 phase to the four products surveyed in the preliminary phase

were that the MRI-certification was added, and there were

8 minor changes in dimensions.

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Once again, there was no request by Petitioners to survey prices by different levels of trade. The fact of the matter is that there are none in this case. And I am prepared to spend in less than one page postconference, through reliance on the existing record as it is, to prove that point. So I think I rest my case on the issue of level of trade.

16 Let me just take a moment to look at my notes

18 (Pause.)

here.

I think that concludes my testimony, but I'll be

20 happy to answer any questions. Thank you.

21 STATEMENT OF SUSANNAH PERKINS

22 MS. PERKINS: Good afternoon, Commissioners, Chairman--

23 Mr. Chairman, and staff. My name is Susannah Perkins and I

24 am a staff economist at Economic Consulting Services. I

25 will be testifying to price effects, falling effects, and

| 1 | impact today. |
|----|---|
| 2 | This is a case primarily about causation. |
| 3 | Subject imports have not been a material cause of injury to |
| 4 | the domestic industry because domestic performance does not |
| 5 | correlate with subject import volumes or prices. If there |
| 6 | is no correlation, there can be no causation. |
| 7 | In framing a discussion of price effects, we need |
| 8 | to first establish that, contrary to Petitioners' claims, |
| 9 | competition in this industry is not primarily price based. |
| 10 | Table II-8 of the Staff Report shows that more purchasers |
| 11 | list quality, availability, delivery time, product |
| 12 | consistency, and reliability of supply as very important |
| 13 | than list price, with 96 percent of responding purchasers |
| 14 | stating delivery time is very important. |
| 15 | The record of this investigation shows that in |
| 16 | this key metric, subject product far outperforms domestic. |
| 17 | Page II-14 of the Staff Report shows that 73 percent of |
| 18 | domestic shipments are produced to order, which averages 50 |
| 19 | days of lead time, while 89 percent of subject imports |
| 20 | average only 8 days of lead time as they are shipped out of |
| 21 | inventories. |
| 22 | This morning's panel can attempt to obfuscate the |

facts, but the record stands. When 25 out of 26 responding

purchasers are saying that lead time is very important, and

the subject product is head and shoulders above domestic in

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| 1 | that regard, you can see how one of those options is much |
|----|--|
| 2 | more attractive to purchasers without any consideration of |
| 3 | price. |
| 4 | Any minute shift in market share that may be |
| 5 | observed in the data cannot be attributed to price-based |
| 6 | competition but to the domestic industry's inability to |
| 7 | provide its customers with product in a timely manner. |
| 8 | There's no credible evidence of price depression, |
| 9 | as domestic prices have increased in every way the |
| 10 | Commission measures. U.S. shipment AUVs are up. Pricing |
| 11 | product AUVs are up. And net sales AUVs are up. Especially |
| 12 | significant are the trends in the pricing products, as the |
| 13 | very products chosen by Petitioners to supposedly show the |
| 14 | most aggressive head-to-head competition with subject |
| 15 | imports show increasing prices across the board. And this |
| 16 | can be seen at Tables V-3 to V-6 of the Staff Report. |
| 17 | There's also no evidence of price suppression by |
| 18 | reason of subject imports. It's clear from Table VI-1 that |
| 19 | domestic producers experienced drastically increasing raw |
| 20 | material costs, coinciding with the 252 tariffs, and |
| 21 | increased their own prices in response to this. |
| 22 | The reason domestic producers were unable to pass |
| 23 | along more of the increase was the unprecedented speed at |
| 24 | which the price for hot-rolled coil increased. Looking at |
| 25 | Exhibit 5 to UMH's brief, you can see what would have |

| Τ | nappened to the operating margin if the domestic industry |
|-----|--|
| 2 | hadpardon methe operating margin of the domestic |
| 3 | industry if the cost of raw materials and the net sales AUV |
| 4 | both maintained their Q-1 levels throughout 2018. |
| 5 | Assuming no other changes to the industry, we |
| 6 | would have seen essentially the same performance in 2018 as |
| 7 | in 2016 just based on those two unit values not changing. |
| 8 | This is further supported by the industry's interim period |
| 9 | performance. |
| 10 | We see imports falling dramatically out of the |
| 11 | market in interim 2019, but the domestic industry's |
| 12 | performance continues to decline. |
| 13 | Now Petitioners can argue that this change in |
| 14 | volume was due to the effect of the Petition and preliminary |
| 15 | duties, but we submit that for an analysis of price effects |
| 16 | or impact it doesn't matter why the import volume fell if |
| 17 | the industry did not see relief. If imports are leaving the |
| 18 | market and the domestic industry is not recovering, it |
| 19 | undermines the claim that imports were impacting the |
| 20 | industry in the first place. |
| 21 | In Table V-8 of the Staff Report, we see majority |
| 22 | overselling by subject imports, with an average overselling |
| 23 | margin of 19.5 percent, and over 12 million pounds of |
| 24 | subject product overselling domestic. This translates to |
| 2.5 | overgolling in 20 out of 40 instances, and 62 nargent |

| 1 | overselling by quantity. |
|----|--|
| 2 | I would also like to point out how Petitioner's |
| 3 | counsel has taken statements from a questionnaire that |
| 4 | clearly referenced specific issues or tables other than the |
| 5 | price data and misconstrue them as applying to pricing data. |
| 6 | See pages 13 to 14 of Petitioner's prehearing brief. We can |
| 7 | and will address these serious misrepresentations of the |
| 8 | record in our posthearing submission. |
| 9 | Nonetheless, the record of this investigation |
| 10 | indicates that the Commission staff has done diligent work |
| 11 | verifying the data provided in the questionnaire responses |
| 12 | and have in fact removed aberrational data from the |
| 13 | aggregation where appropriate. Respondents are very |
| 14 | grateful to staff for all their hard work, and we invite the |
| 15 | Commission to look at the correspondence between many |
| 16 | importers and domestic producers and the ITC staff economist |
| 17 | for this case to confirm that. |
| 18 | We also see no significant evidence of lost sales |
| 19 | or lost revenues. The numbers are BPI, but in our brief at |
| 20 | page 28 you can see that as a percent of total reported |
| 21 | purchases the amount of product switched on the basis of |
| 22 | price is immaterial. |
| 23 | Additionally, only 4 out of 26 responding |
| 24 | purchasers claims that domestic producer to decrease prices. |
| 25 | There are also no appreciable volume effects in this case. |

| 1 | Subject imports cannot cause material harm to an established |
|----|--|
| 2 | industry when they control such a tiny share of the market, |
| 3 | especially considering the dominant share of the domestic |
| 4 | industry. |
| 5 | The market share we're seeing, and especially the |
| 6 | change in market share, is so minuscule that claims of |
| 7 | injury by reason of subject imports fall flat. The numbers |
| 8 | themselves are BPI, but I think if you'll direct your |
| 9 | attention to the shift in the market share between the |
| 10 | interim periods compared to the decline in domestic profit |
| 11 | margins in the same periodand this is Table C-1you'll |
| 12 | see that what's going on in this industry isn't subject |
| 13 | imports. The presence of subject imports is so small that |
| 14 | they could not be a material cause of injury. |
| 15 | In their brief, Petitioners claim that subject |
| 16 | imports are understated without addressing the fact that, as |
| 17 | we've mentioned, both domestic and nonsubject imported |
| 18 | shipments are also understated, as described at pages VI-7 |
| 19 | of our prehearing brief. |
| 20 | Moreover, the methodology by which they suggest |
| 21 | modifying the record is extremely blunt and lacks accuracy. |
| 22 | They've pocketed the majority of this discussion, but the |
| 23 | table on page 10 of Petitioners' brief demonstrates that. |
| 24 | Furthermore, any small change in market share that may be |
| 25 | charged in the data in the record are clearly not based on |

1 unfair competition. On page II-10 of the Staff Report, we see 2 3 evidence that purchasers aren't buying from domestic 4 producers for a host of reasons, chiefly lead times and 5 related issues. We also have a purchaser stating, in direct 6 contrast to something that was said this morning, current lead times for U.S.-produced pallet rack are so long that steel racks from China can be manufactured and shipped to 8 the United States faster than it is able to receive delivery 9 10 from a U.S. producer. End quote. That's a direct quote reproduced in the Staff Report. 11 12 We also see references on this page and 13 throughout the record to exclusivity arrangements where 14 domestic producers are refusing to sell to purchasers due to 15 geographic limitations or exclusive deals with a competitor, as well as a reference to a domestic producer delivering 16

defective product, on page II-11 of the Staff Report.

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If the domestic industry is unwilling or unable to deliver useable products to its purchasers, it isn't losing sales. Page II-10 and II-11 of the Report also addressed the fact that a major importer of subject merchandise has exited the market. This means that in order for the producers, this importer had a relationship with to continue exporting to the U.S., they would need to develop new relationships and new business agreements, and possibly

| 1 | go through new certifications. It remains to be seen |
|----|--|
| 2 | whether any producer will do this, especially with the 301 |
| 3 | tariffs in effect that make the U.S. a less attractive |
| 4 | export market to China. |
| 5 | The domestic industry's volume indicia also |
| 6 | aren't showing injury. At Table C-1, we see essentially |
| 7 | flat production over the POI, falling by only a percentage |
| 8 | point, accompanied by a very slight uptick in shipments. |
| 9 | Both production and shipments increased between '17 and '18. |
| 10 | We see increasing capacity and a corresponding |
| 11 | fall in utilization, but that returns to my earlier point. |
| 12 | If the domestic industry is refusing to sell to purchasers, |
| 13 | as several of them indicated, it really can't claim that |
| 14 | flat sales or declining production are the faults of subject |
| 15 | imports. Instead, they are the fault of its own decisions |
| 16 | not to make a particular sale. |
| 17 | Moreover, almost all of the volume indicators |
| 18 | fell between the interim periods, when subject imports were |
| 19 | at their lowest market penetration in the entire POI. So |
| 20 | there's no correlation to this story, and therefore no sign |
| 21 | of negative volume effects by reason of subject imports. |
| 22 | Once again, if there's no correlation there can |
| 23 | be no causation. |
| 24 | I'd like to take a moment before I get to impact |
| 25 | to point out that in order for the Commission to accept |

| 1 | Petitioner's theory of the case regarding either volume or |
|----|---|
| 2 | price, they would have to make significant adjustments to |
| 3 | the record of this investigation. |
| 4 | First, to exclude an importer from the pricing |
| 5 | data in order to manipulate the underselling record, and to |
| 6 | make a blanket adjustment to the market share of subject |
| 7 | imports when considering volume effects. |
| 8 | Turning to impact, first of all the lack of |
| 9 | adverse impact is clear in the investment indicators. We |
| 10 | see increasing R&D expenditures and increasing assets over |
| 11 | the POI, and increasing capital expenditures from '17 to |
| 12 | '18. |
| 13 | The Commission is aware that capital expenditures |
| 14 | can be irregular over time, and the apparent decline from |
| 15 | 2016 to 2017 is not in fact an indicator of injury, as |
| 16 | explained in page 31 of our brief. |
| 17 | Moreover, the domestic industry's Cap X to |
| 18 | Depreciation Ratio was well over 100 percent in every full |
| 19 | year of the POI, indicating that this industry has been |
| 20 | easily able to reinvest in its assets as they deplete their |
| 21 | average useful life. |
| 22 | We also see no impact in the employment |
| 23 | indicators. This industry has increasing production-related |
| 24 | workers between 2016 and 2018, and between the interim |
| 25 | periods, as well as increasing hours worked by PRWs, |

| 1 | increasing wages paid to PRWs, and increasing wages per |
|----|--|
| 2 | hour. |
| 3 | Against this established backdrop, the declining |
| 4 | profitability of the industry is something of a surprise. |
| 5 | We can see in the variance analysis at Table VI-5 of the |
| 6 | Staff Report that essentially all of the decline is caused |
| 7 | by increasing COGs, and the more detailed variance analysis |
| 8 | presented at Exhibit 7 to our brief proves that this is |
| 9 | further driven by raw materials. |
| 10 | As evidenced by the American Metal Market data in |
| 11 | the Staff Report, and our brief, the price of hot-rolled |
| 12 | coil skyrocketed in the latter part of the POI, but has been |
| 13 | falling steadily since the summer of 2018. |
| 14 | While the record of this investigation indicates |
| 15 | that rising raw material costs have negatively impacted the |
| 16 | industry's financial performance, there is absolutely no |
| 17 | evidence that the decline in domestic industry profitability |
| 18 | was in any way, much less a material way, related to subject |
| 19 | imports. |
| 20 | Profit margins do not correlate with absolute |
| 21 | subject import levels, subject import market share, or |
| 22 | subject import prices, as is particularly clear between the |
| 23 | interim periods. The table at page 34 of our brief lays |
| | |

There was a huge drop-off in subject imports

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this out.

| 1 | between the interim periods, and yet the domestic industry |
|----|--|
| 2 | saw a precipitous fall in profitability. If the decline |
| 3 | could at all be attributed to subject imports, import levels |
| 4 | and domestic performance should move in opposite directions. |
| 5 | This is not the case. Since there is no correlation between |
| 6 | subject imports and domestic performance, the necessary |
| 7 | causal link for an injury determination is absent. |
| 8 | Thank you, and I'm happy to answer any questions. |
| 9 | |
| 10 | MR. MENEGAZ: Okay, thank you, Susannah. This is |
| 11 | Gregory Menegaz for the record. I'm going to have a few |
| 12 | comments on threat before I hand things over to our witness. |
| 13 | As we addressed in pages 36 to 42 of our |
| 14 | prehearing brief, the volume of Chinese imports will not |
| 15 | threaten the domestic industry in the imminent future. We |
| 16 | recognize that volume went up slightly in the calendar |
| 17 | years, but the industry as a whole was growing. Chinese |
| 18 | imports declined sharply in the interim comparison period, |
| 19 | and UMH submits that it is a combination of the fact that |
| 20 | North Shore went out of business, and the imposition of the |
| 21 | 301 tariffs that drove Chinese imports down this way. |
| 22 | As you will hear from Mr. Bartlett shortly, the |
| 23 | 301 tariffs and the overall trade tensions cost him a |
| 24 | tremendous number of sales and lost new business. As the |
| 25 | prehearing report points out at page II-1 to -2 in the |

| Τ | public version, 8 of 9 importers who had knowledge of the |
|----|--|
| 2 | import prices since Section 301 tariffs were imposed |
| 3 | reported that prices had increased as a result. |
| 4 | Pricing trends for POI calendar years in interim |
| 5 | 2019 demonstrate that AUVs grew throughout the time period, |
| 6 | both for domestic products and subject imports. With the |
| 7 | majority of overselling of subject imports, there's no |
| 8 | indication that the domestic industry will be threatened for |
| 9 | the volume of such imports in the imminent future or, for |
| 10 | that matter, price suppression or depression. |
| 11 | Finally, China has a very robust domestic |
| 12 | industry, as well as third-country markets. It is not |
| 13 | export oriented. The majority of foreign producer shipments |
| 14 | were made in the home market in ever period in the POI. We |
| 15 | also see high and increasing levels of capacity utilization |
| 16 | as reflected in Table VII-3 of the Staff Report, which is |
| 17 | projected to continue through 2019 and '20. So we do not |
| 18 | see excess or increasing capacity in the most recent |
| 19 | calendar year in any projections. |
| 20 | Furthermore, this sector is experiencing global |
| 21 | robust growth. Therefore, the U.S. industry is not |
| 22 | threatened with material injury from China. The Petitioners |
| 23 | cited at page 24 and 25 of their prehearing brief a GOC 2013 |
| 24 | overall policy, but that's a very extremely weak, vague |
| 25 | linkage to potential threat. |

| 1 | And we were talking this morning about, you know, |
|----|--|
| 2 | what are the projections for the industry? And in the |
| 3 | prehearing brief the Petitioners included a Wall Street |
| 4 | Journal real estate article on the opening of new |
| 5 | warehouses, but that's notyou know, there's a tremendous |
| 6 | amount of business in refurbishing existing warehouses. |
| 7 | And there's industry specific data and reports out there |
| 8 | that is available to everybody in this room, and certainly |
| 9 | is available to Ryan Bartlett, and he can speak to that, |
| 10 | because I'm going to turn the microphone over to him now. |
| 11 | Thank you. |
| 12 | STATEMENT OF RYAN BARTLETT |
| 13 | MR. BARTLETT: Good afternoon, staffI'm sorry, |
| 14 | good afternoon, Commissioners and staff. Thank you for the |
| 15 | opportunity to be here today. |
| 16 | My name is Ryan Bartlett. I am the President of |
| 17 | United Material Handling located in Moreno Valley, |
| 18 | California. |
| 19 | We hold a large inventory of imported racks from |
| 20 | China. By holding a large inventory of common sizes, we car |
| 21 | service our customers' needs with an average of eight days. |
| 22 | As noted in the staff report on page 2, part 14, our average |
| 23 | lead times is eight days, while the Petitioners' are 50 |
| 24 | days. |
| 25 | This is listed by the Petitioners' response to |

