United States
International Trade Commission

The Year in Trade 2024: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program 76th Report

September 2025
Publication Number: 5673
Investigation Number: 163-004

United States
International Trade Commission

Commissioners

Amy A. Karpel, Chair

David S. Johanson

Jason E. Kearns

Catherine DeFilippo
Director, Office of Operations

William Powers
Director, Office of Economics

Address all communications to
Office of External Relations
(externalrelations@usitc.gov)
United States International Trade Commission
Washington, DC 20436

United States
International Trade Commission

The Year in Trade 2024: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program

76th Report

September 2025
Publication Number: 5673
Investigation Number: 163-004

United States
International Trade Commission

This report was prepared principally by:

Project Leader
Wen Jin "Jean" Yuan

Deputy Project Leader
Erika Bethmann

Office of Economics
Meryem Demirkaya, Charles Dixon, Stephanie Fortune-Taylor, Blaize Giangiulio, Chang Hong, Lin Jones, Sarah Krulikowski, Tricia Mueller, Huyen Khanh Nguyen, Matt Reesman, Beza Tafari

Office of the General Counsel
Brian Allen, William Gearhart

Office of Industry and Competitiveness Analysis
Sharon Fisher, Dominique Varier

Office of Investigations
Kelly Carley, Douglas Corkran, Salvatore Mineo

Office of Operations
Brian Soiset

Office of Tariff Affairs and Trade Agreements
Philip Stone

Office of Unfair Import Investigations
David Lloyd

Office of Analysis and Research Services
Shova KC, Aaron Woodward

Content Reviewers
Elizabeth Howlett and Saad Ahmad

United States
International Trade Commission

Editorial Reviewers
Ronald Docksai, Judy Edelhoff, Brian Rose

Legal Reviewer
Eric Heath

Statistical Reviewers
Ann Marie Carton, Conor Hargrove, Samantha Sanfelice, David Taylor, Laura Thayn

Production Support
Juan Calderon, Brittany Rios

Special Assistance
Ranja Andriamananjara, Jayesh Edwards, Ross Jestrab, Samantha Schreiber, Joshua Vasquez, Ashley Xue, Josie Tarin

Under the direction of
Karen Thome, Chief, Country and Regional Analysis Division, Office of Economics

Table of Contents

Tables

Figures

Preface

This report is the 76th in a series of annual reports submitted to the U.S. Congress under section 163(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2213(c)), under predecessor legislation, and pursuant to request. Section 163(c) states that "the United States International Trade Commission shall submit to the Congress, at least once a year, a factual report on the operation of the trade agreements program."

This report is the principal means by which the U.S. International Trade Commission provides Congress with factual information on the operation of the U.S. trade agreements program for 2024. The "trade agreements program" includes "all activities consisting of, or related to, the negotiation or administration of international agreements which primarily concern trade and which are concluded pursuant to the authority vested in the President by the Constitution" and by congressional legislation.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Terms	Definitions
AD	antidumping
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
ALJ	administrative law judge
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ATEC	Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation
BDCs	beneficiary developing countries
BEA	Bureau of Economic Analysis (USDOC)
BEPS	Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD/G20)
BIS	Bureau of Industry and Security (USDOC)
CAFTA-DR	Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CBA	collective bargaining agreement
CBERA	Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection (USDHS)
CBTPA	Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
C.F.R.	Code of Federal Regulations
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CVD	countervailing duty
DBT	Department for Business and Trade (UK)
DSB	Dispute Settlement Body (WTO)
DST	digital services tax
DSU	Dispute Settlement Understanding (WTO)
EC	European Commission
ECRA	Export Control Reform Act
EDA	Economic Development Administration (USDOC)
EOP	Executive Office of the President
EU	European Union
Fed. Reg.	*Federal Register*
5G	fifth generation
FTA	free trade agreement
FY	fiscal year
G7	Group of Seven
G20	Group of Twenty
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	gross domestic product
GE	genetically engineered
GW	gigawatts
GSP	U.S. Generalized System of Preferences
GSP-LDBC	U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for least-developed beneficiary developing countries
HELP	Haitian Economic Lift Program
HOPE	Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act
HS	*Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (Harmonized System)*
HTS	*Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States*
IATA	International Air Transport Association

Terms	Definitions
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IIP	Index of Industrial Production (UNIDO)
ILCME	Interagency Labor Committee for Monitoring and Enforcement
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPI	International Procurement Instrument
IP	intellectual property
IPR	intellectual property right
IRA	U.S. Inflation Reduction Act
ISIC	International Standard Industrial Classification
ITA	International Trade Administration (USDOC)
KORUS	U.S.-Korea FTA
LDBC	least-developed beneficiary country
LDBDCs	least-developed beneficiary developing countries
LDCs	least-developed countries
LTFV	less than fair value
MAST	Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail [Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs]
MC	Ministerial Conference (WTO)
MC12	12th Ministerial Conference (WTO)
MC13	13th Ministerial Conference (WTO)
MNE	multinational enterprise
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
n.i.e.	not included elsewhere
NTPP	Nepal Trade Preference Program
NTPA	Nepal Trade Preferences Act
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OTEXA	Office of Textiles and Apparel (ITA, USDOC)
PSF	fine denier polyester staple fiber (fine denier PSF)
ROOs	rules of origin
RRM	United States-Mexico Facility-Specific Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (USMCA)
S&P	Standard and Poor’s
SCM Agreement	Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
SME	small and medium-sized enterprise
SPS	sanitary and phytosanitary (standards)
SSA	sub-Saharan Africa
TAA	Trade Adjustment Assistance
TAAEA	Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011
TAARA	Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015
TAICNAR	Technical Assistance Improvement and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (WTO)
TIB	Temporary Importation Under Bond
TIC	Trade and Investment Council
TICFA	Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum Agreement
TIFA	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TPA	Trade Promotion Agreement

Terms	Definitions
TPEA	Trade Preferences Extension Act
TRIPS	Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (WTO)
TRQ	tariff-rate quota
TTC	U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council
UK	United Kingdom
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organization
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S.C.	U.S. Code
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USDHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
USDOC	U.S. Department of Commerce
USDOL	U.S. Department of Labor
USDOS	U.S. Department of State
USITC	U.S. International Trade Commission
USMCA	United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
USTR	Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
WTO	World Trade Organization

Executive Summary

Global Trade Environment in 2024

After contracting by 4.7 percent in 2023 to $24.1 trillion, the value of global merchandise trade—measured by the average value of global merchandise exports and imports—rebounded in 2024, increasing by 2.1 percent to $24.6 trillion. The Middle East experienced the highest growth in the value of merchandise imports among six regions, and Asia recorded the strongest growth of merchandise exports. Meanwhile, global exports of commercial services rose to a record high of $8.7 trillion in 2024, up 9.1 percent compared to 2023.

Global macroeconomic trends: Broader macroeconomic conditions offer context for understanding trends in trade activity. In 2024, global gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 3.3 percent, with emerging markets and developing economies outpacing advanced economies. U.S. GDP growth slowed slightly to 2.8 percent. Global inflation in 2024 was lower than in 2023 but remained elevated, with the U.S. inflation rate declining to 3.0 percent in 2024 from 4.1 percent in 2023. Most major U.S. trading partners experienced inflation rates below the world average. Global manufacturing output growth accelerated to 2.2 percent from 1.2 percent in 2023, led by high-tech industries, and coincided with the 2.1 percent growth in the value of global merchandise trade. Meanwhile, the U.S. dollar appreciated—up 9.0 percent against a basket of currencies of major U.S. trading partners—strengthening most notably against the Mexican peso, the Japanese yen, and the Canadian dollar.

Global merchandise trade: In 2024, the nominal value of global merchandise trade rose to $24.6 trillion. Merchandise trade imbalances widened significantly across the world in 2024 with the highest goods trade imbalances recorded between the United States and China, the United States and the European Union (EU), and the EU and China. Global trade value in most merchandise sectors increased in 2024, with the highest growth rate recorded in the office and telecommunications equipment sector. In contrast, the largest declines in merchandise trade values in 2024 were recorded in the fuels and iron and steel sectors. Geographically, all regions but Europe experienced year-on-year annual increases in the value of two-way merchandise trade in 2024.

Global services trade: Global exports of commercial services grew to $8.7 trillion in 2024. The United States and the EU both had large surpluses in services in 2024, whereas China had a substantial deficit. Services exports increased in all four major categories reported by the WTO: travel services, transportation services, goods-related services, and other commercial services. The fastest-growing commercial services export category was travel services, continuing the rapid recovery that has been underway since 2021 as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic subsided. The EU was the world's leading exporter of commercial services in 2024, followed by the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), China, and Singapore. The EU was also the world's largest importer of commercial services, followed by the United States, China, the UK, and Singapore.

Administration of U.S. Trade Laws and Regulations

Key Developments in 2024

Safeguard investigations: The safeguard provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 set out a procedure under which the President may grant temporary relief to a domestic industry seriously injured by increased imports. If the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC or Commission) makes an affirmative determination, it recommends a remedy to the President, who makes the final decision on whether to take an action. In 2024, the Commission conducted a new global safeguard investigation on fine denier polyester staple fiber, which resulted in an affirmative determination by the Commission and the imposition of safeguard measures by the President. The United States also continued to have a global safeguard action in effect on solar cells and modules, for which the Commission issued a second monitoring report on developments within the U.S. industry, and the President made modifications to the action.

Section 301 investigations: Section 301 investigations are undertaken by the U.S. Trade Representative (the USTR) and address unfair foreign practices affecting U.S. commerce. Such investigations may be used to enforce U.S. rights under bilateral and multilateral trade agreements or to respond to unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory foreign government practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce. In 2024, the Trade Representative initiated several new section 301 investigations, including on (1) China's targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance; (2) Nicaragua's acts, policies, and practices related to labor rights, human rights, and the rule of law; and (3) China's targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance. The Trade Representative completed a four-year review on the section 301 action regarding China's acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation, and recommended that the section 301 tariffs remain in place with certain modifications.

Special 301 investigations: The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) conducts an annual review of the state of intellectual property rights enforcement and protection in U.S. trading partners, pursuant to section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 (known as "special 301"). To aid in the administration of the statute, USTR publishes a watch list and priority watch list identifying countries with intellectual property rights-related problems. In its 2024 special 301 report, USTR placed Argentina, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and Venezuela on the priority watch list, which were the same seven countries on the priority watch list in 2023. USTR placed an additional 20 countries on the watch list in 2024, and the special 301 review of Ukraine continued to be suspended because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) investigations and reviews: Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 offers relief to U.S. industries that are materially injured, or threatened with material injury, by imports that are sold, or likely to be sold, in the United States at less than fair value (dumped), receiving subsidies meeting certain conditions, or both. The U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) determines whether the subject imports are being sold or are likely to be sold in the United States at less than fair value, subsidized, or both, and the Commission determines whether a U.S. industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or whether the establishment of a U.S. industry is materially retarded, by reason of such imports. In March 2024, the USDOC finalized new rules expanding its authority in AD/CVD proceedings. The rules clarify the USDOC's authority to determine particular market situations; allow consideration of inadequate foreign government enforcement of labor, environmental, and intellectual property laws when assessing price and cost distortions; and authorize the USDOC to investigate and countervail transnational subsidies. In December 2024, the USDOC finalized new rules updating several AD/CVD provisions, including filing requirements, cash deposit applications, the application of antidumping rates in nonmarket economies, and respondent selection. The amendments took effect on January 15, 2025.

During 2024, the Commission instituted 68 new antidumping investigations and made 65 preliminary determinations and 57 final determinations. As a result of affirmative final USDOC and Commission determinations, the USDOC issued 39 antidumping duty orders on 11 products from 27 countries in 2024. The Commission instituted 50 new countervailing duty investigations and made 45 preliminary determinations and 19 final determinations during 2024. The USDOC issued 13 countervailing duty orders on 8 products from 7 countries in 2024 as a result of affirmative USDOC and Commission determinations.

Section 129 determinations: Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act sets out a procedure under which the United States may respond to an adverse WTO panel or Appellate Body report concerning U.S. obligations under the WTO agreements on safeguards, antidumping, or subsidies and countervailing duty measures. On February 20, 2024, a WTO compliance panel reviewing a 2022 USDOC section 129 determination circulated its final report with respect to a USDOC redetermination relating to the dispute *United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Ripe Olives from Spain (DS577)*. On review, the compliance panel agreed largely with the EU and concluded that the EU had demonstrated that the United States had failed to bring its measures into conformity with the adopted recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). At the DSB meeting of November 25, 2024, the chair of the DSB announced that the matter had been referred to arbitration pursuant to Article 22.6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).

Section 337 investigations: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, prohibits various unfair acts in the importation and sale of articles in the United States and is most commonly used in connection with allegations of patent infringement. In 2024, there were 109 active section 337 investigations and ancillary proceedings related to unfair practices in the import trade, such as the importation of products that infringe valid and enforceable U.S. patents. Of the 59 proceedings instituted in 2024, 45 were new section 337 investigations and 14 were new ancillary (secondary) proceedings relating to previously concluded investigations. The Commission completed 51 investigations and ancillary proceedings under section 337 in 2024 and issued 3 general exclusion orders, 6 limited exclusion orders, and 39 cease and desist orders. Technology products remained the single-largest category, with about 34 percent of the active proceedings involving computer and telecommunications equipment, about 7 percent involving consumer electronics, and about another 7 percent involving liquid crystal display devices (LCDs) and televisions.

Export controls: Various U.S. laws, including the Arms Export Control Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), control exports for national security and foreign policy purposes by requiring that certain exports receive a license from an enforcement agency. The USDOC's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) administers the ECRA, and the BIS has used this authority in recent years to impose controls on exports to China of certain technologies with dual use in military applications. In 2024, BIS issued an interim final rule implementing export controls on certain semiconductors, quantum computers and related electronic assemblies, and aerospace technology. Additionally, BIS issued a final rule related to controlling exports of advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing by revising the Entity List to include entities in China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore found to be acting contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

Trade Preference Programs

Trade preference programs generally provide duty-free treatment to U.S. imports of eligible articles from designated beneficiary countries. From 2023 to 2024, the value of U.S. imports that claimed preferential treatment and entered under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), and the Nepal Trade Preferences Program (NTPP) all declined. Among these, U.S. imports under the NTPP fell the most in percentage terms, and U.S. imports under AGOA showed the largest decline in value. Utilization rates across all trade preference programs decreased from 2023 to 2024.

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): The GSP program authorizes the President to grant duty-free treatment to imports of eligible articles from designated beneficiary developing countries. The President's authority to provide duty-free treatment under the GSP program expired on December 31, 2020, and had not been reauthorized at year-end 2024.

African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): AGOA provides tariff preferences to eligible sub-Saharan African countries. In 2024, imports from 32 designated sub-Saharan African countries were eligible for AGOA benefits. Imports from 22 of these countries were also eligible for AGOA textile and apparel benefits for all or part of 2024. No beneficiary countries were reinstated or terminated from the program as a result of the 2024 AGOA eligibility review. The 2024 AGOA Forum convened in Washington, DC, in July 2024. During the Forum, the United States highlighted its commitment to AGOA and hosted several conversations on a broad range of issues, including using AGOA to drive economic growth for Africans and Americans, as well as further deepening U.S.-African trade and economic relations.

Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA): CBERA authorizes the President to grant certain unilateral, preferential tariff benefits to Caribbean Basin countries. In 2024, imports from 17 countries and territories were eligible for CBERA preferences; 8 of these countries were also eligible for Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) preferences. Expanding CBERA's scope to include trade in services was one topic at the 2024 U.S.-Caribbean Community Trade and Investment Council meeting. Haiti receives additional preferences under the CBERA program through the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Economic Partnership Encouragement Acts of 2006 and 2008 (HOPE Acts) and the Haiti Economic Lift Program Act of 2010 (HELP Act). Civil unrest and security issues stemming from the 2021 assassination of the Haitian president continued to affect the Haitian apparel sector, especially through job losses. During 2024, U.S. and international organizations engaged in programs supporting the sector and utilization of preferences under the HOPE and HELP Acts.

Nepal Trade Preferences Program (NTPP): The NTPP gives Nepal duty-free access to the U.S. market for certain goods, including luggage, carpets, apparel, textile articles, and headwear items. According to USTR, during the seventh Trade and Investment Framework Agreements Council Meeting in September 2024 between the United States and Nepal, the United States welcomed Nepal's removal of import restrictions on U.S. pork and poultry.

The World Trade Organization

Developments in 2024: The 13th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC13) took place from February 26 to March 2, 2024, in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates. Ministers endorsed the accessions of two least-developed countries to the WTO—Comoros and Timor-Leste—which brought the WTO membership to 166. Ministers discussed various issues such as environmental sustainability, technical barriers to trade, fisheries subsidies, and WTO reform. They delivered several outcomes related to trade and development. Ministers also extended the exemption from customs duties on electronic transmissions and the moratorium on non-violation and situation complaints under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement.

During 2024, the WTO General Council conducted several formal and informal meetings, focusing on addressing and completing "the unfinished business" pending from MC13. The council also reappointed Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as the Director General for a second four-year term, starting on September 1, 2025.

Fisheries subsidies negotiation: The Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, adopted at the 12th Ministerial Conference in June 2022, prohibits subsidies to vessels or operators engaging in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. By year-end 2024, 88 WTO members, including the United States, had formally accepted the agreement. However, for the agreement to enter into force, at least two-thirds of WTO members (111 members) must formally accept it. Despite rounds of negotiations leading to and following MC13 in 2024, WTO members were not able to reach a consensus on the second phase of fisheries subsidies negotiations.

Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement: On February 25, 2024, 123 WTO members finalized the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFD Agreement). The IFD Agreement originated from the Joint Initiative on Investment Facilitation, launched by 70 WTO members at the 2017 Ministerial Conference to improve investment climates, particularly in developing and least-developed countries. The United States was not among the members that finalized the IFD Agreement and had not joined the agreement as of year-end 2024. The sponsors of the IFD Agreement also submitted to MC13 a request to incorporate the IFD Agreement into Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement, the WTO's founding document. Once incorporated, the IFD Agreement would open to all members wishing to join.

Dispute settlement activities in 2024: During 2024, WTO members filed 10 new requests for dispute settlement consultations, 4 more than in 2023. One new request filed during 2024 was against the United States, by China, as described below. No new disputes were filed by the United States. Of the 10 disputes filed during 2024, China filed 5, the EU filed 3, and Indonesia and South Africa filed 1 each. The EU was the named respondent in four of the disputes; China in two; and the United States, Canada, Türkiye, and Chinese Taipei in one dispute each.

China filed a new dispute requesting consultations with the United States regarding certain subsidies that the United States allegedly provides under the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act. The United States and China held consultations on May 7, 2024. When consultations failed to resolve the dispute, China requested the establishment of a panel. At China's request, the Director-General composed the panel on December 19, 2024.

No reports were issued during 2024 by the WTO Appellate Body because of a continuing impasse on appointing Appellate Body members. The term of the last sitting Appellate Body member expired on November 30, 2020. By year-end 2024, 31 appeals had been notified to the Appellate Body.

Selected Regional and Bilateral Activities

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): Highlights from the 2024 OECD Ministerial Council Meeting included the opening of accession discussions for Indonesia and Thailand, the adoption of an Implementation Plan for the OECD Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, and newly revised guidelines on state-owned enterprises, international investment, and artificial intelligence. In 2024, work continued on the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan. Fiji and Moldova joined the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on the action plan, bringing the total number of its members to 147.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): In 2024, APEC carried out work under four general areas: (1) trade and investment with an emphasis on transparency and supply chain resilience; (2) inclusion, innovation, and digitalization; (3) sustainability and resilience; and (4) strengthening cooperation among Asia-Pacific economies. APEC leaders delivered several high-level actions concerning food loss, clean and low-carbon hydrogen policy, sustainable finance, and capacity building around the operation of free trade agreements (FTAs) in the region. The United States provided ongoing support for the implementation of phase three of the Supply Chain Framework Action Plan, holding workshops on a number of customs-related topics.

Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs): A number of TIFA council meetings took place in 2024, including with Argentina, Bangladesh, Central Asian countries, Ecuador, Egypt, Iraq, Maldives, Nepal, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye. In addition, the United States and TIFA partners convened working groups to discuss specific concerns and collaborative issues.

Other trade initiatives: The overarching Agreement on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), as well as its sub-agreements on supply chains (Pillar Two), clean economy (Pillar Three), and fair economy (Pillar Four), came into force in 2024. As of year-end 2024, negotiations on Pillar One (trade) were ongoing. IPEF partners held three ministerial meetings in 2024, convening bodies established under Pillars Two, Three, and Four and kicking off the Clean Economy Investor Forum.

Representatives of the United States and Taiwan continued negotiations of the United States-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade, which was launched in June 2022. The first United States-Taiwan Agreement—covering portions of the negotiating mandate, including chapters on customs administration and trade facilitation, good regulatory practices, domestic regulation of services, and anti-corruption—officially entered into force in December 2024. Negotiations held in 2024 mainly covered market access for U.S. agricultural products, food security, environmental sustainability, and labor rights.

The United States and Kenya launched negotiations on a Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership in July 2022 and continued to meet throughout 2024. During the year, USTR held multiple public stakeholder listening sessions and released negotiating text summaries covering issues, including (1) agriculture, (2) good regulatory practices, (3) workers' rights and protections, (4) environment, (5) customs and trade facilitation and enforcement, and (6) inclusivity.

The United States had worked on the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, a regional framework with 12 member countries, since 2022. In February 2025, the United States announced that it would not continue to participate in this framework.

U.S. Free Trade Agreements

U.S. imports under FTAs: The value of U.S. merchandise imports claiming preferences and entering under FTAs (hereafter FTA imports) increased by 3.9 percent, to $536 billion in 2024. FTA imports accounted for 26.0 percent of total U.S. merchandise imports for consumption in 2024. Of the 14 FTAs, imports under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) accounted for more than three-quarters of total U.S. merchandise imports under FTAs. FTA imports under non-USMCA FTAs increased 9.1 percent, mainly driven by imports from South Korea. The utilization rate across all FTAs was 77.4 percent in 2024. In 2024, U.S. FTAs on average had higher utilization rates compared with other U.S. tariff preference programs, including AGOA, CBERA, and the NTPP. Chile and Jordan sustained utilization rates above 90 percent during 2022–24. Australia, Bahrain, Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), Mexico, Peru, and South Korea had utilization rates above 80 percent in 2024.

U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA) implementation: At the fourth USMCA Free Trade Commission meeting, on May 22, 2024, trade ministers reaffirmed their commitment to USMCA implementation and inclusive economic growth. Discussions focused on strengthening regional supply chains, labor rights, environmental cooperation, small and medium-sized enterprise support, and emergency response coordination. The meeting culminated in the signing of an addendum to USMCA Free Trade Commission Decision No. 5, establishing procedures for extraordinary sessions of the Sub-Committee on Emergency Response.

Discussions at the third USMCA Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Dialogue, on May 17, 2024, focused on expanding small and medium-sized enterprise participation in North American trade, including value chain integration, customs procedures, intellectual property rights, and access to finance and e-commerce. USTR released its second biennial report on the USMCA automotive provisions in July 2024, highlighting the industry's shift toward zero-emission vehicles and preparation for the expiration of transition flexibilities in 2025. Ministers reaffirmed environmental commitments at the May 2024 USMCA Free Trade Commission meeting, emphasizing trilateral cooperation. In 2024, the Secretariat of the Commission on Environmental Cooperation reviewed six Submissions on Enforcement Matters.

Dispute settlement: A USMCA dispute involving genetically engineered corn was concluded in 2024, with the panel finding that Mexico's measures were inconsistent with various USMCA provisions and recommending that Mexico conform its measures with its obligations under the USMCA. No panel reviews under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) cases were concluded in 2024, but one AD/CVD panel review under the USMCA was terminated on procedural grounds. Six new requests for panel review under NAFTA or the USMCA were filed, bringing the total of active AD/CVD panel reviews as of the end of 2024 to 16.

The first dispute settlement panel convened under the USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (RRM) concluded that the panel lacked jurisdiction to reach a decision. In 2024, the United States made requests for five other RRM panels to be convened. In 2024, the United States and Mexico resolved 12 RRM petitions before the panel review stage.

Developments with other FTAs: During 2024, U.S. officials engaged with FTA partners on a range of trade- and investment-related issues. Frequent topics discussed included the environment, agricultural trade, labor rights, intellectual property, and supply chains. Environmental topics discussed in 2024 under various FTAs included fishery, forestry, marine litter, and waste management. Agricultural trade topics discussed in 2024 included market access for agricultural biotechnology products and e-commerce as well as tariff-rate quotas on agricultural products. Labor topics discussed included child labor workplace safety and forced labor in agricultural and manufacturing sectors, as well as promotion and enforcement of labor rights. The U.S. Department of Labor played an active role in labor engagements under the CAFTA-DR and several bilateral FTAs, including with Colombia, Jordan, Oman, and Peru.

U.S. Developments with Selected Trading Partners in 2024

Five trading partners—the EU, Canada, Mexico, China, and the UK—were selected for examination on the basis of their bilateral trade value in goods and services with the United States, as well as the extent of trade policy activity between those countries and the United States in 2024.

European Union: The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) remained the principal forum for coordination and engagement between the United States and the EU on trade matters. The TTC held two ministerial meetings in 2024, launching the Minerals Security Partnership Forum at the second. Outside the TTC, the United States and EU engaged on several issues, including nonmarket practices by China, fair competition in the technology sector and digital economy.

Canada: In 2024, Canada's digital services tax came into force. USTR met with its Canadian counterparts several times to discuss U.S. concerns about the tax. On June 29, 2025, the Canadian government announced it would halt collection of the digital services tax, in anticipation of a comprehensive trade agreement with the United States. The two countries also engaged extensively through USMCA mechanisms. Following an addendum to USMCA Free Trade Commission Decision No. 5, U.S. and Canadian trade representatives released new internal mechanisms that will be used to coordinate North American trade flows in emergency situations.

Mexico: In 2024, U.S. and Mexican officials held several meetings to discuss a surge in Mexican steel and aluminum exports, referencing their 2019 joint statement on section 232 duties. Mexico and the United States engaged through USMCA mechanisms, including the RRM. A USMCA dispute involving genetically engineered corn was concluded in 2024, and in 2024, Mexico further reduced import quota volumes for glyphosate and glyphosate-containing products. In April 2024, U.S. and Mexican officials convened virtually for the 2024 U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue Mid-Year Review, highlighting accomplishments on a joint semiconductor supply chain action plan and success promoting social and economic development in southern Mexico and northern Central America.

China: In 2024, major developments in U.S.-Chinese trade relations included expanded trade and investment restrictions and shifts in strategic resource policies. Following its four-year review of section 301 measures, the United States maintained existing tariffs and imposed additional tariff increases on selected Chinese products in strategic sectors—such as electric vehicles, solar cells, and medical goods—to protect U.S. businesses and workers from China's unfair trade practices. The United States also tightened export controls and placed new investment restrictions. In response, China announced export bans on certain critical minerals to the United States. The United States also stepped up enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and enacted legislation mandating TikTok's divestment from its Chinese parent company.

United Kingdom: The United States and the UK continued to cooperate under the Atlantic Declaration. Notable milestones in 2024 included the launch of the second U.S.-UK Strategic Sanctions Dialogue, the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Artificial Intelligence, and the announcement of the Strategic Dialogue on Biological Security. Engagement between the UK and U.S. state governments on trade matters has also continued.

Chapter 1 Global Trade Environment

Introduction

Scope and Approach of the Report

This report provides information on the operation of the U.S. trade agreements program for 2024. Section 163(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 requires that "The United States International Trade Commission shall submit to the Congress, at least once a year, a factual report on the operation of the trade agreements program."[1] Analysis in this report focuses on the calendar year, January 1 through December 31, 2024. Section 1 of Executive Order 11846 defines the trade agreements program to include "all activities consisting of, or related to, the negotiation or administration of international agreements which primarily concern trade."[2] This report also provides information on the administration of U.S. trade laws and other trade-related policies, to the extent appropriate and to the extent that information was publicly available.[3] This year marks the 76th annual report prepared by the U.S. International Trade Commission (Commission or USITC).[4]

Sources

This report is based on primary source materials about U.S. trade programs and administrative actions pertaining to them. These materials chiefly reflect information published in U.S. government reports, *Federal Register* notices, and news releases, including publications and news releases issued by the Commission and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).[5] Other primary sources of information include publications of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the United Nations (UN), and foreign governments. When primary source information is unavailable, the report draws on professional journals, trade publications, and news reports for supplemental information.

[1] Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 163(c), 88 Stat. 1978, 2009 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2213(c)).
[2] EOP, Executive Order 11846, 40 Fed. Reg. 14291, § 1 (March 27, 1975).
[3] These topics correspond to the types of information the President is to include in a report required under the Trade Act of 1974. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 163(a), 88 Stat. 1978, 2009 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2213(a)). Section 163(a)(2)–(3) specifies the types of information that the President is to include in the report.
[4] The annual reports began in 1949 and were prepared under the name of the Commission's predecessor, the U.S. Tariff Commission (established by section 330 of the Tariff Act of 1930), which was renamed the USITC on January 3, 1975. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 § 171, 88 Stat. 1978, 2009 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C § 2231).
[5] USTR's *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report* includes identical page numbers in multiple chapters of the report. To ensure citation accessibility for readers, all page references to this USTR report are the PDF-generated page numbers starting at page 1 and proceeding consecutively.

Like past reports, *The Year in Trade 2024: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program* also relies on data from the U.S. Census Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) for U.S. merchandise trade statistics presented in chapters 1 through 6. Most tables in the report present U.S. merchandise trade statistics using "total exports" and "general imports" as measures, except for tables on imports that have entered the United States with a claim of eligibility under trade preference programs and free trade agreements, discussed in chapters 2 and 5.[6] Such data require an analysis of U.S. "imports for consumption"—the total of all goods that have been cleared by U.S. Customs and Border Protection with required duties paid to enter the customs territory of the United States. The information on U.S. cross-border total services trade is based on official statistics published by the USDOC's Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).

Trade statistics in this report may not always match the data presented in previous reports because much of the trade data used in the report, including U.S. merchandise and services trade data, are revised over time.

Organization of the Report

This chapter gives an overview of the global trade environment within which U.S. trade policy was conducted in 2024. Chapter 2 covers the administration of U.S. trade laws and regulations in 2024, including trade preference programs. Chapter 3 focuses on U.S. participation in the WTO, including significant developments in WTO dispute settlement cases during 2024. Chapter 4 reviews 2024 developments at the OECD and APEC, developments involving trade and investment framework agreements, and other regional trade initiatives and negotiations. Chapter 5 analyzes U.S. imports under free trade agreements, summarizes U.S. participation in free trade agreements in 2024, and highlights developments in the implementation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Chapter 6 discusses major developments in trade relations with selected major U.S. trading partners. Data on trade with selected partners, as well as information on specific investigations covered in chapters 2 and 3, are provided in an online interactive dashboard for this report.

[6] "Total exports" measures the total physical movement of goods out of the United States to foreign countries, whether such goods are exported from the U.S. customs territory, from a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) bonded warehouse, or a U.S. foreign-trade zone. The total exports measure is the sum of domestic exports and "foreign exports" (also known as re-exports). "General imports" measures the total physical arrivals of merchandise from foreign countries, whether such merchandise enters the U.S. customs territory immediately or is entered into bonded warehouses or foreign-trade zones under CBP custody. These two measures—total exports and general imports—are the broadest measures of U.S. merchandise trade reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, and they are used by the USDOC's BEA, with adjustments, to report on U.S. trade flows in official government balance of payment statistics. These are also the measures most commonly used internationally. "Special Topic: Trade Metrics" chapter in USITC, *Shifts in U.S. Merchandise Trade 2014*, June 2015.

Global Trade Environment in 2024

Global Macroeconomic Trends in 2024

This overview of macroeconomic conditions in 2024 provides context for the U.S. and global trade changes described in this report. The global economy remained resilient in 2024, despite the lingering effects of severe economic shocks weathered in preceding years. These global shocks included the COVID-19 pandemic (the effects of which had subsided by 2024), Russia's war with Ukraine, and the sharp rise in commodity prices (including energy and most foodstuffs) in 2022.

From 2022 to 2024, governments across the world used monetary tightening to battle high inflation. As a result, in 2024, the global economy achieved a significant milestone, according to the IMF—a decline in inflation without triggering a global recession.[7] The global inflation rate slowed to 5.7 percent in 2024, with significant variation across countries and regions. As in 2023, inflation in 2024 was higher in emerging markets and developing economies (7.7 percent) than in advanced economies (2.6 percent).[8] The U.S. dollar appreciated relative to currencies of major trading partners in both nominal and real effective terms, reflecting, among other things, investor confidence in the U.S. market.[9] The value of global merchandise trade increased to $24.6 trillion in 2024 from $24.1 trillion in 2023.[10]

In 2024, global output growth slowed and output growth patterns varied widely across regions and individual economies. Output growth rates in Emerging and Developing Asia (which includes China and India) outpaced growth in other regions.[11] The United States, the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), and Japan experienced subdued growth rates in 2024; Germany's economy contracted for the second year in a row.[12]

Gross domestic product (GDP)

Global GDP grew by an estimated 3.3 percent in 2024, a slightly slower annual growth rate than in 2023 (3.5 percent) and 2022 (3.6 percent).[13] Emerging markets and developing economies experienced higher annual growth rates (4.3 percent) than advanced economies (1.8 percent) in 2024.[14]

---

[7] IMF, World Economic Outlook Press Briefing, October 22, 2024.

[8] IMF, IMF DataMapper, "World Economic Outlook Dataset," April 2025. For information on inflation, exchange rates, output, and other key indicators, see the relevant sections later in this chapter.

[9] Federal Reserve Board, "Foreign Exchange Rates—H-10," accessed May 6, 2025.