1 the questionnaire as one of the most important facts while deciding when to purchase racking. The Petitioners fail to 2 3 understand that customers no longer expect to wait not just 4 for racks but anything they are purchasing, and instead the 5 Petitioners continue to maintain their long lead times, 6 making customers wait and wait. Let's put this in the perspective, since most of you have probably never planned or purchased racking for a 8 9 distribution center. Let's pretend you are on Amazon and 10 you have two choices for the same product. One is prime, and the other is not eligible for prime. The prime order 11 will get to you in 2 days, and the other non-prime products 12 13 will take 7 to 10 days. Which are you going to pick? If 14 you're not an Amazon user, consider you are to get work done at your house and one contractor could start in 8 days, and 15 16 the other in 50 days. The choice is clear on which product or 17 contractor you would pick, because in today's world no 18 19 customer wants to wait. The data collected by the ITC 20 supports that customers are even willing to pay more for the 21 products to get them quicker, which is shown on part 5, page 22 18, where we are overselling. 23 Recently I have been approached by potential 24 customers who typically buy from the U.S. producers asking 25 for our quote and our lead times, because they are unable to

| Τ | buy from the U.S. producers in a reasonable amount of time. |
|----|--|
| 2 | I am aware most U.S. producers have a 12 to 16 |
| 3 | week lead time currently. Imagine if you had rented a |
| 4 | large facility, about to start paying rent on it, and |
| 5 | couldn't put racking in it for 3 to 4 months? That would be |
| 6 | devastating to your bottom line. Customers are not able to |
| 7 | become fully functional and efficient until their storage |
| 8 | systems have been installed and they get to utilize them. |
| 9 | This isn't just a widget that would fill the |
| 10 | shelves, these are the shelves that are needed to store them |
| 11 | before you can start selling. |
| 12 | In addition to lead times, there are many other |
| 13 | factors that are important to purchasers: availability, |
| 14 | delivery terms, lead time, discounts offered, product |
| 15 | consistency, quality that meets industry standards, |
| 16 | reliability of supply, and RMI certification. |
| 17 | As much as the Petitioners would like to pretend |
| 18 | that this is a price-driven industry, the table on Page 2, |
| 19 | page 17, proves that this is not the case. |
| 20 | Another big advantage that imported racks from |
| 21 | China have is that our frame upright members are bolted |
| 22 | instead of welded. This allows our transportation to be |
| 23 | more cost effective by being able to ship around three times |
| 24 | more material on a truck than the Petitioners who weld their |
| 25 | frames and limit their ability to maximize shipping to the |

| 1 | customer. |
|----|--|
| 2 | As you can see, we have brought samples of all |
| 3 | the uprights here are welded and UMH sample is the only |
| 4 | bolted one. None of the Petitioners make a bolted-style |
| 5 | upright. |
| 6 | Another issue in the U.S. producers is they limit |
| 7 | their market by restricting to only certain regional |
| 8 | distributors who can sell their products, which severely |
| 9 | limit their ability to sell through other distributors and |
| 10 | gain market share in those areas. |
| 11 | For example, one of the U.S. producers designates |
| 12 | a distributor in the State of Arizona, only limiting the |
| 13 | business in the state to the distributor that everybody |
| 14 | knows. |
| 15 | The decision to limit their market is a poor |
| 16 | business decision that import racks are not responsible for. |
| 17 | Other characteristic differences are in the shape of UMH's |
| 18 | column that allows for bolted bracing that is optimized with |
| 19 | an innovative engineering to require the minimum amount of |
| 20 | steel required to obtain desired capacities. |
| 21 | The bracing is also engineered to minimize the |
| 22 | amount of steel required to hit the desired capacities and |
| 23 | allow for maximizing the shipping quantities as much as |
| 24 | possible. |
| 25 | Interchangeability between the two different |

| Τ | manufacturers is possible but not 100 percent. I would |
|----|--|
| 2 | guess a vast majority of the different manufacturers' |
| 3 | products can be intermixed within the industry using a |
| 4 | standard teardrop style racking. There are several |
| 5 | different issues that prevent interchangeability like |
| 6 | tolerances on the punches of the teardrops, connectors not |
| 7 | able to sit into the teardrop correctly, and our frame |
| 8 | beingor their frame being bolted not weldedsorry, our |
| 9 | frame being bolted and not welded. |
| 10 | Purchasers do not look to interchange when |
| 11 | purchasing systems from our manufacturer because they lose |
| 12 | the warranty that the manufacturer provides either directly |
| 13 | from the manufacturer or through the distributor. |
| 14 | Business became increasingly more difficult when |
| 15 | the 301 tariffs came into place in September, when we had to |
| 16 | raise our prices 10 percent and pass along this cost to the |
| 17 | customer. In May when the rates were increased to 25 |
| 18 | percent, many more customers were not willing to do business |
| 19 | with us due to the Chinese-U.S. relationship on trade and |
| 20 | the risk that it imposed on the ability to get the facility |
| 21 | open if there were further disputes between the two |
| 22 | countries. |
| 23 | In summary, the facts and data of this case |
| 24 | support that the imported racks from China are a very small |
| 25 | percentage of the U.S. market. We provide a small niche |

| 1 | market that provides racking almost immediately, and the |
|----|---|
| 2 | Petitioners are not able to service them with their 50-day |
| 3 | average lead time. |
| 4 | We can provide this to the customers for a |
| 5 | premium price, which the data supports the prevalence of |
| 6 | overselling. The data also supports the pricing is not the |
| 7 | most important factor. For example, UMH uses a inventory |
| 8 | model that shortens the lead times drastically. We also |
| 9 | have spent the time to engineer a more innovative design on |
| 10 | our racks by implementing a bolted design that saves |
| 11 | customers money on transportation. |
| 12 | With all this evidence, the U.S. market is |
| 13 | thriving and will continue to thrive in the future. The |
| 14 | U.S. producers have not been harmed by subject imports, but |
| 15 | are trying to close off competition rather than innovation. |
| 16 | I have brought samples from most of the |
| 17 | Petitioners' racking, along with my racking. I want to |
| 18 | spend a couple of minute to go over these with you, and |
| 19 | after the hearing I'll leave the samples and invite you to |
| 20 | put your hands on them. |
| 21 | I would be happy to answer any questions that you |
| 22 | may have. So I realize that you guys probably have never |
| 23 | put your hands on these, or seen them. You've probably |
| 24 | interacted with them at a Home Depot or a Lowe's Store. |
| 25 | This is the Teardrop Punch that everybody's |

| Τ | talking about is interchangeable. This is bracing, and a |
|----|--|
| 2 | column, and then these are beams that obviously go on to the |
| 3 | teardrop. |
| 4 | There's obviously tolerance differences when |
| 5 | these are punched. If this hole is punched further away or |
| 6 | closer tofrom different manufacturers, they obviously |
| 7 | won't sit into the teardrop correctly. Most are similar, |
| 8 | but they're not all interchangeable. Let me give you an |
| 9 | example. |
| 10 | This is where our design is bolted, where the |
| 11 | bracing shares the bolt, and all of the other samples are |
| 12 | all welded. By being able to bolt them, we can ship without |
| 13 | the bolts assembled into this. So we're able to probably |
| 14 | get at least three times more product on a truckload for |
| 15 | this particular product. |
| 16 | You will notice that the top one, which goes with |
| 17 | this sample, it sits 90 degree flush with it, and I'm |
| 18 | pushing this this way. On this sample, it cannot sit flush |
| 19 | on it at a 90-degree angle, which would allow the connector |
| 20 | on the other side, if this wasn't a sample, the ability to |
| 21 | not get put into the teardrop on the frame on the other |
| 22 | side. This is just one example of how they are not |
| 23 | interchangeable. |
| 24 | Also, the Petitioners this morning stated that |
| 25 | they would not call their racks if they know it was going to |

- 1 be interchanged with any other manufacturer. That's all I
- 2 have. I'd be happy to take any questions.
- 3 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: And that concludes your
- 4 testimony, is that correct?
- 5 MR. MEMEGAZ: Yes, that's correct.
- 6 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: All right, well, we
- 7 appreciate you all being here today. We will now begin
- 8 Commissioner questions with Commissioner Kearns.
- 9 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Great, yes, thank you all
- 10 for being here today. I appreciate you coming out from
- 11 California. And I think you all answered a lot of questions
- 12 I had in your opening. So I have a lot fewer questions than
- I had originally thought. But I do have a few here.
- I wanted to start with, and I know, Ms. Perkins,
- 15 you addressed this a little bit in your opening as well,
- 16 but, you know, it seems to me that the petitioners make a
- 17 pretty strong case for why the product pricing data we have
- 18 for one of the importers is aberrational, whether you look
- 19 at it from, you know, that importer's price compared to
- others, if you look at AUVs, if you compare it to a
- 21 purchaser questionnaire answers on price superiority, if you
- 22 look at lost sales, lost revenue, you know, and I take the
- 23 point that I think you made this morning about the fairly
- 24 small percentage of the overall market, that it's covered by
- 25 those lost sales and lost revenue in census and yet, you

| | 1 | know, | overwhelmingly | where | there | was | an | answer | to | the |
|--|---|-------|----------------|-------|-------|-----|----|--------|----|-----|
|--|---|-------|----------------|-------|-------|-----|----|--------|----|-----|

- question, it did seem as though the answer was that the U.S.
- 3 industry lost due to price.
- 4 So given all of that, I mean, what should we do
- 5 with this importers' product pricing information?
- 6 MS. PERKINS: Susannah Perkins, ECS. I'm gonna
- 7 come at this, I wanna be careful about what I say, because
- 8 this does obviously concern one company's data in its
- 9 questionnaire. So we'll definitely respond more fully in
- 10 our post-hearing submission, but I think that the core
- 11 respondents confirms -- there's some discussion about --
- 12 sorry, I'm trying not to get too close to the BPI -- as an
- overview, I think that they should be left in the
- 14 aggregation.
- 15 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay.
- 16 MS. PERKINS: I think that their data is not
- 17 really as far out of it. There are other differences to the
- 18 underselling record. There's other firms who've responded
- 19 who didn't respond at the prelim that would account for a
- 20 change between the domestic producer or between the prelim
- 21 and the final, so there are both domestic producers and
- 22 importers. It's a different record. They're slightly
- 23 different products, so I think that this company should be
- left in and I can get into the reasons for that
- post-hearing. So that's my answer to that.

| 1 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you. |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. MALASHEVICH: If I may add, please, Bruce |
| 3 | Malashevich, ECS. In addition to that, by correspondence, |
| 4 | we mean official correspondence between the staff and the |
| 5 | company involved. |
| 6 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. |
| 7 | MR. MALASHEVICH: And we looked at all that |
| 8 | stuff. And one reason why we are so confident that |
| 9 | notwithstanding the value involved, that the record should |
| 10 | stay as it is because staff diligently drilled down. As you |
| 11 | know, we're not permitted to contact the reporting companies |
| 12 | directly unless they're our client. But the staff was |
| 13 | quite, quite diligent in looking after essentially the same |
| 14 | issue. So the fact that their judgment, they retained the |
| 15 | value as is, as was confirmed, I think says a lot about the |
| 16 | veracity of the information. |
| 17 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, great. Thank you |
| 18 | very much. That's helpful. Yeah, please. |
| 19 | MS. PERKINS: Sorry, Ms. Perkins for the record |
| 20 | again. One quick thing I wanted to say is that a comparison |
| 21 | of import AUV to the pricing product AUV is not really |
| 22 | appropriate in the first place. That the import AUV is |
| 23 | naturally not going to include everything that the pricing |
| 24 | product AUV does. So that's sort of a false equivalence |

being drawn there, in my opinion.