[10] WTO, WTO Stats portal, International Trade Statistics, accessed April 16, 2025.

[11] IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, April 2025, 12. According to the IMF's classification of economies, the Emerging and Developing Asia group includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. IMF, "Classification of Economies in IMF's WEO Database," April 2025.

[12] IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, April 2025, 12.

[13] IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, April 2025, 12.

[14] IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, April 2025, 12. For additional details on how the IMF classifies economies by level of development, see IMF, WEO database, "Groups and Aggregates Information," April 2025.

U.S. GDP grew by 2.8 percent in 2024, a slightly weaker pace than in 2023 (2.9 percent).[15] The U.S. output expansion in 2024 was mainly driven by strong consumption; private investment and government spending were additional contributory factors.[16] A reduction in net exports reduced growth as the U.S. goods and services trade deficit increased to 3.1 percent of GDP in 2024 from 2.8 percent in 2023.[17]

Among the major trading partners of the United States, India and China experienced the highest GDP growth rates in 2024, at 6.5 percent and 5.0 percent, respectively (figure 1.1). However, both economies experienced a slowdown in 2024 relative to the growth rates in 2023: 9.2 percent in India and 5.4 percent in China. According to the IMF, output growth in China was below expectations, given a slowdown in consumption amid delayed stabilization in the property market and persistently low consumer confidence.[18] Growth in India decelerated in 2024 primarily as a result of a sharper-than-expected slowdown in industrial activity.[19]

Canada's GDP grew at 1.5 percent in 2024, unchanged from 2023. Mexico's GDP growth slowed from 3.3 percent in 2023 to 1.5 percent in 2024. The EU, the UK, and Japan experienced the lowest growth rates in 2024 among major U.S. trading partners, with Japan growing by 0.1 percent, the EU by 0.9 percent, and the UK by 1.1 percent. Subdued growth in major European economies in 2024 reflected continued weaknesses in manufacturing and merchandise exports, even as consumption picked up with the recovery in real incomes.[20] In Japan, temporary supply disruptions—caused by a production suspension by a major car manufacturer—in the first half of 2024 contributed to the output growth slowdown in 2024.[21]

---

[15] IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, April 2025, 12; USDOC, BEA, "Gross Domestic Product, 4th Quarter and Year 2024 (Third Estimate)," March 27, 2025.
[16] USDOC, BEA, "Gross Domestic Product, 4th Quarter and Year 2024 (Third Estimate)," March 27, 2025.
[17] USDOC, BEA, "U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December and Annual 2024," February 5, 2025.
[18] IMF, *World Economic Outlook Update*, January 2025, 1.
[19] IMF, *World Economic Outlook Update*, January 2025, 1.
[20] IMF, *World Economic Outlook Update*, January 2025, 1.
[21] IMF, *IMF 2025 Article IV Consultation: Japan*, April 2025, 5.

Figure 1.1 Percentage change in real gross domestic product (GDP), by the world economy and selected major economies, annual, 2023–24

In percentages. Underlying data for this figure can be found in appendix table A.1.



Source: IMF, WEO Database, April 22, 2025. USDOC, BEA, table 1, "Real Gross Domestic Product and Related Measures: Percent Change from Preceding Period," accessed June 26, 2025.
Note: Individual economies are ordered by 2024 GDP growth rates, from highest to lowest.

GDP and Trade Linkages

Over the past 10 years, global output and global trade (measured by total volume of exports of goods and services) displayed a closely aligned growth pattern generally moving in tandem (figure 1.2).[22] World trade expansion coincided with growth in world output in every year in the last decade except 2020, when economic activity was severely disrupted across the globe as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Global trade activity declined more sharply than GDP in 2020, then rebounded more quickly than GDP in 2021, when adverse effects of the pandemic eased and international trade picked up.

In 2022 and 2024, the rate of world trade expansion exceeded global GDP growth by 1.8 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively. Such factors as global inflationary pressures and geopolitical tensions weighed on both global GDP and trade growth in 2023.[23] The IMF notes that in some countries, including China, external demand was the main factor supporting output growth in 2024.[24] In 2024, the global export volume of goods and services increased by 3.9 percent (figure 1.2).

[22] Although this chapter covers mostly a one- to three-year perspective, a longer-term historical perspective is also applied in this section to gain a deeper understanding of linkages between macroeconomic indicators over time.
[23] USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 40.
[24] IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, April 2025, 1.

Figure 1.2 Percentage change in global output and trade, annual, 2015–24

In percentages. Underlying data for this figure can be found in appendix table A.2.



Source: IMF, WEO Database, April 22, 2025.

Inflation

Although inflation remained high in many countries in 2024, the global average rate decreased from 2023. The global reduction in inflation during 2023–24 was driven mostly by the gradual unwinding of the unique combination of supply and demand shocks triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, together with the tightening of global monetary policy and improvements in labor supply in many advanced countries in 2024.[25] According to the IMF, monetary policy played a key role in helping keep inflation under control in 2024, and more pronounced progress in reducing inflation was observed in advanced economies.[26]

The global inflation rate decreased from 6.6 percent in 2023 to 5.7 percent in 2024. The pace of inflation varied significantly across individual economies and country groups.[27] Globally, sub-Saharan Africa recorded the highest inflation rate (18.3 percent) and the Emerging and Developing Asia country group and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations-5 group experienced the lowest pace of inflation (2.0

[25] IMF, World Economic Outlook Press Briefing, October 22, 2024.
[26] IMF, "World Economic Outlook Press Briefing," October 22, 2024; Moessner et al., "Global Inflation and Monetary Policy Tightening," June 11, 2023, 151.
[27] Inflation is measured based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). IMF, IMF DataMapper, "World Economic Outlook Dataset," April 2025.

percent each) in 2024.[28] Similar to 2023, inflation was higher in emerging markets and developing economies (7.7 percent) than in advanced economies (2.6 percent) in 2024.[29] Different inflation rates across countries reflect shifts in relative prices, and countries with rates of inflation substantially higher than those of their trading partners can see export competitiveness decline.

Most major U.S. trading partners experienced a lower rate of inflation in 2024 than in 2023, and all had inflation rates below the world average (figure 1.3). Among major U.S. trading partners, the inflation rate in 2024 was lowest in China at 0.2 percent (unchanged from 2023), followed by Canada (2.4 percent), the UK (2.5 percent), the EU (2.6 percent) and Japan (2.7 percent). Among key trading partners of the United States, the UK and the EU experienced the largest declines in annual inflation rates in 2024 relative to 2023. Against this background, the lingering effects of high inflation on traded goods prices experienced after the COVID-19 pandemic appear to have run their course, according to UNCTAD.[30]

Figure 1.3 Percentage change in consumer prices, by the world economy and selected major economies, annual, 2023–24

In percentages. Underlying data for this figure can be found in appendix table A.3.



Source: IMF, WEO Database, April 22, 2025.
Note: Individual economies are ordered by the 2024 inflation rate, from lowest to highest.

[28] According to the IMF's classification of economies, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-5 group comprises the five founding member nations of ASEAN: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. IMF, IMF DataMapper, "World Economic Outlook Dataset," April 2025; IMF, "Classification of Economies in IMF's WEO Database," April 2025.
[29] IMF, *World Economic* Outlook, April 2025, 12.
[30] UNCTAD, *Global Trade Update*, March 2025, 17.

Manufacturing Output

In 2024, manufacturing output declined in many economies, particularly in developed economies, but global manufacturing output continued to grow. This growth was likely driven by China, which accounted for a large share of global manufacturing output and experienced significant manufacturing output growth during the year (figure 1.4).[31] Among the largest U.S. trading partners, China and India had the highest manufacturing output growth rates—6.7 percent and 4.2 percent, respectively—in 2024 (figure 1.4). In 2024 compared to 2023, manufacturing growth accelerated in China but slowed in India.[32]

In 2024, manufacturing output declined in Mexico, the United States, Japan, and Canada for the second year in a row. The UK also experienced a decline in manufacturing output in 2024 of 1.0 percent. The UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) identified several challenges facing the global manufacturing sector, including uncertainty due to potential trade wars, inflation, lingering supply chain disruptions, repercussions of regional conflicts, shortages of skilled workers in certain industries, and natural disasters.[33]

Figure 1.4 Percentage change in manufacturing output, by the world economy and selected major economies, annual, 2023–24

In percentages. Underlying data for this figure can be found in appendix table A.4.



Source: UNIDO, IIP database, accessed May 13, 2025.
Note: The European Union average represents a simple unweighted annual average manufacturing output growth across 27 member countries. Individual economies are ordered by 2024 manufacturing output growth rates, from highest to lowest.

[31] UNIDO, IIP database, May 13, 2025.
[32] UNIDO, IIP database, May 13, 2025.
[33] UNIDO, *World Manufacturing Production, Q4 2023*, March 19, 2025, 2.

The global manufacturing output growth in 2024 of 2.2 percent coincided with a 2.1 percent growth in the value of global merchandise trade.[34] In 2024, the global manufacturing output growth was mostly driven by higher-technology industries.[35] Computer, electronic, and optical products recorded the highest growth rate among manufacturing industries in 2024 (figure 1.5). Several sectors experienced declines in output, with the largest decline in the "other non-metallic mineral products" sector.[36]

Figure 1.5 Percentage change in the world manufacturing output, by ISIC industry, 2023–24

In percentages. ISIC = International Standard Industrial Classification; n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified. Underlying data for this figure can be found in appendix table A.5.



Source: UNIDO, IIP database, accessed May 13, 2025.

Exchange Rate Trends

U.S. dollar exchange rate fluctuations can affect trade flows by changing the relative price of traded goods in international markets. For instance, when the U.S. dollar appreciates, U.S. exports become more expensive (lessening external demand for U.S. goods and services) and U.S. imports become less

[34] WTO, WTO Stats portal, International Trade Statistics, accessed April 16, 2025; UNIDO, IIP database May 13, 2025; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 36–37.
[35] UNIDO, *World Manufacturing Production, Q4 2023*, March 19, 2025, 9.
[36] In the UNIDO database, the term "other non-metallic mineral products" is hyphenated.

expensive. Conversely, when the U.S. dollar depreciates, U.S. exports become less expensive (boosting external demand for U.S. goods and services) and U.S. imports become more expensive.

In 2024, the U.S. dollar appreciated by 9.0 percent in nominal terms against a basket of currencies of major U.S. trading partners (figure 1.6).[37] The dollar appreciated against the individual currencies of all selected major U.S. trading partners, with the largest gains in value being against the Mexican peso (23.4 percent), the Japanese yen (11.7 percent), and the Canadian dollar (9.1 percent) (figure 1.6). The relatively strong growth rate of the U.S. economy, investor confidence in the U.S. market, and higher interest rates in the United States contributed to this trend.[38]

Figure 1.6 The nominal U.S. dollar appreciation against the currencies of major U.S. trading partners in 2024

In percentages. Underlying data for this figure can be found in appendix table A.6.



Source: USITC calculations based on Federal Reserve Board, "Foreign Exchange Rates—H.10," May 6, 2025.

---

[37] Calculated using the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System's (Federal Reserve Board's) nominal broad U.S. dollar index of global currencies. The broad dollar index is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar against the currencies of a large group of major U.S. trading partners. Federal Reserve Board, "Foreign Exchange Rates—H-10," accessed May 6, 2025.

[38] New York Fed, *Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations, October–December 2024*, February 13, 2025, 1, 4, 6, 8; Durham, "Where Is the U.S. Dollar Headed in 2025?," January 3, 2025.

Global Trade Trends in 2024

This section provides an overview of trends in global trade in goods and services in 2024, highlighting the major importers and exporters.

Global Merchandise Trade

Overview of Global Merchandise Trade in 2024

The value of global merchandise trade—measured by the average value of global merchandise exports and imports—increased by 2.1 percent in 2024 to $24.6 trillion, after declining in 2023 by 4.7 percent to $24.1 trillion.[39] With the exception of Europe, all regions experienced growth in the value of two-way merchandise trade in 2024.[40]

Merchandise trade imbalances widened significantly across the world in 2024.[41] The highest goods trade imbalances were recorded between the United States and China, the United States and the EU, and the EU and China. In 2024, the United States continued to show the largest merchandise trade deficit and China continued to maintain the largest surplus of all trading economies. The EU reversed previous merchandise trade deficits, posting a trade surplus for the year, though its bilateral deficit with China increased.[42]

Global Merchandise Trade by Sectors. Global trade value in most merchandise sectors increased in 2024. The highest growth in merchandise trade value in 2024 was recorded in the office and telecommunications equipment sector, which increased by 10 percent after a 6 percent decline in 2023. The electronic components segment (as part of the office and telecommunications equipment sector) grew by 6 percent in 2024, recovering from an 11 percent decline in 2023. The trade value in agricultural products, manufactures, chemicals, textiles, and clothing increased by 1–3 percent in 2024, in contrast to 2023, when the trade value of these sectors had declined by 1–8 percent. Trade values in the food and other machinery sectors increased by 1–3 percent 2023 and continued in 2024.[43]

In contrast, the largest declines in merchandise trade values in 2024 were recorded in the fuels and iron and steel sectors. Fuels sector trade declined by 7 percent (mostly driven by a 5 percent decrease in energy prices) and iron and steel sector trade declined by 6 percent in 2024. These declines continued from 2023, when trade values of the fuels and iron and steel sectors decreased by 11 percent and 13 percent, respectively. On a more aggregated basis, the fuels and mining products sector declined by 5 percent in 2024, following a 17 percent decline in 2023. The automotive products sector declined by 1 percent in 2024, after growing by 20 percent in 2023, driven by exports from China.[44]

---

[39] Global merchandise trade value is measured by the average value of global merchandise exports and imports. WTO, WTO Stats portal, International Trade Statistics, April 16, 2025.

[40] Two-way merchandise trade is measured by adding total exports and general imports. WTO, WTO Stats portal, International Trade Statistics, accessed April 16, 2025.

[41] Global merchandise trade information mainly draws on UNCTAD, *Global Trade Update*, March 2025, 21.

[42] EC, "EU Trade Relations with China," accessed May 27, 2025; UNCTAD, *Global Trade Update*, March 2025, 21.

[43] WTO, *Global Trade Outlook and Statistics*, April 2025, 8.

[44] USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 42; WTO, *Global Trade Outlook and Statistics*, April 2025, 7–8.

Global Merchandise Trade by Regions.[45] Geographically, all regions but Europe experienced year-on-year annual increases in the value of two-way merchandise trade in 2024 (table 1.1). The Middle East experienced the highest growth (5.7 percent) in its two-way merchandise trade value, followed by Asia (4.4 percent), North America (3.8 percent), and Latin America and the Caribbean (3.4 percent). The Middle East led with an 11.4 percent increase in the value of merchandise imports, followed by North America (5.0 percent), Asia (3.4 percent), and Latin America and the Caribbean (2.7 percent). The Asian region recorded the strongest growth of merchandise exports (5.4 percent), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (4.3 percent) and North America (2.2 percent).

On the other hand, Europe recorded a 1.2 percent decline in the value of two-way merchandise trade in 2024 (table 1.1), given that both its merchandise export and import value declined, by 0.5 percent and 1.9 percent, respectively. Europe was also the only region of the world that experienced a contraction of trade in goods in 2024 in terms of both value and volume.[46]

Table 1.1 Percentage change of merchandise trade value, by region, annual, 2023–24
In percentages. Two-way trade is defined as exports plus imports.

Region	Imports	Exports	Two-way trade
Africa	1.5	1.1	1.3
Asia	3.4	5.4	4.4
Europe	−1.9	−0.5	−1.2
Latin America and the Caribbean	2.7	4.3	3.4
Middle East	11.4	1.4	5.7
North America	5.0	2.2	3.8

Source: WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade Statistics, Merchandise Trade Values, Annual, accessed April 16, 2025.
Note: The percentage change in two-way trade depends on the relative size and percentage change of its individual components (imports and exports).

Global Leading Merchandise Exporters and Importers

In 2024, China continued to maintain its position as the world's largest merchandise exporter, followed by the EU, the United States, Japan, and South Korea (figure 1.7). Exports from these exporters increased from 2023 levels, with the exception of Japan, whose exports declined by 1.4 percent. Of the top five exporters, in terms of percentage change, South Korea experienced the largest increase in its exports (8.1 percent), followed by China (5.9 percent), the United States (2.0 percent), and the EU (1.1 percent).

[45] The regions are Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and North America.
[46] WTO, *Global Trade Outlook and Statistics*, April 2025, 6.

Figure 1.7 Merchandise exports from the global top five exporters, annual, 2023–24

In billions of dollars. European Union (EU) data exclude intra-EU trade for the entire time series. Underlying data for this figure can be found in appendix table A.7.



Source: WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade Statistics, Merchandise Trade Values, Annual, accessed April 16, 2025; USITC DataWeb/Census, total exports, accessed June 23, 2025

In 2024, the United States remained the world's largest merchandise importer, followed by the EU, China, the UK, and Japan (figure 1.8). In percentage terms, merchandise imports increased the most in the United States (6.2 percent) in 2024, followed by the UK (3.1 percent) and China (1.2 percent). Japan and the EU recorded declines in their merchandise imports (5.5 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively) in 2024, relative to 2023.

Figure 1.8 Merchandise imports by the global top five importers, annual, 2023–24

In billions of dollars. European Union (EU) data exclude intra-EU trade for the entire time series. Underlying data for this figure can be found in appendix table A.8.



Source: WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade Statistics, Merchandise Trade Values, Annual, accessed April 16, 2025; USITC DataWeb/Census, general imports, accessed June 23, 2025.

Global Trade in Services

Overview of Global Services Trade in 2024

Global exports of commercial services continued to grow in 2024, reaching a record high of $8.8 trillion, up 10.0 percent compared to the previous year. Exports increased in 2024 in all four major categories reported by the WTO: transportation services, travel services, goods-related services, and "other commercial services" (figure 1.9).[47]

Services trade imbalances among large economies follow different patterns than do merchandise trade imbalances. WTO data indicate that the United States and the EU both had large surpluses in services trade in 2024, whereas China had a substantial deficit.[48] On a bilateral basis, the largest U.S. services surplus was with the EU, followed by Canada, China, and Singapore.[49]

[47] The "other commercial services" category includes construction; insurance, financial; intellectual property; information and communications; personal, cultural, and recreational services; and "other business services."
[48] WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade Statistics, April 16, 2025.
[49] USDOC, BEA, table 9, "U.S. International Trade by Selected Countries, Balance on Services," March 6, 2025.

Figure 1.9 Commercial services exports, by services trade category, annual, 2023–24

In trillions of dollars. Underlying data for this figure can be found in appendix table A.9.



Source: WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade in Commercial Services, by Main Sector, Annual, accessed April 16, 2025.
Note: Data for 2024 are preliminary.

The fastest-growing commercial services export category in 2024 was travel services, which rose 13.6 percent to reach $1.7 trillion. Other commercial services and transport services increased by 9.6 percent and 8.3 percent, respectively, while goods-related services rose 6.6 percent. By size, WTO data indicate that other commercial services represented the largest share of global commercial services (59.8 percent) in 2024, followed by travel services (19.9 percent), transport services (16.9 percent), and goods-related services (3.4 percent).

In 2024, travel services continued the rapid recovery that had been underway since 2021, following a steep decline due to travel restrictions during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. Globally, the countries with the largest share of travel exports (the revenue a host country receives from international tourist arrivals) in 2024 were the United States, Spain, the UK, France, and Italy. In 2024, China, the United States, Germany, the UK, and France were the biggest importers of travel services (expenditures by residents while traveling abroad). Although WTO data indicate that global travel exports had fully recovered from the effects of the pandemic by 2023, tourism arrivals remained slightly below 2019 levels in 2024, at an estimated 1.45 billion.[50] One study indicates that overnight stays by international visitors rose considerably faster than tourism arrivals in 2024, signaling a “slow travel” trend, with travelers spending more time in destinations.[51]

Global exports of transport services recovered in 2024, following the previous year’s decline. After weakness in 2023, container freight prices showed strong growth in 2024 due to a drought in the

[50] UNWTO, “World Tourism Barometer and Statistical Annex,” January 2025.
[51] Goodger, *WTM Global Travel Report 2024*, November 8, 2024, 14.

Panama Canal and disruptions in the Red Sea that triggered increasing shipping distances and fuel consumption, resulting in higher costs.[52] One source indicates that traffic at the world's top 20 ports rose 7.1 percent in 2024.[53] Rising air passenger transport was another driver of the recovery of transport services. The International Air Transport Association reported that international passenger air traffic (measured in revenue passenger kilometers) rose 13.6 percent in 2024, surpassing the 2019 level by 0.5 percent.[54]

Leading Global Services Exporters and Importers

In 2024, exports from most major services exporters experienced robust growth. The EU remained the world's leading exporter of commercial services in 2024, followed by the United States, the UK, China, and Singapore (figure 1.10). WTO data indicate that the United States, the UK, and Singapore each reported double-digit growth in commercial services exports in 2024, rising by 10.8 percent, 10.5 percent, and 10.5 percent, respectively; the EU commercial services exports increased 9.1 percent in 2024. Among the top five exporters, China experienced the strongest gains in commercial services exports (17.1 percent) in 2024. This increase was driven by rapid growth in travel (up 154.2 percent) and transport (29.2 percent) services. All five of the top exporters reported growth across commercial services subcategories in 2024, aside from declines in goods-related services for both Singapore (−1.1 percent) and the UK (−13.5 percent).

[52] UNCTAD, "High Freight Rates Strain Global Supply Chains," October 22, 2024.
[53] Kerriou, "Containers," accessed April 28, 2025. Growth is measured in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). Twenty feet is the standard size for stackable shipping containers, and TEUs serve as the main measure for port capacity and volume.
[54] IATA, "Global Air Passenger Demand Reaches Record High in 2024," January 30, 2025.

Figure 1.10 Commercial services exports, by the global top five exporters, annual, 2023–24

In billions of dollars. European Union (EU) data exclude intra-EU trade. Underlying data for this figure can be found in appendix table A.10.



Source: WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade Statistics, Trade in Commercial Services, by Main Sector, Annual, accessed August 1, 2025. USDOC, BEA, "International Transactions, International Services, and International Investment Position Tables," International Transactions, table 3.1, U.S. International Trade in Services, accessed June 24, 2025.

In 2024, the EU was also the largest importer of commercial services, followed by the United States, China, the UK, and Singapore (figure 1.11). Of these top five importers, commercial services imports by the UK grew the fastest during that year (11.1 percent), followed by China (10.7 percent) and the United States (10.7 percent), Singapore (7.6 percent), and the EU (7.1 percent).

Figure 1.11 Commercial services imports, by the global top five importers, annual, 2023–24

In billions of dollars. European Union (EU) data exclude intra-EU trade. Underlying data for this figure can be found in appendix table A.11.



Source: WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade Statistics, Trade in Commercial Services, by Main Sector, Annual, accessed August 1, 2025. USDOC, BEA, "International Transactions, International Services, and International Investment Position Tables," International Transactions, table 3.1, U.S. International Trade in Services, accessed June 24, 2025.

Chapter 2 Administration of Laws and Programs

This chapter summarizes activities related to the administration of U.S. trade laws during 2024, covering import relief laws, laws against unfair trade practices, and national security investigations. In addition, this chapter covers imports under tariff preference programs and developments related to their administration.

Import Relief Laws and Programs

This section summarizes activities related to import relief provided under different authorities. First, it summarizes actions taken under the safeguard provisions of the Trade Act of 1974. Second, it summarizes developments in the provision of trade adjustment assistance to workers and firms.

Safeguard Investigations

This section covers global safeguard investigations that were conducted or in effect during 2024.[55]

Background

The safeguard provisions of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, set out a procedure under which the President may grant temporary relief to a domestic industry seriously injured by increased imports.[56] The process begins at the U.S. International Trade Commission (Commission or USITC) with a petition filed on behalf of a domestic industry, a request from the President or the U.S. Trade Representative (Trade Representative), a resolution from the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means or the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, or on the Commission's own motion.[57] The Commission then conducts an investigation to determine whether an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported article.[58] If the Commission makes an affirmative determination, it recommends to the President action that would address the serious injury or threat of serious injury to the domestic industry and be most effective in facilitating the efforts of the domestic industry to make a positive adjustment to import competition.[59]

[55] Although various bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) include provisions for bilateral safeguard actions, no actions under these provisions took place in 2024. For a list of authorities for bilateral safeguards, see Investigations Related to Bilateral Safeguard Actions, 19 C.F.R. § 206.31 (2025).
[56] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2255. The statute's safeguard provisions are from Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201–204 (1975).
[57] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(A).
[58] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(A).
[59] The Commission is authorized to recommend an increase in or imposition of a duty on the imported article; a tariff-rate quota on the article; a modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on the importation of the article; one or more appropriate adjustment measures, including adjustment assistance; and any combination of the above actions. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2252(e)(2).

The President makes the final decision on whether to take an action and, if so, the form and amount, subject to certain statutory limitations. The action may not exceed an initial period of four years and an overall period—with one or more extensions—of eight years.[60]

The Commission must monitor industry developments during the period the action is in effect. If the action exceeds three years, the Commission must submit a report on its monitoring activities to the President and Congress at the midpoint of the action.[61] Before the action expires, the Commission, upon the request of the President or a petition filed on behalf of the industry concerned, must investigate to determine whether the action remains necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and whether evidence shows the industry is making a positive adjustment to import competition.[62] After the action has expired, the Commission must provide a report to the President and Congress on the action's effectiveness.[63]

Developments in 2024

During 2024, the Commission conducted a new global safeguard investigation on fine denier polyester staple fiber (fine denier PSF), which resulted in an affirmative determination by the Commission and the President imposing measures.[64] The United States also continued to have in effect a global safeguard action on solar cells and modules, for which the Commission issued a second monitoring report on developments within the U.S. industry and the President made modifications to the action.[65]

Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber

The Commission instituted its investigation of fine denier PSF on February 28, 2024, after receiving a petition for relief filed by domestic producers.[66] The Commission made an affirmative determination, finding that increased quantities of imports of fine denier PSF were a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with imports.[67] Of particular note in the investigation were imports of fine denier PSF that entered the United States under the Temporary Importation Under Bond (TIB) program, which allows importers to avoid paying duties, including antidumping or countervailing duties, so long as the U.S.-produced downstream product is

---

[60] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2253(e). The statute also provides two sets of circumstances under which the President may provide provisional relief with respect to a perishable agricultural product or when critical circumstances are found to exist. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2252(d).

[61] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

[62] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(1).

[63] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

[64] Fine denier PSF is a manmade fiber, similar in appearance to cotton or wool, that is used for knit, woven, and nonwoven applications. USITC, *Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber*, August 2024, 10.

[65] USITC, *Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells*, February 2024.

[66] The petition was filed by Fiber Industries LLC d/b/a Darling Fibers, Nan Ya Plastics Corp., America, and Sun Fiber LLC. USITC, Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber; Institution of Investigation, Scheduling of Public Hearings, and Determination that the Investigation Is Extraordinarily Complicated, 89 Fed. Reg. 18435 (March 13, 2024).

[67] The Commission also found that imports of fine denier PSF from various FTA partners individually were not a substantial cause of injury, including with respect to Canada, Mexico, Australia, the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement countries, Colombia, Jordan, South Korea, Panama, Peru, and Singapore. USITC, *Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber*, August 2024, 51–60.

exported and not sold in the United States.[68] The Commission found that imports of fine denier PSF entering under the TIB program competed directly with domestically produced fine denier PSF and included these imports in its analysis.[69] Given its affirmative determination, the Commission recommended a number of remedies to the President.[70] On August 26, 2024, the Commission submitted a report to the President summarizing its investigation.[71]

Following the Commission's affirmative determination, the interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee, which is chaired by the Trade Representative, solicited public comments and conducted a hearing regarding the appropriate remedy for the President to impose.[72] On November 8, 2024, the President proclaimed a safeguard action on imports of fine denier PSF, announcing a quantitative restriction on imports of fine denier PSF that entered under the TIB program for a period of four years.[73]

Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Partially or Fully Assembled into Other Products

The Commission instituted its initial investigation into crystalline silicon photovoltaic solar cells and modules on May 17, 2017, and made an affirmative determination in November 2017.[74] After receiving the Commission's report, President Trump imposed a safeguard action for an initial period of four years, which in 2022, President Biden extended for another four years.[75]

On June 8, 2023, the Commission instituted a proceeding to prepare a midterm report on the results of its second monitoring of developments with respect to the domestic industry.[76] The Commission submitted its report to the President and Congress on February 6, 2024.[77] Significant developments in the industry found by the Commission included (1) announcements of plans to start domestic cell production, (2) increases in imports between 2022 and 2023, including a shift toward imports of bifacial modules that had been excluded from the safeguard measure, (3) increased prices, (4) additional

---

[68] USITC, *Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber*, August 2024, 17–19. For regulations on the TIB program, see 19 C.F.R. §§ 10.31–10.40.

[69] USITC, *Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber*, August 2024, 17–19.

[70] USITC, *Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber*, August 2024, 63–93. The Commission's recommendations included a quantitative restriction for imports of fine denier PSF entered under the TIB program, tariff-rate quotas for imports of fine denier PSF, and additional in-quota tariffs for imports of fine denier PSF. USITC, *Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber*, August 2024, 63–93.

[71] 19 U.S.C. § 2252(f); USITC, Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber, 89 Fed. Reg. 71422 (September 3, 2024); USITC, *Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber*, August 2024.

[72] 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(1)(C); USTR, Requests for Comments and Public Hearing, 89 Fed. Reg. 63465 August 5, 2024.

[73] EOP, Proclamation 10857, 89 Fed. Reg. 92015 (November 8, 2024). The quantities of fine denier PSF to be admitted under the TIB program for the four years of the measure start at 0 kg in the first year and increase each subsequent year. Although the USITC did not find individual FTA partners to be substantial causes of injury, the President included imports from South Korea and Jordan within the remedy but excluded imports from other FTA partners. EOP, Proclamation 10857, 89 Fed. Reg. 92015, November 8, 2024.

[74] USITC, *Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells*, November 2017.

[75] EOP, Proclamation 9693, 83 Fed. Reg. 3541(January 25, 2018); EOP, Proclamation 10339, 87 Fed. Reg. 7357 (February 9, 2022). For further discussion of previous activities under this safeguard action, see USITC, *The Year in Trade 2022*, December 2023, 65–66.

[76] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

[77] USITC, *Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells*, February 2024.

investment in the domestic industry tied to implementation of the Inflation Reduction Act, and (5) anti-circumvention inquiries by the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) and a moratorium on antidumping and countervailing duties on solar products from certain Southeast Asian countries.[78]

Firms representing the majority of the domestic industry also filed two petitions with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) requesting modifications to the safeguard measure.[79] The petition filed on September 19, 2023, requested the elimination or increase of the tariff-rate quota on solar cells; the petition filed on February 23, 2024, requested the revocation of the exclusion for bifacial modules from the measure.[80] Given these petitions and the Commission's report, the President made two adjustments to the safeguard measure. In June 2024, the President revoked the exclusion for bifacial modules under the safeguard measure.[81] In August 2024, the President increased the quantity of solar cells allowed under the tariff-rate quota for the safeguard measures.[82]

Trade Adjustment Assistance

Beginning with the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and subject to funding authority by Congress, the United States has provided trade adjustment assistance (TAA) to aid U.S. workers and firms adversely affected by import competition. Title IV of the Trade Preferences Extension Act—the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015 (TAARA)—amended and reauthorized the TAA program for six years, until June 30, 2021.[83] Effective July 1, 2021, the TAA program, as amended by TAARA, was reverted to a previous version of the program, referred to as Reversion 2021, when the TAA program began to operate under the Sunset Provisions of the Amendments to the Trade Act (sunset provisions) for

[78] Bifacial modules convert sunlight that hits both the front and back of the cell into electricity. USITC, *Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells*, February 2024. USITC, *Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells*, November 2017, 54.
[79] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B).
[80] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 59.
[81] EOP, Proclamation 10779, 89 Fed. Reg. 53333 (June 26, 2024).
[82] EOP, Proclamation 10790, 89 Fed. Reg. 66181 (August 15, 2024). Effective August 1, 2024, the President increased from 5 gigawatts (GW) to 12.5 GW the amount of imports of solar cells allowed to enter the United States duty free.
[83] The trade adjustment assistance (TAA) program has been expanded and reauthorized numerous times. In October 2011, the Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act (TAAEA) extended the initial eligibility and benefit provisions until December 31, 2013. TAAE, Title II of Pub. L. No. 112-40, §§ 211–217, 125 Stat. 401, 403–409 (2011). Beginning January 1, 2014, the TAA program reverted to a more limited set of eligibility and benefit provisions, also called "Reversion 2014 provisions." TAA continued to operate under the Reversion 2014 provision until the enactment of TAARA. TAARA, Title IV of Pub. L. No. 114-27, §§ 401–407, 129 Stat. 362, 373–383 (2015); CBERA, 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (notes). TAARA reinstated many of the eligibility and benefit provisions that were enacted by the TAA Expansion Act of 1962. TAARA also contains sunset provisions. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2271 note.

petitions filed on or after that date.[84] On June 30, 2022, the authorization for the TAA program expired.[85] As of December 31, 2024, the TAA program had not been reauthorized.[86]

The main TAA programs still operating in 2024 consisted of two components: TAA for workers and TAA for firms. On July 1, 2022, the termination provision under section 285(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, took effect for the TAA for workers program.[87] Since then, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) may not issue any determinations and may not accept any new petitions or requests for reconsideration. Furthermore, a worker must have been separated or threatened with separation on or before June 30, 2022, to be eligible for any benefits and services under the TAA for workers program.[88] Although the program entered a phased termination, effective July 1, 2022, it has no statutory end date, despite the termination provisions.[89] Thousands of workers are still receiving benefits and services under the TAA for workers program.[90]

Effective July 1, 2022, the USDOC's Economic Development Administration (EDA) was no longer authorized to accept new petitions from firms for certification of eligibility for TAA through the TAA for firms program.[91] However, firms that had submitted their petitions under the TAA for firms program by June 30, 2022, continue to receive TAA if the EDA has certified that they are eligible.[92]

Table 2.1 provides information on the amount of funding the TAA programs provided to workers and firms during fiscal years 2019–24. Selected developments for 2024 of TAA programs for workers and firms are summarized below.

---

[84] For the major differences between the program operated under TAARA and the Reversion 2021 program, see USITC, *The Year in Trade 2021*, August 2022, 90–91.
[85] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 186–87.
[86] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 186–87. When referencing the *USTR 2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, the citation includes the PDF page numbers instead of the page numbers printed on the pages, because identical page numbers are used in multiple chapters of the report.
[87] TAARA, Title IV of Pub. L. No. 114-27, § 406, 129 Stat. 362, 379 (2015); Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2271 note; USDOL, "Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers," accessed February 7, 2025.
[88] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 186–87; USTR, *2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report*, March 2024, 218.
[89] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 187; USDOL, Employment and Training Administration, email message to USITC staff, February 26, 2025.
[90] USDOL, Employment and Training Administration, email message to USITC staff, February 26, 2025.
[91] USDOC, EDA, "Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms," accessed February 7, 2025.
[92] USTR, *2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report*, March 2024, 219; USDOC, EDA, "Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms," accessed February 7, 2025.

Table 2.1 Funding provided to workers and firms under the trade adjustment assistance (TAA) programs, fiscal years 2019–24

In millions of dollars.

Fiscal year	TAA for workers	TAA for firms
2019	582	13
2020	553	13
2021	441	14
2022	334	14
2023	90	14
2024	30	14

Source: USTR, *2020 Trade Policy Agenda and 2019 Annual Report*, February 2020, 194–95; USTR, *2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report*, March 2021, 162–63; USTR, *2022 Trade Policy Agenda and 2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 173–74; USTR, *2023 Trade Policy Agenda and 2022 Annual Report*, March 2023, 211; USTR, *2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report*, March 2024, 206–07; 118th Congress, *Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024*, March 2024, 632–55.

Assistance for Workers

Beginning with the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and subject to funding authority by Congress, the TAA for workers program provided federal assistance to eligible workers who had been adversely affected by import competition. A variety of TAA benefits and services were available to eligible workers, including training, out-of-area job search and relocation allowances, trade readjustment allowances, and alternative TAA and reemployment TAA benefits.[93] The USDOL's Employment and Training Administration administers the program.[94]

For petitioning workers to be eligible to apply for TAA benefits, the U.S. Secretary of Labor must determine that the workers meet certain criteria relating to the reasons they were separated from their firms, including declining sales or production at their firms and increased imports of like or directly competitive articles.[95] Since the TAA for workers program entered a phased termination on July 1, 2022, the USDOL has been unable to issue determinations or accept new petitions or requests for reconsideration. As a result, 1,147 petitions covering 192,296 workers were still pending investigation as of March 3, 2025.[96] Among them, 432 petitions were submitted during FY 2024, covering 57,035 workers.[97] By state, Georgia had the highest number of petitions submitted (90), followed by Oregon (82), Indiana (35), and New York (19).[98]

[93] USTR, *2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report*, March 2024, 218; USDOL, "Statement by Secretary Walsh on Termination of Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers Program," July 1, 2022. Current information on provisions of the TAA for workers program, as well as detailed information on program eligibility requirements, benefits, and available services, is available at the USDOL's Employment and Training Administration website for TAA. USDOL, "Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers," accessed February 7, 2025.

[94] USDOL, "Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers," accessed February 7, 2025.

[95] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2272.

[96] USDOL, "TAA Termination Impacts: By the Numbers," March 3, 2025.

[97] USDOL, "TAA Termination Impacts: By the Numbers," March 3, 2025.

[98] USDOL, "TAA Termination Impacts: By the Numbers," March 3, 2025.

Assistance for Firms

The TAA for firms program provided assistance to help U.S. firms experiencing a decline in sales and employment to regain competitiveness in the global marketplace.[99] The program provided cost-sharing technical assistance for eligible firms to create and implement targeted business recovery plans to improve their competitiveness (called adjustment proposals). The program pays up to 75 percent of the costs of developing the recovery plans, with firms also contributing a share of the cost of creating and implementing their recovery plans.[100] The U.S. Secretary of Commerce is responsible for administering the TAA for firms program and has delegated the statutory authority and responsibility to the EDA.[101]

To receive trade adjustment assistance, a firm must file a petition containing certain information with the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary must conduct an investigation and determine that certain requirements are met. The firm may apply for adjustment assistance only if the Secretary affirmatively determines that certain conditions are present.[102]

In fiscal year (FY) 2024, the EDA awarded a total of $13.5 million in funds to grantees for the TAA for firms program's national network of 11 Trade Adjustment Assistance Centers, which helped 309 firms implement adjustment proposals.[103]

Laws Against Unfair Trade Practices

This section describes several authorities under U.S. trade laws and actions taken thereunder during 2024. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 addresses unfair foreign practices that affect U.S. commerce. Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, provides a mechanism (known as "special 301") to identify intellectual property rights issues in U.S. trading partners that affect U.S. business. Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 offers relief in the form of duties where U.S. industries are materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of imports that are sold at less than fair value—i.e., dumped—or that benefit from countervailable foreign subsidies. Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 provides a procedure under which the United States may determine its response to an

[99] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2341 et seq.; USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 187; USDOC, EDA, "Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms," accessed February 7, 2025.
[100] USITC, *The Year in Trade 2022*, December 2023, 90.
[101] USTR, *2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report*, March 2024, 219. Current information on provisions of the TAA for firms program, as well as detailed information on program eligibility requirements, benefits, and available services, is available at the USDOC's EDA website for TAA. USDOC, EDA, "Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms," accessed February 7, 2025.
[102] To certify a firm as eligible to apply for TAA for firms, the EDA must determine that three conditions are met: (1) A significant number (or proportion) of the workers in the firm have been or are threatened to be totally or partially separated; (2) sales or production of the firm have decreased absolutely—or sales or production of an article or service that accounted for at least 25 percent of total production or sales of the firm have decreased absolutely—during the 12 months preceding the most recent 12-month period for which data are available; and (3) increased imports of articles like or directly competitive with articles produced or services provided by the firm have "contributed importantly" to both the decrease or threatened decrease in employment and the decline in sales or production. USDOC, EDA, *Fiscal Year 2021 Annual Report to Congress—Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program*, 2022, 9–10.
[103] USDOC, EDA, email message to USITC staff, April 30, 2025.

adverse World Trade Organization (WTO) panel or Appellate Body report concerning U.S. obligations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement, the Safeguards Agreement, or the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Finally, section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits various unfair acts in the importation and sale of articles in the United States and is most commonly applied in connection with allegations of patent infringement. Developments under these laws in 2024 are covered below.

Section 301 Investigations

Section 301 investigations are undertaken by the Trade Representative and address unfair foreign practices affecting U.S. commerce.[104] Such investigations may be used to enforce U.S. rights under bilateral and multilateral trade agreements or to respond to unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory foreign government practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.[105] Investigations may be initiated pursuant to a petition filed by interested persons, or self-initiated by the Trade Representative.[106] If a resolution cannot be reached through consultations with the foreign government involved, then the Trade Representative must determine whether action is appropriate under the statute.[107] If so, section 301 authorizes a wide range of measures, which include suspension of trade agreement concessions, imposition of duties or other restrictions on the imports of goods or services, and entry into an agreement to eliminate the offending practice or provide the United States with compensatory benefits.[108]

During 2024, the Trade Representative initiated several new section 301 investigations, including on (1) China's targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance; (2) Nicaragua's acts, policies, and practices related to labor rights, human rights, and the rule of law; and (3) China's targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance. A petition relating to China's acts, policies, and practices supporting the illicit fentanyl trade was filed but subsequently withdrawn.[109] The Trade Representative completed a four-year review on the section 301 action regarding China's acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation, and the President implemented

---

[104] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420. "Section 301" refers to section 301 of Title III of the Trade Act of 1974, which serves as the basis for the present law. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2014 (1975).

[105] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) and (b).

[106] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2412.

[107] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2413–2414. The Trade Representative must determine whether the practices in question fulfill any of three conditions: (1) They deny U.S. rights under a trade agreement; (2) they are unjustifiable, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce; or (3) they are unreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. The Trade Representative must generally take action under the first two conditions, though action is discretionary under the third. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)–(b).

[108] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c). If a foreign country fails to comply with such an agreement, or to implement a WTO recommendation, the Trade Representative must determine what further action should be taken under section 301. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2416(b).

[109] On October 17, 2024, a coalition of affected families and advocacy organizations filed a petition requesting a section 301 investigation into the acts, policies, and practices of China that support the illicit fentanyl trade. The petition argued that China's acts and policies "permit and actively encourage" the production and export of illicit fentanyl to the United States, and that this trade created an unreasonable burden on U.S. commerce through the debilitating effects of fentanyl on U.S. workers. On December 2, 2024, the Trade Representative issued a statement announcing that the petition had been withdrawn. Facing Fentanyl Inc., 301 Petition for Illicit Fentanyl Trade, October 17, 2024, 4–8; USTR, "Statement from Ambassador Tai," December 2, 2024.

modifications to the action, which are further detailed below. The Trade Representative also continued to monitor developments in section 301 investigations involving taxes on digital services proposed or adopted in France and other jurisdictions, large civil aircraft subsidies by the EU and certain current or former member states, currency valuation in Vietnam, and timber-related activities in Vietnam.[110] For a more comprehensive discussion of trade issues with China, the EU, and the United Kingdom (UK), please see chapter 6 of this report.

China's Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance

On March 12, 2024, five labor unions filed a petition alleging that China targets the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance and engages in a wide range of unreasonable or discriminatory acts that provide China with unfair advantages in these industries. Examples of unreasonable or discriminatory acts alleged in the petition include (1) implementing an industrial strategy designed to capture market share and advantage Chinese enterprises, (2) providing advantages to Chinese firms for upstream and downstream supply chains, (3) providing advanced financing that benefits Chinese firms, (4) tolerating intellectual property theft, and (5) controlling shipping freight rates and capacity allocations to benefit Chinese firms.[111] The petition alleged that these practices burden or restrict U.S. commerce by increasing China's shipbuilding capacity at the expense of the U.S. industry, artificially depressing global prices and impeding investment in U.S. production, reducing the number of U.S.-produced ships, and further burdening or restricting upstream inputs and downstream industries.[112]

After reviewing the petition, the Trade Representative initiated a section 301 investigation regarding the allegations raised therein.[113] During 2024, the Trade Representative solicited public comments and conducted a public hearing on May 29, 2024.[114] The Trade Representative issued a report on the section 301 investigation in January 2025.[115] The report found that China had achieved its goal of dominating the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors and that this dominance was unreasonable because it displaced non-Chinese firms in these sectors, created dependencies on Chinese firms that lessen supply chain resilience, and granted China an "extraordinary" level of control over these sectors.[116] The report further found that China's dominance of these sectors burdened or restricted U.S. commerce because it

[110] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 74–91.
[111] USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, 89 Fed. Reg. 29424 (April 22, 2024).
[112] USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, 89 Fed. Reg. 29424, (April 22, 2024).
[113] USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, 89 Fed. Reg. 29424 (April 22, 2024).
[114] USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, 89 Fed. Reg. 29424 (April 22, 2024).
[115] USTR, *301 Report on China's Maritime Sector*, January 16, 2025.
[116] USTR, *301 Report on China's Maritime Sector*, January 16, 2025, vi–viii.

undercut opportunities for U.S. firms, restricted competition and choice, created security risks and vulnerabilities in sectors critical to the U.S. economy, and undermined supply chain resilience.[117]

Nicaragua's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Labor Rights, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law

On December 10, 2024, the Trade Representative initiated a section 301 investigation on Nicaragua's acts, policies, and practices related to labor rights, human rights, and the rule of law.[118] The Trade Representative found that credible reporting by the U.S. government and international organizations indicated that Nicaragua engaged in labor and human rights violations that exacerbate worker exploitation and diminish economic growth and opportunities.[119] USTR indicated that this is the first section 301 investigation to focus on how labor rights, human rights, and dismantling of the rule of law may burden U.S. commerce.[120]

China's Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance

On December 23, 2024, the Trade Representative initiated a section 301 investigation on the acts, policies, and practices of China that relate to targeting the semiconductor industry for dominance.[121] The Trade Representative found evidence to indicate China undertakes anticompetitive and nonmarket means to dominate the semiconductor industry with detrimental effects on the U.S. economy.[122] The investigation will focus on the manufacture of foundational semiconductors, the production of silicon

---

[117] In light of these findings, the Trade Representative in April 2025 announced actions to address these measures, including various service fees on Chinese maritime services and vessels, and proposals for tariffs on ship-to-shore cranes and cargo handling equipment made in China. USTR, *301 Report on China's Maritime Sector*, January 16, 2025, ix–x; USTR, Notice of Action and Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China's Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, Request for Comments, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114 (April 23, 2025). The annexes to the notice include a schedule of implementation for the respective fees related to the section 301 action. 90 Fed. Reg. 17122–24 (April 23, 2025).

[118] USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation, Hearing, and Request for Public Comments: Nicaragua's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Rule of Law, 89 Fed. Reg. 101088 (December 13, 2024).

[119] USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation, Hearing, and Request for Public Comments: Nicaragua's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Rule of Law, 89 Fed. Reg. 101088 (December 13, 2024).

[120] USTR outlined a schedule for the investigation that included the submission of written comments and a hearing in January 2025. In its *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, USTR indicated that consultations related to the investigation were ongoing with the government of Nicaragua. USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 75; USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation, Hearing, and Request for Public Comments: Nicaragua's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Rule of Law, 89 Fed. Reg. 101088 (December 13, 2024).

[121] USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation; Hearing; and Request for Public Comments: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance, 89 Fed. Reg. 106725 (December 30, 2024).

[122] USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation; Hearing; and Request for Public Comments: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance, 89 Fed. Reg. 106725 (December 30, 2024).

carbide substrates (or other wafers used as inputs into semiconductor fabrication), and excess capacity or overconcentration of semiconductor production in China.[123]

China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation

In 2018, the Trade Representative found that numerous acts, policies, and practices of China related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation were unreasonable or discriminatory and that they burdened or restricted U.S. commerce.[124] At the direction of the President, the Trade Representative imposed additional duties on products from China through a series of lists, each covering a distinct set of products, issued between July 2018 and August 2019.[125] USTR subsequently implemented a process for U.S. importers to request that products included on the various lists be excluded from additional duties.

USTR completed a statutory four-year review of the action in May 2024.[126] In the review's report, the Trade Representative concluded that (1) the section 301 actions had been effective in encouraging China to eliminate some technology transfer–related acts, policies, and practices; (2) China had not, however, eliminated many other practices, which continued to impose a burden on U.S. commerce; (3) economic analyses supported that the duties had benefited U.S. production in sectors most affected by duties; and (4) the section 301 tariffs had helped to reduce U.S. imports from China and increase imports from alternative sources.[127] In view of these findings, the Trade Representative recommended that the section 301 tariffs remain in place with certain modifications.[128] Recommended modifications included that section 301 tariffs be increased for products in sectors "targeted by China for dominance" or in which the United States "has recently made significant investments," such as batteries, electric vehicles, and semiconductors.[129] The Trade Representative also proposed establishing a new exclusion process for

[123] USTR outlined a schedule for the investigation, including submissions of written comments in February 2025 and a hearing in March 2025. USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation; Hearing; and Request for Public Comments: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance, 89 Fed. Reg. 106725 (December 30, 2024).

[124] For a more detailed summary of the issues and additional duties, see USITC, *The Year in Trade 2022*, December 2023, 68–69. *See also* USTR, *Findings of the Investigations into China's Acts*, March 22, 2018.

[125] USTR, *2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report*, March 2024, 84–85.

[126] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2417(c). As part of the four-year review, the Trade Representative had sought public comment in 2023 on whether to extend previously granted exclusions. USTR, Extension of Exclusions and Request for Comments: China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation, 88 Fed. Reg. 90225 (December 29, 2023).

[127] USTR, *Four-Year Review of China IP 301 Investigation*, May 14, 2024, 10–61 and 83–84.

[128] USTR, *Four-Year Review of China IP 301 Investigation*, May 14, 2024, 83–87.

[129] USTR, *Four-Year Review of China IP 301 Investigation*, May 14, 2024, 83–84. Products for which the Trade Representative recommended increased tariffs included battery parts (non-lithium-ion batteries), electric vehicles, facemasks, lithium-ion electric vehicle batteries, lithium-ion nonelectric vehicle batteries, medical gloves, critical minerals, permanent magnets, semiconductors, solar cells, ship to shore cranes, steel and aluminum products, and syringes and needles.

imports of certain machinery used in domestic manufacturing.[130] On May 14, 2024, the President adopted the recommendations and findings of USTR's report and laid out a process for implementation.[131]

USTR implemented these measures over the following months. For products previously granted exclusions, USTR granted a one-year extension through May 31, 2025, for products where the extension was found to support efforts to shift sourcing outside China. Exclusions were ended for products where it was found that an extension would not aid in shifting supply outside China.[132] USTR further sought public comment on proposed increases in section 301 tariffs for certain products, as well as comments on new section 301 exclusions for machinery used in domestic manufacturing.[133] Following analysis of public comments received, USTR implemented section 301 tariff increases, effective September 27, 2024, for those products directed by the President.[134] For new exclusions of machinery used in domestic manufacturing, the Trade Representative issued procedures for requesting such exclusions in October 2024.[135]

Digital Services Taxes

On December 6, 2019, the Trade Representative determined that the 3 percent French digital services tax (DST) was unreasonable or discriminatory and burdened or restricted U.S. commerce and was thus

[130] USTR, *Four-Year Review of China IP 301 Investigation*, May 14, 2024, 86. Appendix K of the report listed 8-digit tariff lines for manufacturing equipment under chapters 84 and 85 of the *Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States* for proposed exclusion, and appendix L listed certain solar manufacturing equipment for temporary exclusion.

[131] EOP, Actions by the United States Related to the Statutory 4-Year Review of the Section 301 Investigation of China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 89 Fed. Reg. 44541 (May 20, 2024).

[132] USTR, Notice of Extension of Certain Exclusions: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 89 Fed. Reg. 46948 (May 30, 2024). Annex C of this notice lists products for which exclusions were extended one year, and Annex D list products for which a one-year extension was not granted. Products whose exclusions were not extended include those for which no public comment was received, importers did not report plans to shift sourcing out of China in 2024, parties had reported few steps taken to shift sourcing out of China over the preceding four years, opposing comments reported the availability of alternative sources outside of China, or claims of "unavailability" referred only to the price available in China. Expiring exclusions were given a transition period, through June 14, 2024, before additional duties were imposed.

[133] USTR, Requests for Comments on Proposed Modifications and Machinery Exclusion Process in Four-Year Review of Actions Taken in the Section 301 Investigation: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 89 Fed. Reg. 46252, (May 28, 2024).

[134] USTR, Notice of Modification: China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation, 89 Fed. Reg. 76581 (September 18, 2024). In this notice, USTR also proposed increasing section 301 duties on five additional HTS subheadings covering certain tungsten products, wafers, and polysilicon. USTR subsequently implemented modifications increasing section 301 duties on these products, effective January 1, 2025. USTR, Notice of Modification: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 89 Fed. Reg. 101682 (December 16, 2024).

[135] The Trade Representative opened an online portal for submissions and established a deadline of March 31, 2025, for requesting exclusions. USTR, Procedures for Requests to Exclude Certain Machinery Used in Domestic Manufacturing from Actions Pursuant to the Section 301 Investigation of China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation, 89 Fed. Reg. 83755 (October 17, 2024).

actionable under section 301.[136] In January 2021, the Trade Representative found that DSTs adopted by Austria, India, Italy, Spain, Türkiye, and the UK were likewise subject to action under section 301.[137] The United States subsequently reached agreements with these countries to allow for DSTs that accrued during a transitional period to be creditable to future corporate income taxes, and the United States in turn did not continue the section 301 actions against these countries while monitoring the implementation of these agreements.[138] These arrangements were extended through June 30, 2024.[139]

Large Civil Aircraft Subsidies by the EU and Certain Current or Former Member States

On April 12, 2019, the Trade Representative initiated a section 301 investigation to enforce U.S. rights in a WTO dispute relating to subsidies provided by the European Communities (now the EU), France, Germany, Spain, and the UK to the EU's large civil aircraft industry (DS316).[140] In June 2021, the United States announced similar yet separate cooperative frameworks with the EU and the UK to address the large civil aircraft dispute by suspending the tariffs related to the dispute for five years and agreeing upon a set of principles that will guide the cooperation between them in this sector.[141] In line with the framework, the Trade Representative suspended the section 301 action for five years, effective July 4, 2021, with respect to the UK and effective July 11, 2021, with respect to EU member states.[142] USTR indicated that it will monitor EU and UK implementation of the framework understandings and their respective measures related to the matters covered in the dispute. In its annual report covering 2024, USTR stated that if either the EU or the UK is not satisfactorily implementing the agreement or associated measures, the Trade Representative "will take any and all appropriate and feasible action under section 301 to enforce U.S. WTO rights."[143]

---

[136] USTR, Notice of Determination and Request for Comments Concerning Action Pursuant to Section 301: France's Digital Services Tax, 84 Fed. Reg. 66956, (December 6, 2019); USTR, *France DST Report*, December 2, 2019.
[137] For a summary of notices for these decisions, see USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 60.
[138] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 81–87; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 58–59.
[139] Following passage of the June 30, 2024 deadline, USTR neither announced an extension nor restarted the section 301 actions for the remainder of 2024. On January 20, 2025, a presidential memorandum indicated that "commitments made by the prior administration" regarding DSTs had "no force or effect within the United States absent an act by the Congress" adopting these commitments. USTR has continued to monitor relevant measures in these countries. USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 81–87. EOP, OECD Global Tax Deal: White House Memorandum, 90 Fed. Reg. 8483, (January 30, 2025).
[140] USTR, Initiation of Investigation; Notice of Hearing and Request for Public Comments: Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute, 84 Fed. Reg. 15028 (April 12, 2019). For more information on this dispute and the subsequent WTO proceedings, see USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 87–89.
[141] USTR, "USTR Announces Joint U.S.-E.U. Cooperative Framework for Large Civil Aircraft," June 15, 2021. USTR, "Joint U.S.-U.K. Statement on a Cooperative Framework for Large Civil Aircraft," June 17, 2021.
[142] USTR, Suspension of Action: Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in the Large Civil Aircraft Dispute, 86 Fed. Reg. 36313 (July 9, 2021).
[143] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 89.

Vietnamese Currency

On January 22, 2021, the Trade Representative determined that Vietnam's acts, policies, and practices related to the undervaluation of its currency through excessive foreign exchange market interventions were unreasonable under U.S. and international norms. The Trade Representative further determined that these activities constituted a burden or restriction on U.S. commerce and, accordingly, were actionable under section 301.[144] On July 23, 2021, the Trade Representative found that no action under the section 301 investigation was warranted at the time in light of an agreement regarding currency practices between the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the State Bank of Vietnam.[145] In 2024, USTR, in coordination with Treasury, continued to monitor implementation of commitments and associated measures under this agreement.[146]

Vietnamese Timber

On October 2, 2020, the Trade Representative initiated a section 301 investigation regarding whether acts, policies, and practices related to Vietnam's import and use of illegally harvested or traded timber were unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.[147] On October 1, 2021, the Trade Representative announced that the United States and Vietnam had reached an agreement addressing U.S. concerns about Vietnamese timber.[148] To oversee and facilitate implementation of the agreement, the United States and Vietnam established the Timber Working Group, which has convened four times and met most recently in May 2024.[149] In September 2024, Vietnam issued a new regulation on timber legality with a view to implementing core commitments of the agreement with the United States.[150] USTR continues to monitor Vietnam's implementation of the commitments.[151]

Special 301 Investigations

USTR conducts an annual review of the state of intellectual property rights enforcement and protection in U.S. trading partners, pursuant to section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (known as "special 301").[152] Section 182(a) of the act requires the Trade Representative to identify "those foreign countries that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, or deny fair and

---

[144] USTR, Notice of Determination Pursuant to Section 301: Vietnam's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Currency Valuation, 86 Fed. Reg. 6732 (January 22, 2021); USTR, *Report on Vietnam's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Currency Valuation*, January 15, 2021.
[145] USTR, Determination on Action and Ongoing Monitoring: Vietnam's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Currency Valuation, 86 Fed. Reg. 40675 (July 28, 2021).
[146] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 92.
[147] USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: Vietnam's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to the Import and Use of Illegal Timber, 85 Fed. Reg. 63639 (October 8, 2020).
[148] USTR, Determinations and Ongoing Monitoring: Investigations Concerning Vietnam's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Illegal Timber, 86 Fed. Reg. 55681 (October 6, 2021).
[149] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 91.
[150] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 91.
[151] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 91.
[152] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2242.

equitable market access to United States persons that rely on intellectual property protection."[153] Under section 182(b), "priority foreign countries" are those that (1) have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices with the greatest actual or potential impact and (2) are not entering into—or making significant progress in—good faith negotiations. Priority foreign countries are subject to an investigation under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.[154]

To aid in the administration of the statute, USTR created a watch list and a priority watch list. Placement of a trading partner on either list means that particular problems exist in that country with respect to protection, enforcement, or market access for persons relying on intellectual property rights. Countries placed on the priority watch list are the focus of increased bilateral attention during a given year.[155] Section 182(a), as amended, directs the Trade Representative to develop action plans for each country identified as a priority watch list country that has also been on the priority watch list for at least one year.[156]

USTR solicited broad public participation in the 2024 special 301 review process through both written submissions and a public hearing.[157] The interagency Special 301 Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee (the subcommittee) conducted the hearing and heard testimony from foreign government representatives, industry, and nongovernmental organizations.[158] USTR and the subcommittee assessed U.S. trading partners' intellectual property rights protection and enforcement, as well as related market access issues. Following this assessment, the subcommittee, through the Trade Policy Staff Committee, provided advice to USTR.[159]

USTR issued the *2024 Special 301 Report* on April 25, 2024. In the report, USTR placed Argentina, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and Venezuela on the priority watch list.[160] These same seven countries composed the priority watch list in the *2022 Special 301 Report* and *2023 Special 301 Report*.[161] USTR placed an additional 20 countries on the watch list: Algeria, Barbados, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam.[162] The special 301 review of Ukraine continued to be suspended in 2024 because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[163]

[153] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a).
[154] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b).
[155] USTR, *2024 Special 301 Report*, April 25, 2024, 4–5.
[156] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2242(g); USTR, *2024 Special 301 Report*, April 25, 2024, 6–8.
[157] USTR, *2024 Special 301 Report*, April 25, 2024, 6; USTR, Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Regarding the 2024 Special 301 Review, 88 Fed. Reg. 84869 (December 6, 2023).
[158] USTR, *2024 Special 301 Report*, April 25, 2024, 6–7.
[159] USTR, *2024 Special 301 Report*, April 25, 2024, 7.
[160] USTR, *2024 Special 301 Report*, April 25, 2024, 5.
[161] USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 63.
[162] USTR, *2024 Special 301 Report*, April 25, 2024, 5. Two countries were removed from the previous year's watch list: the Dominican Republic and Uzbekistan. USTR, *2024 Special 301 Report*, April 25, 2024, 10.
[163] USTR, *2024 Special 301 Report*, April 25, 2024, 5.

Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations and Reviews

Antidumping Investigations

The U.S. antidumping law is found in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.[164] This law offers relief to U.S. industries that are materially injured by imports that are dumped—that is, sold at “less than fair value” (LTFV). The U.S. government provides a remedy by imposing an additional duty on LTFV imports.

Antidumping duties are imposed when (1) the USDOC has determined that imports are being, or are likely to be, sold at LTFV in the United States and (2) the Commission has determined that a U.S. industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of such imports. Such a conclusion is called an “affirmative determination.” Investigations are generally initiated in response to a petition filed with the USDOC and the Commission by or on behalf of a U.S. industry but can be self-initiated by the USDOC. The USDOC and the Commission each make a preliminary determination. If the Commission’s preliminary determination is affirmative, each agency will make a final determination during the investigation process.

In March 2024, the USDOC published a notice of rulemaking in the *Federal Register* on the Regulations Improving and Strengthening the Enforcement of Trade Remedies Through the Administration of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws.[165] The revisions broaden the USDOC’s ability to enforce antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws, while introducing new analytical methods in AD/CVD proceedings. Major changes include (1) clarifying the USDOC’s authority to determine particular market situations; (2) factoring in foreign government inaction or inadequate enforcement of labor, environmental, and intellectual property laws when measuring price and cost distortions; and (3) authorizing the USDOC to investigate and countervail transnational subsidies, when appropriate.[166] The amendments took effect on April 24, 2024.

In December 2024, the USDOC published a notice of final rulemaking in the *Federal Register* on the Regulations Enhancing the Administration of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Trade Remedy Laws. The revisions updated several antidumping and countervailing duties rules, including filing requirements, cash deposit applications, the application of antidumping rates in nonmarket economy proceedings, and the selection of examined respondents. The amendments took effect on January 15, 2025.[167]

---

[164] Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 et seq.

[165] USDOC, ITA, Regulations Improving and Strengthening the Enforcement of Trade Remedies Through the Administration of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 89 Fed. Reg. 20766 (March 25, 2024).

[166] An example of a transnational subsidy is subsidies provided by a government or public entity in one country that benefit producers or exporters in another country.

[167] USDOC, ITA, NARA, Regulations Enhancing the Administration of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Trade Remedy Laws. Part II: Rules and Regulations, 89 Fed. Reg. 101694 (December 16, 2024); Cannistra and Xun, “Commerce Publishes Final Amendments on Trade Remedy Regulations,” January 6, 2025.

In general, imports are considered to be sold at LTFV when a foreign firm sells merchandise in the U.S. market at a price that is lower than the "normal value" of the merchandise.[168] Generally, normal value is the price the foreign firm charges for a comparable product sold in its home market.[169] The amount by which the normal value exceeds the U.S. sales price is the "dumping margin." The duty specified in an antidumping duty order reflects the weighted average dumping margins found by the USDOC, both for the specific exporters it examined and for all other exporters.[170] This rate of duty (in addition to any ordinary customs duty owed) will be applied to subsequent imports from the specified producers or exporters in the subject country and may be adjusted if the USDOC receives a request for an annual review.[171] The Commission instituted 68 new antidumping investigations and made 65 preliminary determinations and 57 final determinations in 2024.[172] As a result of affirmative final USDOC and Commission determinations, the USDOC issued 39 antidumping duty orders on 11 products from 27 countries in 2024 (table 2.2). The online interactive dashboard for this report presents the status of all antidumping investigations active at the Commission during 2024. The dashboard also presents a list of all antidumping duty orders and suspension agreements (agreements to suspend investigations) in effect as of year-end 2024.[173]

Table 2.2 Antidumping duty orders that became effective during 2024 (alphabetical by trade partner)
In percentages.

Trade partner	Product	Range of dumping margins (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mattresses	217.38
Brazil	Brass rod	22.78–77.14
Bulgaria	Mattresses	106.27
Burma	Mattresses	181.71
Cambodia	Paper shopping bags	7.07–248.81
China	Aluminum lithographic printing plates	115.85–317.44
China	Certain pea protein	122.19–280.31
China	Paper shopping bags	73.05–146.32
China	Gas Powered Pressure Washers	179.88–274.37
Colombia	Paper shopping bags	11.06–56.14

168 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A); see also Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) (defining export price); Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (defining constructed export price).
169 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b.
170 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(B); 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c).
171 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a).
172 Data reported here and in the following two sections ("Countervailing Duty Investigations" and "Reviews of Outstanding Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements") reflect the total number of investigations. In other USITC reports, these data are grouped by product because the same investigative team and all of the parties participate in a single grouped proceeding, and the USITC generally produces one report and issues one opinion containing its separate determinations for each investigation.
173 An antidumping investigation may be suspended if exporters accounting for substantially all of the imports of the merchandise under investigation agree either to eliminate the dumping or to cease exports of the merchandise to the United States within six months. In extraordinary circumstances, an investigation may be suspended if exporters agree to revise prices to completely eliminate the injurious effect of exports of the merchandise in question to the United States. A suspended investigation is resumed, assuming it was not continued after the suspension agreement was issued, if the USDOC determines that the suspension agreement has been violated. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673c.

Trade partner	Product	Range of dumping margins (%)
India	Mattresses	13.35–42.76
India	Paper shopping bags	0.00–53.05
India	Non-Refillable steel cylinders	0.00–6.27
India	Brass rod	2.19–5.42
Indonesia	Frozen warmwater shrimp	0.00–3.90
Israel	Brass rod	19.48
Italy	Mattresses	257.06
Japan	Aluminum lithographic printing plates	91.83–160.11
Kosovo	Mattresses	63.66–344.70
Malaysia	Paper shopping bags	3.18–112.22
Malaysia	Boltless steel shelving units prepackaged for sale	58.29–81.12
Mexico	Mattresses	37.59–61.97
Mexico	Brass rod	6.51–29.43
Philippines	Mattresses	538.23
Poland	Mattresses	330.71
Portugal	Paper shopping bags	6.14
Russia	Ferrosilicon	283.27
Slovenia	Mattresses	744.81
South Africa	Brass rod	10.67
South Korea	Brass rod	8.26–9.18
Spain	Mattresses	4.61–280.28
Taiwan	Paper shopping bags	4.74–65.81
Taiwan	Mattresses	624.50
Taiwan	Boltless steel shelving units prepackaged for sale	7.03–78.12
Thailand	Truck and bus tires	12.33–48.39
Thailand	Boltless steel shelving units prepackaged for sale	0.00–2.75
Türkiye	Paper shopping bags	26.32–47.56
Vietnam	Paper shopping bags	36.51–92.34
Vietnam	Boltless steel shelving units prepackaged for sale	181.60–224.94

Source: Compiled by the USITC from *Federal Register* notices.