| 1 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you. Turning |
|-----|--|
| 2 | to the cost-price squeeze issue. You argue that just |
| 3 | because prices went up so quickly and so significantly, |
| 4 | that's the source of the industries' problems. And, you |
| 5 | know, but of course, petitioners would say, well, you know, |
| 6 | that may happen in other cases, but you can raise your |
| 7 | prices and we weren't able to do so in this case because of |
| 8 | subject imports. So I guess I'd like you to respond to |
| 9 | that. |
| 10 | But then also, if you can respond to what we |
| 11 | heard this morning, which was that, you know, that most of |
| 12 | the sales for the U.S. industry are spot sales and so |
| 13 | increases in raw material costs are pretty immediately |
| 14 | factored into sales prices if they're able to do so, if |
| 15 | there isn't competition for subject imports. Did you all |
| 16 | have any responses to that? |
| 17 | MS. PERKINS: Susannah Perkins, ECS. So some of |
| 18 | this is gonna be about the pricing practices of the domestic |
| 19 | producers, which I don't have insight into. But I would |
| 20 | say, first of all, that they did raise their prices in |
| 21 | response to increasing raw materials. |
| 22 | And so it's not, we're not saying that there's no |
| 23 | evidence that they couldn't pass along part of the increase, |
| 24 | but there's a very large spike, and you can see that, |
|) 5 | therely a graph in the staff report therely a graph in our |

| Τ. | bilei, of the American Metal Market data. |
|----|--|
| 2 | And in terms of the spot sales, there is |
| 3 | discussion, I have the public version in front of me, so I'm |
| 4 | not sure if the page numbers will exactly track, but in my |
| 5 | copy it's 5-2 and 5-3 of the staff report where domestic |
| 6 | producers and an importer are noting that there's added a |
| 7 | surcharge. |
| 8 | And we don't have insight into when that |
| 9 | happened, but it seems to me from this discussion, as well |
| 10 | as from the questionnaire responses, that it sounded like |
| 11 | there were surcharges being added, not indexing, that would |
| 12 | be what's going on in a contract situation. So I don't, |
| 13 | again, I can't confirm this and I don't wanna speculate, but |
| 14 | there is discussions of surcharges in the staff report and |
| 15 | that's the best evidence I have for this. |
| 16 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Please, Mr. Malashevich. |
| 17 | MR. MALASHEVICH: Yes, one further thing. I |
| 18 | think it's fair to say that the testimony of the individual |
| 19 | witnesses today was actually quite mixed in terms of |
| 20 | whether these price on a spot or different kinds of |
| 21 | arrangements, and what I glean from the testimony is that |
| 22 | there was a lot of push-back from certain customers who had |
| 23 | some kind of arrangement that was in place. |
| 24 | There was mention of certain fixed-price |
| 25 | contracts in certain situation. I think each producer has a |

| 1 | different philosophy about its pricing. And the fact of the |
|----|---|
| 2 | matter is, just because costs increases, it doesn't mean |
| 3 | that individual purchasers will go along with it. |
| 4 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: But what would stop I |
| 5 | mean I would think that the U.S. producers would increase |
| 6 | their prices unless they weren't able to do so, so the only |
| 7 | reason why a purchaser, you would, would say, I mean, how |
| 8 | can a purchaser say no? One reason would be because they |
| 9 | can go to the purchasing subject imports as a replacement. |
| 10 | What other reasons are there? |
| 11 | MR. MALASHEVICH: Well, the other reasons out |
| 12 | there is that this is an industryI may be off by one or |
| 13 | twowith something like ten players. And those ten players |
| 14 | collectively account for a dominant share of the market by |
| 15 | anybody's standard. So there are other domestic players |
| 16 | they can go to. They can go to imports from Mexico as |
| 17 | another alternative. |
| 18 | So there needs to be a reality check between the |
| 19 | size of the import market share, even at its peak, and the |
| 20 | size of the market share of domestic producers, including |
| 21 | captive imports from Mexico, in particular. So they have a |
| 22 | lot of other options. |
| 23 | And also, in my experience in these cases, you |
| 24 | hear a lot of customers saying, "Well, they don't like to |
| 25 | accept what's calledin the jargonopportunistic price |

1 increases," where somebody's been a supplier to them for many years and all of a sudden, they're making a price 2 increase and there's some negotiated settlement in between. 3 4 I don't think -- take the price of gasoline, 5 obviously it moves with the price of oil, and oil is the 6 larger component of that than the steel is in this industry 7 here. Yes, they move in sync, but not immediately, because of competition and existing arrangements that might include 8 9 or guarantee, well, we're gonna hold our price for so many 10 months, and the adjustments would not be instantaneous, but more align of a step increase. 11 12 And our point here is that when the prices move 13 up so quickly by so much, it's not to be expected that any 14 industry would be able to immediately put up the price to cover themselves. And the effects of that on the downside 15 16 of pricing, which was equally traumatic from about the summer of 2018, are that they had all this high-priced 17 material, steel, that they bought, not anticipating that 18 19 prices would plummet by the degree they had, and they were 20 stuck with this stuff that they had to use and draw it down. 21 So there were issues of the difficulty of 22 increasing prices by double-digit percentages to the 23 customers. Generally, when you have ten competitors, even 24 if imports were zero. And on the downside, there was really an accounting issue of, you know, having to use that 25

| 1 | high-priced inventory and that's going to depress their |
|----|--|
| 2 | reported profits for financial purposes, which is what the |
| 3 | Commission relies on properly so. But in the actual |
| 4 | marketplace, if you looked at the spread of steel versus the |
| 5 | racks at the same time, you're going to have what appears to |
| 6 | be a hugely widening profit spread, but that would not occur |
| 7 | immediately, probably is occurring now. |
| 8 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, great, thank you. My |
| 9 | time is up. |
| 10 | MR. MENEGAZ: Am I able to just add two cents to |
| 11 | the responses? |
| 12 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Please, yes. |
| 13 | MR. MENEGAZ: We do want to put into perspective |
| 14 | the option of Mexico. There are two big U.S. producers that |
| 15 | we all know, Frazier and Interlake, that did not join the |
| 16 | petition. Our client informs us that they are the 800-pound |
| 17 | gorillas in this market. They are the two largest producers |
| 18 | with essentially unlimited access to Mexican products and |
| 19 | their own products. So it's not a hypothetical that there |
| 20 | were many options in the marketplace besides the subject |
| 21 | imports. Thank you. |
| 22 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, thank you very much. |
| | |

adequately explain any shift in market share away from the

nonprice factors such as lead time and availability

CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Respondent claims that

23

24

| 1 | domestic industry to subject imports during the period of |
|----|--|
| 2 | investigation. And y'all argue this at Page 9 of your |
| 3 | brief. Are you aware of specific purchasers who quit |
| 4 | purchasing domestic steel racks due to these factors? |
| 5 | MR. BARTLETT: Ryan Bartlett with United |
| 6 | Materials Handling. I would say that not all purchasers |
| 7 | quit solely purchasing from U.S. producers, but they looked |
| 8 | at the option when their customers need the supply of power |
| 9 | racking quicker. So they don't solely stop supplying to |
| 10 | their customers U.Sproduced racks. |
| 11 | In addition to that, we also have, you know, some |
| 12 | customers that come to us for a bid and we are competing |
| 13 | head-to-head with the U.S. producers. I mean, a lot of our |
| 14 | orders are based on lead time, and we have a huge facility |
| 15 | that stores racking and with our one- to two-week lead time, |
| 16 | it was a much more advantageous for customers who are |
| 17 | looking at a 12- to 16-week lead time from U.S. producers. |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay, thank you, Mr. |
| 19 | Bartlett. And are there any other factors in your view that |
| 20 | explain the market share shift between the domestic industry |
| 21 | and the subject imports from 2016 to 2018? And you see the |
| 22 | shift in the Table C-1 of the staff report. |
| 23 | MR. BARTLETT: I think some of the shift would be |
| 24 | that our product is obviously more cost-effective for |
| 25 | shipping. It has, you know, obviously, different lead |

| | cimes, the ability to engineer crose to the capacities of |
|----|--|
| 2 | the U.S. producers. It's not exact. And our design and I |
| 3 | think our aesthetics are better looking. |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Yes. |
| 5 | MS. PERKINS: Susannah Perkins, ECS. Just to |
| 6 | speak to that. So it's only a few percentage points of |
| 7 | market share really changed. So there doesn't need to be a |
| 8 | mass exodus of purchasers saying, "We don't wanna buy from |
| 9 | domestic producers." Just a few purchasers deciding that |
| 10 | the lead times are an important issue, could be enough to |
| 11 | shift a few percentage points. So I think it's just an |
| 12 | important thing to keep in mind when we're talking about |
| 13 | such a tiny shift in volume. Thank you. |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay, thanks, Ms. Perkins. |
| 15 | Sixteen out of twenty purchasers, or 80%, reported that |
| 16 | subject imports were priced lower than domestic steel racks, |
| 17 | and this can be seen at Table 2-10 of the staff report. In |
| 18 | addition, of the fourteen purchasers who stated that they |
| 19 | purchased subject imports instead of domestic steel racks, |
| 20 | some thirteen stated that subject imports were priced lower |
| 21 | as shown in Table 5-10 of the staff report. |
| 22 | How do we square the pricing data showing more |
| 23 | overselling than underselling with the information from |
| 24 | purchasers also compiled in the prehearing report that tells |
| 25 | us that subject imports are priced lower than domestic |

| 1 | product? It's kind of a confusing situation. |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. MALASCHEVICH: Bruce Malashevich, ECS. And |
| 3 | Ms. Perkins will likely add to this. She's smarter than I |
| 4 | am, so it's more important. But I think we have to |
| 5 | understand that there are a lot of configurations of these |
| 6 | products. "Different strokes for different folks." And the |
| 7 | pricing data focuses on apples-to-apples comparisons. |
| 8 | And those apples might not be the same as what |
| 9 | the purchasers are reporting as lower- or higher-priced. |
| 10 | But they're deemed to be that representative of that pricing |
| 11 | as a whole. They were defined by petitioners. So, you |
| 12 | know, presumably, the expectation was that their best case |
| 13 | would be made from these products. And it just didn't work |
| 14 | out that way. Ms. Perkins, do you have something to add? |
| 15 | MS. PERKINS: Yeah, Susannah Perkins, ECS. I |
| 16 | think that petitioners this morning talked a lot about their |
| 17 | different they have sort of, I don't wanna say "segments" |
| 18 | necessary, but they had two sort of distinct product lines |
| 19 | they talked about, their customized things and their stock |
| 20 | markets. And all of the industry witnesses really |
| 21 | emphasized that the stock products are what is competing |
| 22 | head-to-head with subject imports, even though we know Ryan |
| 23 | does have some ability to do some customization as well. |
| 24 | So the pricing data is, as my colleague, Mr. |
| 25 | Malashevich, pointed out, that's specific pieces. And if |

| 1 | the imported product is, in general, not offering this |
|----|--|
| 2 | customization, then the purchaser perceptions would be that |
| 3 | domestic is priced higher, even though, when you lay a piece |
| 4 | side-by-side, when you lay the same beam from domestic and |
| 5 | imported, the imported beam might be higher, is that clear? |
| 6 | Did I make myself clear? |
| 7 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: I think so. I mean I |
| 8 | understand what you're saying there. But this leads me to a |
| 9 | very basic question, which is only, like, eight or nine |
| 10 | words long, which might be too basic today. But are subject |
| 11 | imports priced lower than domestic product? |
| 12 | MS. PERKINS: Susannah Perkins. I think the |
| 13 | underselling data indicates that that's mixed. |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay. That's kind of |
| 15 | yeah, okay, thank you. Petitioner argues that anti-dumping |
| 16 | and Section 232 duties on hot-rolled steel provide incentive |
| 17 | for Chinese producers to focus on downstream products such |
| 18 | as steel racks and increase their exports to the U.S. market |
| 19 | in the absence of relief. They argued this at Pages 26 and |
| 20 | 27 of their brief. Do you see this incentive pointing out? |
| 21 | And does this explain in any part the increase in subject |
| 22 | imports during the period of investigation? |
| 23 | MR. MENEGAZ: This is Greg Menegaz. I don't |
| 24 | think so. I think, as our witnesses explained, there are a |
| 25 | lot of nonprice factors. It's a very modest absolute volume |

| 1 | increase | in | the | market | and, | you | know, | their | linkage | is | а |
|---|----------|----|-----|--------|------|-----|-------|-------|---------|----|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | |

- 2 very highly speculative. And so we don't think the
- 3 Commission should put any weight on a 2013 government policy
- 4 plan or on the fact that there were orders on other steel
- 5 products. Thank you.
- 6 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay, thanks, Mr. Menegaz.
- Respondent has argued that the Section 301 tariffs now in
- 8 effect, create an unprecedented advantage for domestic
- 9 producers of steel racks. And this is at Page 2 of your
- 10 brief. A number of domestic producers, however, have
- 11 reported no change in demand, supply, U.S. prices, or raw
- material costs as a result of the Section 301 tariffs, as
- 13 shown in Table 2-1 of the staff report. What is your
- 14 reaction to this?
- 15 MR. MENEGAZ: Well, I mean, we could look at that
- 16 and address it more fully in the post-conference brief, but
- 17 certainly the 25% tariff on 301 is outside the data that
- 18 you've collected. And I would argue that even when you look
- 19 at a 10% tariff and the 25% tariff and you compare it to the
- 20 level of underselling, we would argue that, regardless,
- 21 injury has been removed.
- 22 And so, you know, what our client is reporting is
- 23 that the lead times for the petitioners is growing rapidly,
- 24 not shrinking. It's much more than fifty days now, so that
- 25 would contradict whatever findings you're referring to from

- 1 their arguments.
- 2 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: All right, thank you, Mr.
- 3 Menegaz. And to follow up on that, could you all please
- 4 explain how the Section 301 tariffs have impacted your
- 5 businesses, or your business and the U.S. market from your
- 6 perspective? Mr. Bartlett?
- 7 MR. BARTLETT: Sure. Ryan Bartlett, United
- 8 Materials Handling. The 301 tariffs have obviously
- 9 increased our costs dramatically. It's not allowing us to
- 10 service our customers. We have a smaller supply of
- inventory. We are still having to pass as much of that on
- 12 to the customer as possible, but we're not having any luck
- 13 with that.
- I would say on the U.S. market, I believe it's
- obviously given them an advantage over subject imports, but
- 16 they're still being held by the imports from Mexico, so
- 17 while they can't directly be in charge of the pricing,
- 18 they're still being checked by other nonsubject imports.
- 19 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Thanks, Mr. Bartlett. My
- 20 time is about to expire, so we'll now turn to Commissioner
- 21 Williamson.
- 22 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Thank you, Mr.
- 23 Chairman. I wanted to express my appreciation to the
- 24 witnesses for coming today. Mr. Bartlett, I was wondering
- 25 if you could -- what else does MHS[sic] do anything else

| 1 | other than sell the subject product: |
|-----|--|
| 2 | MR. BARTLETT: UMH? Me? |
| 3 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Excuse me, I'm sorry. |
| 4 | MR. BARTLETT: Yeah, so we sell the subject |
| 5 | product, we do installations. We sell a third-party |
| 6 | engineering service and we would also set up freight for |
| 7 | customers. Those are really the four items that we do. |
| 8 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, so, would you |
| 9 | consider yourself both an importer and a distributor then, |
| 10 | in certain respects? |
| 11 | MR. BARTLETT: Yes. |
| 12 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, and so are |
| 13 | distributors pretty much spread all over are they |
| 14 | concentrated or do they tend to specialize in certain areas? |
| 15 | MR. BARTLETT: This is Ryan with UMH. I can't |
| 16 | speak for the petitioners' distributors, but we do have some |
| 17 | distributors we work with that are most likely are mostly |
| 18 | regionally. We do not have any distributors on the East |
| 19 | Coast, since we're West Coast-based. But we may have a |
| 20 | customer or distributor that's on the East Coast selling a |
| 21 | project on the West Coast, which we would then supply the |
| 22 | material for. |
| 23 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay. This morning the |
| 24 | petitioners kept talking about the fact that and it's |
| 2.5 | talking about this load times that their distributors what |

| 1 | they can provide just-in-time, as well as the imports. And |
|----|--|
| 2 | that it's really, the lead times are between the domestic |
| 3 | producer and their distributors. It sounds like you are in |
| 4 | a position to have that inventory available as a distributor |
| 5 | to get to the end user and that their distributors can do |
| 6 | the same, does that really put the domestic industry at a |
| 7 | better disadvantage? |
| 8 | MR. BARTLETT: I don't believe so. I believe |
| 9 | most of their sales is not through stocking distributors. I |
| 10 | believe they do have very small share of stocking |
| 11 | distributors that handle a very small amount of racking. We |
| 12 | handle very, very large amount of inventory that allows us |
| 13 | to react faster than, say, somebody who's stocking a 1,000 |
| 14 | beams versus us, who's stocking 100,000 beams. |
| 15 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: But are there |
| 16 | distributors who are national distributors, as well as |
| 17 | local? |
| 18 | MR. BARTLETT: For us or for the petitioners? |
| 19 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Well, first petitioners |
| 20 | and then for you. |
| 21 | MR. BARTLETT: I don't know |
| 22 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Or is there a |
| 23 | difference in who your distributors are versus their |
| | |

MR. BARTLETT: No, I believe they're about the

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distributors?