Note: Antidumping duty orders become effective following final affirmative determinations by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Commission. The rates in the table apply in addition to any ordinary customs duty owed.

Countervailing Duty Investigations

The U.S. countervailing duty law is also set forth in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. It provides for the imposition of additional duties to offset (countervail) foreign subsidies on products imported into the United States.[174] In general, procedures for such investigations are similar to those under the antidumping law. Petitions are filed with the USDOC (the administering authority) and with the Commission. Before a countervailing duty order can be issued, the USDOC must find that a countervailable subsidy exists. In addition, the Commission must make an affirmative determination that a U.S. industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of an industry is materially retarded, because of the subsidized imports.

The Commission instituted 50 new countervailing duty investigations and made 45 preliminary determinations and 19 final determinations during 2024. The USDOC issued 13 countervailing duty orders on eight products from seven countries in 2024 as a result of affirmative USDOC and Commission determinations (table 2.3). The online interactive dashboard for this report presents the status of all countervailing duty investigations active at the Commission during 2024 and the date of final action, if applicable. The dashboard also presents a list of all countervailing duty orders and suspension agreements in effect at year-end 2024.[175]

[174] For purposes of countervailing duties, the Tariff Act of 1930 defines a subsidy as a financial benefit given by an authority (a government of a country or any public entity within the territory of the country) to a person, in which the authority either (1) provides a financial contribution, (2) provides any form of income or price support within the meaning of Article XVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, or (3) makes a payment to a funding mechanism to provide a financial contribution, or entrusts or directs a private entity to make a financial contribution, if providing the contribution would normally be vested in the government and the practice does not differ in substance from practices normally followed by governments. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B).

[175] A countervailing duty investigation may be suspended if the government of the subsidizing country or exporters accounting for substantially all of the imports of the merchandise under investigation agree to eliminate the subsidy, to completely offset the net subsidy, or to cease exports of the merchandise to the United States within six months. In extraordinary circumstances, an investigation may be suspended if the government of the subsidizing country or exporters agrees to completely eliminate the injurious effect of exports of the merchandise in question to the United States. A suspended investigation is resumed, assuming it had not previously been continued after issuance of the suspension agreement, if the USDOC determines that the suspension agreement has been violated. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671c.

Table 2.3 Countervailing duty orders that became effective during 2024
In percentages.

Trade partner	Product	Range of countervailable subsidy rates (%)
China	Aluminum lithographic printing plates	35.66–229.54
China	Certain pea protein	15.15–355.89
China	Paper shopping bags	40.76–172.36
China	Gas powered pressure washers	11.19–206.57
Ecuador	Frozen warmwater shrimp	3.57–4.41
India	Frozen warmwater shrimp	5.63–5.87
India	Paper shopping bags	2.38–4.81
India	Non-Refillable steel cylinders	2.26–2.48
India	Brass rod	2.24
Israel	Brass rod	1.89
Russia	Ferrosilicon	748.58
South Korea	Brass rod	2.04–3.70
Vietnam	Frozen warmwater shrimp	2.84–221.82

Source: Compiled by the USITC from *Federal Register* notices.
Note: Countervailing duty orders are listed alphabetically by trade partner. Countervailing duty orders become effective following final affirmative determinations by the USDOC and the Commission. The rates in the table apply in addition to any ordinary customs duty owed.

Reviews of Outstanding Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspensions Agreements

Section 751(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 requires the USDOC, if requested, to conduct annual reviews of outstanding antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders to ascertain the amount of any net subsidy or dumping margin and to determine compliance with suspension agreements. Section 751(b) also authorizes the USDOC and the Commission, as appropriate, to review certain outstanding determinations and agreements after receiving information or a petition that shows changed circumstances.[176] Where a changed-circumstances review is directed to the Commission, the party that is asking to have an antidumping duty order or countervailing duty order revoked or a suspended investigation terminated has the burden of persuading the Commission that circumstances have changed enough to warrant revocation.

Five-year reviews were added to the U.S. antidumping and countervailing laws in 1995, pursuant to the WTO Uruguay Round negotiations, so that antidumping duties and countervailing duties might remain in force only to the extent necessary to offset dumping and subsidies causing injury. Implementing laws are set out in section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, which requires both the USDOC and the Commission to conduct five-year reviews of existing antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders and suspension agreements five years after their initial publication and five years after publication of any subsequent determination to continue them.

These reviews are intended to determine whether revoking an order or terminating a suspension agreement would likely lead to the continuation or recurrence of dumping or a countervailable subsidy

[176] Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b); 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(3).

and to material injury. If either the USDOC or the Commission reaches negative determinations, the order will be revoked, or the suspension agreement terminated.

During 2024, the USDOC and the Commission instituted 115 five-year reviews of existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders or suspended investigations. The Commission completed 78 reviews with zero negative votes (6 reviews were terminated before a Commission determination). As a result of affirmative determinations by the USDOC and the Commission, 86 antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders were continued.[177] The online interactive dashboard for this report presents the reviews of antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders and suspended investigations completed or terminated in 2024.

Section 129

Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act[178] provides a procedure under which the United States may determine its response to an adverse WTO panel or Appellate Body report concerning U.S. obligations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement, the Safeguards Agreement, or the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Section 129 also established a mechanism that permits the agencies concerned (the USDOC and the Commission), when such action is appropriate, to respond to the recommendations in a WTO panel or Appellate Body report and make new determinations and bring U.S. findings into conformity with the findings of a WTO panel or the Appellate Body.[179] With the exception of a compliance panel report relating to a section 129 determination the USDOC made in 2022, neither agency made new determinations or progress under section 129 during 2024.

On February 20, 2024, a WTO compliance panel reviewing a 2022 section 129 determination by the USDOC circulated its final report with respect to a USDOC redetermination relating to the dispute *United States–Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Ripe Olives from Spain* (WTO/DS577). The compliance panel report followed a request by the European Union (EU) on April 28, 2023, for consultations with the United States with respect to the USDOC's redetermination in *Ripe Olives from Spain*. When consultations failed to resolve the matter, the EU on July 14, 2023, requested the establishment of a compliance panel.[180]

[177] Apart from the 78 reviews the USITC completed in 2024, 8 antidumping and countervailing duty orders continued in 2024, following USITC determinations made in 2023.

[178] Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 3538.

[179] Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, H.R. Doc. 103-316, 103rd Congress (October 8, 1994), 1022.

[180] WTO, "WTO Dispute Settlement—DS577," October 25, 2023. For more details on the timeline of the compliance panel's establishment, please see the section 129 discussion in chapter 2 of *The Year in Trade 2023*. USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 68. This case is also discussed in chapter 3, under the WTO Dispute Settlement Body section. For further details, please refer to that chapter.

The USDOC had issued its final section 129 determination on December 20, 2022.[181] The USDOC addressed each issue and conclusion of the panel in DS577 through a preliminary determination memorandum and invited interested parties to comment on the Preliminary Determination. In its final section 129 redetermination, the USDOC made certain changes to its original findings, including its subsidy rate calculations.[182] On January 12, 2023, USTR directed the USDOC to implement the section 129 redeterminations.[183] On January 16, 2023, the United States provided a status report to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) stating that it had completed implementation of the DSB's recommendations.[184]

Following the establishment of the compliance panel in July 2023 at the EU's request, on review, the compliance panel agreed largely with the EU and concluded that the EU had demonstrated that the United States had failed to bring its measures into conformity with the adopted recommendations and rulings of the DSB.[185]

On November 14, 2024, the EU requested authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations pursuant to Article 22.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) on the ground that the compliance panel had concluded that the United States had failed to implement relevant aspects of the adopted DSU recommendation and rulings. On November 22, 2024, the United States objected to the EU-proposed level of suspension of concessions. At the DSB meeting of November 25, 2024, the chair of the DSB announced that the matter had been referred to arbitration pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU.[186]

Section 337 Investigations

Background

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,[187] prohibits various unfair acts in the importation and sale of articles in the United States and is most commonly used in connection with allegations of patent infringement. In this context, section 337 prohibits the importation into the United States, the sale for importation, and the sale within the United States after importation of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent, provided that an industry in the United States, relating to articles protected by the patent concerned, exists or is in the process of being established.[188] Similar requirements govern

[181] In particular, the USDOC (1) reconsidered its specificity analysis on the basic payment scheme program and found the program is de facto specific under section 771(5A)(D)(iii)(III) of the Tariff Act of 1930; (2) modified its definition of the "prior stage product" from all raw olives to four biologically distinct table and dual-use olive varietals and found that 55.28 percent of these varietals were processed into table olives; and (3) revised downward certain of its subsidy rate calculations. For model details on the USDOC's redetermination, please see the section 129 discussion in chapter 2 of *The Year in Trade 2023*. USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 67–68.
[182] USDOC, Ripe Olives From Spain, 88 Fed. Reg. 3384 (January 19, 2023).
[183] USDOC, Ripe Olives From Spain, 88 Fed. Reg. 3384 (January 19, 2023).
[184] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 139.
[185] WTO, "WTO Dispute Settlement–DS577," October 25, 2023.
[186] WTO, "WTO Dispute Settlement–DS577," October 25, 2023.
[187] Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
[188] Section 337 also applies to articles that are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable U.S. patent. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii).

investigations involving infringement of other federally registered intellectual property rights, including registered trademarks, registered copyrights, registered mask works, and registered vessel hull designs. In addition, the Commission has broad authority to investigate other unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation and sale of products in the United States (such as products manufactured abroad using stolen trade secrets), the threat or effect of which is to destroy or injure a U.S. industry, to prevent the establishment of a U.S. industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.[189] The Commission may institute an investigation on the basis of a complaint or on its own initiative.[190]

If the Commission determines that a violation of section 337 has occurred, it will issue an exclusion order directing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to block the imports in question from entry into the United States.[191] This can take the form of a limited exclusion order, which excludes the products of a named respondent in an investigation, or a general exclusion order, which excludes all infringing products, regardless of source.[192] The Commission can also issue cease and desist orders that direct the violating parties to stop engaging in the unlawful practices. These orders enter into force unless disapproved for policy reasons by USTR within 60 days of issuance.[193]

Developments in 2024

In 2024, the Commission had 109 active section 337 investigations and ancillary (secondary) proceedings,[194] 59 of which were instituted that year. Of these 59 new proceedings, 45 were new section 337 investigations and 14 were new ancillary proceedings relating to previously concluded investigations.

In 41 of the 45 new section 337 investigations instituted in 2024, patent infringement was the only type of unfair act alleged. Of the remaining four investigations, one involved allegations of patent and trade dress infringement; one involved allegations of copyright infringement; one involved allegations of trademark infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition; and one involved allegations of trade secret misappropriation, trademark infringement, and unfair competition.

---

[189] Other unfair methods of competition and unfair acts have included common-law trademark infringement, trademark dilution, trade dress infringement, false advertising, false designation of origin, and antitrust violations. Unfair practices that involve the importation of dumped or subsidized merchandise must be pursued under antidumping or countervailing duty provisions, not under section 337.
[190] Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1).
[191] Section 337 investigations at the USITC are conducted before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559. The ALJ conducts an evidentiary hearing and makes an initial determination, which is transmitted to the USITC for review. If the USITC finds a violation, it must determine the appropriate remedy, the amount of any bond to be collected while its determination is under review by USTR, and whether public interest considerations preclude issuing a remedy.
[192] Although rare, the USITC may also issue temporary or preliminary relief pending the outcome of an investigation. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e).
[193] Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j). Although the statute reserves the review for the President, since 2005 this function has been officially delegated to USTR. EOP, Assignment of Certain Functions Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 70 Fed. Reg. 43251 (July 26, 2005).
[194] An ancillary proceeding is a secondary or follow-up proceeding related to a previously concluded section 337 investigation.

The Commission completed a total of 51 investigations and ancillary proceedings under section 337 in 2024, including 5 rescission proceedings, 2 remand proceedings, 2 modification proceedings, 1 bond-related proceeding, 3 enforcement proceedings, 3 reconsideration proceedings, and 1 declassification proceeding.[195] In addition, the Commission issued 3 general exclusion orders, 6 limited exclusion orders, and 39 cease and desist orders during 2024. Of the 18 investigations in which the Commission rendered a final determination on the merits, the Commission found a violation of section 337 in 7 investigations and no violation in 11 investigations. The Commission terminated 16 investigations without determining whether a violation had occurred; 12 of those were terminated on the basis of settlement agreements, 3 were terminated because the complaint was withdrawn, and 1 was terminated as a result of an arbitration agreement. The online interactive dashboard for this report presents Commission activities involving section 337 proceedings in 2024.

As in past years, the section 337 investigations active in 2024 involved a broad spectrum of products (table 2.4). Technology products remained the single-largest category, with 33.9 percent of the active proceedings involving computer and telecommunications equipment, 7.3 percent involving consumer electronics, and another 7.3 percent involving liquid crystal displays and TVs. The next largest category was pharmaceuticals and medical devices, which were at issue in 10.1 percent of the active proceedings. The “other” category grew to about 27.5 percent of active investigations and, in 2024, included products such as eye cosmetics, hydrodermabrasion systems, storage containers, solar cells, flash spun nonwoven materials, crafting machines, injection molding machines, ceiling fans, furniture, and firearm disassembly tongs. A listing of the categories of products at issue in 2024 is set forth below.

Table 2.4 Share of products in active section 337 investigation proceedings, 2024
In percentages.

Category	Share of total (%)
Computer and telecommunications equipment	33.9
Pharmaceuticals and medical devices	10.1
Consumer electronics	7.3
Liquid crystal displays and TVs	7.3
Small consumer products	5.5
Automotive, manufacturing, and transportation products	5.5
Lighting products	1.8
Chemical compositions	0.9
Other	27.7

Source: USITC calculations.
Note: Because of rounding, totals may not add up to 100 percent.

At the close of 2024, 58 section 337 investigations and ancillary (secondary) proceedings were pending at the Commission. As of December 31, 2024, the Commission had 141 exclusion orders based on

[195] A rescission proceeding is a proceeding to determine whether to rescind a previously issued remedial order. A remand is a situation in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has directed the USITC to conduct additional proceedings with respect to a previously concluded investigation. A reconsideration proceeding is a situation in which the USITC has been requested to reconsider a prior decision.

violations of section 337 in effect. This report's online interactive dashboard lists the investigations in which these exclusion orders were issued.

National Security Investigations

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 provides for investigations by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to determine effects on national security of imports of articles.[196] The Secretary, upon request of the head of any department or agency, application of an interested party, or the Secretary's own motion, must initiate an appropriate investigation to determine the effects on national security of imports of the article that is the subject of the request, application, or motion. The Secretary must submit a report to the President within 270 days of initiating an investigation. The report must include the Secretary's findings "with respect to the effect of the importation of such article in such quantities or under such circumstances upon the national security" and recommendations for action or inaction.[197] The statute also provides that if the imported article "is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security," the Secretary must so advise the President in the report.[198]

Within 90 days of receiving such a report from the Secretary, the President must determine whether to concur with the finding of the Secretary and, in concurring, must determine the nature and duration of the action that must be taken to adjust imports of the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair national security.[199]

During 2024, the Secretary did not institute any new investigations under the national security provisions in section 232. Since 2017, the Secretary has initiated eight investigations, which are described in detail in two Commission publications: *Economic Impact of Section 232 and 301 Tariffs on U.S. Industries* (investigations initiated between 2018 and 2022) and *The Year in Trade 2021* (investigations initiated between 2017 and 2021).[200] Most investigations conducted since 2017 had no new developments in 2024. The exceptions were the investigations on steel and aluminum, in which the USDOC issued final rules on the exclusion process and removed certain exclusions in response to public comments.[201]

Export Controls

Various U.S. laws, including the Arms Export Control Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), control exports for national security and foreign

---

[196] Safeguarding National Security, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2015).
[197] Safeguarding National Security, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A).
[198] Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A).
[199] Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A).
[200] USITC, *Economic Impact of Section 232 and 301 Tariffs*, March 2023, 37–42; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2021*, August 2022, 82–87.
[201] USDOC, BIS, Revisions of the Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariff Exclusions Process, 89 Fed. Reg. 43740 (May 20, 2024). In response to public comments, the USDOC removed six general approved exclusions for steel products and six general approved exclusions for aluminum products to support the effectiveness of the section 232 tariffs. USDOC, BIS, Revisions of the Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariff Exclusions Process, 89 Fed. Reg. 43740 (May 20, 2024).

policy purposes by requiring that certain exports receive a license from an enforcement agency.[202] Exports subject to restrictions include nuclear materials and technology, defense or munitions items, dual-use goods, or exports to countries under U.S. sanctions.[203] Enforcement of these restrictions encompasses several agencies, with the USDOC regulating exports for military and dual-use items, the U.S. Department of State regulating exports of munitions, and Treasury regulating exports to countries under U.S. sanctions.[204] ECRA broadened the President's authority to regulate exports of dual-use goods and establish licensing procedures for technologies that are essential to the national security of the United States or essential to maintaining a defense industrial base.[205] The USDOC's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) administers ECRA and has used this authority in recent years to impose controls on exports to China of certain technologies with dual-use in military applications.[206]

In September 2024, the BIS issued an interim final rule implementing export controls on certain semiconductors, quantum computers and related electronic assemblies, and aerospace technology.[207] The rule imposed immediate export controls on these items and created an exception to authorize exports to countries that implemented equivalent technological controls.[208] In December 2024, BIS issued a final rule related to controlling exports of advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing by revising the entity list through adding entities in China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore found to be acting contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.[209] For more information on these developments as they related to trade with China, please see chapter 6.

Trade Preference Programs

Trade preference programs generally provide duty-free treatment to U.S. imports of eligible articles from designated beneficiary developing countries.[210] Imports for consumption under these trade preference

---

[202] Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2571–2577; § 1702(b); Export Control Reform, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4811-4812.

[203] A defense item is one that meets the criteria of a defense article or defense service on the U.S. munitions list, or one that provides an equivalent performance capability of an item on the U.S. munitions list. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120.3. A dual-use good includes commodities, software, or technologies that have both civilian and military applications. Export Control Reform, 50 U.S.C. § 4801(2).

[204] USDOC, BIS, "Bureau of Industry and Security," accessed May 13, 2025.; USDOS, "Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction," accessed May 13, 2025; Treasury, "Office of Foreign Assets Control," accessed May 13, 2025.

[205] Export Control Reform, 50 U.S.C § 4817. *See also* CRS, *The U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018*, June 7, 2021, 18–21.

[206] *See, e.g.*, USITC, *The Year in Trade 2022*, December 2023, 187–88.

[207] USDOC, BIS, Commerce Control List Additions and Revisions; Implementation of Controls on Advanced Technologies Consistent with Controls Implemented by International Partners, 89 Fed. Reg. 72926 (September 6, 2024).

[208] USDOC, BIS, Commerce Control List Additions and Revisions; Implementation of Controls on Advanced Technologies Consistent with Controls Implemented by International Partners, 89 Fed. Reg. 72926 (September 6, 2024).

[209] USDOC, BIS, Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; Removals from the Validated End-User (VEU) Program, 89 Fed. Reg. 96830 (December 5, 2024).

[210] CBERA also allows for reduced duty treatment for items classified under 63 tariff lines. USITC, *U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact*, December 2022.

programs totaled 28.8 billion in 2024.[211] Imports claiming GSP preferences in 2024 remained substantially larger than imports under the other preference programs—totaling $19.1 million—despite authorization lapsing from 2022–24 (table 2.5).[212]

Total U.S. imports under these trade preference programs decreased in value from 2023 to 2024. The values of U.S. imports under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) and the Nepal Trade Preference Program (NTPP) all decreased in 2024 compared to 2023 (table 2.5).

Utilization rates across all trade preference programs decreased from 2023 to 2024. CBERA and NTPP saw the largest decreases in percentage points, each falling by 8.5 percentage points. AGOA followed with a drop of 8.4 percentage points (table 2.6).

Table 2.5 Imports for consumption under specified trade preference programs, annual, 2022–24
In millions of dollars and percentages. GSP = the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences; AGOA = the African Growth and Opportunity Act; CBI = Caribbean Basin Initiative and includes the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership (CBTPA) and Haiti-specific preferences: the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 and of 2008 (HOPE) and the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP); NTPP = the Nepal Trade Preference Program.

Trade preference program	2022 (million $)	2023 (million $)	2024 (million $)	Percentage change, 2023–24 (%)
Imports that claimed GSP preferences	21,530	18,161	19,077	5.0
Imports that claimed AGOA preferences, excluding GSP	9,639	8,620	7,871	−8.7
GSP (including GSP-LDBC) imports from AGOA countries	710	454	363	−20.1
Total imports that claimed AGOA (including GSP) preferences	10,349	9,074	8,234	−9.3
Imports that claimed CBERA preferences, including CBTPA and HOPE I/HOPE II/HELP	2,801	1,968	1,878	−4.6
Imports that claimed NTPP preferences	5	4	3	−18.3

Source: USITC DataWeb/Census, accessed June 25, 2025.
Note: GSP data refer only to "GSP-claimed" imports, which have not yet received duty-free treatment, given the lapse in authorization for the entirety of 2022–24. Because of rounding, figures may not add to totals shown. Rounding may affect percentage changes.

[211] GSP data included in this total refer only to "GSP-claimed" imports, which have not yet received duty-free treatment, given the lapse in authorization for the entirety of 2022–24.
[212] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 35; for GSP authorization status over time, see USITC, *U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact*, December 2022, table E.1.

Table 2.6 The utilization rate of specific trade preference programs, annual, 2022–24
In percentages and percentage points (ppts). GSP = the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences; GSP-LDBC = the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for least-developed beneficiary developing countries; AGOA = the African Growth and Opportunity Act; CBI = Caribbean Basin Initiative and includes the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership (CBTPA) and Haiti-specific preferences: the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 and of 2008 (HOPE) and the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP); NTPP = the Nepal Trade Preference Program.

Trade preference program	2022 (%)	2023 (%)	2024 (%)	Percentage point change, 2023–2024 (ppts)
GSP (including GSP-LDBC)	58.9	56.7	49.8	−6.9
AGOA (excluding GSP)	67.0	64.0	56.3	−7.6
AGOA (including GSP)	72.0	67.4	58.9	−8.4
CBERA, including CBTPA and HOPE I/HOPE II/HELP	50.9	36.8	28.3	−8.5
NTPP	44.0	48.8	40.3	−8.5

Source: USITC DataWeb/Census, accessed June 25, 2025.
Note: The utilization rate is measured by imports under specified trade preference programs as a share of total program-eligible country imports. Percentages reflect the total imports for consumption under the specified program as a share of imports for consumption of products classified under eligible Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS) 8-digit subheadings from program-eligible countries. GSP data refer only to "GSP-claimed" imports, which have not yet received duty-free treatment, given the lapse in authorization for the entirety of 2022–24. AGOA beneficiary countries receive GSP trade preferences tied to AGOA authorization dates, allowing imports from AGOA beneficiaries to claim preferences that have lapsed for other countries.

Generalized System of Preferences

Background

The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program authorizes the President to grant duty-free treatment to imports of eligible articles from designated beneficiary developing countries (BDCs).[213] The President's authority to provide duty-free treatment under the GSP program lapsed on January 1, 2021, and had not been reauthorized at year-end 2024, resulting in the longest lapse in the history of the program.[214] Before the lapse in authorization, products entered under 3,614 *Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States* (HTS) subheadings were eligible for duty-free access under GSP when imported from BDCs and imports entered under an additional 1,524 HTS subheadings were eligible for duty-free access when imported from countries designated as least-developed beneficiary developing countries (LDBDCs).[215] In 2020, the most recent year that GSP was authorized and importers received the GSP duty-free benefits, U.S. imports under GSP totaled $16.9 billion.[216] The President has the authority to designate countries and territories as BDCs under the GSP program with certain limitations described in the statute.[217] As of December 31, 2024, of the 119 countries and territories designated as GSP BDCs, 44

[213] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461–2467.
[214] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 35; for GSP authorization status over time, see USITC, *U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact*, December 2022, table E.1.
[215] USITC, "The 2025 HTS Item Count," accessed April 14, 2025.
[216] USITC, *The Year in Trade 2021*, August 2022, table 2.9.
[217] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462.

were also designated as LDBDCs.[218] The President also has the authority to designate the articles that are eligible for duty-free treatment, but only after receiving advice from the Commission.[219]

Developments in 2024

Because the President's authority to provide duty-free treatment under the GSP program lapsed at the beginning of 2021, no imports received duty-free treatment under the program during 2024. USTR did not open or close any reviews of designated GSP beneficiary countries' eligibility or hold public hearings on existing reviews during the year.[220] In 2024, USTR continued to engage with GSP beneficiary countries, including Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Maldives, Pacific Islands, Paraguay, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uzbekistan, on utilization of GSP benefits and compliance with GSP eligibility criteria in preparation for the GSP program's potential reauthorization.[221]

African Growth and Opportunity Act

Background

Enacted in 2000, AGOA provides tariff preferences to products from eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).[222] AGOA provides duty-free access to the U.S. market for all GSP-eligible products and more than 1,800 additional qualifying products classified under HTS 8-digit subheadings that are eligible under AGOA only.[223] AGOA's eligibility criteria and rules of origin are similar, but not identical, to those of the GSP program.[224] AGOA beneficiary countries are exempt from GSP competitive need limitations.[225] AGOA provides duty-free treatment for certain apparel articles cut and sewn in designated beneficiary countries if additional eligibility criteria are also satisfied.[226] Duty-free treatment under the AGOA program is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2025.[227] Each year, the President must consider

[218] USITC, *HTS (2025) Basic Edition*, January 2025, GN p. 11-13.
[219] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2463.
[220] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 35; 143.
[221] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 35.
[222] Extension of Certain Trade Benefits to sub-Saharan Africa, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3702.
[223] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2463; Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2466a(b); Extension of Certain Trade Benefits to sub-Saharan Africa, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3721–3722.
[224] Compare Extension of Certain Trade Benefits to sub-Saharan Africa, Compare Extension of Certain Trade Benefits to sub-Saharan Africa, 19 U.S.C. § 3703. (AGOA eligibility criteria) with Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462. (GSP eligibility criteria). See also USTR, *2024 AGOA Biennial Report*, June 2024, apps. 2–3. Countries must be GSP eligible as well as AGOA eligible to receive AGOA's trade benefits. The (non-apparel) rules of origin under AGOA are set forth in the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2466a(b). and are reflected in HTS general notes 4 and 16, USITC, *HTS (2025) Basic Edition*, January 2025, GN 11-22, 164-165.
[225] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2)(D).
[226] Extension of Certain Trade Benefits to sub-Saharan Africa, Extension of Certain Trade Benefits to sub-Saharan Africa, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3721–3722; USITC, *HTS (2025) Basic Edition*, January 2025, chap. 98, subchap. XIX.
[227] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2466b; Extension of Certain Trade Benefits to sub-Saharan Africa, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3721–3722. AGOA beneficiary countries receive GSP trade preferences tied to AGOA authorization dates and thus may continue to receive duty-free treatment for GSP products even when GSP authorization has lapsed for other countries. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2466b.

whether individual SSA countries are, or remain, eligible for AGOA benefits.[228] USTR initiates the annual eligibility review with a request for comments and the announcement of a public hearing.[229] Forty-nine countries are defined as part of the SSA region for purposes of AGOA.[230]

Developments in 2024

In 2024, 32 SSA countries were eligible for AGOA benefits.[231] Of these countries, 22 were eligible for AGOA textile and apparel benefits for 2024.[232] South Africa was the only country in the latter group that was not eligible for additional textile and apparel benefits intended for least-developed beneficiary countries (LDBCs) for 2024.[233] Notable among these extra benefits is the third-country fabric provision for LDBCs. This provision provides duty-free treatment for certain apparel articles cut and sewn in designated beneficiary countries from non-U.S., non-AGOA fabrics if additional eligibility criteria are satisfied.[234] No beneficiary countries were reinstated or terminated from the program as a result of the 2024 AGOA eligibility review; therefore, all 32 beneficiary countries remained eligible for AGOA benefits as of January 1, 2025.[235]

AGOA requires that the President convene the annual U.S.-Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum (also known as the AGOA Forum) to discuss trade, investment, and development at an annual ministerial-level meeting with AGOA beneficiary countries.[236] From July 24 through July 26, 2024, in Washington, DC, the AGOA Forum convened senior government officials from the United States and 32 AGOA-eligible countries, representatives of continental and regional economic organizations, and

---

[228] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2466a(a)(2); Extension of Certain Trade Benefits to sub-Saharan Africa, 19 U.S.C. § 3705 note.

[229] USTR, Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning the Annual Review of Country Eligibility for Benefits Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act for Calendar Year 2025, 89 Fed. Reg. 42052 (May 14, 2024).

[230] Extension of Certain Trade Benefits to sub-Saharan Africa, 19 U.S.C. § 3706. Equatorial Guinea and Seychelles are not AGOA program eligible because they are no longer GSP BDCs. Somalia requested consideration for designation as an AGOA beneficiary country for the first time in 2023, and Sudan has never requested to join AGOA. USTR, *2024 AGOA Biennial Report*, June 2024, 19.

[231] The 32 countries eligible for AGOA benefits were Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eswatini, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia. Several SSA countries were reinstated and terminated as of January 1, 2024, as a result of the 2023 AGOA eligibility review. USTR, *2024 AGOA Biennial Report*, June 2024, app. 1.

[232] The 22 countries eligible for AGOA textile and apparel benefits were Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Eswatini, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia. USDOC, ITA, OTEXA, "AGOA Preferences: Country Eligibility, Apparel Eligibility, and Textile Eligibility," January 8, 2024, Category 0 or 9.

[233] USDOC, ITA, OTEXA, "AGOA Preferences: Country Eligibility, Apparel Eligibility, and Textile Eligibility," January 8, 2024, Category 5.

[234] USITC, *HTS (2025) Basic Edition*, January 2025, chap. 98, subchap. XIX, U.S. note 2.

[235] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 66–67.

[236] Extension of Certain Trade Benefits to sub-Saharan Africa, 19 U.S.C. § 3704.

U.S. and African representatives from labor organizations, civil society, and the private sector.[237] The United States highlighted its commitment to AGOA and hosted several conversations on a broad range of issues, including using AGOA to drive economic growth for Africans and Americans, as well as further deepening U.S.-African trade and economic relations.[238]

Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act

Background

The 1983 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) authorizes the President to grant certain unilateral, preferential tariff benefits to Caribbean Basin countries.[239] These benefits have been enhanced and expanded over time and are intended to promote economic growth and development through increased exports of nontraditional products.[240] Altogether, CBERA provides duty-free access for 5,674 qualifying HTS 8-digit tariff lines and an additional 259 tariff lines under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA).[241] Although the 1983 CBERA trade preferences have no expiration date, the preferential tariff benefits granted under the CBTPA are set to expire on September 30, 2030.[242]

Imports from 17 countries and territories were eligible for CBERA preferences during 2024 (CBERA beneficiaries), 8 of which were also eligible for CBTPA preferences.[243] More countries are potentially eligible for designation but have not been designated CBERA beneficiaries.[244]

Developments in 2024

Almost all CBERA beneficiaries are also members or associate members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), an integration movement composed of 21 Caribbean-region countries.[245] The United States

[237] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 36.

[238] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 36.

[239] As of year-end 2024, the 17 CBERA beneficiaries were Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Curacao, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the British Virgin Islands. USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 36–37. CBERA, 19 U.S.C. § 2703. The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) also provides that imports from beneficiaries receive equivalent treatment to goods under USMCA. CBERA, 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(3)(A).

[240] CBERA, 19 U.S.C. § 2701; 19 U.S.C § 2702, notes. The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) amended CBERA in 2000, expanding preferential treatment to several products previously excluded from CBERA, notably certain apparel, for CBERA beneficiaries that meet additional eligibility requirements. For a detailed description, see USITC, *Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 27th Report*, September 2025, 32.

[241] USITC, "HTS Item Count," accessed April 21, 2025.

[242] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 37.

[243] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 36–37. CBTPA beneficiaries are Barbados, Belize, Curacao, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago.

[244] CBERA countries and territories that are eligible for designation as CBERA beneficiaries—but are not yet designated—are Anguilla, the Cayman Islands, Sint Maarten, Suriname, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. USITC, *Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 26th Report*, September 2023, 30.

[245] UNDPPA, "Caribbean Community (CARICOM)," accessed May 26, 2025; CARICOM, "Who We Are—CARICOM," accessed May 28, 2025.

and CARICOM met multiple times in 2024. In June 2024, U.S. and CARICOM officials held a mid-year progress monitoring meeting in accordance with the United States-CARICOM TIFA.[246] On August 2, 2024, U.S. and Caribbean officials met in Georgetown, Guyana. The officials discussed topics related to U.S.-Caribbean trade and investment, including expanding the CBERA program's scope to include trade in services.[247] On October 18, 2024, the U.S. Trade Representative and foreign ministers from Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago focused on CBERA programs and the United States-CARICOM TIFA as possible means to furthering inclusive trade and investment.[248] In addition, the ministers discussed the opportunity for joint work between the United States and CARICOM to foster economic prosperity and generate resilient supply chains throughout diverse communities and within micro-, small, and medium-sized businesses.[249]

Haiti Initiative

Since 2006, three amendments to CBERA have expanded the duty-free benefits available to Haiti.[250] The Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Acts of 2006 (HOPE I) and 2008 (HOPE II) (collectively referred to as the HOPE Acts) expanded the rules of origin for textiles and apparel by permitting the limited use of materials of any origin.[251] Following a major earthquake in January 2010, the Haiti Economic Lift Program Act of 2010 (HELP Act) amended CBERA a third time and further enhanced benefits provided in the HOPE Acts.[252] The Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 extended HOPE/HELP preferential duty treatment to September 30, 2025.[253]

The HOPE and HELP Acts expanded preferential treatment of imports of certain apparel and textile items and implemented eligibility requirements for Haiti. These textile- and apparel-specific benefits give Haitian producers more flexibility in sourcing yarns and fabrics beyond the preferences available under the CBTPA, which stipulates apparel must be made exclusively from U.S. yarns or fabrics of U.S. yarns.[254]

---

[246] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 58.