- 1 same and I believe they're mostly regionally. There's
- 2 nobody, that I'm aware of, that's spread throughout the
- 3 country.
- 4 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Ms. Perkins, you seem
- 5 to want to interject here, so --
- 6 MS. PERKINS: Yeah, thank you, Commissioner
- 7 Williamson. Susannah Perkins, ECS. I just wanna say that
- 8 this was actually confirmed by petitioners' panel this
- 9 morning. I believe it was Mr. Quist who said 20- to 25% of
- 10 his sales are to distributors. And that is almost exactly
- 11 confirmed by what the staff report says, that 73% are
- 12 produced to order.
- So, and I believe Mr. Young, is it, of the Husky
- 14 Wireway, said 25%, could be up to 50%, so that's not--I
- 15 think--doesn't contradict what's in the staff report about
- 16 the 73% of shipments being produced to order. I just wanted
- 17 to point that out.
- 18 MR. BARTLETT: And I'd like to add that, you
- 19 know, you can be a distributor of their product and not
- 20 stock it. So they can sell product coming directly from the
- 21 U.S. producers plant directly to the job site, which is a
- 22 majority of their distribution sales. Very little of their
- 23 distribution sales is actually buying and stocking at their
- 24 facility.
- 25 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: So are those mostly to

| Τ | projects that are large-scale projects that have to be |
|----|--|
| 2 | well-planned out far in advance? Or |
| 3 | MR. BARTLETT: I believe it would be all types of |
| 4 | projects, large, small and medium. And also the larger |
| 5 | projects, they work directly with the U.S. producers. |
| 6 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Say that again? |
| 7 | MR. BARTLETT: So most customers, when they have |
| 8 | a large project, they do not work through distributors. |
| 9 | They work directly with the U.S. producers. And buy |
| 10 | directly from the U.S. producers. |
| 11 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: And are those projects |
| 12 | ones that tend to have a long-term planning |
| 13 | MR. BARTLETT: Yes. |
| 14 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: terms of |
| 15 | MR. BARTLETT: Yes. |
| 16 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay. And do you work |
| 17 | with those do you sell to large projects, too? |
| 18 | MR. BARTLETT: Very rarely. There's a couple of |
| 19 | customers that I have a really good relationship, that we've |
| 20 | been able to build that ability for them, but we are mainly |
| 21 | supplying a smaller type of project. |
| 22 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay. |
| 23 | MR. BARTLETT: And I'll add to that. When they |
| 24 | were saying customizations, I have a couple of customers |

that like their racks painted as their company colors, and

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| 1 | they're waiting the lead time to get the company colors, |
|----|---|
| 2 | which we don't charge extra for. And so that's why the |
| 3 | customization to a degree is what we're able to do for |
| 4 | customers. |
| 5 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay. I guess, for the |
| 6 | economists and lawyers. Post-hearing, could you take a look |
| 7 | at Table 2-2, which talks about sources and channel of |
| 8 | distribution and particularly of imports from China. And |
| 9 | there was a shift from '18 to '19, in between distributors |
| 10 | and I want you to comment on post-hearing, and what does |
| 11 | that mean? |
| 12 | Okay. Also, Ms. Perkins, and Chairman Johanson |
| 13 | also got it though somewhat. You had talked about the |
| 14 | you have referred to Table 2-2 and the I'm sorry, wrong |
| 15 | one. Table 2-8, you had talked about what purchasers |
| 16 | considered to be important. And you mentioned that there |
| 17 | were more things than price. |
| 18 | But if you compare that with the results in Table |
| 19 | 2-10 as to where the imports were supposed to have an |
| 20 | advantage, it would seems like only one of those leading |
| 21 | things was there a significant difference, and isn't that |
| 22 | really the more important point when you're talking about |
| 23 | price and impact? And you can do it post-hearing, but do |
| 24 | you |

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MS. PERKINS: Yeah, I think I will get more into

| 1 | this | post-hearing | g, Susannah | Perkins, | ECS. | One | thing | Ι | would |
|---|------|--------------|-------------|----------|------|-----|-------|---|-------|
|---|------|--------------|-------------|----------|------|-----|-------|---|-------|

- 2 like to point out is that in petitioners' presentation this
- 3 morning, they had a nice little pie chart where they'd
- 4 collapsed superior and comparable and compared it to
- 5 inferior. And if you look at, for example, delivery time,
- 6 you'll see that it's evenly split, essentially. It's 7-7-5,
- 7 in terms of superior, comparable, inferior, so that's just,
- 8 I think that these numbers, they don't show necessarily a
- 9 dominance one way or the other, but I'll get more into this.
- 10 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Yeah, but I guess the
- 11 question -- yeah, they may be comparable, but the thing is
- where they're not comparable, the significant difference is
- in the price.
- MS. PERKINS: I understand. I think I'm going to
- 15 need to get it at post-hearing, but --
- 16 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay. What explains
- 17 the pattern of imports we see? Particularly with the
- substantial increases in the last three quarters of 2018?
- 19 This is at UMH's prehearing brief, Page 13. And what
- 20 explains the decline in interim 2019?
- 21 MR. MENEGAZ: So, you're just asking about the
- decline in imports in 2019 internally?
- 23 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: No, also the increase
- 24 in 2018.
- 25 MR. MENEGAZ: Well, we would maintain that the

| 1 | increase was modest throughout the POI year to year and |
|----|--|
| 2 | overall, until the interim 2019 when the, you know, the 301 |
| 3 | really started to bite into the Chinese exports. So, we |
| 4 | don't think that these are significant numbers in the |
| 5 | calendar years in the first place. |
| 6 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, and but you'll |
| 7 | say the decline was because of the two 301's and the |
| 8 | MR. MENEGAZ: Yes, that and the departure of a |
| 9 | major importer from the market as the staff noted. |
| 10 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay. |
| 11 | MR. MENEGAZ: So, that would probably you know, |
| 12 | put a big hole in the ability of their Chinese supplier to |
| 13 | continue to participate in the market. |
| 14 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, okay. Thank you |
| 15 | and thank you for those answers. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Broadbent? |
| 17 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Thanks. I want to |
| 18 | welcome the panel. I appreciate you coming. Mr. Bartlett, |
| 19 | why is it that most imports are sold from inventories while |
| 20 | most domestic shipments are produced to order? Does this |
| 21 | reflect greater variety or customization within the domestic |
| 22 | market? |
| 23 | MR. BARTLETT: I think the answer is we're trying |
| 24 | to come up with innovative ways to be able to service |
| 25 | customers. The produced to order has been a 50 plus year |

| 1 | business model that the producers have lived in for $50\ \mathrm{years}$ |
|----|--|
| 2 | or longer, and we're trying to think of innovative ways to |
| 3 | meet the demand, really. |
| 4 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Right, is there greater |
| 5 | concentration of domestic industry shipments of complete |
| 6 | rack sets, whereas most subject imports are not of the |
| 7 | complete rack sets right now? |
| 8 | MR. BARTLETT: No, it really is sold as a |
| 9 | complete set. |
| 10 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. |
| 11 | MR. BARTLETT: It voids the warranties if they |
| 12 | start trying to piece mail it together, so the end user and |
| 13 | the distributor doesn't it doesn't benefit them to start |
| 14 | piece mealing one product from one manufacturer and a |
| 15 | product from another manufacturer. |
| 16 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay, Miss Perkins, you |
| 17 | state that certain purchasers noted supply issues with |
| 18 | certain domestic producers, but the variety of U.S. |
| 19 | producers and most purchasers noted that there were no |
| 20 | supply issues that they faced. |
| 21 | Does this record really demonstrate that the |
| 22 | domestic industry had systemic supply issues over the period |
| 23 | of investigation? |
| | |

know if I would characterize it as systemic, but I think we

MS. PERKINS: Susannah Perkins, ECS. I don't

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| 1 (| do | have | а | pretty | significant | record | of | supply | constraints. |
|-----|----|------|---|--------|-------------|--------|----|--------|--------------|
|-----|----|------|---|--------|-------------|--------|----|--------|--------------|

- 2 I'd also repeat what I said earlier to Commissioner
- 3 Williamson, where we're not seeing a huge shift in market
- 4 share.
- 5 There isn't -- there hasn't been a mass exodus,
- there doesn't need to be a systemic problem for a few
- 7 purchasers to decide that they don't want to wait 22 weeks
- 8 to get their steel racks, would be how I would interpret the
- 9 record.
- 10 COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. Mr. Bartlett,
- 11 what is the outlet for overall U.S. demand for steel racks
- for 2019 and 2020? Do you agree with Petitioners that
- demand is likely to slow in the future?
- 14 MR. BARTLETT: No, I believe that the global
- forecast, including the national forecast is positive, very
- 16 positive, especially with the growing demand for more and
- 17 more e-commerce. I was quite surprised that they had that
- 18 kind of outlook on the market.
- 19 COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: I mean I quess they're
- 20 arguing that the retailers -- the physical retailers are
- scaling back and there's an adjustment going on there.
- 22 MR. BARTLETT: Yeah, most of them are scaling
- 23 back the retail brick and mortar places to build warehouses.
- 24 COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Right.
- MR. BARTLETT: So, that way they can ship direct

| 1 | to your houses. |
|----|---|
| 2 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. |
| 3 | MR. BARTLETT: I was quite surprised by their |
| 4 | testimony. |
| 5 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. |
| 6 | MR. MENEGAZ: And if I can just add, Gregory |
| 7 | Menegaz, when we were sitting here at the staff conference, |
| 8 | we all kind of agreed that demand might tail off at the end |
| 9 | of 2018. It's quite unbelievable that it's a whole year |
| 10 | later that we're sitting here at the hearing due to the |
| 11 | government shutdown. |
| 12 | But that didn't turn out to be true. The growth |
| 13 | was robust through 2018 and continues to be that way and we |
| 14 | will be able to submit the actual industry reports in our |
| 15 | post-hearing brief that we're sure everyone else in this |
| 16 | room has, thank you. |
| 17 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay, the Petitioners |
| 18 | argued that the anti-dumping duties and hot-rolled steel |
| 19 | from China, could be an incentive for more exports of |
| 20 | downstream steel products from China to the United States. |
| 21 | Is that part of the reason for the increase in |
| 22 | subject imports from 2016 to 2018? |

another product at all. And I think we can't start pointing

how that such a small increase could be attributed to

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MR. MENEGAZ: Gregory Menegaz, I just don't see

| Τ | at other orders on upstream products as a cause of injury |
|----|--|
| 2 | and all of the downstream product investigations, so we |
| 3 | think the record that you have on this product does not |
| 4 | support an injury finding. |
| 5 | And there's no hard evidence of a linkage between |
| 6 | those two phenomenon. |
| 7 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay, why did steel |
| 8 | prices gradually decline after 2018 despite the continued |
| 9 | application of the 232 Tariff? Do you agree that this was |
| 10 | driven by an increase in domestic steel supply? |
| 11 | MR. MENEGAZ: We don't have any direct knowledge |
| 12 | of that, but we have the American metal reports, and so we |
| 13 | have to stand by what those reports say. |
| 14 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. Miss Perkins |
| 15 | confirmed lost sales accounted for a greater share of |
| 16 | subject imports than pricing data provided by the importers. |
| 17 | Does this prove that subject imports undersold the |
| 18 | domestic-like product? |
| 19 | MS. PERKINS: I don't think it does because the |
| 20 | purchaser's questionnaires were had a fairly small |
| 21 | coverage in and of themselves. And there's no indication in |
| 22 | the purchaser's questionnaires that there were these were |
| 23 | pricing products or vise-versa, so I believe that the |
| 24 | Petitioners picked pricing products that they thought were |
| 25 | representative of the market and that the overselling data |

| 1 | that's reflected there should be considered to be accurate. |
|----|--|
| 2 | And I believe that as a percent of reported |
| 3 | purchases, again I can't state the percentage publicly, but |
| 4 | it was very, very small, so. |
| 5 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. Mr. Malashevich, |
| 6 | why is it that the domestic industry was unable to |
| 7 | successfully pass through changes in the raw material cost |
| 8 | to customers? Why was it unable to maintain its cogs to net |
| 9 | sales ratio throughout the period of investigation? |
| 10 | MR. MALASHEVICH: I don't think there's any one |
| 11 | reason, but I don't think there's any industry who can |
| 12 | immediately reflect increases in the costs of a key material |
| 13 | and the prices they get from its customers. I mean it's |
| 14 | just a reflection of competition and human nature that there |
| 15 | is a balance between what the supplier would like to get and |
| 16 | what the customer is willing to pay, and that is frequently |
| 17 | compromised during the course of negotiation. |
| 18 | And also, I would say they did a pretty good job |
| 19 | of increasing prices under the circumstances to recover a |
| 20 | lot of the increased cogs through higher prices, including |
| 21 | to the limited degree, the introduction of surcharges. |
| 22 | So, there are a lot of positive developments in |
| 23 | the pricing factor, even if they did not completely recover |
| 24 | the increased cost, but the opposite is true on the |
| 25 | downside. The price of steel has indicated in the American |

| 1 | Metal Market Index, and the staff report addresses this, was |
|----|--|
| 2 | just as dramatic as the increase and quite sudden. But it |
| 3 | was not reflected in the county conventions of profit and |
| 4 | loss, it would not have been reflected until much later in |
| 5 | the period. There's always a lag in that respect, but it's |
| 6 | a counter convention, it's not of the underlying economics. |
| 7 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay. Miss Perkins, the |
| 8 | vast majority of responding purchasers indicated that |
| 9 | Chinese product was priced lower than the domestic product. |
| 10 | Isn't this an indication of underselling? |
| 11 | MS. PERKINS: Susannah Perkins, ECS. I think |
| 12 | this goes back to what the Petitioner's panel said this |
| 13 | morning where they do big custom jobs and they also do their |
| 14 | quick ship stocking stuff, that's how they referred to it I |
| 15 | believe. |
| 16 | If the stocking product is competing on a |
| 17 | head-to-head basis with subject product as in the |
| 18 | underselling data, it shows that subject product is in a |
| 19 | majority of instances, higher priced, but because the |
| 20 | domestic producers also do large custom jobs, the purchaser |
| 21 | perception could be that domestic product is generally |
| 22 | higher priced and on average is higher priced. |
| 23 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay, Miss Perkins, the |
| 24 | Commission has reached an affirmative determination based |
| 25 | primarily on small market share shifts in prior cases, as |