[247] Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Ministry of Trade, Investment and Tourism, "Minister Gopee-Scoon Participates in CARICOM Ministerial Discussions with US Trade Representative," August 3, 2024.

[248] USTR, "Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai's Meeting with Ministers from CARICOM Member States," October 21, 2024.

[249] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 58; USTR, "Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai's Meeting with Ministers from CARICOM Member States," October 21, 2024.

[250] These amendments to CBERA were made in 2006, 2008, and 2010. USITC, *Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 26th Report*, September 2023, 39–41.

[251] HOPE Act of 2006, Title V of Pub. L. No. 109432, §§ 5001–06, 120 Stat. 3181–90; HOPE Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§ 15401–12, 122 Stat. 2289–2309 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2703a). For a description of provisions, see USITC, *U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact*, December 2022, 49–54.

[252] HELP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-171, § 2, 124 Stat. 1194 (2010); USITC, *U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact*, December 2022, 19–20.

[253] Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Extension of Preferential Duty Treatment Program for Haiti, Pub. L. No. 114-27 (2015); CBERA, 19 U.S.C. § 2703a(e)(1) and (3). In addition, for items either knit-to-shape or wholly assembled in Haiti, the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 extended the value-added rule to December 19, 2025. USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 37.

[254] CBERA, CBERA, 19 U.S.C. § 2701. CBTPA provisions were most recently renewed on October 10, 2020. Extension of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 116-164, § 2, 134 Stat. 758 (2020). CBTPA preferences will expire on September 30, 2030. USTR, "Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)," accessed May 26, 2025.

HOPE II required that Haiti establish workers' rights monitoring systems, including a Labor Ombudsman's office and, in cooperation with the International Labour Organization, a labor-related capacity-building and monitoring program in the apparel sector, known as the Technical Assistance Improvement and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation (TAICNAR) program.[255] Under HOPE II, producers must participate in the TAICNAR program, which assesses their compliance with international core labor standards.[256] The Better Work Haiti program—a collaboration between the International Labour Organization and the International Finance Corporation—reports on noncompliance findings and remediation efforts every two years as part of the TAICNAR program.[257]

Developments in 2024

Since the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, the government of Haiti has faced increased challenges due to civil unrest, political instability, and security issues driven by gang activity.[258] These ongoing actions have continued to disrupt factory operations and government operations, including those overseeing the apparel sector, and led to significant job losses in the apparel sector. A June 2024 report on the implementation of HOPE II noted that since May 2022, nearly 28,000 jobs in the apparel sector had been lost as a result of factory closures and reductions in international orders. One expert noted, "At the end of 2021, Haiti had over 62,000 workers in the garment manufacturing industry. Today, with gang violence [and] political instability, that number is down to around 22,000."[259] The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail, or MAST) continues to be one of the key Haitian government entities implementing the requirements of HOPE II. The security situation in Haiti, especially around the capital, has limited MAST's ability to conduct site visits to manufacturing facilities. Nevertheless, the office has continued to engage with the Labor Ombudsman's office and Better Work Haiti to determine and remediate labor violations. In response to plant closures, MAST has aided in severance pay calculations for affected workers.[260] In 2024, Better Work Haiti continued to provide assessments and advisory services to address inconsistencies in Haiti's national legal framework as well as improve compliance and working conditions in the country's apparel sector.[261]

[255] USTR, *The TAICNAR Report*, June 18, 2024, 2.
[256] USTR, *The TAICNAR Report*, June 18, 2024, 1.
[257] USTR, *The TAICNAR Report*, June 18, 2024, 2.
[258] USITC, hearing transcript, February 20, 2025, 66 (testimony of Gail Strickler, Brookfield Associates); USTR, *The TAICNAR Report*, June 18, 2024, 3.
[259] USITC, hearing transcript, February 20, 2025, 61 (testimony of Gail Strickler, Brookfield Associates); USTR, *The TAICNAR Report*, June 18, 2024, 3.
[260] USTR, *The TAICNAR Report*, June 18, 2024, 4.
[261] ILO, *27th Compliance Synthesis Report Under HOPE*, 2024, 13–17.

Nepal Trade Preference Program

Background

The Nepal Trade Preferences Act (NTPA) came into effect on March 25, 2016, and is currently set to expire on December 31, 2025.[262] The NTPA authorizes the President, if the President determines that Nepal meets certain requirements set forth in the NTPA, to provide preferential treatment to articles imported directly from Nepal to the United States that would not otherwise have preferential access under GSP. In addition to the requirements set forth in the NTPA, the President must also determine that Nepal meets the eligibility criteria outlined in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and GSP statutes.[263]

The NTPA authorizes the Nepal Trade Preference Program (NTPP). The NTPP gives Nepal duty-free access to the U.S. market for certain goods, including certain luggage and flat goods classified in HTS chapter 42, certain carpets and floor coverings in chapter 57, certain apparel in chapters 61 and 62, two non-apparel made-up textile articles in chapter 63, and various headwear items in chapter 65.[264] Under the NTPP, Nepal is eligible for duty-free treatment on 77 HTS 8-digit subheadings, 31 of which are also duty free under GSP.[265]

Developments in 2024

The United States engages with Nepal on a regular basis through the United States-Nepal Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council. One goal of the TIFA Council is to ensure that Nepal meets the statutory criteria of the NTPP.[266] The United States and Nepal held their seventh TIFA Council Meeting in Kathmandu, Nepal, on September 16, 2024.[267] The meeting focused on bilateral trade and investment-related matters, including agriculture, labor rights, digital economy, trade in services, technical barriers to trade, intellectual property protection, and information sharing. According to USTR, Nepal expressed interest in support from the United States to improve the investment climate in Nepal and to attract U.S. investment. Both countries discussed the importance of a smooth graduation of Nepal from least developed country (LDC) status, enhancing export competitiveness and trade capacity

[262] Trade Facilitation and Enforcement Act, 19 U.S.C. § 4454(f)–(g). Amendments to the HTS providing for duty-free treatment under NTPP applied to imports from Nepal entered for consumption on or after December 30, 2016. Proclamation 9555, 81 Fed. Reg. 92499 (December 20, A2016).
[263] Trade Facilitation and Enforcement Act, 19 U.S.C. § 4454(b)(1).
[264] Trade Facilitation and Enforcement Act, 19 U.S.C. § 4454(c)(2)(A)(iii).
[265] USTR, *2024 USTR Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Nepal Trade Preference Program (NTPP)*, 2024, 4.
[266] See preceding and next section for descriptions of GSP and AGOA eligibility requirements. USTR, *2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report*, March 2024, 158. For more information on AGOA and GSP coverage and eligibility criteria, see USITC, *African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Program Usage, Trends, and Sectoral Highlights*, June 2023. For more details, see the TIFAs section in chapter 4.
[267] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 68. For more details, see the TIFAs section in chapter 4.

building.[268] The United States welcomed Nepal's confirmation of no restrictions on imports of U.S. pork and poultry and encouraged Nepal to improve trademark administration and examination. Both countries committed to intensifying engagement under the TIFA and agreed to hold the eighth TIFA Council Meetings in Washington, DC, in 2025.[269] According to USTR, Nepal has shown a great desire to extend and expand the NTPP beyond 2025.[270]

[268] Graduation from a trade preference program or from LDC status refers to the termination of preferential trade benefits for a country when it no longer meets the criteria for receiving such benefits. This typically occurs when a country achieves a certain level of economic development, often measured by income per capita. CRS, "Generalized System of Preferences," accessed July 22, 2025.
[269] USTR, "Joint Statement on the 7th United States-Nepal Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Council Meeting," September 18, 2024.
[270] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 69.

Chapter 3 The World Trade Organization

This chapter provides an overview of major developments at the World Trade Organization (WTO) during 2024 that affect the United States. The overview highlights the outcomes of the 13th WTO Ministerial Conference, summarizes key activities of the General Council, and provides information on the development of selected WTO negotiations and agreements. It also reviews developments relating to WTO dispute settlement activity—in which the United States was either the complaining or responding party—and continued U.S. concerns about the operation of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.

Background

The WTO was established by 124 governments through the Marrakesh Agreement in April 1994, which replaced an earlier world trade framework under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).[271] The main functions of the WTO include (1) facilitating the implementation, administration, and operations of the Marrakesh Agreement, the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and the Plurilateral Trade Agreements; (2) providing the forum for negotiations among its members concerning their multilateral trade relations; and (3) administering the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.[272] As of December 31, 2024, the WTO had 166 member and 23 observer countries,[273] and an additional 22 countries were in negotiations for WTO accession.[274] The WTO oversees 16 multilateral agreements (to which all WTO members are parties)[275] and two plurilateral agreements (to which only some WTO members are parties).[276]

Under the Marrakesh Agreement, the Ministerial Conference is the WTO's highest decision-making body. It is composed of representatives of all the members and carries out the functions of the WTO. It typically convenes every two years and has the authority to make decisions on all matters under any

[271] Marrakesh Agreement (April 15, 1994); WTO, "What Is the WTO?," accessed February 24, 2025; WTO, "The History of the Multilateral Trading System," accessed February 24, 2025.
[272] Marrakesh Agreement, Art. III (April 15, 1994).
[273] WTO, "Members and Observers," accessed February 24, 2025.
[274] WTO, "WTO Accessions," accessed February 24, 2025.
[275] The WTO agreements fall into a simple structure with six main parts: an umbrella agreement (the agreement establishing the WTO); agreements for each of the three broad areas of trade that the WTO covers (goods, services, and intellectual property); dispute settlement; and reviews of governments' trade policies. WTO, "Overview: A Navigational Guide," accessed February 24, 2025.
[276] The two plurilateral agreements that are currently in force and listed in Annex IV of the Marrakesh Agreement are the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and the Agreement on Government Procurement. In addition, modern plurilateral initiatives under the WTO are currently in force—for instance, the Information Technology Agreement—although they are not formally part of Annex IV. WTO, "Plurilaterals: of Minority Interest," accessed February 24, 2025; WTO, "WTO legal texts," accessed August 20, 2025; WTO, "Information Technology Agreement—an Explanation," accessed August 20, 2025.

multilateral trade agreement.[277] The General Council reports to the Ministerial Conference and comprises representatives of all WTO member states.[278]

The WTO Secretariat, led by the WTO Director-General, provides "technical and professional support to the WTO's councils and committees," though it does not have decision-making powers.[279]

The U.S. Trade Representative is the chief representative of the United States with lead responsibility for U.S. conduct in the WTO, including all negotiations under the auspices of the WTO in which the United States participates. The Trade Representative also issues and coordinates policy guidance to other U.S. departments and agencies on any matter considered in the WTO.[280] The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC or Commission) and the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) administer, in part, U.S. statutes implementing several WTO agreements, including the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,[281] the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,[282] and the Agreement on Safeguards,[283] though other agencies are involved as well. For more information on U.S. developments in 2024 under these agreements, see the respective sections in chapter 2.

WTO Developments in 2024

This section presents selected activities at the Ministerial Conference, as well as in the General Council and its subsidiary bodies during 2024, highlighting those that involved the United States.

Ministerial Conference

The 13th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC13) took place from February 26 to March 2, 2024, in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates. During the conference, ministers endorsed the accession of two least-developed countries (LDCs)—Comoros and Timor-Leste—to the WTO. They were the first new members in almost eight years, which brought the WTO membership to 166.[284] Ministers also discussed various issues, including trade and environmental sustainability, e-commerce, technical barriers to trade, fisheries subsidies, and WTO reform.[285]

---

[277] WTO, "Ministerial Conferences," accessed February 24, 2025; Marrakesh Agreement, Art. IV (April 15, 1994).
[278] The Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the Trade Negotiations Committee operate under the general guidance of and report to the General Council. WTO, "General Council," accessed February 24, 2025; Marrakesh Agreement (April 15, 1994); WTO, "WTO Organization Chart," accessed February 24, 2025.
[279] WTO, "Overview of the WTO Secretariat," accessed February 24, 2025; Marrakesh Agreement, Art. VI (April 15, 1994).
[280] Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. 2171(c)(1).
[281] Antidumping Agreement (April 15, 1994).
[282] Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (April 15, 1994).
[283] Agreement on Safeguards (January 1, 1995).
[284] WTO, "Ministers Approve WTO Membership of Comoros and Timor-Leste at MC13," February 26, 2024.
[285] WTO, "MC13 News Archives," accessed March 4, 2025.

On March 2, 2024, ministers adopted the Abu Dhabi Ministerial Declaration, which set out “a forward-looking, reform agenda” for the WTO.[286] The declaration restated the commitment to a rules-based multilateral trading system, with the WTO at its core. It underscored the need for WTO reform, particularly in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of its daily functions. It also reaffirmed the commitment to reform the WTO dispute settlement system, aiming to establish a fully functional and accessible mechanism for all members by year-end 2024.[287] For more information, see the section below on the 2024 development of the WTO dispute settlement system reform.

At MC13, ministers released the following joint statements related to trade and development.[288]

- Ministers issued a Ministerial Decision that adopted measures supporting smooth transitions for members graduating from the LDC category.[289] Among them was the continuous access to LDC-specific technical assistance for a three-year transition period after graduation.[290]
- In another Ministerial Decision, ministers instructed the WTO to undertake work in several areas that facilitates trade opportunities for small economies, including leveraging e-commerce and the digital environment to enhance competitiveness.[291]
- In a Ministerial Declaration, ministers directed the WTO to advance the implementation of Special and Differential Treatment provisions for developing members under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. They directed the WTO to improve technical assistance, training, and capacity building to support developing members’ implementation of both agreements.[292]

---

[286] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 209; WTO, “MC13 Ends with Decisions on Dispute Reform,” March 1, 2024.
[287] WTO, Abu Dhabi Ministerial Declaration, March 4, 2024; WTO, “Dispute Settlement Reform,” March 4, 2024.
[288] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 209.
[289] WTO, “Least-Developed Countries,” accessed April 16, 2025; UN, “Special Treatment Regarding Obligations and Flexibilities,” accessed May 23, 2025. The WTO recognizes LDCs which have been designated by the United Nations. As of December 2024, the United Nations list included 44 LDCs, of which 37 were WTO members and 4 were in the process of acceding to the WTO. To support their economic development and integration into global trade, LDCs receive special concessions in implementing the WTO agreements. For example, they are exempted from applying certain TRIPS standards and requirements. In addition, LDCs also receive various technical and financial supports in the WTO. Developing countries in the WTO are designated by self-selection; however, the self-designation is not automatically accepted in all WTO bodies.
[290] WTO, “WTO Smooth Transition Support Measures,” March 4, 2024; USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 209. The WTO provides specific technical assistance to help LDCs build trade capacity and support their implementations of WTO agreements. The examples of such technical assistance include offering specialized courses designed for LDCs to enhance their understanding of trade rules and negotiations and providing financial and technical support to help LDCs implement WTO agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement. UN, “Trade-Related Technical Assistance,” accessed May 1, 2025; WTO, “WTO Technical Assistance and Training,” accessed May 1, 2025.
[291] WTO, “Work Programme on Small Economies,” March 4, 2024; USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 209.
[292] WTO, Declaration on the Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, March 2, 2024; USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 209.

Ministers also adopted Ministerial Decisions on other matters. These included extending the exemption from customs duties on electronic transmissions for at least two more years until the 14th Ministerial Conference or March 31, 2026, whichever is earlier.[293] Ministers also prolonged the moratorium on non-violation and situation complaints under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.[294]

Furthermore, through a Ministerial Declaration, ministers urged members to strengthen regulatory cooperation to reduce technical barriers to trade. They emphasized early collaboration on draft regulations and transparency. They also highlighted the use of digital tools and international recognition of accreditation processes to reduce trade barriers.[295]

General Council

During 2024, the WTO General Council conducted five formal meetings and two special meetings, with a focus on addressing and completing outstanding items from MC13. Key agenda items included advancing work on fisheries subsidies, agriculture, dispute settlement reform, the graduation path for LDCs, and investment facilitation for development.[296]

The current WTO Director-General is Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala of Nigeria, who took office on March 1, 2021. She is the seventh Director-General and her current term will expire on August 31, 2025.[297] In 2024, the appointment of the next Director-General emerged as another focus of the General Council. The United States emphasized the importance of having sufficient time to consider all nominations and the commitment for an impartial review, as well as a transparent, predictable selection process.[298] In mid-2024, the General Council initiated the appointment process ahead of schedule.[299] Okonjo-Iweala expressed her interest in a second term. With no other nominees, she became the sole candidate.[300] On

---

[293] WTO, Abu Dhabi Ministerial Declaration, March 4, 2024; WTO, "Work Programme on Electronic Commerce," March 4, 2024.

[294] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 209; WTO, Abu Dhabi Ministerial Declaration, March 4, 2024; WTO, "TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complaints," March 4, 2024. Nonviolation complaints occur when a government measure is technically compliant with the TRIPS Agreement but undermines the expected benefits of intellectual property protections. Situation complaints involve broader circumstances where external factors (not necessarily a government measure) negatively affect a member's expected TRIPS benefits. Nonviolation and situation complaints under the TRIPS Agreement allow WTO members to challenge these measures. Article 64.2 of the TRIPS Agreement initially placed a five-year moratorium (until 1999) on nonviolation and situation complaints under TRIPS, meaning WTO members could not challenge measures that did not explicitly violate TRIPS but still impaired expected benefits. This moratorium has been extended multiple times because of ongoing debates about their applicability to intellectual property rights. Stilwell and Tuerk, "Non-Violation Complaints and the TRIPS Agreement," May 2001; TRIPS Agreement, § Article 64 (April 15, 1994).

[295] WTO, "Strengthening Regulatory Cooperation to Reduce TBT," March 4, 2024.

[296] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 212; WTO, "General Council News Archives," accessed March 5, 2025.

[297] WTO, "WTO Director-General," accessed February 24, 2025. Okonjo-Iweala was reappointed to a second four-year term in November 2024. Her second term will start on September 1, 2025, and expire on August 31, 2029.

[298] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 212.

[299] WTO, "Members Voice Support for Early Start of Director-General Selection Process," July 22, 2024.

[300] WTO, "Nominations for Director-General Closed," November 9, 2024.

November 29, 2024, she was officially reappointed for a second four-year term, commencing on September 1, 2025.[301] Throughout 2024, the United States actively participated in MC13, and all other WTO meetings, consultations, and negotiations.[302]

Selected WTO Negotiations and Agreements

Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies

WTO members launched negotiations on fisheries subsidies in 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Conference.[303] On June 17, 2022, at the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12), ministers adopted the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (the Agreement), in which they committed to "eliminate the most harmful fisheries subsidies that are fueling depletion of fish stocks and depriving fishing communities of their livelihoods." The Agreement prohibits subsidies to vessels or operators engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. It also bans subsidies for fishing overfished stocks or fishing on the unregulated high seas. In addition, the Agreement contains provisions on transparency of fisheries subsidies.[304]

This is the first WTO agreement with a primarily environmental objective, and it is the first multilateral agreement reached at the WTO since the Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2013. For the Agreement to enter into force, at least two-thirds of WTO members (111 members) must formally accept it.[305] In April 2023, the United States became one of the first members to formally accept the Agreement.[306] By year-end 2024, 62 WTO members, including the European Union (EU) representing its 27 member states, had formally accepted the Agreement.[307]

At MC12, ministers directed the Negotiating Group on Rules to conduct "a second wave" of negotiations to strengthen the Agreement, with a goal of making recommendations on additional provisions at MC13.[308] Despite rounds of negotiations leading to and following MC13, WTO members were not able to reach a consensus. As of December 31, 2024, the second phase of fisheries subsidies negotiations was still ongoing.[309] USTR noted that the United States encouraged other members to accept the Agreement

[301] WTO, "WTO General Council Reappoints Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala," November 29, 2024.
[302] For more information on U.S. activities at the General Council and its subsidiary bodies, see USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 209–30.
[303] For the background information of fisheries subsidies negotiations at the WTO, see U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), *Year in Trade 2020*, September 2021, 97–98; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2021*, August 2022, 113–14; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2022*, December 2023, 107; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 85–86.
[304] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 211; Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (June 17, 2022).
[305] WTO, *Annual Report 2023*, 2023, 55–58; WTO, "Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies," accessed March 6, 2025.
[306] USTR, "U.S. Formally Accepts WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies," April 12, 2023; USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 211.
[307] WTO, "Members Submitting Acceptance of Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies," accessed March 6, 2025; WTO, "MC14 Host Cameroon Formally Accepts Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies," December 16, 2024.
[308] WTO, *Annual Report 2023*, 2023, 56.
[309] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 211.

and to support the establishment of working procedures and reporting templates for its effective implementation upon entry into force.[310]

Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement

On February 25, 2024, ministers representing 123 WTO members issued the Joint Ministerial Declaration on the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement. It marked the conclusion of negotiations on the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFD Agreement).[311] The ministers also submitted a request to MC13 to incorporate the IFD Agreement into the WTO framework as a plurilateral agreement under Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement, open to all members wishing to join.[312] However, India and South Africa reportedly opposed the IFD Agreement at MC13.[313] As a result, the process to formally add it to Annex 4 is still pending. The General Council is expected to further discuss the incorporation request.[314] The United States was not among the members joining the IFD Agreement by year-end 2024.[315] It also had expressed no intention to join. However, the United States also indicated no objection to incorporating the IFD Agreement into the WTO framework.[316]

The IFD Agreement originated from the Joint Initiative on Investment Facilitation, launched by 70 members during the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference in 2017. This initiative aimed to develop a multilateral agreement that would help improve investment and business climates, especially in developing and least-developed WTO members. Formal negotiations began in September 2020. The WTO noted that the IFD Agreement seeks to foster an investment-friendly business environment by improving transparency of investment policies and streamlining investment-related administrative procedures.[317]

Dispute Settlement Body

This section provides an overview of the activities of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the dispute settlement process, and proceedings during 2024, particularly those in which the United States was a complaining or responding party. Similar to prior reports in this series, this section provides (1) a tally of new requests for consultations filed by all WTO members during 2024 under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); and (2) a short summary of the panel report issued during 2024 that involved the United States. Additionally, the online interactive dashboard of this report lists the new

[310] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 211.
[311] WTO, "Joint Ministerial Declaration on the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement," February 25, 2024; WTO, "Ministers Mark Finalization of IFD Agreement in Abu Dhabi," February 25, 2024.
[312] WTO, "The IFD Agreement," accessed April 16, 2025.
[313] TWN, "IFD Proponents Press for More Discussions after MC13," March 4, 2024; Wang, "The WTO at a Crossroads," March 6, 2024.
[314] WTO, "Incorporation of the IFD Agreement into Annex 4," May 14, 2024.
[315] WTO, "Members Parties," accessed April 16, 2025; WTO, "WTO General Council Meeting, May 20–21, 2025, United States Interventions as Delivered," accessed September 2, 2025.
[316] WTO, "WTO General Council Meeting, May 20–21, 2025, United States Interventions as Delivered," accessed September 2, 2025.
[317] WTO, "Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement," September 4, 2024.

dispute settlement proceedings initiated during 2024 in which the United States was the named complaining party or the named respondent.

The WTO Appellate Body did not issue any reports in 2024 as a result of the continuing impasse on appointing Appellate Body members. The term of the last sitting Appellate Body member expired on November 30, 2020.[318] As of year-end 2024, 31 appeals had been notified to the Appellate Body.[319]

Disputes are initiated through a formal request for consultations, in which the complaining member invites the member whose measures are being challenged to discuss the disputed matter, with a view to resolving the matter without recourse to further litigation. If consultations fail to resolve the dispute, the complaining member may request that a panel be established. According to the WTO, between 1995 and year-end 2024, a total of 631 requests for consultations were circulated to the WTO membership and a panel had been established in respect to 376 disputes—about 60 percent of all disputes initiated. Panel reports were issued in 297 of these disputes, and an appeal was notified in 66 percent of all cases in which a panel report was circulated in the original proceeding.[320] In the absence of a functioning Appellate Body, this section focuses on developments during 2024 through the panel stage and includes only limited discussion of matters that arose following the adoption of a panel report by the DSB. However, in the absence of a functioning appellate body, a number of parties in disputes (but not the United States) have, by mutual agreement, chosen to resort to arbitrators to seek a solution to disputes.

This section's summaries of issues and of findings and recommendations in panel reports are based entirely on information in publicly available documents. The summaries should not be regarded as comprehensive or as reflecting a U.S. government or Commission interpretation of the issues raised or addressed in the disputes or in panel reports. The online interactive dashboard presents a table showing procedural developments in active disputes, including during 2024, in which the United States was the complainant or the respondent.

U.S. Concerns About the Dispute Settlement Process

Over the years, the United States has voiced concern about the dispute settlement process and about the ways in which the DSB has overstepped what the United States regards as its intended functions.[321] In the lead-up to MC13, the U.S. delegation to the WTO participated in numerous meetings on dispute

[318] WTO, "Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body," accessed May 8, 2025.
[319] WTO, "Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body," accessed May 8, 2025.
[320] Data and description from WTO, "Dispute Settlement Activity," December 31, 2024.
[321] For example, USTR, in February 2020, issued its Report on the Appellate Body setting out U.S. concerns about the operation of the WTO dispute settlement process, particularly at the Appellate Body level. In July 2023, USTR circulated to WTO members a document titled "U.S. Objectives for a Reformed Dispute Settlement System." USTR, *Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization*, February 2020; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 91; WTO, "U.S. Objectives for a Reformed Dispute Settlement System," July 5, 2023.

settlement reform with WTO members in various configurations in an effort to advance progress on achieving fundamental reform at the WTO.[322]

WTO members did not reach agreement during 2024 on dispute settlement reform. As a result, according to USTR, the United States "was not prepared to agree to launch the process to fill vacancies on the WTO Appellate Body, thereby allowing the Appellate Body to continue to hear appeals, without WTO members engaging with and addressing these critical issues. Accordingly, there were no persons serving on the Appellate Body as of December 31, 2024."[323]

Dispute Activities During 2024

During 2024, WTO members filed 10 new requests for dispute settlement consultations, four more than in 2023, but still at one of the lowest levels since disputes were first filed in 1995.[324] China filed one of the new disputes during 2024 against the United States with respect to certain tax credits under the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), as described below.[325] The United States filed no new disputes. Of the 10 disputes filed during 2024, China filed five, the EU filed three, and Indonesia and South Africa filed one each. The EU was the named respondent in four of the disputes; China in two; and the United States, Canada, Türkiye, and Chinese Taipei in one dispute each.[326]

China filed a new dispute requesting consultations with the United States regarding certain subsidies the United States allegedly provides under the IRA that are contingent upon the use of "domestic over imported goods or that otherwise discriminate against goods of Chinese origin." The complaint identified these as comprising (1) the Clean Vehicle Credit and (2) the Renewable Energy Tax Credits. Specifically, China contested IRA rules that disqualify EV buyers from tax credits if battery components or critical minerals are sourced from China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran, thereby discriminating against imports, particularly those from China.[327] China also claimed that the challenged measures appear to be inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994; Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TRIMS Agreement; and Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). In addition, China claimed that the Clean Vehicle Credit appears to be inconsistent with Article I.1 of the GATT 1994.[328]

---

[322] In a statement released after the conclusion of MC13, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai said that a "significant amount of work" had been done on dispute settlement, but that "additional efforts are needed to finish the work we set out to do at MC12." USTR, "Statement from Ambassador Tai on 13th WTO Ministerial," March 3, 2024.

[323] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 225.

[324] WTO, "WTO Dispute Settlement Gateway," accessed April 22, 2025.

[325] Apart from filing the dispute, China also responded by implementing export controls on critical minerals. For more details, please see the discussion in the China section in chapter 6.

[326] WTO, "WTO Dispute Settlement Gateway," accessed April 22, 2025.

[327] WTO, "China Initiates Dispute Regarding US Tax Credits for Electric Vehicles, Renewable Energy," accessed April 18, 2025; WTO, *United States–Certain Tax Credits, WT/DS623/3*, July 16, 2024.

[328] WTO, "WTO Dispute Settlement - DS623," accessed April 18, 2025; WTO, "Chronological List of Disputes Cases," accessed April 22, 2025.

The United States and China held consultations on May 7, 2024, that failed to resolve the dispute.[329] At China's request, the WTO established a panel on September 23, 2024, with many countries, including Japan, the United Kingdom, and the EU, registering as third parties to the proceedings. Upon China's request, the Director-General composed a panel on December 19, 2024.[330]

Panel Reports Issued or Adopted During 2024 that Involve the United States

During 2024, the WTO issued only one panel report involving the United States, a compliance panel report relating to a USDOC determination under section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.[331] In the section 129 determination, the United States sought to bring certain findings in a countervailing duty determination relating to ripe olives from Spain (DS577) into conformity with an earlier WTO dispute settlement panel ruling.[332] The EU, in seeking the compliance panel review, had challenged the USDOC section 129 determination. The USDOC section 129 determination and the compliance panel ruling are further discussed in chapter 2.[333]

---

[329] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 140.

[330] WTO, "WTO Dispute Settlement - DS623," accessed April 18, 2025; WTO, "Chronological List of Disputes Cases," accessed April 22, 2025; WTO, "Dispute Panel Established to Review Certain Tax Credits under US Inflation Reduction Act," September 23, 2024.

[331] Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 3538.

[332] WTO, "WTO Dispute Settlement—DS577," October 25, 2023.

[333] Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 3538.

Chapter 4 Selected Regional and Bilateral Activities

This chapter summarizes trade-related activities during 2024 in two major multilateral organizations: the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. It also covers the activities conducted under U.S. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) and summarizes activities and negotiations under other multilateral U.S. trade initiatives during 2024.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Background

Established in 1961, the OECD is a multilateral organization serving as a specialized forum and a repository of knowledge for data and analyses, exchange of experiences and best practices, and advice on public policy and international standard setting.[334] The OECD closely collaborates with the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of Twenty (G20) and uses analyses and recommendations to advance reforms and multilateral solutions to global challenges.[335]

At the end of 2024, 38 countries were members of the OECD.[336] In 2024, eight countries—Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Indonesia, Peru, Romania, and Thailand—were candidates for accession to the OECD.[337] Six of these countries—Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru, and Romania—began the accession process in 2022 and continued to make progress in 2024; Indonesia and Thailand began the process in 2024.[338] The OECD also works closely with some of the largest nonmember economies, including Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa, designated as "OECD Key Partners." OECD key

[334] OECD, "The OECD: Better Policies for Better Lives," accessed April 28, 2025.
[335] OECD, "OECD 60th Anniversary," accessed April 28, 2025; OECD, "OECD and G20," accessed April 28, 2025; OECD, 2021 OECD Vision Statement, October 5, 2021, 2. The G20 is an international forum representing the world's major developed and emerging economies, accounting for 85 percent of global GDP, 75 percent of international trade, and about 66 percent of the world's population. The G20 members are Argentina, Canada, Germany, Italy, Russia, South Korea, the United States, Australia, China, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, the European Union (EU), Brazil, France, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the African Union. The G7 is an informal grouping of seven of the world's advanced economies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States, as well as the EU).
[336] OECD, "OECD Member Countries and Partners," accessed April 28, 2025.
[337] OECD, "OECD Member Countries and Partners," accessed April 28, 2025; OECD, "OECD Kicks off Accession Process with Thailand," October 30, 2024.
[338] OECD, "OECD Member Countries and Partners," accessed April 28, 2025; OECD, "OECD Kicks off Accession Process with Thailand," October 30, 2024.

partners participate in OECD policy discussions and surveys and are included in OECD statistical databases.[339]

The OECD organizational structure consists of the OECD Council, committees, and Secretariat, which comprises 12 substantive directorates.[340] The OECD Council is the overarching decision-making body. The OECD Council meets regularly to discuss key work, share concerns, and make decisions by consensus. Every year, the OECD Council conducts the Ministerial Council Meeting to set priorities, discuss the global economic and trade environment, and decide on issues such as the OECD budget or the accession process.[341] The OECD Secretariat, led by the Secretary-General, conducts its work in close coordination with more than 300 committees and expert and working groups focused on all areas of policy making.[342]

OECD Developments in 2024

OECD Ministerial Council Meeting

The 2024 OECD Ministerial Council Meeting, chaired by Japan, with Mexico and the Netherlands as vice-chairs, took place on May 2–3 at the OECD Headquarters in Paris.[343] The theme of the 2024 Ministerial Council Meeting was “Co-Creating the Flow of Change: Leading Global Discussions with Objective and Reliable Approaches Towards Sustainable and Inclusive Growth.”[344] Some highlights of the meeting included the opening of accession discussions for Indonesia and Thailand and the adoption of an Implementation Plan for the OECD Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific. Other topics discussed at the meeting included revised guidelines on state-owned enterprises and artificial intelligence.[345]

The 2024 OECD Ministerial Council Statement affirmed members’ commitment to the shared values listed in the OECD Vision Statement adopted at the 2021 Ministerial Council Meeting, which include individual liberty, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, gender equality, environmental sustainability, tackling inequalities, diversity, and inclusion.[346] The ministers expressed continued support for the several programs aimed at Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction. In addition, the ministers reaffirmed unity when addressing global challenges, while welcoming progress on the accessions of Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru, and Romania, as well as the new additions of Indonesia and Thailand.[347] Continuing to recognize the importance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in global growth, the ministers welcomed the new Implementation Plan for the OECD Strategic Framework

---

[339] OECD, “OECD Member Countries and Partners,” accessed April 28, 2025.
[340] OECD, “Organisational Structure,” accessed April 28, 2025; OECD, “About the Trade and Agriculture Directorate,” accessed April 28, 2025.
[341] OECD, “Organisational Structure,” accessed April 28, 2025.
[342] OECD, “Organisational Structure,” accessed April 28, 2025.
[343] OECD, OECD Ministerial Council Meeting 2024, May 2, 2024.
[344] OECD, 2024 Ministerial Council Statement, May 3, 2024.
[345] OECD, “OECD Ministerial Council Statement and Outcomes,” May 3, 2024; OECD, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024, October 28, 2024; OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence, accessed April 28, 2025.
[346] OECD, 2024 Ministerial Council Statement, May 3, 2024, 2; OECD, 2021 OECD Vision Statement, October 5, 2021.
[347] OECD, 2024 Ministerial Council Statement, May 3, 2024, 2–3.

for the Indo-Pacific and committed to the promotion of outreach and dissemination of OECD standards and best practices in the Indo-Pacific region.[348]

The ministers expressed support for the OECD's role in promoting free and fair trade and investment. They reiterated support for the rules-based international trading system and the World Trade Organization (WTO) reform on dispute settlement, encouraged WTO members to finalize domestic processes to formally accept the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, and welcomed the continuation of the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce.[349] Ministers also welcomed the adoption of revised OECD Recommendations on Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, as well as the revision of the 2019 OECD Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence.[350] Ministers noted new standards for international investment and multinational enterprises, reforms in international taxation, and the OECD/G20 Action Plan and Inclusive Framework Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (see below).[351]

OECD/G20 Action Plan and Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing

In 2024, the OECD, in partnership with the G20, continued work on developing a multilateral solution to international tax challenges under the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan and the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS (Inclusive Framework).[352] BEPS refers to tax planning strategies used by multinational enterprises that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to avoid paying tax in higher-tax jurisdictions, eroding countries' tax bases. The OECD estimates that BEPS practices cost countries $100–240 billion in lost tax revenue annually, equivalent to 4–10 percent of global corporate income tax revenue.[353] The Inclusive Framework, established in 2016, continues to encourage the use of tax rules and efforts to improve their coherency and transparency.[354]

The Action Plan seeks to curb tax avoidance and improve coherence of international tax rules by closing the gaps that had emerged in the international tax system in the wake of globalization and digitalization.[355] The Inclusive Framework provides a forum for members to collaborate on implementing the Action Plan, primarily through the "Two-Pillar Solution," which aims to reallocate taxing rights across jurisdictions on the basis of where business is conducted (Pillar One) and establish a global minimum corporate tax rate (Pillar Two).[356]

---

[348] OECD, 2024 Ministerial Council Statement, May 3, 2024, 3.
[349] OECD, 2024 Ministerial Council Statement, May 3, 2024, 3. For more information on the WTO, see chapter 3 of this report.
[350] OECD, 2024 Ministerial Council Statement, May 3, 2024, 3–4.
[351] OECD, 2024 Ministerial Council Statement, May 3, 2024, 4–5.
[352] For more background information and discussion of developments before 2024, see USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 101–2; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2022*, December 2023, 127–29.
[353] OECD, "Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)," accessed April 28, 2025.
[354] OECD, "Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)," accessed April 28, 2025.
[355] OECD, "Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)," accessed April 28, 2025.
[356] OECD, "Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)," accessed April 28, 2025; OECD, Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution, October 8, 2021, 3–5.