- long as it has been able to establish significant
- 2 underselling.
- 3 If the Commission determines that underselling is
- 4 significant in this case, could it reach an affirmative
- 5 determination based on a market share shift?
- 6 MS. PERKINS: I mean, the Commission can do -- I
- 7 don't dictate that, but I think that an affirmative
- 8 determination would not be warranted. I think for an
- 9 example of a similar fact pattern, the tapered roller
- 10 bearing case from Korea, from last summer had similarly very
- small numbers involved, and actually if I recall correctly,
- 12 more underselling.
- 13 And reached a negative determination. So, that
- 14 would be my answer to that.
- 15 COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay.
- 16 MR. MALASHEVICH: If I may expand on that please?
- 17 I think it's fair to say that all the information staff has
- gathered in the staff report is important, but I think it's
- 19 fair to say that they deserve different weights in the
- 20 Commission's decision-making.
- 21 The purchaser perceptions -- they're always
- 22 surveyed and they're important yes, however, I think we can
- agree is a squishier figure than the precise verifiable,
- 24 actual pricing data that the staff collects for products 1
- through 4.

| 1 | And also, would guess that among the purchasers |
|----|---|
| 2 | surveyed, some might be reporting that perception of prices |
| 3 | is based on I'm not saying this is a worry, you know, I'm |
| 4 | not, but hearsay what they hear from colleagues at |
| 5 | conventions, et cetera. |
| 6 | And I would venture to say there's a fair amount |
| 7 | of that that goes into surveys of purchaser perceptions |
| 8 | because they might not be purchasers of the Chinese product |
| 9 | at all. They could be talking to a buddy over a beer or |
| 10 | something like that and I just think less weight, can't |
| 11 | ignore it, but less weight should be placed on those |
| 12 | measures of who's underselling whom, then verifiable actual |
| 13 | prices for deemed to be identical products. |
| 14 | It just deserved greater weight. Also, I think |
| 15 | there's a subtle point that may have been lost in today's |
| 16 | discussions, is that I think the power of Mr. Bartlett's |
| 17 | testimony concerning the limited interchangeability of the |
| 18 | Chinese and the U.S. products, and I confirmed with him |
| 19 | earlier today that his samples on discussion of |
| 20 | interchangeability were not only for what he happened to |
| 21 | import from China, but it's true of the Chinese products |
| 22 | generally. |
| 23 | And it goes back to different strokes for |
| 24 | different folks. It's not because of the interchangeability |
| 25 | not being nearly as extensive as Petitioners are arguing. |

| _ | There are going to be instances where demand is expanded by |
|----|--|
| 2 | the availability of products that have the positive |
| 3 | attributes, like more can be stuck in the same container and |
| 4 | freight costs and everybody in the room can agree a steel |
| 5 | product freight is a significant item. |
| 6 | So, those who feel it's important to save on |
| 7 | freight the game in town has to be the Chinese product. |
| 8 | So, I think there is some difficult to calculate proportion |
| 9 | of the increase in market share that represents an expansion |
| 10 | of demand, rather than displacement of competing domestic |
| 11 | products, and that's a consideration that I think has been |
| 12 | to some extent lost in the considerations today. |
| 13 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay, my time has |
| 14 | expired, thank you. |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Schmidtlein? |
| 16 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, thank you. I'd |
| 17 | like to also welcome the witnesses today, thank you for |
| 18 | being here. So, I'd like to go back to the question about |
| 19 | the confirmed loss sales that we have and how we should |
| 20 | consider those. |
| 21 | And Miss Perkins, I think you were just speaking |
| 22 | about that with Commissioner Broadbent, and I wonder if you |
| 23 | couldn't either repeat your answer or explain it a little |
| 24 | more, because I wasn't I thought I understood that you |
| 25 | said it goes back to the same answer that you were talking |

| Τ | about with regard to the pricing products? |
|----|---|
| 2 | That this has to do with what the purchasers |
| 3 | might be thinking about when they indicate whether or not |
| 4 | one is lower cost than the other? |
| 5 | MS. PERKINS: Susannah Perkins. Generally, yes. |
| 6 | I mean I think that it there's sort of two parts of that. |
| 7 | I just want to make sure I'm answering the correct one. Is |
| 8 | the question why are the like what's the, like the |
| 9 | coverage on the wagon wheels or the |
| 10 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: On the lost sales we |
| 11 | have 12 purchasers saying that they purchased subject |
| 12 | imports instead of domestic product, and that price is a |
| 13 | primary reason, right? And then they give an estimate of |
| 14 | the amount of that purchase that was made instead of |
| 15 | domestic. |
| 16 | And so, I think the question I think the |
| 17 | question from Commissioner Broadbent, doesn't that indicate |
| 18 | and in answering that question they indicate that subject |
| 19 | imports were lower priced. And then the next question is |
| 20 | was that a primary reason? |
| 21 | And I thought her question was does that indicate |
| 22 | underselling? And then your response was well, I go back |
| 23 | to the same answer that I gave with regard to I thought, |
| 24 | when we were talking about pricing products, and that you |
| 25 | have to make an apples to apples comparison and that |

| _ | purchasers might be thinking of the made to order, |
|----|--|
| 2 | customized product versus the stock product and so, am I |
| 3 | wrong about that? |
| 4 | And so, I just wanted to clarify for this when |
| 5 | we're asking purchasers did you purchase subject imports |
| 6 | instead of domestic product? Do you think they're thinking |
| 7 | of two different types of products there? |
| 8 | MS. PERKINS: Susannah Perkins, I wouldn't want |
| 9 | to speculate, so my answer about the of going back to the |
| 10 | pricing products was more about the purchasers stating in |
| 11 | the comparability and interchangeability questions. |
| 12 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. |
| 13 | MS. PERKINS: That subject was lower priced, that |
| 14 | was |
| 15 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. |
| 16 | MS. PERKINS: So, is |
| 17 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: But for the confirmed |
| 18 | lost sales, do you think this is evidence of underselling |
| 19 | given the number of purchasers that have shifted their |
| 20 | purses and indicated that price was a primary reason? |
| 21 | MS. PERKINS: No, I don't, because I think that |
| 22 | an underselling analysis was done on a quarterly basis on an |
| 23 | apples to apples comparison, and I don't think we're seeing |
| 24 | granularity in the data from purchaser's questionnaire. |
| 25 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN. Well given that the |

| 1 | percent here, and this is confidential, but when you look at |
|----|--|
| 2 | the estimated total amount and you compare that to just the |
| 3 | overall increase in volume that occurred, which is also |
| 4 | confidential. It's a pretty hefty percentage of that. |
| 5 | So, when you look at the overall increase in |
| 6 | volume and shipments from China, right let's look at this |
| 7 | C Table, and again you could address what they're sharing, |
| 8 | if you look at that or you look at the on page Roman V-XX |
| 9 | where it shows the total subject imports that were purchased |
| 10 | and then you look at the amount that's been confirmed, |
| 11 | that's a fairly large amount. |
| 12 | MS. PERKINS: I think to avoid getting into any |
| 13 | confidential information on these, we'll address it in |
| 14 | post-hearing. |
| 15 | COMMISSIONER SCHMDITLEIN: Okay. Well, given |
| 16 | that given the percentage that it covers there, I guess |
| 17 | I'd invite you to address why doesn't that indicate that |
| 18 | there has been underselling? I mean the purchaser is |
| 19 | actually stating that the price is lower, and that price was |
| 20 | a primary reason? |
| 21 | MS. PERKINS: I'll address that post-hearing. |
| 22 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. And sort of |
| 23 | along the same lines, you made the point a couple times that |
| 24 | it might given the percentage loss of market shares here, |
| 25 | that may only be a couple of purchasers that have changed |

| 1 | their buying habits and that those could be due to the lead |
|----|--|
| 2 | time issues that you all have pointed out. |
| 3 | And so, my question is could it have changed |
| 4 | things that were priced though, given the evidence in the |
| 5 | record where we have 15 purchasers reporting that domestic |
| 6 | product was inferior and terms of price, I think you go back |
| 7 | to your original answer, but they probably weren't making an |
| 8 | apples to apples comparison and we have the lost sales |
| 9 | information that I just referred to. |
| 10 | Couldn't you say the same thing for price that |
| 11 | well, it will only take a couple of purchasers shifting |
| 12 | their sales due to price that will cause that loss in market |
| 13 | share? |
| 14 | MS. PERKINS: Susannah Perkins, ECS. I think you |
| 15 | could, but I also think that this record indicates that |
| 16 | price is not the primary basis on which this product was. |
| 17 | It's not that price is never a consideration. I don't walk |
| 18 | around the grocery store without looking at the prices on |
| 19 | the shelves, but it's not always my primary consideration |
| 20 | and I think that the record, the investigation supports |
| 21 | this. |
| 22 | There are lots of purchasing factors of which |
| 23 | price is one, but price is not the primary. |

gears a little bit. I believe that I think it was your

24

25

COMMISSIONER SCHMDITLEIN: Okay, okay, shifting

| Τ | testimony, you talked about the correlation here, and that |
|----|---|
| 2 | if there's no correlation there's no causation, and I think |
| 3 | you're referring mostly to the interim period and I |
| 4 | apologize if you already testified to the response of this |
| 5 | question. Can you respond to the Petitioner's or anybody |
| 6 | else on the panel, in fact, I don't want to pick on you, to |
| 7 | the Petitioner's contention that the inventory the |
| 8 | shipping out of inventory in the interim period is why the |
| 9 | domestic industry didn't do better? |
| 10 | And in particular, and again I think I can have |
| 11 | some of this in the post-hearing, when you look at the |
| 12 | interim level of inventory right, which I suppose is in the |
| 13 | January to March 2018, March of '18 versus March of '19, |
| 14 | there's a fairly substantial difference there in the |
| 15 | inventory level when you look at it on the interim basis. |
| 16 | Can you respond to that argument that that's why |
| 17 | you don't see the industry doing better that imports are |
| 18 | different from shipments and that shipments actually |
| 19 | continued? |
| 20 | MS. PERKINS: Yes, absolutely, Susannah Perkins, |
| 21 | ECS. So, if you look at Exhibit 3 to our brief, we did an |
| 22 | apparent consumption scenario using the importer |
| 23 | questionnaires, so reported shipments, yeah reported |
| 24 | shipments, not reported import, would show that shipments |
| 25 | yere also down |

| 1 | These numbers were not revealed publicly, so I |
|----|--|
| 2 | can't talk about them, but I will go more into detail |
| 3 | post-hearing, but shipments, according to the record, |
| 4 | shipments of subject product were down in interim '19. |
| 5 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. Alright we will |
| 6 | take a look at Exhibit 3 as well. Okay, speaking of which |
| 7 | and I'm not sure if anyone has touched on this yet, do you |
| 8 | all agree that the filing of the petition had an impact on |
| 9 | the volume of subject imports? When did subject imports go |
| 10 | down in the interim period in '19, Mr. Bartlett go ahead? |
| 11 | MR. BARTLETT: Yeah, I'm sorry. |
| 12 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Yeah, you don't have |
| 13 | access to all this information so go ahead. |
| 14 | MR. BARTLETT: I would suggest obviously the |
| 15 | cases won in relationship with China and the U.S. is another |
| 16 | factor. The tariffs are another factor, probably all of it |
| 17 | combined makes it very difficult. |
| 18 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, and would you |
| 19 | all like to add anything given that you do have access to |
| 20 | the numbers in terms of showing the volume from China in the |
| 21 | interim period dropping substantially? |
| 22 | MS. PERKINS: Susannah Perkins, ECS. I would |
| 23 | agree with what Miss Drake said this morning. I think it's |
| 24 | a little difficult to parse exactly what came from the case, |
| 25 | what came from the 301, what came from U.S. China trade |

| 1 | relations. I think there are a number of things, but I |
|----|--|
| 2 | think our point stands that if the volumes have dropped, |
| 3 | whether measured from importer shipments or from foreign |
| 4 | producer's exports, and the domestic industry has not seen |
| 5 | relief and is actually performing at its worst level of the |
| 6 | entire POI in interim 2019, then it severs the problem |
| 7 | access. |
| 8 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, the last |
| 9 | question I have in this round is back to I think what you |
| 10 | all covered in the beginning of your presentation which is |
| 11 | the question about coverage in this case, and I know you've |
| 12 | made several points about the scope changing and therefore, |
| 13 | you know, many of the importers have dropped out because |
| 14 | their products are no longer covered by the scope. |
| 15 | One thing we noticed though is that we've got |
| 16 | responses from 6 foreign producers, but that there were |
| 17 | roughly 40 foreign producers that received separate rates at |
| 18 | the Commerce for anti-dumping duties. So, how does that, |
| 19 | you know, have you taken that into account? |
| 20 | So, obviously there are still a number of other |
| 21 | foreign producers that has product covered within the scope |
| 22 | that didn't respond? |
| 23 | MR. BARTLETT: Ryan Bartlett with UMH. As the |
| 24 | Petitioners mentioned this morning, to really be able to |
| 25 | sell into the U.S. market, you really need the RMI |

| Τ | certification which only very few have. |
|----|--|
| 2 | And in addition, there's only very few factories |
| 3 | in China that actually produce this type of racking, so |
| 4 | there's not there's nowhere near 40 different factories |
| 5 | that make this type of racking. I can I believe that a |
| 6 | majority of them have responded to the case. |
| 7 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. |
| 8 | MR. MENEGAZ: Can I just add also. |
| 9 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay. |
| 10 | MR. MENEGAZ: It's very important to understand |
| 11 | that the separate rate application is due by Federal |
| 12 | Register Notice of Initiation and I think it's CVD only |
| 13 | in the AD case within 30 days of initiation of the case. |
| 14 | So, all the light duty people in the world that |
| 15 | were concerned that they were going to be cut off from the |
| 16 | U.S. market, filed SRAs. The applications for the separate |
| 17 | rate due to the timing of the requirement of the filing |
| 18 | really has no relationship to who was really in this |
| 19 | industry. |
| 20 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: I see, so some of |
| 21 | those individual rate cases would be companies that are no |
| 22 | longer within the scope? |
| 23 | MR. MENEGAZ: That's right, and that's why |
| 24 | there's nobody else at our hearing today. |

COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: I see.

| Τ | MR. MENEGAZ: All those people that were at the |
|----|--|
| 2 | staff conference don't care anymore. |
| 3 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, alright, thank |
| 4 | you for that. |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Kearns? |
| 6 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Thank you. Just picking up |
| 7 | from where Commissioner Schmidtlein left off on the import |
| 8 | coverage issue and I have the same question for Petitioners. |
| 9 | Post-hearing, can you please comment on the volumes of the |
| 10 | imports from UMH in interim 2019 versus our aggregate date |
| 11 | for that period which is based on foreign producer |
| 12 | responses? |
| 13 | And again, if I can get a response to that |
| 14 | question from both the Respondents and Petitioners, I would |
| 15 | appreciate it. |
| 16 | MR. BARTLETT: Yes, we can address it |
| 17 | post-conference. |
| 18 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Thank you. And then |
| 19 | another issue that Commissioner Schmidtlein was just |
| 20 | touching on the post-petition effect versus 301. It |
| 21 | would you agree that a good way for us to kind of try to |
| 22 | tease out which, you know, to the extent to which the |
| 23 | decline in imports is due to the position versus 301, if we |
| 24 | looked at the preliminary CBD margins for various companies. |
| 25 | You know, if Chinese producers and saw, and |

| 1 | looked at what happened with their quantities, their sales |
|----|--|
| 2 | to the U.S., that that would help us, sort of, determine |
| 3 | because obviously, they're all covered by 301, they're not |
| 4 | all covered by the same preliminary CBD margins. |
| 5 | So, we've just taken a look at that and it seems |
| 6 | like it yields some pretty interesting findings. So, I |
| 7 | would encourage you, I guess post-petition and now, if |
| 8 | you're able, you know, to comment on that as well. |
| 9 | MR. BARTLETT: I think we'll have to take a look |
| 10 | at that data and comment in the post-conference hearing |
| 11 | brief. |
| 12 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, and I should maybe |
| 13 | mention too that this is connected to the first question we |
| 14 | asked about the UMH import data as well. I can't say much |
| 15 | more than that, it's a little bit cryptic, sorry, but |
| 16 | anyway. |
| 17 | I've got some questions there as well. Okay, so |
| 18 | turning back to lead times, you know, Mr. Bartlett, you're |
| 19 | obviously in a great position to answer these questions and |
| 20 | you did to some extent with Commissioner Williamson earlier, |

Sorry, I think Commissioner Williamson was

pointing out that what we heard this morning was that if you

look at the sales from distributors of U.S. producers to

their downstream purchasers, that you wouldn't see long lead

but you had mentioned earlier.

| Τ | times and that maybe that's part of the issue here. |
|----|--|
| 2 | And also, that there's a difference between |
| 3 | commodity racks and custom product. So, I guess I'm just |
| 4 | curious, can you tell me a little bit more about your |
| 5 | thoughts on that? I mean one thing that you mentioned with |
| 6 | Commissioner Williamson was that you know, it was your |
| 7 | understanding that the U.S. producers typically don't sell |
| 8 | through distributors, is that right? |
| 9 | MR. BARTLETT: No, they typically, per their |
| 10 | testimony they do, but they do have a business that they |
| 11 | deal directly with the end user on as well. |
| 12 | COMMISSIONERS KEARNS: Okay. |
| 13 | MR. BARTLETT: And typically, those are larger |
| 14 | projects, the larger. |
| 15 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Larger projects when |
| 16 | they're direct, right, and some of that's going to be the |
| 17 | customized? |
| 18 | MR. BARTLETT: Yep. |
| 19 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Product. |
| 20 | MR. BARTLETT: Exactly. |
| 21 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Right, so but doesn't that |
| 22 | lead us to the conclusion that yeah, there's going to be |
| 23 | longer lead times when U.S. producers are selling customized |
| 24 | product but when we're talking about commodities sales, it's |
| 25 | probably not just a long lead time, no? |

| L MR. | BARTLETT: | No, | their | production, | I' | m |
|-------|-----------|-----|-------|-------------|----|---|
|-------|-----------|-----|-------|-------------|----|---|

- 2 assuming, is slotted similarly whether they're making
- 3 whatever beam or whatever type of component. They often
- 4 quote the distributors with the 50 plus daily lead time, so
- 5 regardless of the scope of work. They don't have different
- 6 lead times for different types of products in my opinion.
- 7 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: So, you're saying you think
- 8 that a U.S. producer, even selling to a distributor
- 9 commodity type product, that that lead time is probably not
- 10 that different from any other?
- 11 MR. BARTLETT: Correct, I believe that yes,
- 12 absolutely.
- 13 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, and what is that view
- 14 based on? I mean how would you know that.
- MR. BARTLETT: At one point I used to sell racks
- from these U.S. producers.
- 17 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Oh.
- MR. BARTLETT: So, I'm very familiar with getting
- 19 a quote from them.
- 20 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, so you were a
- 21 distributor for --
- MR. BARTLETT: Yeah.
- 23 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, that's a good answer
- 24 I take it. Okay.
- MR. MENEGAZ: If I just made add to recall Mr.

| 1 | Bartlett's | earlier | testimony, | that h | ne said | although | many |
|---|------------|---------|------------|--------|---------|----------|------|
| | | | | | | | |

- 2 sales are through distributors, those distributors often do
- 3 not stock. And when they do stock, their level of stock is
- 4 actually very low compared to his. And that's why we're
- 5 seeing a pervasive high lead time in the staff report for
- 6 the U.S. producers.
- 7 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, okay, interesting.
- 8 MR. BARTLETT: They're stocking distributors is
- 9 to my knowledge, a very, very small portion of their
- 10 business.
- 11 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, but that's not what
- we heard this morning from them, is it? I thought they --
- MR. BARTLETT: That's correct.
- 14 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, okay, thank you.
- 15 This just to turning back to import coverage and my
- 16 apologize since I know you addressed this in your opening.
- 17 I know you discussed this generally in your opening, but
- 18 have your
- 19 Chinese steel rack suppliers -- your clients, Chinese steel
- 20 rack suppliers submitted foreign producer questionnaires to
- 21 the Commission, do you know?
- 22 MR. MENEGAZ: Well, you know, we represented Dong
- 23 Sheng, that is a supplier to UMH.
- 24 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay.
- 25 MR. MENEGAZ: But we also see that the other

| 1 | major foreign producers that were initially ranked in the |
|----|---|
| 2 | highest level by the Commerce Department, also supplied |
| 3 | their foreign producer questionnaires. |
| 4 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. |
| 5 | MR. MENEGAZ: So, that's why we've said that we |
| 6 | think that the Commission has the largest, or almost all of |
| 7 | the largest suppliers from China in the data currently. |
| 8 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, but Mr. Bartlett, do |
| 9 | you have suppliers other than Dong Sheng, I guess? |
| 10 | MR. BARTLETT: No. |
| 11 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: No, okay. Okay, alright, |
| 12 | so that answers the question, thank you. If I heard you |
| 13 | right earlier, I think you suggested that you only sell |
| 14 | complete sets. You don't sell components, is that right? |
| 15 | MR. BARTLETT: That is to a degree, if somebody |
| 16 | has installed racks and they'd like to add more levels we |
| 17 | will like sell them beams. |
| 18 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. |
| 19 | MR. BARTLETT: But we do not sell just uprights |
| 20 | only for the same reason as the Petitioners. We don't want |
| 21 | them to use our uprights with their product. |
| 22 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Uh-huh, and you don't sell |
| 23 | beams only unless it's to extend |
| | |

MR. BARTLETT: Add more levels to the racks.

COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Add more levels, okay, and

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| 1 | you think that that's represented that your experience is |
|----|---|
| 2 | representative of others in the |
| 3 | MR. BARTLETT: Yeah, yes. |
| 4 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. |
| 5 | MR. BARTLETT: Going back to interchangeability, |
| 6 | they don't really work well together. They have different |
| 7 | tolerances and different punches and things that they don't |
| 8 | sit in as easy as the Petitioners claim to be. |
| 9 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, so why, you know our |
| 10 | data show that most imports subject imports come in as |
| 11 | components, not as sets. Do you all have any thoughts on |
| 12 | that? |
| 13 | MR. BARTLETT: The U.S. producers also produce as |
| 14 | components, so everything is produced as components, and |
| 15 | shipped as components and when it's assembled by the site |
| 16 | once the installation team onsite to create that set. |
| 17 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: So, you're saying to the |
| 18 | extent that we see differences, you know, I mean our data |
| 19 | seem to show that subject imports are components, more than |
| 20 | not versus on the U.S. side the opposite. That's sort of an |
| 21 | artificial distinction. |
| 22 | MR. BARTLETT: Yeah, I don't personally |
| 23 | understand the difference between the two. |
| 24 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. |
| 25 | MR. BARTLETT: Because to make a set you need |

- 1 components.
- COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Yeah, right.
- 3 MR. BARTLETT: So, to me there's no -- it's not
- 4 possible.
- 5 COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Yeah, okay. Okay, let's
- 6 see here. I want to ask you about pricing your raw material
- 7 costs. Have you increased your prices for steel racks to
- 8 cover increases in raw material costs? Has your firm
- 9 implemented raw material surcharges on its steel rack prices
- 10 and are those surcharges still in effect?
- 11 That's typically a question you might think we'd
- 12 be asking for U.S. producers, but I don't know if there's
- 13 any increases in --
- MR. BARTLETT: I mean we haven't -- it would be
- more of a 301 Tariff increase surcharge that we're charging
- our customers.
- 17 COMMISSONER KEARNS: Yeah, okay. Okay. Alright,
- 18 I only have one other question about -- for the threat side
- 19 of the case relating to Australia and anti-dumping measures.
- 20 To what extent will Australia's anti-dumping measures on
- 21 steel racks cause Chinese exporters to divert steel racks to
- the United States in the near future?
- 23 MR. MENEGAZ: We don't have any direct knowledge
- of that -- the answer to that question.
- COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, you haven't heard

| Τ | anything in the and I guess that would be for you, Mr. |
|----|--|
| 2 | Bartlett, you haven't heard anything? |
| 3 | MR. BARTLETT: No, not that I'm aware of. |
| 4 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay. |
| 5 | MR. BARTLETT: I believe it's a very small market |
| 6 | in Australia, so I don't know how much excess China would |
| 7 | have because of that, but I mean it's something we can |
| 8 | definitely look into and respond in our brief. |
| 9 | COMMISSIONER KEARNS: Okay, okay, I appreciate |
| 10 | that. I have no further questions right now, thank you. |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: So, we've heard about certain |
| 12 | differences between Chinese product and U.S. product such as |
| 13 | longer lead times. Are there any quality differences |
| 14 | between subject imports and the domestic byproduct? |
| 15 | MR. BARTLETT: I know, I'm sure everybody |
| 16 | besides, I mean me, and the Petitioners would all say our |
| 17 | products is the best in the room, but realistically I don't |
| 18 | think there's too many. I forgot the question, sorry. |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Are there any quality |
| 20 | differences between subject imports and the |
| 21 | MR. BARTLETT: Not that I'm aware of. I mean I |
| 22 | believe there's some characteristics of looking differently, |
| 23 | but quality I think they're pretty even. |
| 24 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay. |

MR. MENEGAZ: Could I just add?

| 1 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Yeah, certainly. |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. MENEGAZ: Because what he said before is the |
| 3 | way they've designed their racks, including the bolt on |
| 4 | option, you know, the way they use the bolt on, which she |
| 5 | says is representative of all the Chinese products. |
| 6 | That gives them an advantage in the freight and |
| 7 | the shipping and all that is obviously not captured in the |
| 8 | questionnaire, but it has to be factoring into the ultimate |
| 9 | purchaser's considerations because they're looking at their |
| 10 | overall cost, not just the FOB landed costs of a product. |
| 11 | So, he feels that although the racks will all |
| 12 | stand and hold the same rough capacity, that there are |
| 13 | design features of his product that could be considered a |
| 14 | quality superiority overall. |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay, so the end product I |
| 16 | think you're citing would be the same, it's just that there |
| 17 | are different features that make them more attractive to |
| 18 | import? |
| 19 | MR. BARTLETT: They would hold the same weight |
| 20 | and capacity in theory, but there's different ways of |
| 21 | getting them there. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay, I understand, thanks. |
| 23 | As far as you all are aware, have there been difficulties in |
| 24 | fulfilling the orders or in delivering steel racks from |
| 25 | China on time? |

| 1 | M | D. | BARTLETT: | From | no | not | +ha+ | T I m | 214212 | \circ f |
|---|-------|----|-----------|----------|------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-----------|
| Т | L IVI | Γ. | DAKILLII: | F T OIII | 110, | 110 L | LIIaL | T 111 | aware | OI. |

- 2 Most of them like we stated, is sold from inventory. And at
- 3 that time, we know exactly what inventory we have on hand,
- 4 so we either can or can't make the sale to the client at
- 5 that time.
- 6 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: And what is the lead time
- 7 needed to deliver imports of steel racks from China to
- 8 purchasers in the United States? Is that moot because of
- 9 the large inventories?
- 10 MR. BARTLETT: It's mostly moot, I would say our
- supply from China to our warehouse takes roughly 6 to 7
- 12 weeks to get.
- 13 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay.
- 14 MR. BARTLETT: Which is still faster than most
- U.S. producers.
- 16 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Okay, well that concludes my
- 17 questions. I appreciate you all being here today.
- 18 Commissioner Williamson?
- 19 COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, just two
- 20 additional questions. If you look at the Petitioner's
- 21 Exhibit 8, you're looking at the parsing data you see only
- 22 one firm, and that shows quite a different pattern in terms
- 23 of underselling and so I'd like you to comment on that and
- 24 also you particularly think about size of market as the
- 25 firm.