In 2024, the OECD announced that Fiji and Moldova had joined the Inclusive Framework, bringing the total number of members to 147 countries and jurisdictions, both OECD and non-OECD.[357] Inclusive Framework members collaborate on implementing the 15 points of the BEPS Action Plan.[358] As of 2024, 142 of the 147 member jurisdictions within the Inclusive Framework had joined the Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy.[359] This statement was adopted in October 2021.[360]

In October 2021, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, the United States, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement establishing a transitional period to remove existing digital services taxes (DSTs) before the finalization and application of Pillar One measures, as part of announcing their support for the Inclusive Framework.[361] Initially ending on December 31, 2023, this transitional period was extended in February 2024 to end on June 30, 2024.[362] In June 2024, the OECD published additional guidance on relevant definitions that Inclusive Framework members will use to implement Pillar One.[363] In September 2024, the Inclusive Framework published additional practical tools to facilitate the implementation of political commitments made under Pillar One.[364]

OECD Standard Setting

The 2021 OECD Vision Statement states that "the OECD strengthens, within its mandate, the rules-based international order by developing standards promoting well-being for all."[365] In 2024, 16 new or updated

---

[357] OECD, "Fiji Joins the Inclusive Framework on BEPS," May 27, 2024; OECD, "Moldova Joins the Inclusive Framework on BEPS," May 28, 2024; OECD, "Members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS," May 28, 2024.

[358] OECD, "Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)," accessed April 28, 2025.

[359] OECD, Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution, October 8, 2021; OECD, "Members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS That Have Approved the July 2023 Outcome Statement on the Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy," May 28, 2024.OECD, Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution, October 8, 2021; OECD, "Members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS That Have Approved the July 2023 Outcome Statement on the Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy," May 28, 2024.

[360] OECD, Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution, October 8, 2021.

[361] Pillar One measures are composed of amounts A and B. Amount A introduces a coordinated system for allocating taxing rights on a portion of large multinational enterprise residual profits by the jurisdiction in which consumers of goods or services (including digital services) are located, rather than where the multinational enterprise is headquartered or incorporated. With respect to digital services trade, amount A replaces existing digital service taxes and relevant similar measures by calling for their withdrawal or suspension. Amount B is a framework for pricing transactions between related parties (like subsidiaries of a multinational company) as transactions conducted between independent, unrelated entities—particularly in digital services like marketing and distribution activities. Treasury, "Joint Statement on DST," October 21, 2021; OECD, "Pillar One Update on BEPS," January 13, 2025.

[362] USTR, "The United States, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom Announce Extension of Agreement," February 15, 2024; EY, "The Latest on BEPS and Beyond - October 2023 Edition," October 18, 2023.

[363] OECD, "Statement on Pillar One Definitions," June 2024.

[364] OECD, "OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS Takes a Further Step on the Implementation of the Amount B of Pillar One," September 26, 2024.

[365] OECD, 2021 OECD Vision Statement, October 5, 2021, 4. Within the OECD framework, the term "standard" applies to all OECD legal instruments and other sets of policy principles or guidelines.

legal instruments were added to the OECD standards.[366] These standards address the challenges related to digitalization, free and fair trade, sustainable and inclusive economic growth, resilience of institutions, public health, environmental efforts, strengthening the global tax system, preserving the values of democracy, the rule of law, and protecting human rights.[367]

In 2024, the OECD updated the text of the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, an action that followed the 2023 update of the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct.[368] The update to the Declaration aims to incorporate a current narrative of the OECD Investment Committee's approach to international investment policy, which focuses on how investment policies keep markets open while managing security implications and enhancing the positive impact of foreign direct investment.[369]

OECD Trade and Agriculture Directorate Highlights

The Trade and Agriculture Directorate is the substantive department of the OECD providing policy analysis and advice to governments regarding trade, agriculture, and fisheries policies. The Directorate works with member governments through three principal committees: the OECD Committee for Agriculture, the OECD Committee for Fisheries, and the OECD Trade Committee.[370]

In 2024, the OECD Trade and Agriculture Directorate engaged in several key activities aimed at enhancing sustainable agricultural productivity and fostering global trade in light of challenges related to continued global conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East, climate change, and international fragmentation.[371] The directorate continued the work program of the Trade Committee in 2024, focusing on measuring and analyzing industrial subsidies and digital trade in support of the rules-based multilateral trading system, promoting resilient supply chains, and countering illicit trade, among other things.[372] The committee continued work on the development of and investment in tools for trade policymakers, such as the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index.[373]

---

[366] The OECD 2024 standard setting report covers the period from June 2023 to May 2024. OECD, "OECD Legal Instruments," accessed April 28, 2025; OECD, "2024 Annual Update on OECD Standard-Setting," May 3, 2024, 3, 8.
[367] OECD, "2024 Annual Update on OECD Standard-Setting," May 3, 2024, 4.
[368] OECD, "2024 Annual Update on OECD Standard-Setting," May 3, 2024; OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, accessed April 28, 2025; OECD, *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*, June 8, 2023. For more details on the 2023 updated multinational enterprise guidelines, see USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 102–3.
[369] OECD, "2024 Annual Update on OECD Standard-Setting," May 3, 2024, 9.
[370] OECD, "About the Trade and Agriculture Directorate," accessed April 28, 2025.
[371] OECD, *OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2024 Issue 2*, December 4, 2024, 12–13.
[372] The 2023 OECD Contribution to Open Markets and International Trading System was released at the 2023 OECD Ministerial Council meeting and adopted on June 8, 2023. OECD, "About the Trade and Agriculture Directorate," accessed April 28, 2025; OECD, "OECD Contribution to Open Markets and International Trading System," June 8, 2023.
[373] OECD, "About the Trade and Agriculture Directorate," accessed April 28, 2025; OECD, *OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index*, February 12, 2024.

Additional U.S. Participation with the OECD

In 2024, the United States engaged with the OECD to address various supply chain topics, including semiconductors and women entrepreneurs in global supply chains. In September 2024, the United States and the OECD co-led efforts at the seventh Semiconductor Network Meeting to Promote Global Supply Chain Resilience and Transparency.[374] Beginning in 2023, this network has brought together representatives from industry, government, and international organizations to identify and address key obstacles in the semiconductor sector.[375] In November 2024, the U.S. Mission to the OECD supported a workshop aimed at promoting awareness and understanding of challenges faced by women in global supply chains, ranging from financing to education and discrimination.[376]

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Background

The APEC forum, established in 1989, is a regional economic and trade forum comprising 21 member economies, with the primary goal to support regional economic growth and prosperity.[377] In 2024, APEC economies accounted for approximately 40 percent (3 billion people) of the global population and more than 60 percent of global gross domestic product.[378] APEC states that it is committed to achieving its goals by promoting dialogue and making decisions on a consensus basis and without requiring its members to enter into legally binding obligations.[379]

Four high-level committees, including the Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI), carry out APEC's work and are supported by subcommittees, expert groups, working groups, and task forces.[380] The APEC Secretariat serves as the core support mechanism for the APEC process, administering the budget for project funding and overseeing more than 250 APEC-funded projects focused on moving each member economy closer to the Putrajaya Vision 2040.[381] Every year, one of the 21 APEC member economies hosts

---

374 USDOS, "U.S. Department of State and OECD Lead Efforts," September 27, 2024.

375 The Semiconductor Network is financed in part by the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors Act of 2022. OECD, "Semiconductor Informal Exchange Network," accessed May 26, 2025; USDOS, "U.S. Department of State and OECD Lead Efforts," September 27, 2024.

376 OECD, "Women Entrepreneurs in Global Supply Chains," November 6, 2024.

377 APEC, "About APEC," January 1, 2024. In 2024, the 21 APEC member economies were Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; the Philippines; Russia; Singapore; South Korea; Taiwan; Thailand; the United States; and Vietnam.

378 IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database, April 22, 2025, population.

379 APEC, "How APEC Operates," October 2023.

380 APEC, "Working Level," October 2023.

381 APEC, "APEC Secretariat," accessed March 21, 2025; APEC, "APEC: Overview," March 2022; APEC, "APEC Project Funding Sources," April 2025.

APEC meetings and serves as the chair.[382] Peru chaired APEC in 2024, and South Korea is the host for 2025.[383]

APEC Developments in 2024

APEC Themes and Priorities

In 2024, APEC adopted the theme "Empower. Include. Grow." and prioritized efforts for fostering inclusive, innovative, and sustainable economic growth.[384] The scope of work focused on (1) trade and investment with an emphasis on transparency and supply chain resilience; (2) inclusion, innovation, and digitalization by leveraging technology to transition vulnerable groups from informal to formal economic sectors; (3) sustainability and resilience, codified through multiple high-level deliverables; and (4) strengthening cooperation among Asia-Pacific economies.[385] The agenda also included food security and regulation of artificial intelligence.[386]

APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting

The 2024 APEC Economic Leader's Week took place November 9–16, 2024, in Lima, Peru.[387] The week concluded with the adoption of a Machu Picchu Declaration, a consensus declaration to work toward a "resilient and peaceful Asia-Pacific community by 2040."[388] The declaration acknowledged both unprecedented challenges and opportunities in the context of multilateral cooperation and reaffirmed the commitment of the APEC economies to supporting the rules-based multilateral trading system; reducing the digital divide among partners; promoting the transition to more sustainable energy sources and economic models; and improving connectivity, inclusivity, and food security.[389]

Finally, the APEC Leaders welcomed a number of high-level deliverables published and endorsed in 2024, including the Trujillo Principles for Preventing and Reducing Food Loss and Waste in the Asia-Pacific Region, the APEC Policy Guidance to Develop and Implement Clean and Low-Carbon Hydrogen Policy Frameworks in the Asia-Pacific, and the Sustainable Finance Initiative.[390]

---

[382] APEC, "How APEC Operates," October 2023.
[383] APEC, "About APEC," January 1, 2024; APEC, "Leaders in Focus: APEC 2024 and Inclusive Growth," December 9, 2024; APEC, "Korea Sets Ambitious Priorities for APEC 2025," December 17, 2024.
[384] APEC, 2024 APEC Leaders' Machu Picchu Declaration, November 16, 2025; APEC, "Leaders in Focus: APEC 2024 and Inclusive Growth," December 9, 2024.
[385] APEC, "Leaders in Focus: APEC 2024 and Inclusive Growth," December 9, 2024.
[386] APEC, "Leaders in Focus: APEC 2024 and Inclusive Growth," December 9, 2024.
[387] APEC, "APEC Peru Priority 2024," accessed March 21, 2025; APEC, "Leaders in Focus: APEC 2024 and Inclusive Growth," December 9, 2024.
[388] APEC, 2024 APEC Leaders' Machu Picchu Declaration, November 16, 2025.
[389] APEC, 2024 APEC Leaders' Machu Picchu Declaration, November 16, 2025.
[390] APEC, "Leaders in Focus: APEC 2024 and Inclusive Growth," December 9, 2024.

APEC Committee on Trade and Investment Highlights

In 2024, the CTI continued to advance the work on multiple trade- and investment-related projects in support of the 2024 theme "Empower. Include. Grow."[391] In its report to the ministers, the CTI highlighted a set of priorities and work conducted in 2024, including (1) trade and investment for inclusive and interconnected growth, (2) innovation and digitalization to promote transition to the formal and global economy, and (3) sustainable growth for resilient development.[392] Select programs and additional U.S.-led initiatives are described below.

Advancement of economic integration in the region. On November 16, 2024, APEC leaders produced the Ichma Statement on A New Look at the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).[393] This statement collectively reaffirmed the APEC Leaders' vision for how a modern FTAAP agenda could foster trade and investment. In 2024, three dialogues under this agenda ultimately called for a new workstream within the CTI FTAAP Agenda Work Plan, aimed at assessing similarities and differences between countries' operation of free trade agreements (FTAs) and regional trade agreements (RTAs).[394] The three dialogues also emphasized opportunities for capacity building, calling for an updated Information Sharing Mechanism on RTAs/FTAs and additional support through the Capacity Building Needs Initiative.[395]

Inclusivity and sustainability. The CTI continued work on inclusive and sustainable growth by endorsing the Lima Roadmap to Promote the Transition to the Formal and Global Economies (2025–40).[396] The Roadmap recommends actions to spur the transition from the informal to the formal economy, while recognizing the different levels of informality across APEC economies, and identifies key factors required to achieve this goal.[397]

In 2024, APEC economies continued to work to improve their capacity to combat illegal logging, promoting trade in legally harvested forest products within the region.[398] Under the Oceans and Fisheries Working Group, the United States supported implementation of the Port State Measures

---

[391] APEC, *2024 CTI Annual Report to Ministers*, November 2024, iv.

[392] APEC, *2024 CTI Annual Report to Ministers*, November 2024, viii.

[393] APEC, Ichma Statement, November 16, 2024.

[394] APEC, Ichma Statement, November 16, 2024.

[395] Under the Information Sharing Mechanism Initiative on RTAs/FTAs, which dates back to 2015, APEC conducts policy dialogues to share information on recently concluded FTAs and RTAs. The Capacity Building Needs Initiative has been implemented since 2012 to increase understanding and capability of developing economies to negotiate high-quality, comprehensive FTA and RTA agreements. APEC, Ichma Statement, November 16, 2024; APEC, "FTA/RTA Information Sharing," March 2025; APEC, "Capacity Building Needs Initiative," May 2025.

[396] APEC, "Lima Roadmap," November 16, 2024.

[397] According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the informal economy refers to "all economic activities by workers and economic units that are—in law or in practice—not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements." Some of the actions cited in the Roadmap include increasing consistency in regulations, strengthening institutions for policy coordination and collaboration, using innovative and digital tools for inclusive participation and workforce development, and facilitating fair access to credit. APEC, "Lima Roadmap," November 16, 2024; Kuriyama and Simanjuntak, *Addressing Informality: Transitioning to the Formal Economy*, February 2024, 2; ILO, "Informal Economy and Atypical Forms of Employment," January 3, 2012.

[398] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 174.

Agreement, which promotes sustainable management of aquaculture.[399] The United States led continuing work on the Recyclable Materials Policy Program, which aims to develop the policy capacities of APEC economies to promote recycling and solid waste management.[400]

Trade facilitation, connectivity, digitalization, and innovation. In concert with APEC partners, the United States focused on implementing phase three of the Supply Chain Framework Action Plan, which aims to build secure, resilient, sustainable, and open supply chains in the Asia-Pacific region.[401] Throughout 2024, the United States also supported a record number of workshops and discussions on customs-related topics, including emerging technologies and digitalization of end-to-end supply chains, transparency in logistics and transportation, green customs, risk management, and technology solutions for growth in low-value shipments.[402]

Trade and Investment Framework Agreements

TIFAs provide "strategic frameworks and principles for dialogue on trade and investment issues between the United States" and its trade partners.[403] TIFAs and related council meetings serve as a setting for U.S. government officials and other parties to discuss diverse issues of mutual interest (e.g., market access, labor, environment, intellectual property rights, capacity building), with the core objective of strengthening trade and investment ties.

[399] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 174.
[400] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 174.
[401] APEC's Supply Chain Connectivity Framework Action Plan was started in 2009, and is now in its third phase, focused on identifying and addressing five specific supply chain chokepoints, including inefficient digitalization, inadequate infrastructure development, insufficient cooperation on data flows and cross-border payments, lacking understanding on green supply chain management practices, and lacking targeted support for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises' access and integration into global supply chains. USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 158; APEC, *Phase Three of Supply-Chain Connectivity Framework Action Plan*, August 27, 2022, 1–2.
[402] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 200–201.
[403] TIFAs may include agreements such as an Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, Trade and Investment Council Agreement, Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum, Trade and Investment Cooperation Agreement, Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum Agreement, and Trade, Investment, and Development Agreement. All are considered TIFAs by USTR. USTR, "Trade & Investment Framework Agreements," accessed March 18, 2024.

As of year-end 2024, the United States had entered into 60 TIFAs.[404] The most recent TIFA was signed by the United States and Fiji in October 2020.[405] For more information on select developments under TIFAs in 2024, see table 4.1.[406]

Table 4.1 U.S. trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs) select developments in 2024
ATEC = Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation; IP = intellectual property; SPS = sanitary and phytosanitary; TIC = Trade and Investment Council; TICFA = Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum Agreement.

Type and name	Date signed	2024 developments
United States-Argentina TIFA	March 23, 2016	In June 2024, the United States and Argentina met for the fourth TIFA Council meeting to discuss mutual market access interests, trade facilitation, and regulatory practices. They additionally established a working group dedicated to supply-chain resilience with the goal of deepening cooperation on supply chains for critical minerals and other sectors.
United States-Bangladesh TICFA	November 25, 2013	In April 2024, the United States and Bangladesh held an intersessional TICFA Council meeting to discuss a Labor Action Plan provided by the U.S. Department of Labor and the need to align Bangladesh's Labor Act with international labor standards.
United States-Brazil ATEC	March 18, 2011; updated October 19, 2020	Throughout 2024, the United States and Brazil continued to implement the 2020 Protocol Relating to Trade Rules and Transparency and engaged on other U.S. priorities, including access to Brazil's ethanol market.
United States-Cambodia TIFA	July 14, 2006	In 2024, U.S. and Cambodian government officials and labor stakeholders discussed ongoing concerns regarding workers' rights in Cambodia and other trade issues through a virtual TIFA Labor Working Group meeting.
United States-Central Asia TIFA	June 1, 2004	In June 2024, the United States-Central Asia TIFA Council met with the goal of advancing the objectives of its working groups and diversifying trade and investment opportunities by improving supply chain resilience and promoting regulatory transparency and stakeholder consultation. In April and October 2024, the TIFA SPS Working Group met to share and exchange trade-related SPS best practices, including implementation of World Trade Organization-consistent requirements.

[404] USTR, "Trade & Investment Framework Agreements," accessed March 18, 2024.
[405] USTR, "Trade & Investment Framework Agreements," accessed March 18, 2024.
[406] In 2024, additional meetings and work occurred under the U.S.-Armenia TIFA, the United States-Caribbean Community TIFA, the United States-Gulf Cooperation Council Framework Agreement for Trade, Economic, Investment, and Technical Cooperation, the United States-Sri Lanka TIFA, the United States-Taiwan TIFA, the United States-Thailand TIFA, and the United States-Vietnam TIFA. For more information, see USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 57–58, 61–62, 64–69. The United States-Caribbean Community TIFA consists of the United States, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago. The United States-Central Asia TIFA consists of the United States, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The United States-Gulf Cooperation Council TIFA consists of the United States, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.

Type and name	Date signed	2024 developments
United States-Ecuador TIC	July 23, 1990	During 2024, the United States and Ecuador held the fifth meeting under the TIC and agreed to establish new committees on labor, environment, and fair trade. The two countries also held the first Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) Dialogue under the TIC in late July 2024, bringing together over 150 U.S. and Ecuadorian SMEs, associations, and government representatives.
United States-Egypt TIFA	July 1, 1999	In October 2024, the United States-Egypt TIFA Council met to discuss ways to promote fair and reciprocal trade in agriculture and industrial goods, workers' rights, and IP protection. The United States additionally conveyed willingness to explore further technical assistance to promote enhanced trade and investment with Egypt.
United States-Iraq TIFA	July 11, 2005	In May 2024, the third United States-Iraq TIFA Council meeting took place with a focus on business climate concerns, customs and trade facilitations, IP protection and enforcement, market access for agricultural goods (including poultry, rice, and wheat), technical barriers to trade, and tariff rates. The two nations also committed to increased information exchange at the technical level.
United States-Maldives TIFA	October 17, 2009	In July 2024, the United States and Maldives held their third TIFA Council meeting, which highlighted the critical nature of workers' rights, IP protection and enforcement, and transparency in rulemaking and procurement.
United States-Nepal TIFA	April 15, 2011	The seventh meeting of the United States-Nepal TIFA Council took place in September 2024, with discussion covering issues such as labor rights and the investment climate.
United States-Pakistan TIFA	June 25, 2003	In April 2024, the United States and Pakistan held an intersessional meeting of the United States-Pakistan TIFA Council. During the meeting, the United States continued its effort to finalize U.S. beef access to the Pakistani market, reopen the market for U.S. soybeans, and address concerns regarding IP protection and enforcement.
United States-Paraguay TIFA	January 13, 2017	In September 2024, the United States and Paraguay held the third meeting of the TIC, where officials agreed to further cooperation on inclusivity, labor rights, anti-corruption, agricultural trade, regulatory practices, and government procurement. They also assessed current progress of the 2022 United States-Paraguay Intellectual Property Work Plan.
United States-Philippines TIFA	November 9, 1989	In July 2024, the United States and the Philippines discussed trade and investment issues, including government procurement, IP, environment, vehicle safety standards, and supply chains at a TIFA meeting. This meeting followed other TIFA working group meetings held in May and June 2024.
United States-Saudi Arabia TIFA	July 31, 2003	In June 2024, the United States convened its eighth TIFA Council meeting with Saudi Arabia. The two discussed methods of promoting bilateral trade, regulatory measures, and IP rights.

Type and name	Date signed	2024 developments
United States-Türkiye TIFA	September 29, 1999	U.S. officials held a TIFA Council meeting with Türkiye in April 2024. Both parties welcomed the resumption of the TIFA Joint Council Meeting and emphasized the importance of working together to strengthen their economic relationship.
United States-Uruguay TIFA	January 25, 2007	In 2024, the United States and Uruguay continued negotiations regarding an update to their TIFA with a protocol on trade rules and transparency. In June 2024, U.S. and Uruguayan officials discussed this and other measures to advance their bilateral trade relationship.

Sources: USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 57–58, 61–62, 64–69, 164; Government of Saudi Arabia, "The 8th Saudi-US TIFA Meeting," accessed July 30, 2025; USTR, "United States-Türkiye TIFA Joint Council Meeting," April 30, 2024.
Notes: The United States-Central Asia TIFA includes the United States, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Other Regional Trade Initiatives and Negotiations

This section covers negotiations on bilateral and regional trade initiatives, including the ongoing negotiations on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), the United States-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, and the United States-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership.[407]

Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity

The IPEF comprises four pillars—trade (Pillar One), supply chains (Pillar Two), clean economy (Pillar Three), and fair economy (Pillar Four)—that aim to promote sustainable and inclusive economic growth, cooperation, and peace within the region.[408] In 2024, the United States continued to make progress on implementation and negotiation of the IPEF with the other 13 member countries: Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.[409] IPEF negotiations began in 2022, and in 2023 the negotiations on the text for pillars two through four were substantially completed.[410] The goals and text of each pillar are described in more detail in *Year in Trade 2022* and *Year in Trade 2023* reports.[411] Partners have also committed to

[407] The discussions of specific initiatives are ordered by launch date.
[408] For the United States, USTR is leading negotiations on Pillar One; the USDOC is leading Pillars Two and Three and is the overall lead on Pillar Four, co-leading the provisions on anti-corruption with USTR. USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 38.
[409] USTR, "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)," accessed May 12, 2024.
[410] USITC, *The Year in Trade 2022*, December 2023, 136–38; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 112–18.
[411] USITC, *The Year in Trade 2022*, December 2023, 136–38; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 112–18.

collaborate and use technical assistance and capacity building to achieve the IPEF goals.[412] IPEF partners are not required to join all four pillars, though as of December 2024, all partners were participating fully, except for India, which abstained from the trade pillar.[413]

Developments in 2024

In 2024, the three USDOC-led pillars came into force: the Supply Chain Agreement (formerly referred to as Pillar Two) entered into force on February 24, 2024; the Clean Economy Agreement (formerly Pillar Three) entered into force on October 11, 2024; and the Fair Economy Agreement (formerly Pillar Four) entered into force on October 12, 2024.[414] The Agreement on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (the overarching agreement) also entered into force on October 11, 2024.[415] There were three ministerial meetings in 2024: the first ministerial meeting took place virtually on March 14, 2024; the second ministerial meeting took place in Singapore on June 6, 2024; and the third ministerial took place virtually on September 23, 2024.[416] On July 30, IPEF partners held the first virtual meetings for the three bodies established by the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement: the Supply Chain Council, the Crisis Response Network, and the Labor Rights Advisory Board.[417]

At the first ministerial meeting, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce joined ministers from the other IPEF partners to discuss progress on pillars two through four (supply chains, clean economy, and fair economy).[418] In conjunction with the ministerial meeting, Commerce released the final texts for the clean economy and fair economy pillars as well as the text for the overarching agreement.[419] At the second ministerial meeting, the Secretary of Commerce met with IPEF partners to continue discussions on pillars two through four and to kick off the Inaugural Clean Economy Investor Forum.[420] At the third ministerial meeting, the Secretary of Commerce and representatives from the other IPEF partners discussed progress on pillars two through four and the then upcoming entry into force of the clean economy and fair economy agreements and the overarching agreement on the IPEF.[421]

Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity

APEP, a framework for regional economic cooperation, was announced at the Summit of the Americas in June 2022.[422] In addition to the United States, APEP membership comprises Barbados, Canada, Chile,

---

412 White House, "Statement on Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity," May 23, 2022.

413 USTR, "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)," accessed May 12, 2024; USTR, "Pillar I: Trade," September 2022, 1; USDOC, "Pillar I – Fair and Resilient Trade," accessed April 7, 2025. A senior government official stated India abstained from the trade pillar because of a lack of clarity on the details of the agreement. India will be able to opt into the agreement at a later point. Nandi, "IPEF Trade Pillar," November 22, 2023.

414 USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 38.

415 USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 38.

416 USDOC, "IPEF: Timeline," accessed April 9, 2025; USDOC, "Secretary Raimondo, IPEF Ministers Welcome Upcoming Entry into Force," September 24, 2024.

417 USDOC, "U.S. and IPEF Partners Establish Supply Chain Bodies," July 30, 2024.

418 USDOC, "Raimondo, IPEF Ministers Welcome Continued Progress," March 14, 2024.

419 USDOC, "Raimondo, IPEF Ministers Welcome Continued Progress," March 14, 2024.

420 USDOC, "IPEF: Timeline," accessed April 9, 2025.

421 USDOC, "Secretary Raimondo, IPEF Ministers Welcome Upcoming Entry into Force," September 24, 2024.

422 White House, "Remarks by President Biden at the Inaugural Ceremony," June 8, 2022.

Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay.[423] The APEP's stated goal is to deepen economic cooperation and strengthen resilience in the region.[424]

In the 2023 East Room Declaration, APEP parties identified goals, actions, and initiatives along three tracks: foreign affairs, trade, and finance.[425] Under the foreign affairs track, the goals included promoting inclusive and sustainable growth and linking the growth to good governance.[426] Under the trade track, the parties intended to improve regional competitiveness through initiatives that would have created formal jobs and promote labor rights, economic inclusion, and environmental sustainability.[427] Under the finance track, the parties aimed to increase the quality and quantity of financing in the Americas region.[428]

On February 14, 2025, the United States announced that it will not continue to participate in the APEP initiative.[429] The rest of this section describes U.S. participation in APEP in 2024.

Developments in 2024

APEP partners held several meetings throughout 2024. In addition, APEP established the Council on Trade and Competitiveness to facilitate work on the trade track across several committees, including Trade Rules and Transparency, Inclusive Trade and SMEs, Sustainable Value and Supply Chains, Trade and Labor, and Trade and Environment.[430] Descriptions of major activities under APEP in 2024 follow:

- On February 12–13, the Council for Trade and Competitiveness held its first formal meeting.[431]
- On March 18, ministers from the partner countries held the first Trade Ministerial meeting.[432]
- On April 16, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Invest launched a cofinancing framework to support investment in projects in key sectors in Latin America and the Caribbean.[433]
- On July 17, the U.S. Secretary of State hosted the second APEP high-level ministerial meeting. The meeting worked to "identify opportunities to build on the initiative's early successes in expanding entrepreneurship to foster greater innovation, broadening access to training in the digital economy, advancing clean energy and decarbonization goals, bolstering the rule of law, and strengthening food security and sustainable food production."[434]

---

[423] White House, "Joint Declaration on The Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity," January 27, 2023.
[424] White House, "Joint Declaration on The Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity," January 27, 2023.
[425] White House, "Joint Declaration on The Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity," January 27, 2023.
[426] White House, East Room Declaration, November 3, 2023.
[427] White House, East Room Declaration, November 3, 2023.
[428] White House, East Room Declaration, November 3, 2023.
[429] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 57.
[430] USTR, "Americas Partnership: Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Trade Track," accessed May 15, 2025.
[431] USTR, "Readout of Americas Partnership Council for Trade and Competitiveness Meeting," February 15, 2024; USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 57.
[432] USTR, "Joint Statement of the First Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the APEP," March 19, 2024.
[433] USDFC, "DFC and IDB Invest Expand the Americas Partnership Platform," April 16, 2024.
[434] USDOS, "Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity," accessed April 15, 2025.

- On July 24–25, APEP partners held a public-private dialogue on trade facilitation.[435] Partner countries shared experiences in implementing the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation, "focusing on border agency cooperation, single customs windows, and pre-arrival processing."[436]
- On August 1, partners held the first in-person Trade Ministerial meeting.[437] In a statement following the meeting, trade ministers from the partner countries affirmed commitments to existing agreements and laid out several action items on trade facilitation, digitalization, inclusive trade and SMEs, trade and environment, trade and labor, regional value and supply chains, and good regulatory practices.[438]

The United States-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade

The United States-Taiwan Initiative was launched on June 1, 2022, with the aim of "deepen[ing] the economic and trade relationship, advanc[ing] mutual trade priorities based on shared values, and promot[ing] innovation and inclusive economic growth for our workers and businesses."[439] The negotiating mandate, released in August 2022, covers several areas: trade facilitation, good regulatory practices, anti-corruption, SMEs, agriculture, standards, digital trade, labor, environment, state-owned enterprises, and nonmarket policies and practices.[440] The First United States-Taiwan Agreement covering part of the negotiating mandate, including chapters on customs administration and trade facilitation, good regulatory practices, domestic regulation of services, anti-corruption, and SMEs, was signed in June 2023 and the related Implementation Act was signed on August 7, 2023. The agreement officially entered into force on December 10, 2024.