| 1 | MS. PERKINS: Yes, Susannah Perkins, ECS, I'll |
|----|--|
| 2 | comment on that post-hearing. |
| 3 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, thank you. If |
| 4 | you turn to page 2 of your pre-hearing brief that a |
| 5 | significant producer in China has lost it's RMI mark, is |
| 6 | there any substantiation of this in the record? |
| 7 | MR. BARTLETT: Could you repeat the question |
| 8 | please? |
| 9 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, I guess on page 2 |
| 10 | of your pre-hearing brief, you claim that a significant |
| 11 | subject producer in China has lost its RMI mark? |
| 12 | MR. BARTLETT: Yeah, that would be Nanging |
| 13 | Hauday. They dropped out and lost their RMI certification. |
| 14 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, do you have any |
| 15 | independence of a certification of that? Is there any, I |
| 16 | guess, I don't know what that |
| 17 | MR. BARTLETT: It should have been on the |
| 18 | website, so they're listed on the website or they're not. |
| 19 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, thank you. How |
| 20 | difficult would it be for them to regain that certification? |
| 21 | MR. BARTLETT: When we gained it, it took us over |
| 22 | a year, and it cost us over \$50,000. |
| 23 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: To get it the first |
| 24 | time? |
| 25 | MR. BARTLETT: Yeah, the first time, sorry, the |

| 1 | process to the best of my knowledge it would just be |
|----|--|
| 2 | repetitive of the same first step. |
| 3 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, are there |
| 4 | producers in China that have the mark that are not currently |
| 5 | exporting to the United States? |
| 6 | MR. BARTLETT: Not that I'm aware of. |
| 7 | COMMISSIONER WILLIAMSON: Okay, fair enough, no |
| 8 | further questions. I'd like to thank the witnesses for |
| 9 | their testimony. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Broadbent? |
| 11 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay, for the |
| 12 | post-hearing if you could just answer I know we've been |
| 13 | around this question before, but how we can separate the |
| 14 | post-petition of fact from the effects of the Section 301 |
| 15 | Tariff. If the volume of the subject imports was lower in |
| 16 | 2019 as a result of the Section 301 Tariffs, can we place |
| 17 | less weight on this value on this data within our present |
| 18 | injury analysis. I'm asking just to address that |
| 19 | comprehensively, that'd be helpful. |
| 20 | I have one question, let's see. Mr. |
| 21 | Malaschevich, you divided, when you started out you talked |
| 22 | about the but for analysis and divided it into four tests. |
| 23 | And I was not quite following what you were saying about |
| 24 | capacity utilization how that factor specifically would |
| 25 | impact the outcome of this case? |

| 1 | MR. MALASCHEVICH: Well the I think in the |
|----|--|
| 2 | theory involved as far as I can interpret simply from |
| 3 | reading the relevant opinions is that in applying the "but |
| 4 | for" test, these four elements were applied most frequently. |
| 5 | On some occasions there were other factors, but most |
| 6 | frequently that seemed to be the common threads across |
| 7 | the various investigations. |
| 8 | And the theory is that one test is did the |
| 9 | industry have the physical capability to expand production |
| 10 | and but for the presence of the subject imports? And the |
| 11 | point of my testimony is that the capacity utilization rates |
| 12 | reported for this industry in this case, are respectable for |
| 13 | industries fabricated metals, generally. |
| 14 | Because unlike a steel mill, they are not capital |
| 15 | intensive by their nature, they're material intensive. And |
| 16 | so, their profitability is much less affected by any |
| 17 | particular level of capacity utilization and we did a |
| 18 | calculation to point that out using an income statement |
| 19 | model which the details are in our brief. |
| 20 | So, in general, changes in capacity utilization |
| 21 | rates don't make a big difference in this industry and in |
| 22 | absolute terms, they're very similar to what I've seen in |
| 23 | any number of Commission investigations involving fabricated |
| 24 | steel products. |
| 25 | But also significant is that in during the |

| 1 | morning session, there is a direct question, forgive me i |
|----|--|
| 2 | forget by whom, so what I think it was you, Commissioner |
| 3 | Williamson. So, what is you know, a respectable capacity |
| 4 | utilization rate in this industry? |
| 5 | And none of the witnesses answered the question. |
| 6 | So, I guess that tells me it isn't important. And the |
| 7 | particular rates reported in this case as indicated in the |
| 8 | staff report, among those four factors should be given |
| 9 | little weight. But there seems to have been a constraint on |
| 10 | wherever capacity is in this industry during the POI because |
| 11 | of restrictions on distribution, geographically, the policy |
| 12 | among certain producers not to sell to a distributor in the |
| 13 | same territory as an existing distributor already being |
| 14 | supplied. |
| 15 | I think that in effect, constrains capacity to |
| 16 | expand production and shipments, whatever the utilization |
| 17 | rate is. And also, again I have to be very careful, but |
| 18 | there in our brief, there is a page of the staff report |
| 19 | that's entirely APO, but it shows capacity and capacity |
| 20 | utilization rate by individual producers. |
| 21 | And I have to be very careful, but there are |
| 22 | certain producers that are operating at an extremely high |
| 23 | rate of capacity utilization and that suggests in theory |
| 24 | that they are among the most competitive producers. |
| 25 | So, if their capacity is constrained, the whole |

| 1 | system is constrained in expanding production, but for the |
|----|--|
| 2 | presence of subject imports. But we have a calculation that |
| 3 | involves this income statement model which the Commission |
| 4 | has used on some regularity in the past, and we're saying |
| 5 | even if the domestic industry had gotten all the share |
| 6 | allegedly lost to the increase in subject imports, its |
| 7 | impact on profitability would have been minimal. |
| 8 | So, the test concerning the industry's capability |
| 9 | to expand production in this case deserves little weight. |
| 10 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay, thank you, I |
| 11 | appreciate the explanation. Miss Perkins, you cite |
| 12 | purchaser data stating that most purchasers consider |
| 13 | delivery time as very important, but if you use this data, |
| 14 | shouldn't you use Table 2-10 to assess whether subject |
| 15 | imports outperform the domestic industry with respect to |
| 16 | this very same factor of delivery time? |
| 17 | This Table shows that 14 out of 19 purchasers |
| 18 | considered the domestic product to be comparable or superior |
| 19 | to subject imports with respect to delivery time. Doesn't |
| 20 | this liken your argument on delivery time? |
| 21 | MS. PERKINS: I think that it's inconsistent with |
| 22 | the data on lead times presented at page 2-14 from the |
| 23 | importer questionnaires which pretty clear state that the |
| 24 | subject product is getting to its customers faster. |
| 25 | I can't really explain it beyond that, but I |

| 1 | think that we have data throughout the record stating that |
|----|--|
| 2 | the domestic product is getting to its customers faster than |
| 3 | the sorry, the subject product is getting to its |
| 4 | customers faster than the domestic product, so that's great. |
| 5 | COMMISSIONER BROADBENT: Okay, great got it. |
| 6 | Alright, that concludes my questions. I appreciate all your |
| 7 | testimony. |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Schmidtlein? |
| 9 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: I just had a couple |
| 10 | follow-up questions since Mr. Bartlett you are an importer |
| 11 | and a distributor. And I know you just testified a few |
| 12 | minutes ago in response to some question that it usually |
| 13 | takes 6 or 7 weeks for you to get the product from the |
| 14 | foreign producer in China. So, are you buying from an |
| 15 | exporter in China or the producer directly? |
| 16 | MR. BARTLETT: The producer directly. |
| 17 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: You are, okay. And |
| 18 | when you buy, do you place your do you place an order |
| 19 | with them for something, or do you buy out of their |
| 20 | inventory? |
| 21 | MR. BARTLETT: We place an order with them. |
| 22 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: You place an order, |
| 23 | okay and that generally takes 6 to 7 weeks you said? |
| 24 | MR. BARTLETT: To get to our warehouse, yeah. |
| 25 | COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: For you to get it, |

- 1 okay. So, do you have -- and then you sell out of your
- 2 inventory?
- 3 MR. BARTLETT: Correct.
- 4 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, and do you have
- 5 customers that you're selling to -- I assume you're not
- 6 selling to other distributors?
- 7 MR. BARTLETT: We do sell to some others.
- 8 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Oh, you do sell to
- 9 other distributors, okay.
- 10 MR. BARTLETT: Yeah, about 30% of our business.
- 11 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, and are those
- distributors, do you know, are they also buying from U.S.
- 13 producers?
- 14 MR. BARTLETT: I don't know for sure, but I
- 15 assume so.
- 16 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, okay that's -- I
- 17 didn't expect that but alright. In addition to those, do
- 18 you have other, or maybe those customers, do you have
- 19 customers coming to you and placing orders with you for made
- 20 to order product for specific projects -- and I apologize if
- 21 you've already answered this.
- 22 MR. BARTLETT: No, no problem. Usually, if we
- have that it's just that they want custom colors.
- 24 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: It's that they just
- 25 want custom colors, okay, I do recall you mentioning

| 1 | something | about | that, | okay. |
|---|-----------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | | | |

- MR. BARTLETT: Because we don't charge for custom
- 3 colors, we can give the customer any color we want -- or
- 4 they want, for no additional charge and to my knowledge the
- 5 U.S. producers charge extra because it interrupts their
- 6 production runs.
- 7 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, and so in
- 8 addition to other distributors, what types of purchasers do
- 9 you sell to? Who are the -- not names, but just what types
- 10 of?
- 11 MR. BARTLETT: End users, and all types of
- 12 industries really.
- 13 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: So, whoever is going
- 14 to be --
- MR. BARTLETT: Whoever needs a warehouse.
- 16 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Putting up the racks.
- MR. BARTLETT: We're not --
- 18 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay.
- 19 MR. BARTLETT: Whoever has the warehouse.
- 20 COMMISSIONER SCHMIDTLEIN: Okay, okay.
- MR. BARTLETT: And needs room.
- 22 COMMISSIONER SCHMDITLEIN: Okay, okay alright,
- 23 thank you very much. I don't have any further questions.
- MR. BARTLETT: Thank you.
- 25 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Commissioner Kearns? Do any

- 1 Commissioners have further questions, no Commissioners do.
- 2 Do staff have any questions for this panel?
- 3 MR. BORISSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Stamen
- 4 Borisson, Office of Investigations. Staff has two follow-up
- 5 questions.
- 6 CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Alright.
- 7 MR. TSUJI: Thank you Mr. Chairman, for the
- 8 record, Karl Tsuji, the commodity industry analyst for this
- 9 investigation. And for the afternoon panel I have two
- 10 separate sets of questions. First of all, for Mr. Bartlett
- 11 who was very good to bring in samples of both the
- domestically produced product as well as the imported
- 13 subject product.
- 14 Mr. Bartlett, as far as you're aware, do all the
- 15 Chinese producers of steel racks produce the bolted upright
- 16 columns or is it -- or does some also weld the horizontal
- and vertical bracing to the vertical columns?
- 18 MR. BARTLETT: Ryan Bartlett with UMH. To my
- 19 knowledge all of the imports coming from China are the
- 20 bolted connection. If they were the welded connection, they
- 21 would not be able to be transported and sold at a reasonable
- 22 cost that customers would pay.
- 23 MR. TSUJI: Okay, thank you. The next part of
- 24 my question be as far as you're aware, the domestic
- 25 producers all produce strictly the welded vertical columns

| 1 | when I say welded, meaning that the vertical columns have |
|----|--|
| 2 | welded bracings, both horizontal and diagonal, or do some |
| 3 | also have a bolted feature? |
| 4 | MR. BARTLETT: Ryan with UMH. To my knowledge, I |
| 5 | believe all of them produce a welded column to bracing. At |
| 6 | least all of the ones that are part of the 9 part of this |
| 7 | petition. |
| 8 | MR. TSUJI: Okay, and as far as you're aware, |
| 9 | what about the Mexican producers? |
| 10 | MR. BARTLETT: They produce both, Interlay |
| 11 | Mackilux produced a bolted upright and brace and Frazier |
| 12 | produces a welded one. |
| 13 | MR. TSUJI: Okay, thank you very much, |
| 14 | particularly for those most detailed responses. And I also |
| 15 | invite the Petitioners to respond to these questions as |
| 16 | well, particularly regarding the domestic producer's rack |
| 17 | components. And now the question from this morning, I |
| 18 | would also like to ask of the responding panel this |
| 19 | afternoon. |
| 20 | In your this would be more for Mr. Menegaz as |
| 21 | well as in your post-hearing brief we would appreciate if |
| 22 | you could provide your assessment of the extent of overlap |
| 23 | in the scope of the subject products, subject to the |
| 24 | well, this investigation of steel racks as well as |

Australia's investigation of what they refer to as steel

| Τ | pellet racking. |
|----|---|
| 2 | When you look on page 7-9 of the Commission staff |
| 3 | report in Footnote 4, there's a very brief description as |
| 4 | well as a reference to the Australian anti-dumping |
| 5 | Commission's documentation. |
| 6 | And the second part of my second question is also |
| 7 | please include in your post-hearing brief, if you're aware |
| 8 | of any other anti-dumping countervailing duty orders or |
| 9 | investigations or even import safeguard investigations on |
| 10 | steel racks in other third country markets other than |
| 11 | Australia. Thank you very much. |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Do Petitioners have any |
| 13 | questions for this panel? |
| 14 | MS. DRAKE: Petitioners have no questions. |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Alright thank you. Then |
| 16 | before I dismiss this panel, I would like to note that with |
| 17 | regard to time remaining, Petitioners have 16 minutes of |
| 18 | direct, 5 minutes of closing for a total of 21 minutes. |
| 19 | Respondents have 13 minutes of direct, 5 minutes of closing |
| 20 | for a total of 18 minutes and this panel is dismissed while |
| 21 | we prepare for the Petitioners and then Respondent's |
| 22 | rebuttals in closing. |
| 23 | Thank you all for appearing here today. |
| 24 | MR. BURCH: Closing and rebuttal remarks on |

behalf of Petitioner will be given by Elizabeth J. Drake of

| 1 | Schagrin Associates. Ms. Drake you have 21 minutes. |
|----|--|
| 2 | CLOSING REMARK BY ELIZABETH J. DRAKE |
| 3 | MS. DRAKE: Thank you, Elizabeth Drake of |
| 4 | Schagrin Associates for the Petitioner, the Coalition for |
| 5 | Fair Rack Imports. I want to thank the Commissioners for |
| 6 | their attention today and for all of their very helpful |
| 7 | questions. |
| 8 | I just want to briefly go through the different |
| 9 | factors that the Commission will be considering in its final |
| 10 | determination and address some of the points that were |
| 11 | raised by those in opposition to relieve this afternoon. |
| 12 | First, with regard to interchangeability and the |
| 13 | importance of price, there was a very limited definition of |
| 14 | interchangeability that was the focus this afternoon in |
| 15 | terms of can a specific piece from a Chinese producer fit |
| 16 | into a specific piece from a domestic producer. |
| 17 | And sometimes the case is yes, sometimes it might |
| 18 | not fit as well, but that's very different from how the |
| 19 | Commission normally defines interchangeability which is can |
| 20 | you use this rack in your warehouse? Could you also use |
| 21 | that other rack in your warehouse? |
| 22 | And to that, the answer is clearly yes, and |
| 23 | purchasers agree with more than 75% reporting that Chinese |
| 24 | and domestic product are always or frequently |
| 25 | interchangeable So on a broad level clearly a high |

| 1 | degree of interchangeability between imports and the |
|----|--|
| 2 | domestic-like product. |
| 3 | In terms of the bolted versus the welded product, |
| 4 | our understanding is that as Mr. Bartlett said, the reason |
| 5 | that the imports are welded are to save on freight costs, |
| 6 | principally freight costs from China to the U.S. because |
| 7 | it's much easier to fit them in a container if they haven't |
| 8 | yet been joined together, welded together. |
| 9 | And that may also entail some freight savings |
| 10 | once the product is in the United States, but it's our |
| 11 | understanding from our clients that those are far outweighed |
| 12 | by the additional labor that is required, so a customer may |
| 13 | have a somewhat lower freight cost for a bolted product, but |
| 14 | then once it gets to its warehouse, it needs to bolt it |
| 15 | together, and that labor totally outweighs any freight |
| 16 | savings once in the United States. |
| 17 | And that's why all of domestic product is welded, |
| 18 | because that's what customers prefer and in fact there are |
| 19 | no cases where a customer says well, I really want that |
| 20 | bolted product because I want to put it together myself in |
| 21 | my warehouse, the freight savings just simply aren't worth |
| 22 | it which is why the domestic product is welded, and that |
| 23 | doesn't attenuate competition, or it doesn't limit |
| 24 | interchangeability at all, whether it's bolted or welded, it |

serves the same function and is used in the same end uses.

24

| 1 | With regard to lead times, clearly as the |
|----|--|
| 2 | Commissioners noted, the purchasers do not believe that the |
| 3 | Chinese product has an advantage in terms of lead time, or |
| 4 | only 26% of purchasers reported that Chinese product was |
| 5 | superior in terms of lead time and nearly 74% reported that |
| 6 | the U.S. and Chinese products were either comparable or the |
| 7 | U.S. product was superior. |
| 8 | And this is because of the complete disconnect |
| 9 | that I hope we tried to resolve this morning, but just to |
| 10 | circle back to it. Just because more of domestic |
| 11 | manufacturers report that their shipments are produced to |
| 12 | order does not mean that that whole produced order time |
| 13 | period is what their customer needs to wait to receive the |
| 14 | product because produced to order also means produced to the |
| 15 | order of their dealers their distributors. |
| 16 | And once their dealers and their distributors, |
| 17 | which is the majority of sales both for domestic producers |
| 18 | and for importers, once they are holding that product, the |
| 19 | lead times are very short. And that's reflected in the |
| 20 | purchaser's responses which agree that there's no |
| 21 | disadvantage for domestic product in terms of lead time. |
| 22 | So, this is simply a fake issue that simply flows |
| 23 | from the fact that we were asking manufacturers on the one |
| 24 | hand for lead times and importers on the other importers |
| 25 | obviously have their own lead times with their own suppliers |

| 1 | which was just discussed. |
|----|---|
| 2 | Again, no quality issues the vast majority of |
| 3 | purchasers reporting comparable on quality, so we believe, |
| 4 | again, the record supports a high degree of |
| 5 | interchangeability and the importance of price. |
| 6 | With respect to volume, in terms of the scope of |
| 7 | the case, changing again we'll address that post-hearing. |
| 8 | We don't think that can fully explain the discrepancies in |
| 9 | the volumes that have been reported to the Commission, both |
| 10 | between Commerce and Commission responses, but also between |
| 11 | foreign producers, importers and reports of volume at |
| 12 | different stages of this case. |
| 13 | There is simply no support whatsoever for claims |
| 14 | that the increase in volume was due somehow to some kind of |
| 15 | mysterious scarcity or supply constraints in the U.S. |

scarcity came from or why it is that domestic producers
would invest so much in increasing their capacity and then
just choose, voluntarily, not to use that capacity to
increase their shipments and production.

The idea of strict territorial limits, we alread

market. You see there is no description of where the

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The idea of strict territorial limits, we already talked about that this morning, that while there may be preferred distributors in any particular region, any customer can go to that distributor and get that product.

There's simply no logical reason why the domestic industry

| 1 | would invest to increase capacity and then refuse to make |
|----|--|
| 2 | sales, especially as their capacity utilization rate was |
| 3 | falling. |
| 4 | So, for all those reasons, we think the volume of |
| 5 | subject imports is significant absolutely, and increased |
| 6 | clearly significantly, and gained market share at the |
| 7 | expense of domestic producers. |
| 8 | In terms of price, first of all with the |
| 9 | underselling data, we do hope that that particular importer |
| 10 | we identified could provide some more information to the |
| 11 | Commission to support the prices that it reported. We are |
| 12 | not trying to say that the Commission needs to totally |
| 13 | ignore that data in favor of the other data, but look at |
| 14 | the record as a whole, look at all of the data points that |
| 15 | suggest significant underselling. |
| 16 | And if there's one data point that seems |
| 17 | aberrational, maybe that's because it is aberrational. On |
| 18 | the level of trade there was a suggestion that the reason |
| 19 | purchasers reported that domestic product was higher priced |
| 20 | in the sort of qualitative answers, was because domestics do |
| 21 | more of these custom projects and less of the commodity |
| 22 | work. |
| 23 | But the product is the same. It's this product, |
| 24 | whether it's going into a custom project, or whether it's |
| 25 | going into a standard project, so the prices are pretty much |

| 1 | the same. In fact, these custom projects are so large that |
|----|---|
| 2 | it's often lower priced, so there's no support for that |
| 3 | being the basis of purchasers reporting higher domestic |
| 4 | prices. |
| 5 | In terms of the price suppression, we heard that |
| 6 | the reason that domestic producers weren't able to pass on |
| 7 | rapidly increasing prices was because their customers would |
| 8 | see us as being opportunistic, that the record doesn't |
| 9 | support this speculation at all. |
| 10 | You had a situation where raw material costs were |
| 11 | increasing 25% this is a completely transparent market. |
| 12 | Everyone knows how much the raw materials costs are |
| 13 | increasing, and unit costs are increasing 20% and they were |
| 14 | only able to pass along 6% of that through price increases. |
| 15 | That is less than half of their costs increase |
| 16 | that they were allowed to pass along. That is significant |
| 17 | price suppression, that drove their operating income margin |
| 18 | to just 1.7% in 2018, so this isn't greedy or opportunistic |
| 19 | domestic producers trying to force increases on to their |
| 20 | reluctant customers, this is a market when demand was |
| 21 | growing and they were justified in believing that they |
| 22 | should have been able to pass along those rising prices and |
| 23 | it was competition from low price imports that prevented |
| 24 | them from doing so. |
| 25 | In terms of impact clearly the financial |

| 1 | performance of the domestic industry has been dismal over |
|----|--|
| 2 | the period, especially as demand has been increasing and has |
| 3 | left them very vulnerable at the end of the period of |
| 4 | investigation. And this is not due to transfer just one |
| 5 | company. |
| 6 | You look at pretty much every single company and |
| 7 | you see declining trends. Some may decline more than |
| 8 | others, but this is clearly an industry that is hurting both |
| 9 | to a substantial degree, but also across a broad array of |
| 10 | domestic producers. |
| 11 | In terms of capacity utilization and the idea |
| 12 | that the Commission should place less weight on capacity |
| 13 | utilization, we also completely disagree with that argument |
| 14 | in that the industry was at a respectable rate of capacity |
| 15 | utilization at the end of the period. |
| 16 | They began the period at nearly 80% capacity |
| 17 | utilization rate. That's respectable, that's where they |
| 18 | began before imports came in and took market share. They |
| 19 | ended, in 2018, at only 75% capacity utilization. That is a |
| 20 | true loss as production actually declined despite their |
| 21 | growing capacity and despite growing demand. So, that the |
| 22 | Commission should place a lot of weight on the capacity |
| 23 | utilization data. |
| 24 | Finally, the issue with I know correlation |
| 25 | with import transit is simply untrue, that's based solely on |

| Τ. | the interim period where we ve discussed why imports alone |
|----|--|
| 2 | may not be a true reflection of import volume. |
| 3 | If you want to look for when there was |
| 4 | correlation, just look from 2016 to 2017, and look from 2017 |
| 5 | to 2018, in each of those calendar years, you see a direct |
| 6 | correlation between rising imports, rising import market |
| 7 | share, and increased cost price squeeze, and falling |
| 8 | operating income from the domestic industry pretty strong |
| 9 | correlation throughout the period, that strongly supports a |
| 10 | finding of adverse impact. |
| 11 | And finally, with respect to threat on the growth |
| 12 | projections issue, we were able to in the afternoon, locate |
| 13 | some additional public sources of growth projections that is |
| 14 | projected to slow and even contract. These are the same |
| 15 | sources that are available to Respondents. So, we'd be |
| 16 | happy to put those on the record. |
| 17 | We believe that the foreign producer data, |
| 18 | contrary to what those in opposition to relieve said this |
| 19 | afternoon, does show that the foreign producers are export |
| 20 | oriented, and in fact were increasingly export oriented, |
| 21 | particularly on the U.S. market over the period of |
| 22 | investigation. |
| 23 | And if orders are not imposed, the U.S. will |
| 24 | continue to be a highly attractive market in the future as |
| 25 | their primary input material continues to be subject to much |

| 1 | higher duties than the steel racks themselves. |
|----|--|
| 2 | For all these reasons, we ask the Commission to |
| 3 | make an affirmative determination. Thank you very much. |
| 4 | MR. BURCH: Thank you Miss Drake. And closing |
| 5 | and rebuttal remarks on behalf of Respondent will be given |
| 6 | by Gregory S. Menegaz, of DeKieffer & Horgan. Mr. Menegaz, |
| 7 | you have 18 minutes. |
| 8 | CLOSING STATEMENT OF GREGORY S. MENEGAZ |
| 9 | MR. MENEGAZ: Again, Gregory Menegaz from |
| 10 | DeKieffer & Horgan. Mercifully, I will take nowhere near 18 |
| 11 | minutes to do my close. Maybe since you just heard us |
| 12 | speak, I'll just address some of the points that were just |
| 13 | raised by opposing counsel. |
| 14 | The interchangeability issue was raised by them |
| 15 | saying that we were going to mix and match beams and posts |
| 16 | all over the place, and I think by the conclusion of the day |
| 17 | you found out that all the panelists have said that's not |
| 18 | what happens, that there might be some supplementing of |
| 19 | existing rack systems as a minor point, but nobody in this |
| 20 | meeting room wants to sell a part of a rack for warranty |
| 21 | reasons. |
| 22 | There are substantial barriers to that and |
| 23 | whether people are importing or producing parts at a time, |
| 24 | that's because ultimately all those parts will become |

racking systems. So, I think that's where we were going on

| 4 | the costs are inconsequential. UMH does the bolting in |
|----|---|
| 5 | California, which is in the United States. |
| 6 | It is much cheaper than the corresponding freight |
| 7 | savings where they're able to stack and interlock all of |
| 8 | their posts and braces on a flatbed truck as opposed to |
| 9 | trying to take one of these oddly shaped, fully welded |
| 10 | parts, and stacking that on a truck. |
| 11 | And the freight savings are substantial and |
| 12 | that's why, you know, UMH doesn't really have as much of an |
| 13 | east coast presence because freight costs are very |
| 14 | substantial in this industry, and the advantage on the west |
| 15 | coast, a disadvantage on the east coast. |
| 16 | But just to say the cost the simple cost of a |
| 17 | simple bolting assembly outweighs the freight cost, is |
| 18 | really strongly wrong. And that is a major advantage that |
| 19 | the bolted products have in this market. |
| 20 | Now, with respect to lead times, you know, there |
| 21 | are some discrepancies in the staff report on lead times, |
| 22 | but the main conclusion of the staff report is that there's |
| 23 | a 50-day lead time for the Petitioners and 8 days for the |
| 24 | importers. |
| 25 | And so, we stand by the staff report on that and |

Now, on the bolted versus welded, we very

strongly disagree with what opposing counsel just said, that

the interchangeability.

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| 1 | Ryan Bartlett testified that even though the Petitioners |
|----|---|
| 2 | have distributors, they still have to produce to order 50 |
| 3 | days to get them to the distributors, and the distributors |
| 4 | keep very low inventory of parts. |
| 5 | So, the importers and their distributors have a |
| 6 | huge lead time advantage. With respect to quality, if |
| 7 | you're RMI certified, you have comparable quality maybe |
| 8 | not exact quality, but comparable quality. And this goes to |
| 9 | the scope and volume effect issue. |
| 10 | Look at how few foreign Chinese exporters are RMI |
| 11 | certified very few of them, and so you don't really need |
| 12 | to look to who answered the questionnaire when, you know, |
| 13 | J.C. Penney thought they were involved in the case, or |
| 14 | whoever the other lawyers represented. You should focus on |
| 15 | the RMI listing to determine that. |
| 16 | With respect to the price effects, we would argue |
| 17 | that even if the Commission were to remove an importer |
| 18 | and we don't think the overall record supports that, I'll |
| 19 | obviously argue that in our post-hearing brief. We would |
| 20 | still think that the say that the underselling record is |
| 21 | not significant, has not led to significant market share |
| 22 | changes overall, given the magnitude of the volume of the |
| 23 | market share. |
| 24 | Now, with respect to the level of trade issues |
| 25 | we also think those are not supported by the record and |

| 1 | can't be reconstructed in the post-hearing briefs. Mr. |
|----|--|
| 2 | Bartlett testified that even though he's an importer and a |
| 3 | distributor, he still has a significant portion of sales to |
| 4 | other distributors, and we don't know anything about other |
| 5 | companies. So, they're really going to have to make |
| 6 | something up to develop their level of trade argument in the |
| 7 | post-hearing brief. |
| 8 | Now, on the correlation issue of we simply did |
| 9 | the proforma analysis to show what would happen if the |
| 10 | subject imports weren't involved, or if they were all |
| 11 | attributed to domestic parties. That's all we can do, and |
| 12 | we think it does break the causal link. |
| 13 | We would also note that importer shipments were |
| 14 | down in the 2018 period, yet, you know, the Petitioner's |
| 15 | industry has not done well in the period. You know, we know |
| 16 | that's what the data shows, if you consider those that you |
| 17 | know, reported, but we don't think the explanation is the |
| 18 | subject imports. |
| 19 | With respect to the threat, you know, I guess |
| 20 | we'll all be putting articles on the record, but you know, |
| 21 | the articles we see from the industry show robust global |
| 22 | growth through at least, I think through 2024-2026. |
| 23 | And so, and as we stated before, the Chinese have |
| 24 | a huge domestic market that is growing and the global |
| | |

market. So, we don't see the Chinese poised to, you know,

| 1 | deliver additional products to the United States. |
|----|--|
| 2 | As for the 301, certainly going forward if you're |
| 3 | looking at the next 12 to 18 months, the 25% is a massive |
| 4 | increase in those 301 Tariffs, and we can only, you know, we |
| 5 | would argue as we did in the previous case that the |
| 6 | Commission can only consider the facts at vote day, and with |
| 7 | a 25% Tariff in place, that surely even if they could sell, |
| 8 | would erase any possible injury to the U.S. industry. |
| 9 | And so, with that I conclude our comments, and we |
| 10 | appreciate the Commission's questions and time this |
| 11 | afternoon. |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN JOHANSON: Thank you again to all of you |
| 13 | for appearing here today. I will now make the closing |
| 14 | statement. Post-hearing briefs, statements responsive to |
| 15 | questions and requests of the Commission and corrections to |
| 16 | the transcript, must be filed by July 23rd, 2019. Closing |
| 17 | of the record and final release of data to parties occurs on |
| 18 | August 14th, 2019 and final comments are due on August 16th, |
| 19 | 2019. With that this hearing is adjourned. |
| 20 | (Whereupon, the hearing adjourned at 3:47 p.m.) |
| 21 | |
| 22 | |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |
| | |

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

TITLE: In The Matter Of: Steel Racks from China

INVESTIGATION NOS.: 701-TA-608 AND 731-TA-1420

HEARING DATE: 7-16-19

LOCATION: Washington, D.C.

NATURE OF HEARING: Final

I hereby certify that the foregoing/attached transcript is a true, correct and complete record of the above-referenced proceeding(s) of the U.S.

International Trade Commission.

DATE: 7-16-19

SIGNED: Mark A. Jagan

Signature of the Contractor or the Authorized Contractor's Representative

I hereby certify that I am not the Court Reporter and that I have proofread the above-referenced transcript of the proceedings of the U.S. International Trade Commission, against the aforementioned Court Reporter's notes and recordings, for accuracy in transcription in the spelling, hyphenation, punctuation and speaker identification and did not make any changes of a substantive nature. The foregoing/attached transcript is a true, correct and complete transcription of the proceedings.

SIGNED: Duane Rice Proofreader

I hereby certify that I reported the above-referenced proceedings of the U.S. International Trade Commission and caused to be prepared from my tapes and notes of the proceedings a true, correct and complete verbatim recording of the proceedings.

SIGNED: Larry Flowers
Court Reporter

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