Representatives from the United States and Taiwan met several times during 2024 for additional negotiating rounds and released summaries of the texts proposed by the U.S. side on labor, environment, and agriculture in April 2024.[441] Summaries of these texts follow:

- The summary on agriculture includes a general set of provisions aimed at opening and expanding market access for U.S. agricultural producers; promoting sustainable agricultural production; and increasing transparency, collaboration, innovation, and regulatory certainty for traders. It emphasizes tailored solutions to shared environmental goals; facilitates trade in agricultural goods; and protects human, plant, and animal life and health. The proposed text also

---

[435] APEP, "Summary Report on the APEP Public–Private Dialogue on Trade Facilitation," 2024.
[436] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 57.
[437] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 57.
[438] USTR, "Joint Statement of the First In-Person Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the APEP Partnership," August 2, 2024.
[439] USTR, "United States and Taiwan Announce the Launch," June 1, 2022.
[440] USTR, "U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade: Negotiating Mandate," August 17, 2022.
[441] USTR, "USTR Releases Summaries from U.S.-Taiwan 21st Century Trade Initiative Negotiations," April 5, 2024; USTR, "United States and Taiwan to Hold Negotiating Round for the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade," April 26, 2024; USTR, "Readout of Negotiating Round Under the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade," May 3, 2024.

contains provisions covering the imposition of export restrictions to promote food security in the region.[442]

- The summary on environment covers provisions that deepen cooperation, respond to common sustainability challenges, and promote a healthy environment. The text includes novel provisions on topics like clean energy and technologies, circular economies, responsible business conduct, sustainable finance, and digital economy. Opportunities for public participation and awareness building were also established in the text alongside commitments to natural resource conservation and protection.
- The summary on labor includes provisions and initiatives to center worker interests, ensure free and fair trade, and promote sustainable and inclusive growth for both parties' economies. It highlights the need to protect labor rights and compliance in global supply chains and distant-water fishing vessels, as well as for migrant workers. In addition to a requirement for both parties to adopt and maintain internationally recognized labor rights, the proposed text establishes cooperative mechanisms to build capacity, share information, and address forced labor.

The United States-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership

The United States and Kenya launched negotiations on a Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership on July 14, 2022, with the intent to foster investment, economic growth, and regional economic integration, while benefiting workers and micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. Following the opening round of negotiations, USTR released summaries of its proposed texts in May 2023, covering issues of agriculture, anti-corruption, micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, and services domestic regulation, as well as conceptual discussions on inclusivity. Throughout 2024, the United States and Kenya met several times and produced multiple tranches of negotiating text summaries covering issues, including (1) agriculture, (2) good regulatory practices, (3) workers' rights and protections, (4) environment, (5) customs and trade facilitation and enforcement, and (6) inclusivity.[443] Throughout these meetings, representatives also discussed textual issues in the chapters on anti-corruption; micro, small,

---

[442] USTR, *US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade Public Summaries–Part Two*, April 5, 2024, 1.

[443] USTR, "United States and Kenya to Hold Third Negotiating Round," January 25, 2024; USTR, "Readout of Third U.S.-Kenya Negotiating Round," February 6, 2024; USTR, "United States and Kenya to Hold Fourth Negotiating Round," March 27, 2024; USTR, "USTR Releases Summaries from Fourth U.S.–Kenya Negotiating Round," April 5, 2024; USTR, "Readout of Fourth U.S.-Kenya Negotiating Round," April 15, 2024; USTR, "United States and Kenya to Hold Fifth Negotiating Round," May 9, 2024; USTR, "United States and Kenya Joint Statement after the Fifth Round," May 17, 2024; USTR, "United States and Kenya to Hold Sixth Negotiating Round," May 24, 2024; USTR, "USTR Releases Summaries from Sixth U.S.–Kenya Negotiating Round," May 31, 2024; USTR, "Readout of Sixth STIP Negotiating Round," June 7, 2024; USTR, "United States and Kenya to Hold Seventh Negotiating Round," July 30, 2024; USTR, "Readout of Seventh STIP Negotiating Round," August 9, 2024; USTR, "USTR Releases Summaries from Seventh U.S.–Kenya Negotiating Round," August 27, 2024; USTR, "United States and Kenya to Hold Eighth Negotiating Round," September 9, 2024; USTR, "Readout of Seventh STIP Negotiating Round," October 1, 2024.

and medium-sized enterprises; and services domestic regulation. During the fifth and sixth rounds of negotiations, USTR held public stakeholder listening sessions in partnership with Kenyan counterparts.[444]

[444] USTR, "USTR Holds Listening Session During Fifth Negotiating Round," May 13, 2024; USTR, "United States and Kenya Hold Listening Session During Sixth Round," June 3, 2024.

Chapter 5 U.S. Free Trade Agreements

This chapter summarizes developments related to comprehensive U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) during 2024.[445] It describes trends in U.S. merchandise imports entered under FTAs[446] and summarizes major activities in 2024 involving U.S. FTAs in force during 2024. As of December 31, 2024, the United States had 14 FTAs in force with 20 trading partners (table 5.1). The newest agreement is the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and entered into force on July 1, 2020. The United States did not publicly advance negotiations on any comprehensive FTAs during 2024.

Table 5.1 U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) in force as of December 31, 2024
TPA = trade promotion agreement; Korea refers to the Republic of Korea (South Korea).

Agreement	Date of signature	Date of entry into force
United States-Israel FTA	April 22, 1985	September 1, 1985
United States-Jordan FTA	October 24, 2000	December 17, 2001
United States-Chile FTA	June 6, 2003	January 1, 2004
United States-Singapore FTA	May 6, 2003	January 1, 2004
United States-Australia FTA	May 18, 2004	January 1, 2005
United States-Morocco FTA	June 15, 2004	January 1, 2006
United States-Bahrain FTA	September 14, 2004	August 1, 2006
United States-Dominican Republic-Central America FTA	May 28, 2004	Various dates, 2006–09
United States-Oman FTA	January 19, 2006	January 1, 2009
United States-Peru TPA	April 12, 2006	February 1, 2009
United States-Korea FTA (KORUS)	June 30, 2007	March 15, 2012
United States-Colombia TPA	November 22, 2006	May 15, 2012
United States-Panama TPA	June 28, 2007	October 31, 2012
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement	November 30, 2018	July 1, 2020

Source: USTR, “Free Trade Agreements,” accessed May 21, 2025.
Note: The United States-Jordan FTA was fully implemented on January 1, 2010. The United States-Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR) is an FTA between the United States and six developing economies: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. All parties signed CAFTA-DR on May 28, 2004, except the Dominican Republic, which signed in August 2004. CAFTA-DR entered into force between the United States and Costa Rica on January 1, 2009; the Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007; Guatemala on July 1, 2006; Honduras and Nicaragua on April 1, 2006; and El Salvador on March 1, 2006.

[445] The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) identifies the 14 FTAs and trade promotion agreements (TPAs) covered in this chapter as “comprehensive free trade agreements.” According to USTR, comprehensive FTAs include market access provisions (tariff provisions) and also “build on the foundation of the WTO Agreement, with more comprehensive and stronger disciplines.” USTR, “Free Trade Agreements,” accessed May 21, 2025.
[446] The U.S. Census Bureau maintains data on U.S. exports to FTA partners but does not collect data on how other countries impose duties on imports into their own countries. Given this data gap, we cannot reconcile U.S. export data with individual FTA partners’ data for originating U.S. goods imports. Thus, chapter 6 of this report discusses only total U.S. exports to FTA partners.

U.S. Imports Entered Under FTAs in 2024

The value of U.S. merchandise imports under FTAs (hereafter FTA imports) increased by 3.9 percent, to $536 billion in 2024 (table 5.2). FTA imports accounted for 26.0 percent of total U.S. merchandise imports for consumption in 2024. Of the 14 FTAs, imports under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) accounted for more than three-quarters of total U.S. merchandise imports under FTAs (75.9 percent or $407 billion), of which Mexico contributed the largest share, at 46.6 percent of the total, and Canada made up 29.3 percent. FTA imports under non-USMCA FTAs increased 9.1 percent, to $130 billion in 2024.

U.S. FTA imports from Mexico and Canada, combined under the USMCA, experienced the largest increases in dollar value. U.S. FTA imports from Australia and Jordan achieved the largest percentage increases, though each rose from a smaller baseline. Imports from several FTA partners, including Israel, Oman, Singapore, Peru, and Canada fell in 2024 (table 5.2).

Table 5.2 U.S. imports entered under free trade agreement (FTA) provisions, by FTA partner, annual, 2022–24

In millions of dollars and percentages. USMCA = United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement; CAFTA-DR = United States-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement. The table shows U.S. imports for consumption from Canada and Mexico under the USMCA, from U.S. partners under 13 other FTAs, imports for consumption under non-FTAs, and total U.S. imports for consumption. Imports for consumption under non-FTAs are determined by the difference between the total U.S. imports for consumption and the imports from all FTA partners. This could include imports that are eligible for entry under FTA provisions but were not claimed by trading partners.

FTA partner	2022 (million $)	2023 (million $)	2024 (million $)	Percentage change, 2023–24 (%)
Canada	148,201	159,508	157,016	−1.6
Mexico	226,641	237,950	249,843	5.0
USMCA partners	374,841	397,458	406,859	2.4
Israel	3,380	3,077	2,830	−8.0
Jordan	2,592	2,491	2,926	17.5
Chile	8,637	8,724	9,943	14.0
Singapore	7,448	6,096	5,923	−2.8
Australia	5,352	4,925	6,491	31.8
Morocco	585	435	485	11.3
Bahrain	741	595	673	13.1
CAFTA-DR partners	17,738	17,310	17,788	2.8
Oman	1,310	841	782	−7.0
Peru	5,494	5,514	5,415	−1.8
South Korea	53,688	61,565	68,425	11.1
Colombia	7,771	7,072	7,769	9.9
Panama	60	65	69	5.6
Non-USMCA FTA partners	114,798	118,710	129,520	9.1
All FTA partners	489,639	516,168	536,379	3.9
All imports under non-FTAs	1,469,639	1,453,135	1,525,526	5.0
Total U.S. imports for consumption	1,959,277	1,969,304	2,061,905	4.7

Source: USITC DataWeb/Census, accessed June 30, 2025.

The utilization rate across all FTAs was 77.4 percent in 2024 and 77.1 percent in 2023 (table 5.3). In 2024, U.S. FTAs, on average, had higher utilization rates compared with U.S. trade preference programs, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, and the Nepal Trade Preference Program (table 2.6).[447] FTA utilization rates vary over time and across countries. Chile and Jordan sustained utilization rates above 90 percent during 2022–24. Australia, Bahrain, the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), Mexico, Peru, and South Korea had utilization rates above 80 percent in 2024. FTA utilization rates in 2024 were lowest for Morocco (52.2 percent) and Canada (63.8 percent).

Table 5.3 U.S. utilization rates for free trade agreements (FTAs), by FTA partner, annual, 2022–24
In percentages and percentage points (ppts). USMCA = United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. CAFTA-DR = Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement. Utilization rates are calculated as total imports for consumption claiming preferences under the FTA as a share of total imports for consumption of products eligible to claim preferences under the FTA.

FTA partner	2022 (%)	2023 (%)	2024 (%)	Percentage point change, 2022–24 (ppts)
Canada	58.4	65.3	63.8	−1.5
Mexico	85.1	82.8	84.1	1.3
USMCA partners	72.1	74.8	74.9	0.1
Israel	79.2	75.4	73.7	−1.7
Jordan	92.8	96.3	96.9	0.6
Chile	96.7	92.9	97.2	4.3
Singapore	72.2	70.1	67.6	−2.6
Australia	91.8	89.0	93.6	4.6
Morocco	60.8	50.4	52.2	1.8
Bahrain	82.5	86.1	83.1	−3.0
CAFTA-DR partners	83.3	88.4	88.6	0.2
Oman	79.6	68.0	88.3	20.4
Peru	92.4	88.4	88.4	−0.1
South Korea	87.7	90.0	89.4	−0.7
Colombia	70.1	68.2	68.5	0.3
Panama	74.7	69.6	73.5	3.8
Non-USMCA FTA partners	84.9	86.2	86.6	0.4
All FTA partners	74.8	77.1	77.4	0.3

Source: USITC DataWeb/Census, accessed June 30, 2025.

447 In 2024, U.S. FTAs also show a higher utilization rate compared to the GSP program. However, the report excludes discussion of the GSP utilization rate due to its authorization lapse from 2022 to 2024.

Developments in U.S. FTAs in Force During 2024

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement

The USMCA entered into force on July 1, 2020, superseding NAFTA.[448] This section highlights key 2024 developments in the implementation of the USMCA, including actions by the USMCA Free Trade Commission and updates related to environmental initiatives, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) support, and dispute settlement, including labor rights enforcement.[449]

Developments in the Implementation of the USMCA

USMCA Free Trade Commission

The USMCA established a Free Trade Commission composed of ministerial-level representatives from all three countries. The Free Trade Commission supervises the operation of the USMCA, monitors committee activities, and considers ways to deepen regional trade and investment ties.[450]

The fourth Free Trade Commission meeting took place on May 22, 2024, in Phoenix, Arizona. Trade ministers from the three countries focused on strengthening regional supply chains, labor rights, environmental cooperation, and support for SMEs.[451] The meeting also featured discussions on combating forced labor, increasing North American competitiveness, and enhancing coordination of efforts to maintain and protect trade flows during emergency situations, which culminated in the signing of an addendum to the 2023 Free Trade Commission Decision No. 5 that included procedures for convening extraordinary sessions of the Sub-Committee on Emergency Response.[452] The parties reaffirmed their commitment to USMCA implementation and fostering inclusive economic growth.[453]

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs)

The USMCA Chapter 25 (Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises) includes commitments on cooperation via a variety of mechanisms intended to increase trade and investment opportunities for SMEs.[454] The Third USMCA SME Dialogue was held on May 17, 2024, in Montreal, Canada, bringing together representatives

---

[448] On January 29, 2020, the President signed the USMCA Implementation Act into law. Through the USMCA Implementation Act, Congress approved the USMCA and enacted legislation that implements its provisions. USMCA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 116-113, 134 Stat. 11 (2020).
[449] For information on the negotiation and passage of the USMCA, see USITC, *The Year in Trade 2019*, August 2020, 155–58; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2020*, September 2021, 123–31.
[450] USITC, *The Year in Trade 2022*, December 2023, 147.
[451] USTR, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Meeting of the USMCA Free Trade Commission," May 23, 2024.
[452] The addendum is applicable for "emergency situation[s] impacting North American trade flows." For more information about the Free Trade Commission Decision No.5, see USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 125; "Addendum to Decision No. 5 of the Free Trade Commission of the CUSMA, T-MEC, and USMCA ('The Agreement')," May 22, 2024.
[453] USTR, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Meeting of the USMCA Free Trade Commission," May 23, 2024.
[454] USMCA, Chapter 25 (July 1, 2020).

from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the U.S. Small Business Administration, the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC), and their Canadian and Mexican counterparts. Discussions focused on enhancing SME participation in North American trade. According to USTR, the meeting highlighted the critical role of small businesses in regional trade—noting that “Mexico and Canada are the top two export destinations for U.S. SME goods”—and promoted efforts to reduce trade barriers and provide government resources to support SMEs across the three nations.[455]

Automotive Rules

The USMCA sets out specific rules of origin (ROOs) for automobiles, which were designed to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) automotive ROOs and mostly phase in between three and seven years after entry into force.[456] “The USMCA automotive ROOs provide new content requirements and establish new requirements for vehicle producers’ purchases of steel and aluminum for passenger vehicles, light and heavy trucks, and certain automotive parts to be eligible for preferential treatment under the USMCA.”[457] On January 31, 2024, the U.S. Trade Representative issued a statement on a U.S. Government Accountability Office report regarding the implementation of new automotive ROOs under the USMCA.[458] In her statement, the U.S. Trade Representative referenced the effective interagency collaboration that had occurred since early 2020 and expressed a commitment to further strengthen efforts to support U.S. auto workers and manufacturers.[459]

In July 2024, USTR released its second biennial report on the operation of the USMCA with respect to trade in automotive goods.[460] The report highlighted the automotive industry’s ongoing transition toward a zero-emissions future and preparations for full implementation of the USMCA automotive ROOs as alternative staging ends for many vehicle manufacturers in 2025. In preparing the report, USTR hosted a virtual hearing on USMCA automotive ROOs on February 7, 2024, to receive public comments on the topic.[461] According to the report, stakeholders have suggested modifications to these ROOs to better reflect evolving technologies in electric and autonomous vehicles; to incentivize North American production of newer components; and to increase the transparency regarding the implementation and enforcement of said rules, alternative staging regimes, and labor value content requirements.[462] The

[455] USTR, “USTR Convenes the Third USMCA Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Dialogue,” May 17, 2024; USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 155–56.
[456] USITC, *USMCA Automotive Rules of Origin, 2025 Report*, July 1, 2025, 48–55.
[457] The USMCA automotive ROOs have three major components for the finished vehicle: regional value content, labor value content, and the steel and aluminum purchasing requirements. USITC, *USMCA Automotive Rules of Origin, 2025 Report*, June 1, 2025, 48–55.
[458] USTR, “Ambassador Katherine Tai Statement on GAO Report,” January 31, 2024; GAO, *International Trade Report*, January 31, 2024.
[459] USTR, “Ambassador Katherine Tai Statement on GAO Report,” January 31, 2024; GAO, *International Trade Report*, January 31, 2024.
[460] USTR, “USTR Releases Second Biennial Report on USMCA Automotive Goods,” July 1, 2024.
[461] USTR, “USTR to Hold Virtual Hearing on USMCA Autos,” February 5, 2024.
[462] USTR, “USTR Releases Second Biennial Report on USMCA Automotive Goods,” July 1, 2024; USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 51.

report also found that the USMCA has had a "significantly positive economic impact on the U.S. and North American auto industry, benefitting producers, suppliers, and workers."[463]

Environment

Throughout 2024, U.S., Mexican, and Canadian government counterparts met monthly to discuss the ongoing implementation and enforcement of USMCA environmental obligations.[464] In coordination with interagency partners, USTR also reviewed six Submissions on Enforcement Matters submitted to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation.[465] At the Fourth Meeting of the USMCA Free Trade Commission, in May, trade ministers from the United States, Canada, and Mexico reaffirmed their commitment to advancing environmental priorities under the agreement. They emphasized trilateral cooperation on environmental policies, ensuring that trade policies align with sustainability efforts.[466] The discussions focused on inclusive trade and environmental protections, particularly in strengthening North American competitiveness while maintaining high environmental standards.[467]

USMCA Dispute Settlement

The USMCA has three principal dispute mechanisms: Chapter 10 (Trade Remedies), Chapter 14 (Investment), and Chapter 31 (Dispute Settlement). This section describes disputes that had active panels reviews under USMCA Chapters 10 and 31 in 2024.[468] No panel reviews were active under Chapter 14 in 2024.

Chapter 10 Disputes

USMCA Chapter 10 contains the principal dispute settlement mechanisms of the USMCA for trade remedies.[469] Article 10.12 establishes a mechanism to provide review of final determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty cases by independent binational panels established under the USMCA as an alternative to judicial review by domestic courts. Seventeen Chapter 10 panels reviewed U.S. determinations in 2024, including six that involved requests for panel review filed in 2024 (table 5.4).

[463] USTR, "USTR Releases Second Biennial Report on USMCA Automotive Goods," July 1, 2024.
[464] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 169.
[465] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 169.
[466] USTR, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Meeting of the USMCA Free Trade Commission," May 23, 2024.
[467] USTR, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Meeting of the USMCA Free Trade Commission," May 23, 2024.
[468] USMCA Chapter 14 contains procedures for resolving disputes between a party and an investor of another party. Annex 14-C of that chapter addresses the transition from NAFTA to the USMCA regarding legacy investment claims and pending claims. Two other annexes (14-D and 14-E) apply only between Mexico and the United States regarding investment disputes.
[469] USMCA, Chapter 10 (July 1, 2020).

Table 5.4 Panels under USMCA Chapter 10 active during 2024 reviewing determinations and year-end status

AD = antidumping; CVD = countervailing duty; AR = administrative review; AR2 = second administrative review; AR3 = third administrative review; AR4 = fourth administrative review; AR5 = fifth administrative review; AR7 = seventh administrative review; AR8 = eighth administrative review; CDA = Canada; MEX = Mexico.

Country of determination under panel review	Panel review number	Case	Date of request	Status
United States	USA-CDA-2020-10.12-01	Softwood lumber CVD AR	December 10, 2020	Active
United States	USA-CDA-2020-10.12-02	Softwood lumber AD AR	December 22, 2020	Active
United States	USA-CDA-2021-10.12-03	Softwood lumber CVD AR2	December 29, 2021	Active
United States	USA-CDA-2021-10.12-04	Softwood lumber AD AR2	December 29, 2021	Active
United States	USA-CDA-2022-10.12-02	Softwood lumber AD AR3	September 8, 2022	Active
United States	USA-CDA-2022-10.12-03	Softwood lumber CVD AR3	September 8, 2022	Active
United States	USA-CDA-2023-10.12-01	Softwood lumber CVD AR4	August 31, 2023	Active
United States	USA-CDA-2024-10.12-01	Softwood lumber five-year review AD CVD	January 29, 2024	Active
United States	USA-CDA-2024-10.12-02	Tin mill products - final determinations AD	February 8, 2024	Terminated
United States	USA-CDA-2024-10.12-03	Softwood lumber CVD AR5	September 18, 2024	Active
United States	USA-CDA-2024-10.12-04	Softwood lumber AD AR5	September 18, 2024	Active
United States	USA-MEX-2021-10.12-01	Carbon and certain alloy steel wire rod AD AR	September 17, 2021	Active
United States	USA-MEX-2021-10.12-02	Steel concrete reinforcing bar AD AR	October 8, 2021	Active
United States	USA-MEX-2023-10.12-01	Steel concrete reinforcing bar AD AR7	July 6, 2023	Active
United States	USA-MEX-2024-10.12-03	Steel concrete reinforcing bar AD AR8	June 6, 2024	Active
United States	USA-MEX-2024-10.12-04	Aluminum extrusions CVD	November 1, 2024	Active
United States	USA-MEX-2024-10.12-05	Aluminum extrusions AD	November 1, 2024	Active

Source: USMCA Secretariat, “Publications,” accessed April 14, 2025; USMCA Secretariat, “Trade Agreements Secretariat E-Filing System,” accessed April 14, 2025.

Note: All cases listed in table 5.4 are USDOC determinations, with the exception of the softwood lumber five-year AD/CVD review (USA-CDA-2024-10.12-01), which is a panel reviewing a determination of the USITC.

One panel active under Chapter 10 concluded its review processes in 2024. The panel reviewing the USDOC's final determination regarding tin mill products from Canada was terminated because no complaint was timely filed.[470] No panels in 2024 reviewed determinations of Canada or Mexico.

Chapter 31 Disputes

USMCA Chapter 31 contains the principal dispute settlement mechanisms of the USMCA for state-to-state disputes concerning interpretations of and obligations under the USMCA.[471] Only one panel under Chapter 31 was active in 2024, and it issued its panel report in December (table 5.5).

Table 5.5 Panel review under United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Chapter 31 active during 2024 and year-end status
MEX = Mexico.

Complaining party	Panel review number	Title	Date of request	Status
United States	MEX-USA-2023-31-01	Measures concerning genetically engineered corn	August 17, 2023	Final panel report issued December 20, 2024

Source: USMCA Secretariat, "Trade Agreements Secretariat E-Filing System," accessed April 14, 2025.

In August 2023, the United States requested a dispute settlement panel be established to challenge measures reflected in Mexico's Decree Establishing Various Actions Regarding Glyphosate and Genetically Modified Corn, issued initially in December 2020 and extended on February 13, 2023. Specifically, the United States challenged Mexico's ban on the use of genetically engineered corn in tortillas or dough and the instruction to Mexican governmental agencies to reduce and ultimately ban the use of genetically engineered corn in all products for human consumption and for animal feed.[472] In December 2024, the panel released its decision that Mexico's measures were inconsistent with seven USMCA provisions and were not justified under two other USMCA provisions, recommending that Mexico conform its measures with its obligations under the USMCA.[473]

Chapter 31, Annex 31-A—United States-Mexico Facility-Specific Rapid Response Labor Mechanism

Annex 31-A to Chapter 31 established the United States-Mexico Facility-Specific Rapid Response Labor Mechanism, which allows the United States to take expedited enforcement action against individual facilities in Mexico that deny workers the right of free association and collective bargaining under Mexico's laws necessary to fulfill the obligations under USMCA labor provisions.[474] This mechanism

---

[470] USDOC, ITA, USMCA, Article 10.12: Binational Panel Review: Notice of Request for Panel Review, 89 Fed. Reg. 19808 (March 20, 2024).
[471] USMCA, Annex 31-A, Art. 4 (July 1, 2020).
[472] USTR, *2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report*, March 2024, 61, 151. Canada also participated in this dispute.
[473] For more information on Mexico's February 13, 2024, decree, see chapter 6: Mexico–Developments under the USMCA. USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 96–97; Bi-National Review Panel, *Mexico—Measures Concerning Genetically Engineered Corn*, December 20, 2024.
[474] USMCA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 4646; USTR, Notice of ILCME Final Procedural Guidelines for Petitions Pursuant to the USMCA, 88 Fed. Reg. 40914 (June 22, 2023).

provides for enforcement of these workers' rights at the facility level.[475] To begin the process, a petition is filed with the U.S. Interagency Labor Committee for Monitoring and Enforcement (ILCME).[476] Within 30 days, the ILCME reviews the petition and accompanying information and makes a determination.[477] If the ILCME determines that sufficient, credible evidence of a denial of rights exists, the ILCME informs the U.S. Trade Representative for purposes of submitting a request that Mexico review the matter.[478] After the United States submits a request to Mexico, Mexico may review the matter and take remedial action to correct the denial of rights. Then, if the United States concludes that the correction resolves the denial of rights, it considers the matter resolved; otherwise, the United States may request a panel review. The United States and Mexico resolved 12 Rapid Response Labor Mechanism petitions in 2024 before the panel review stage (table 5.6).

[475] USMCA, Annex 31-A, Art. 4 (July 1, 2020).

[476] USMCA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 4646. Any person of a party may file a petition. For purposes of the ILCME, "person" means any natural person or enterprise, including labor organizations or nongovernmental organizations. USTR, Notice of ILCME Final Procedural Guidelines for Petitions Pursuant to the USMCA, 88 Fed. Reg. 40914 (June 22, 2023), 40918. The ILCME is co-chaired by the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Secretary of Labor. USMCA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 4641(b)(1).

[477] USTR, Notice of ILCME Final Procedural Guidelines for Petitions Pursuant to the USMCA, 88 Fed. Reg. 40914 (June 22, 2023), 40919.

[478] USTR, Notice of ILCME Final Procedural Guidelines for Petitions Pursuant to the USMCA, 88 Fed. Reg. 40914 (June 22, 2023), 40919.

Table 5.6 Petitions under United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Chapter 31, Annex 31-A resolved before the panel review stage, 2024

Announcement date of resolution (2024)	Firm cited in labor rights allegation	Facility location in Mexico
January 22	Autoliv Steering Wheels	Querétaro
February 5	Goodyear-SLP	San Luis Potosí
February 13	Fujikura Automotive Mexico	Coahuila
February 16	Asiaway Automotive Components Mexico	San Luis Potosí
April 9	Teklas Automotive	Aguascalientes
April 9	Draxton	Guanajuato
May 30	Minera Tizapa	Zacazonapan
May 30	Servicios Industriales González	Nuevo Leon
July 15	RV Fresh Foods	Michoacán
August 26	Volkswagen de México	Puebla
September 17	Impro Industries	San Luis Potosí
December 20	Odisa Concrete Equipment	Hidalgo

Source: USTR, "Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Mechanism Labor Matter at Autoliv," January 22, 2024; USTR, "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at Goodyear SLP Facility," February 5, 2024; USTR, "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Mechanism Labor Matter at Fujikura Automotive Mexico," February 13, 2024; USTR, "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Mechanism Labor Matter at Asiaway Automotive Components México, S. de R.L. de C.V.," February 16, 2024; USTR, "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at Teklas Automotive Facility," April 9, 2024; USTR, "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at Draxton Facility," April 9, 2024; USTR, "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter to Restore Workers' Rights at Minera Tizapa Facility," May 30, 2024; USTR, "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Mechanism Labor Matter at Servicios Industriales González, S.A. de C.V.," May 30, 2024; USTR, "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at RV Fresh Foods Facility," July 15, 2024; USTR, "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at Volkswagen de México Facility," August 26, 2024; USTR, "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Mechanism Labor Matter at Impro Industries Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.," September 17, 2024; USTR, "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at Odisa Facility," December 20, 2024.

If Mexico does not determine a denial of rights and the United States disagrees, the United States may request a panel review. Six panel reviews were active in 2024 (table 5.7).

Table 5.7 Panel reviews under United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Chapter 31, Annex 31-A active during 2024 and year-end status
MEX = Mexico.

Complaining party	Panel review number	Title	Date of petition filing	Date of panel request	Status
United States	MEX-USA-2023-31A-01	Rapid response labor panel concerning the San Martín Mine	May 15, 2023	August 22, 2023	Final report issued April 26, 2024
United States	MEX-USA-2024-31A-01	Rapid response labor panel concerning Atento Servicios	December 18, 2023	April 16, 2024	Active
United States	MEX-USA-2024-31A-02	Rapid response labor panel concerning the Minera Camino Rojo Mine	June 24, 2024	December 12, 2024	Active
United States	MEX-USA-2024-31A-03	Rapid response labor panel concerning Pirelli Neumáticos	July 23, 2024	December 18, 2024	Active
United States	MEX-USA-2024-31A-04	Rapid response labor panel concerning Bader de México	August 15, 2024	December 18, 2024	Active
United States	MEX-USA-2024-31A-0x	Rapid response labor panel concerning Industrias Tecnos	May 23, 2024	December 18, 2024	Active

Source: USMCA Secretariat, “Trade Agreements Secretariat E-Filing System,” accessed April 14, 2025; USTR, “United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Industrias Tecnos Facility,” December 18, 2024. USTR, U.S. Request for RRM Panel—San Martin, August 22, 2023; USTR, U.S. Request for RRM Panel—Atento Servicios, April 16, 2024; USTR, U.S. Request for RRM Panel—Minera Camino Rojo Mine, December 12, 2024; USTR, U.S. Request for RRM Panel—Bader de México, December 18, 2024; USTR, U.S. Request for RRM Panel—Pirelli Neumáticos Facility, December 18, 2024; USTR, U.S. Request for RRM Panel—Industrias Tecnos Facility, December 18, 2024.
Note: No case number had been assigned to the panel concerning Industrias Tecnos at the time of writing.

In August 2023, the United States requested that a dispute settlement panel be convened under the Rapid Response Labor Mechanism for the first time.[479] The dispute arose when the ILCME received a petition stating that the San Martín Mine operator in the state of Zacatecas chose to bypass the existing union, which had the sole right to bargain collectively with the operator, and resumed operations during an ongoing strike.[480] The panel found it lacked jurisdiction to reach a decision because the alleged violations would likely be subject to Mexican labor laws that predate Mexico’s labor reform in 2019 and the USMCA’s entry into force.[481]

[479] USTR, *2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report*, March 2024, 4; USTR, “United States Requests First Ever USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Panel at Grupo Mexico Mine,” August 22, 2023.
[480] USTR, *2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report*, March 2024, 4; USTR, “United States Requests First Ever USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Panel at Grupo Mexico Mine,” August 22, 2023.
[481] USTR, “USMCA RRM Panel Releases Determination Regarding Grupo México Mine,” May 13, 2024.

In April 2024, the United States requested that a dispute settlement panel be convened to examine allegations that Atento Servicios threatened and dismissed workers in retaliation for conducting union organizing and other activities.[482] Mexico determined that the denial of workers' rights had been remediated; the United States disagreed and requested a panel review.[483]

In December 2024, the United States requested that four dispute settlement panels be convened. The first panel will examine allegations that the Camino Rojo mine "disparage[d]and undermine[d]" worker support for the union Mineros and promoted an external union. Mexico issued a limited finding of a denial of workers' rights, and the United States requested a panel review.[484]

The second panel will examine allegations that Pirelli has not abided by the provisions in the sectoral collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the rubber industry and signed a singular CBA with benefits inferior to those in the sectoral CBA.[485] Mexico found no denial of workers' rights; the United States disagreed and requested a panel review.[486]

The third panel will examine allegations that Bader de México is violating workers' rights by creating a company-controlled labor committee and firing, harassing, surveilling, and intimidating workers, among other actions.[487] Mexico issued a limited finding of a denial of workers' rights; the United States requested a panel review.[488]

The fourth panel will examine allegations that Industrias Tecnos and the union that currently holds collective bargaining rights at the facility discouraged affiliation to another union at the facility and dismissed workers for engaging in union activities.[489] Mexico found no denial of workers' rights; the United States disagreed and requested a panel review.[490]

---

[482] USTR, "United States Requests Second Ever USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel," April 16, 2024.

[483] USTR, "United States Requests Second Ever USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel," April 16, 2024.

[484] USTR, "United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Minera Camino Rojo Mining Facility," December 12, 2024.

[485] USTR, "United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Pirelli Neumáticos Facility," December 18, 2024.

[486] USTR, "United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Pirelli Neumáticos Facility," December 18, 2024.

[487] USTR, "United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Bader de México Facility," December 18, 2024.

[488] USTR, "United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Bader de México Facility," December 18, 2024.

[489] USTR, "United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Industrias Tecnos Facility," December 18, 2024.

[490] USTR, "United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Industrias Tecnos Facility," December 18, 2024.

NAFTA Dispute Settlement

NAFTA Chapter 11 contains the NAFTA dispute settlement provisions for investment.[491] During 2024, there were nine pending arbitral cases filed under Chapter 11: six cases filed against Canada by U.S. investors[492] and three cases filed against Mexico by U.S. investors.[493]

NAFTA Chapter 19 contains the NAFTA dispute settlement provisions for antidumping and countervailing duty matters.[494] There were two active Chapter 19 panels in 2024 (table 5.8).

Table 5.8 Panel reviews under NAFTA Chapter 19 active during 2024 and year-end status
CDA = Canada; USDOC = U.S. Department of Commerce; ITA = International Trade Administration.

Country of determination under panel review	Panel review number	Dispute	Investigating authority	Status
United States	USA-CDA-2017-1904-03	Softwood lumber from Canada (antidumping)	USDOC/ITA	Affirmed in part, remanded in part
United States	USA-CDA-2017-1904-02	Softwood lumber from Canada (countervailing duty)	USDOC/ITA	Active

Source: USMCA Secretariat, “Publications,” accessed April 14, 2025; USMCA Secretariat, “Trade Agreements Secretariat E-Filing System,” accessed April 14, 2025.

On October 5, 2023, for USDOC’s affirmative final determination of sales at less than fair value and affirmative final determination of critical circumstances on certain softwood lumber products from Canada, the panel affirmed in part USDOC’s final determination and remanded in part for further explanation on three topics, including USDOC’s differential pricing methodology.[495]

[491] NAFTA Chapter 20 contains the NAFTA dispute settlement provisions for state-to-state matters. No panel reviews were active under NAFTA Chapter 20 in 2024. For a description of NAFTA provisions, settlement mechanisms, and arbitral provisions, see USITC, *The Year in Trade 2019*, August 2020, 161.
[492] USDOS, “Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada,” accessed April 11, 2025; Government of Canada, “Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada,” July 25, 2007.
[493] USDOS, “Cases Filed Against the United Mexican States,” accessed April 11, 2025; World Bank Group, ICSID, Cases Database, accessed April 28, 2025.
[494] USMCA Chapter 34, Final Provisions, provides the transitional provisions from NAFTA, under which disputes initiated under NAFTA Chapter 19 may proceed to their conclusion, including any panel review, under Chapter 19. See USMCA, Chapter 34, Art. 34.1 (July 1, 2020).
[495] USMCA Secretariat, “Publications,” accessed April 14, 2025; USMCA Secretariat, “Trade Agreements Secretariat E-Filing System,” accessed April 14, 2025.

Other U.S. FTAs in Force

The United States-Israel FTA

The United States-Israel FTA Joint Committee did not meet during 2024. The United States and Israel agreed on another one-year renewal of the Agreement on Trade in Agricultural Products through December 31, 2025.[496] The renewed agreement is one in a series of one-year extensions of the previous Agreement on Trade in Agricultural Products that expired in 2008.[497]

The United States-Jordan FTA

In 2024, the United States and Jordan resolved import licensing and sampling matters affecting U.S. exports of poultry, corn, and apples.[498] The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) continued to fund multiple labor-related initiatives in Jordan, namely a migrant work center in the garment sector and a program related to workers' mental health as part of the Better Work program.[499]

The United States-Chile FTA

In 2024, the United States continued agricultural trade negotiations with Chile. A new trade agreement between the European Union and Chile raised concerns among U.S. stakeholders that it could weaken U.S. meat and cheese producers' access to the Chilean market.[500] On June 21, 2024, the United States and Chile agreed that U.S. producers could use specific cheese and meat terms when they export and sell their meats and cheeses to Chile. This agreement came into force on December 29, 2024.[501]

The United States and Chile also met to review their compliance with the Environment Chapter of the FTA at the 10th meeting of the Environmental Affairs Council on October 29, 2024.[502] Both nations reported actions taken to implement the Environment Chapter and discussed potential topics for future collaboration, such as fisheries management; combating wildlife trafficking and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; improving forest, wetland, and marine conservation; and promoting environmental justice and education.[503] The two nations also outlined priorities for future collaboration during the eighth Joint Commission for Environmental Cooperation meeting and signed the 2025–28 Work Program for Environmental Cooperation.[504] Chile and the United States held a public session on October 30, 2024, to allow members of the public to offer comments and questions on current and future environmental issues and areas of cooperation.[505]

---

[496] EOP, To Implement the United States-Israel Agreement on Trade in Agricultural Products and for Other Purposes, 89 Fed. Reg. 105333 (December 27, 2024).
[497] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 47.
[498] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 47–48.
[499] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 47–48.
[500] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 44–45.
[501] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 44–45.
[502] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 44–45.
[503] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 44–45, 169–70.
[504] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 44–45.
[505] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 170.

The United States-Singapore FTA

On April 19, 2024, the United States and Singapore met to evaluate progress toward the goals outlined in the Environment Chapter of their FTA (Chapter 18).[506] Both nations expressed their continued support for environmental protection and sustainability and shared perspectives on other topics, including timber trade, recycling innovation, marine litter, and waste management.[507] During the meeting, the parties conducted a Biennial Review of the 2022–2023 Plan of Action.[508] The parties later held a joint session informing the public of their progress toward the Chapter 18 FTA objectives and the related memorandum of intent between the United States and Singapore on Cooperation in Environmental Matters.[509]

Additionally, the United States and Singapore held their annual Joint Committee meeting on April 30, 2024.[510] The nations discussed their ongoing commitment to shared priorities, including intellectual property, supply chains, labor, digital trade, and the environment.[511]

The United States-Australia FTA

Under the United States-Australia FTA, the two parties met regularly in 2024 to monitor FTA implementation, discuss market access, and deepen the bilateral trade relationship.[512] The United States reiterated concerns regarding barriers to Australian market entry for U.S. agricultural goods.[513] In June 2024, Australia suspended all U.S. cherry imports.[514] However, the U.S. Department of Agriculture successfully worked with Australian officials to remove the ban the following month, on July 15, 2024.[515]

The United States-Morocco FTA

The United States and Morocco held a Joint Committee meeting on July 1, 2024.[516] During the meeting, the United States and Morocco identified the automotive, agriculture, and textile and apparel sectors as areas for future collaboration.[517] In addition to the Joint Committee meeting in July, U.S. government representatives met with counterparts from FTA partners Morocco, Jordan, and Oman in July and August 2024 to hold a technical exchange on the topics of waste electrical and electronic equipment and lithium-ion battery management.[518]

[506] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 56, 172.
[507] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 56, 172.
[508] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 56, 172.
[509] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 56, 172.
[510] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 56.
[511] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 56.
[512] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 40.
[513] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 162.
[514] NHC, "Australia Closes Market to U.S. Cherries Due to Reported Pest Detection," July 3, 2024.
[515] NHC, "Australia to Reopen Market to Pacific Northwest Cherries Starting July 15," July 10, 2023.
[516] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 52–53.
[517] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 52–53, 173.
[518] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 172–73.

The United States-Bahrain FTA

On February 21, 2024, U.S. and Bahraini officials met to discuss trade and environmental cooperation under the United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation.[519] The Joint Forum on Environmental Cooperation reviewed activities under the 2022–2025 Plan of Action, and the Subcommittee on Environmental Affairs focused on implementing Chapter 16 of the FTA, which covers environmental commitments.[520]

On June 24, 2024, the United States-Bahrain FTA Joint Committee—the central oversight body of the FTA—convened in Washington, DC.[521] Representatives from USTR and Bahrain's Minister of Industry and Commerce met to discuss "ongoing labor consultations and global nonmarket excess capacity in the steel and aluminum sectors."[522]

The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States FTA (CAFTA-DR)

In 2024, U.S. government agencies such as the USDOL, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Department of State funded programs to facilitate U.S. market access in Central American countries and the Dominican Republic, implement CAFTA-DR's Environment Chapter, and promote labor rights and improve the enforcement of labor laws in the CAFTA-DR countries.[523] In addition, USTR worked with Central American trade agencies, textiles and apparel industry stakeholders, and the Inter-American Development Bank to build a CAFTA-DR Textiles and Apparel Supply Chain Directory to facilitate sourcing of such products within the region.[524] To further support a strong and resilient textile and apparel supply chain, USTR and U.S. Customs and Border Protection launched a trade capacity-building program to promote trade in textiles and apparel between the United States and Guatemala.[525]

In 2024, actions in support of labor rights and enforcement of labor law initiatives under CAFTA-DR included the following:

- U.S. and Dominican Republic officials continued efforts to improve labor law enforcement in the sugar sector, including improving labor conditions to meet international standards.[526]
- U.S. officials visited Honduras multiple times to monitor the implementation of the Labor Rights Monitoring and Action Plan[527] and encourage Honduras to act on these recommendations.[528] These visits by USTR and the USDOL gave rise to discussions of ongoing and new labor issues,

[519] USDOS, Notification of Meetings of the United States-Bahrain Subcommittee on Environmental Affairs and Joint Forum on Environmental Cooperation, 89 Fed. Reg. 11332 (February 14, 2024), 11332.
[520] USDOS, Notification of Meetings of the United States-Bahrain Subcommittee on Environmental Affairs and Joint Forum on Environmental Cooperation, 89 Fed. Reg. 11332 (February 14, 2024).
[521] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 40.
[522] USTR, "Readout of Ambassador Tai's Meeting with Bahrain's Minister of Industry and Commerce," June 26, 2024.
[523] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 41–42.
[524] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 44–45.
[525] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 44–45.
[526] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 42.
[527] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 42.
[528] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 42.

including child labor workplace safety and forced labor in agricultural and manufacturing sectors in Honduras.[529]

- The U.S. Agency for International Development's regional Human Rights and Democracy program worked with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the International Labour Organization to enhance labor rights and inclusion in Central America and to support entrepreneurship and training opportunities for various types of workers, including those with disabilities.[530] The Association of Nongovernmental Organizations in Honduras developed labor guidelines for the Honduras Secretariat for Labor and Social Security, aiming to strengthen protections against abuse, violence, and labor harassment.[531]

The United States-Oman FTA

The United States-Oman Joint Committee did not meet in 2024, but USTR and the USDOL continued to monitor labor rights in Oman pursuant to labor provisions of the FTA.[532] In February 2024, the Subcommittee on Environmental Affairs held its inaugural meeting under the United States-Oman FTA.[533] In 2024, the United States supported Oman with capacity-building assistance to implement its environmental obligations, including a U.S.-sponsored technical exchange on battery management and recycling.[534]

The United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA)

The United States and Peru held the sixth Free Trade Commission meeting in February 2024.[535] Discussion covered a variety of areas, including the implementation of the Labor Chapter of the TPA, market access for agricultural biotechnology products and electronic commerce, food safety, changes to the FTA Specific Rules of Origin related to adjustments made in the 2022 edition of the *Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System*, and the strengthening of environmental protections and climate change objectives through resource efficiency and circular economies.[536]

In 2024, the USDOL led several technical-level exchanges and continued to finance four technical assistance initiatives aimed at enhancing labor law treatment, such as strengthening civil society organizations against child labor; improving working conditions in the fishing industry; boosting unionization efforts across Peru, Brazil, and Colombia; and developing research capabilities on forced labor.[537]

In 2024, the United States worked with the Peruvian government under the Annex on Forest Sector Governance (Forest Annex).[538] This collaboration focused on logging issues, including necessary steps needed to strengthen forest sector governance and fight illegal logging and trade in timber and wildlife

[529] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 42.
[530] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 42–43.
[531] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 42–43.
[532] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 53.
[533] USTR, "Inaugural Meeting of the U.S.-Oman Subcommittee on Environmental Affairs," February 22, 2024.
[534] USTR, "Inaugural Meeting of the U.S.-Oman Subcommittee on Environmental Affairs," February 22, 2024.
[535] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 55.
[536] USTR, "Joint Statement of the Sixth United States-Peru FTA FTC," February 16, 2024.
[537] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 55–56.
[538] USTR, "Joint Statement of the Sixth United States-Peru FTA FTC," February 16, 2024.

products.[539] The Forest Sector Annex requires compliance audits of particular timber producers and exporters and shipment verifications upon U.S. request.[540] USTR requested the initiation of this compliance mechanism on September 18, 2024, with respect to five timber shipments from Peru to the United States.[541]

The United States-Korea (KORUS) FTA

In 2024, the United States enforced KORUS commitments through 21 committees and working groups, holding multiple meetings throughout the year to resolve trade concerns and ensure Korea complied with its obligations.[542] In March 2024, the Joint Committee met to discuss the recent Ministerial Conference of the WTO, work related to the Trade Pillar of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and other bilateral trade-related issues, such as building resilient supply chains.[543] In April 2024, under the Labor Cooperation Mechanism, the United States and Korea discussed developments in domestic advancements of labor provisions in KORUS.[544] Throughout 2024, various committees and working groups established under KORUS met to discuss topics such as obstacles for U.S. meat and poultry exports, Korea's acceptance system for genetically engineered goods, its system of acceptable pesticides, its application of tariff-rate quotas on agricultural goods, purchase of cloud services, and compliance of KORUS.[545]

The United States-Colombia TPA

The United States and Colombia held multiple TPA committee meetings during 2024 to discuss various issues, including sanitary and phytosanitary and agriculture trade issues.[546] On February 26, 2024, the United States regained access to Colombia's poultry market after restrictions imposed in 2023 were lifted. On April 15, 2024, Colombia banned U.S. beef from states with avian influenza but lifted the ban on September 16, 2024, after months of discussions.[547]

The United States engaged with Colombia on labor issues throughout 2024.

- USTR met with the Colombian Attorney General's Office and Ministries of Labor and Trade and emphasized the critical nature of addressing violence and threats of violence against unions and its relevance to trade policy.[548] Additionally, both governments engaged in discussions regarding

[539] USTR, "Joint Statement of the Sixth United States-Peru FTA FTC," February 16, 2024.
[540] USTR, "USTR Announces Enforcement Action under the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement," September 19, 2024.
[541] USTR, "USTR Announces Enforcement Action under the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement," September 19, 2024.
[542] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 48.
[543] USTR, "Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai's Meeting with Republic of Korea Trade Minister Cheong Inkyo," March 15, 2024.
[544] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 48.
[545] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 48–49.
[546] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 45.
[547] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 45.
[548] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 46.

Colombia's ongoing labor law reform and the issues that were highlighted in a 2016 submission filed under the Labor Chapter of the TPA.[549]

- In 2024, the USDOL managed technical assistance projects in Colombia that focused on labor law enforcement and labor rights, including enhanced understanding of labor law compliance in the port sector, child and forced labor in the palm oil sector, and women's and girls' labor rights in the agriculture sector.[550]

The United States-Panama TPA

The United States monitored and enforced the Environment Chapter of the TPA with Panama in 2024, overseeing environment-related activities of the Secretariat for Environment Enforcement Matters. Officials from both governments worked together to review cooperative activities to address previous environmental enforcement concerns.[551] The United States, through the Cooperative Labor Dialogue under the agreement, continued to work on labor-related topics of mutual interest with Panama.[552]

---

[549] In response to the 2016 submission, the United States provided recommendations on improving Colombia's labor law inspection and penalty systems, addressing abusive subcontracting, and improving investigations of violence against unionists. USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 46.
[550] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 46.
[551] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 54.
[552] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 54.

Chapter 6 Developments with Selected Trading Partners in 2024

This chapter reviews developments in U.S. bilateral trade relations in 2024 with five selected trading partners: the European Union (EU), Canada, Mexico, China, and the United Kingdom (UK). These partners were selected on the basis of their bilateral trade value in goods and services with the United States and the extent of trade policy activity between them and the United States in 2024. This chapter begins with a depiction of merchandise trade between the United States and its 10 largest merchandise trade partners. The online interactive dashboard for this report provides additional statistics on U.S. trade in goods and services in 2024 with all 10 trading partners.

U.S. Merchandise Trade with Major Trading Partners

U.S. total merchandise exports were $2,061.7 billion in 2024, up $41.2 billion, or 2.0 percent, from 2023 (table 6.1). U.S. exports to the EU—the largest U.S. export destination in 2024—rose slightly, up 0.4 percent from 2023. Combined exports to United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) partners, Canada and Mexico, also grew by 0.9 percent, primarily driven by a $10.4 billion increase in U.S. exports to Mexico. U.S. exports to Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and India all increased, by $3.2 billion (4.2 percent), $2.6 billion (6.5 percent), $3.2 billion (32.9 percent), $4.5 billion (6.0 percent), and $1.2 billion (3.0 percent), respectively. U.S. exports to other FTA partners and other non-FTA partners increased by $7.5 billion (2.8 percent) and $16.2 billion (5.1 percent), respectively. The only decline in U.S. exports to major trading partners in 2024 was in exports to China, which fell by $4.4 billion—a 3.0 percent decrease from 2023. Overall, non-FTA partners collectively accounted for 53.4 percent of total U.S. exports in 2024 and experienced a $27.9 billion (or 2.6 percent) increase.

Table 6.1 U.S. merchandise exports, by leading trading partners, annual, 2023–24
In billions of dollars and percentages. USMCA = United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement; FTA = free trade agreement.

Trading partner	2023 (billions $)	2024 (billions $)	Absolute change, 2023–24 (billions $)	Percentage change, 2023–24 (%)
Canada	354.4	349.9	−4.5	−1.3
Mexico	323.6	334.0	10.4	3.2
USMCA trading partners	678.0	683.9	5.9	0.9
Other FTA trading partners	268.8	276.2	7.5	2.8
FTA partner total	946.8	960.2	13.4	1.4
European Union	368.4	369.8	1.4	0.4
China	147.6	143.2	−4.4	−3.0
Japan	75.8	79.0	3.2	4.2
Taiwan	40.0	42.5	2.6	6.5
Vietnam	9.8	13.0	3.2	32.9
United Kingdom	75.0	79.5	4.5	6.0
India	40.3	41.5	1.2	3.0
Other non-FTA trading partners	316.7	332.9	16.2	5.1
Non-FTA trading partner total	1,073.6	1,101.5	27.9	2.6
U.S. total exports	2,020.5	2,061.7	41.2	2.0

Source: USITC DataWeb/Census, total exports, accessed June 25, 2025.

U.S. total merchandise imports were $3,266.4 billion in 2024, an increase of $189.6 billion, or 6.2 percent, from 2023 (table 6.2). The EU, Canada, China, and Mexico remained the top sources of U.S. imports in 2024, and their ranking remained unchanged from 2023. Imports from Canada decreased by $6.1 billion (1.5 percent), and imports from Mexico totaled $505.5 billion in 2024, up 6.9 percent ($32.6 billion) from 2023. This led to an overall increase in U.S. imports of 3.0 percent from the USMCA trading partners. Imports from the EU increased by 5.1 percent. Imports from other major U.S. trading partners—including China, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and India—all increased in 2024 compared to 2023, rising by 2.7 percent, 0.8 percent, 32.4 percent, 19.3 percent, 6.2 percent, and 4.5 percent, respectively. U.S. imports from other FTA trading partners and other non-FTA trading partners also increased, by 9.0 percent and 9.2 percent, respectively. Overall, non-FTA partners collectively accounted for 62.7 percent of total U.S. imports in 2024 and experienced a $138.2 billion (or 7.2 percent) increase.

Table 6.2 U.S. merchandise imports, by leading trading partners, annual, 2023–24
In billions of dollars and percentages. USMCA = United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement; FTA = free trade agreement.

Trading Partner	2023 (billions $)	2024 (billions $)	Absolute change, 2023–24 (billions $)	Percentage change, 2023–24 (%)
Canada	418.0	411.9	−6.1	−1.5
Mexico	472.9	505.5	32.6	6.9
USMCA trading partners	890.9	917.4	26.5	3.0
Other FTA trading partners	277.3	302.2	25.0	9.0
FTA partner total	1,168.2	1,219.7	51.4	4.4
European Union	576.1	605.7	29.6	5.1
China	427.2	438.7	11.5	2.7
Japan	147.2	148.4	1.2	0.8
Taiwan	87.8	116.3	28.5	32.4
Vietnam	114.4	136.5	22.1	19.3
United Kingdom	64.2	68.2	4.0	6.2
India	83.6	87.3	3.8	4.5
Other non-FTA trading partners	408.1	445.7	37.6	9.2
Non-FTA trading partner total	1,908.6	2,046.8	138.2	7.2
U.S. total imports	3,076.8	3,266.4	189.6	6.2

Source: USITC DataWeb/Census, general imports, accessed June 25, 2025.

European Union

The United States and the EU remained engaged on trade matters in 2024, with major trade developments, including meetings of the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), the U.S.-EU Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue, and the Minerals Security Partnership. Progress was minimal in certain areas of active discussion in 2024, including the U.S.-EU Critical Minerals Agreement and the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum.

Trade and Technology Council

Established in June 2021, the TTC and its 10 working groups remained the principal coordination mechanism for U.S.-EU engagement on trade and technology issues in 2024.[553] Notably, two TTC ministerial meetings occurred in 2024.

- On January 30, officials met in the fifth TTC ministerial meeting in Washington, DC, to discuss semiconductor supply chain resilience, technology cooperation, artificial intelligence (AI) governance, economic coercion by foreign actors, and the green transition.[554]

[553] EC, “EU-US Trade and Technology Council,” accessed April 1, 2025.
[554] White House, “Readout of U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council Fifth Ministerial Meeting,” January 31, 2024.

- On April 4–5, the sixth TTC ministerial meeting was held in Leuven, Belgium, focusing on economic security, the climate-neutral transition, governance of critical technologies, and nonmarket practices.[555] Notable milestones from the ministerial meeting include the release of the Joint Catalogue of Best Practices on Green Public Procurement,[556] the launch of the Minerals Security Partnership Forum,[557] and the Joint Declaration on Enhancing eInvoicing Interoperability.[558]

On September 16, 2024, the TTC convened a meeting of U.S. and EU deputies to discuss progress the two governments had achieved at an operational level. Officials reviewed steps the United States and the EU had taken on AI governance and collaboration on technology issues, such as building a secure digital infrastructure of fifth generation(5G) and subsea cables, exchanging information on nonmarket policies and best practices for investment screenings, and strengthening U.S. and EU semiconductor and solar supply chains.[559]

U.S.-EU Efforts to Address China's Nonmarket Practices

The United States supported several EU actions in 2024 against China's nonmarket practices. The U.S.-EU joint statement from the sixth TTC ministerial meeting reflected the shared support from the U.S. and EU governments to respond to economic coercion and nonmarket practices by China.[560] On April 23, 2024, the European Commission (EC) launched an investigation under its new International Procurement Instrument (IPI), targeting Chinese procurement policies that discriminate against European exports of medical devices. The IPI allows the EU to address restrictive public procurement practices and measures abroad by investigating and potentially restricting access to EU public tenders for companies from those

[555] According to the Joint Statement issued by USTR, non-market practices refer to actions taken by certain third-party countries that can create distortions in key U.S. and EU industries. USTR, "U.S.-EU Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council," April 8, 2024.
[556] Drafted by the TTC Working Group on Climate and Clean Tech, the Joint Catalogue of Best Practices on Green Public Procurement presents a compilation of key policies, actions, and best practices used in green public procurement that other governments can leverage to globally increase green public procurement practices. USTR, *Joint Catalogue of Best Practices on Green Public Procurement*, accessed April 1, 2025.
[557] The forum provided Minerals Security Partnership partners' ministers a platform to expand on and formalize previous engagements and information sharing between minerals-producing countries; the forum was particularly focused on accelerating projects and policies that have high environmental, social, and governance standards. USDOS, "Secretary Blinken Launches the MSP Forum with the EC," April 5, 2024.
[558] According to the European Commission, eInvoicing is "the exchange of an electronic invoice document between a supplier and a buyer." An electronic invoice (eInvoice) is "an invoice that has been issued, transmitted and received in a structured data format which allows for its automatic and electronic processing." Through discussions within the TTC Global Trade Challenges Working Group, the Joint Declaration on Enhancing eInvoicing Interoperability outlines ways the United States and the EU are cooperating and coordinating for greater compatibility in terms of business and technical interoperability. USTR, *Joint Declaration on Enhancing eInvoicing Interoperability*, accessed April 1, 2024; EC, "What is eInvoicing," accessed August 29, 2025.
[559] USTR, "Readout from U.S.-EU TTC Deputies Meeting," September 16, 2024.
[560] USTR, "U.S.-EU Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council," April 8, 2024.

markets.[561] This inquiry was the first time the IPI had been invoked.[562] The United States issued a statement supporting the EU investigation and its use of the IPI, identifying it as a tool that can address China's unfair procurement policies in trade.[563]

On October 28, 2024, the EC concluded an anti-subsidy investigation by imposing countervailing duties on imports of battery electric vehicles from China for a period of five years.[564] The United States issued a statement that recognized and welcomed the EU countervailing duties on Chinese battery-electric vehicles, citing them as another step in confronting China's nonmarket practices and calling for future U.S.-EU engagement on collective economic security.[565]

Other Developments in 2024

On March 4, 2024, the EC released *A European Defense Industrial Strategy*, which, among other things, included a recommendation to allocate 50 percent of the EU military procurement budget to EU-made equipment by 2030, with an increase to 60 percent by 2035.[566] Following through on the proposal, in September 2024, the EC President directed officials to proceed with the implementation of the defense strategy, including progress toward its recommended targets for procurement of EU-made military equipment.[567] This effort has raised concern within the United States about nondiscriminatory access, particularly by U.S. defense equipment suppliers and investors who engage in opportunities provided by the European defense sector.[568]

In December 2021, the United States and the EU launched the Technology Competition Policy Dialogue (TCPD), which provides a forum for the two governments to strengthen cooperation and promote fair competition in the technology sector and digital economy.[569] U.S. and EU senior officials convened for the fourth U.S.-EU Joint TCPD on April 10, 2024. Topics discussed at the meeting included competition policy with AI and other emerging technologies, the evolving market dynamics in the digital sector and concerns about data monopolies, and merger enforcement in the modern digital economy.[570]

In October 2021, the United States and the EU launched negotiations for a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum. The potential agreement sought to address global nonmarket excess capacity and the emissions intensity of the steel and aluminum industries.[571] Furthermore, in March 2023, the United States and the EU began negotiations on a targeted U.S.-EU Critical Minerals

---

[561] EU, International Procurement Instrument (June 23, 2022).

[562] On January 13, 2025, the EC concluded the investigation and published its findings in a public report. The report concluded that China has both directly and indirectly discriminated against EU medical devices producers by limiting their access to Chinese government contracts. EC, "First Investigation under EU International Procurement Instrument," April 23, 2024; EC, "Discrimination in China's Procurement for Medical Devices," January 13, 2025.

[563] USTR, "Statement on EU's International Procurement Instrument Investigation," April 24, 2024.

[564] EC, "EU Imposes Countervailing Duties on BEV Imports from China," October 28, 2024.

[565] USTR, "Statement on EU Anti-Subsidy Duties on BEV Imports from China," October 7, 2024.

[566] EC, *A European Defence Industrial Strategy*, March 5, 2024, 15.

[567] von der Leyen, Ursula, "Mission Letter to Andrius Kubilius," September 17, 2024, 6.

[568] USTR, *2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers*, March 31, 2025, 147.

[569] EC, "EU-US Hold Fourth Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue," April 10, 2024.

[570] FTC, "EU-US Hold Fourth Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue," April 11, 2024.

[571] USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 145.

Agreement. The proposed agreement aimed to allow EU firms to qualify for the clean vehicle tax credit offered by the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act.[572] In a January 2024 meeting, U.S. and EU senior officials expressed support for moving forward with negotiations.[573] However, no rounds of U.S.-EU negotiations on either the Global Arrangement or a critical minerals agreement were reported in 2024.

Canada

In June 2024, the Canadian government enacted a digital services tax (DST). Apart from the DST, this section also summarizes engagements with Canada under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).

Digital Services Tax

Throughout 2024, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) met several times with Canadian trade representatives to discuss U.S. concerns on Canada's DST. The Digital Services Tax Act came into force on June 28, 2024[574] and imposes a 3 percent levy on certain gross revenues relating to online marketplaces, online targeted advertising, social media platforms, and user data.[575] Canada's DST is retroactive to January 1, 2022, thereby requiring companies to make first payments on revenue earned since 2022, starting on June 30, 2025.[576] The DST applies to foreign and domestic taxpayers with annual global revenues of €750 million (approximately $833 million) and Canadian digital services revenue of CAD$20 million (approximately $14.3 million).[577]

This move came despite Canada's adoption of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), which calls on

[572] USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 144.

[573] USTR, "Readout of Meeting with EC Executive Vice President," January 29, 2024.

[574] Government of Canada, "Digital Services Tax," September 12, 2024.

[575] USTR, *2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers*, March 31, 2025, 45. The Canadian DST was first proposed in November 2020, with draft legislation introduced in December 2021, proposing a 3 percent levy on large companies' Canadian digital services revenue. Government of Canada, "Digital Services Tax Act," December 14, 2021.

[576] On June 29, 2025, the Canadian government announced it would halt collection of the Digital Services Tax (DST). The Minister of Finance and National Revenue also stated that Canada would rescind the DST in anticipation of a mutually beneficial comprehensive trade agreement with the United States. Government of Canada, Department of Finance, "Canada Rescinds Digital Services Tax," June 29, 2025.

[577] Government of Canada, Department of Finance, "Digital Services Tax Act," December 14, 2021. USTR, *2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers*, March 31, 2025, 45. The United States expressed concerns over Canada's DST in 2023 and continued discussions with Canada on the significant retroactive tax liabilities it would impose for U.S. companies. USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023,* September 2024, 147.

participating countries to refrain from introducing new DSTs.[578] On August 30, 2024, USTR announced that the United States requested dispute settlement consultations with the Canadian government under the USMCA regarding Canada's DST.[579] As of December 31, 2024, the United States had not requested the establishment of a dispute resolution panel under the USMCA.[580]

USTR noted in comments made to Canada in 2021 and 2023 that most DSTs have been designed in ways that discriminate against U.S. companies, targeting U.S. firms for taxation while excluding national firms engaged in similar activities.[581] Additionally, USTR noted that Canada's DST creates significant retroactive tax liabilities that have immediate consequences for U.S. companies and U.S.-Canadian trade.[582]

Developments Under the USMCA

The United States and Canada also engaged through USMCA mechanisms on several issues.[583] The third Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) Dialogue, hosted in Montreal in May 2024, brought together officials and stakeholders from the United States, Mexico, and Canada to explore ways to boost small business participation in trade.[584] Later in the same month, the fourth meeting of the USMCA Free Trade Commission emphasized inclusive trade, labor rights, and SME integration into supply chains.[585] For a more detailed discussion on the SME dialogue and the fourth Free Trade Commission meeting, see the USMCA section in chapter 5.

On May 23, 2024, USTR announced new action through an addendum to improve emergency response collaboration between the United States, Mexico, and Canada during emergency situations that impact

---

[578] As discussed in chapter 4, in October 2021, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, the United States, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement establishing a transitional period to remove the existing DST before finalizing and implementing the Pillar One measures of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS. However, Canada's approach to DST has contradicted its BEPS commitments, resulting in a lack of developments under or related to BEPS when it comes to the DST. For more details on the BEPS Inclusive Framework, see chapter 4. OECD, "Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution," October 8, 2021, 3. The G20 is an international forum representing the world's major developed and developing economies. The G20 comprises 19 countries including: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, United Kingdom, and United States and two regional bodies, namely the EU and the African Union. G20 South Africa 2025, "G20 South Africa – Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability," accessed July 27, 2025.
[579] USTR, "United States Requests USMCA Dispute Settlement Consultations," August 30, 2024.
[580] USTR, "Chapter 31 Disputes," accessed May 14, 2025.
[581] USTR, "Readout of September Meeting with Canada's Deputy Minister for International Trade," September 21, 2023; USTR, "Statement by USTR Spokesperson on Canada's Digital Services Tax," December 15, 2021.
[582] USTR, *2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers*, March 31, 2025, 45.
[583] Please see chapter 5 of this report for more detailed discussion about USMCA developments in 2024.
[584] USTR, "1st USMCA Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Dialogue," April 22, 2022; USTR, "The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Small Business Administration, and Department of Commerce Convene the Third USMCA Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Dialogue," May 17, 2024.
[585] USTR, "United States, Canada, and Mexico Joint Statement of the Fourth Meeting," May 23, 2024.

North American trade flows, like the COVID-19 pandemic.[586] Additionally, the U.S. Trade Representative and the Canadian Minister of Export Promotion, International Trade, and Economic Development announced the release of U.S. and Canadian internal mechanisms that will be used to coordinate on North American trade flows in emergency situations.[587]

Mexico

This section summarizes several developments in the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship in 2024. Major developments under the USMCA are discussed in more detail in chapter 5 of this report, but USMCA-related developments involving the United States and Mexico are summarized below. Additionally, the U.S. and Mexican governments also saw developments in bilateral issues regarding steel and aluminum trade and the 2024 U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) Mid-Year Review.

Steel and Aluminum

When U.S. and Mexican trade officials met on January 24, 2024, U.S. representatives underscored the need to address the recent surge of Mexican steel and aluminum exports to the United States in accordance with the 2019 Joint Statement by the United States and Mexico on Section 232 Duties on Steel and Aluminum.[588] U.S. officials also highlighted the need for ensuring greater transparency regarding Mexico's steel and aluminum imports from third countries.[589] The U.S. Trade Representative and the Mexican Secretary of Economy met twice in 2024 and discussed the persistent challenges the United States faces in steel and aluminum trade with Mexico. In these meetings, the two governments agreed to continue to work together to address the issue and advance North American economic competitiveness.[590]

U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue

On April 19, 2024, U.S. and Mexican officials convened virtually for the 2024 U.S.-Mexico HLED Mid-Year Review. HLED principals at the deputy level discussed joint accomplishments and progress on the dialogue's ongoing workstreams since the third HLED Ministerial meeting in Washington, DC, on

---

[586] This addendum includes explicit procedures for consultations and coordination between USMCA parties on items like labor rights, worker health and safety, and critical infrastructure priorities. North American Competitiveness Committee, *Addendum to FTC Decision No. 5*, May 23, 2024.
[587] USTR, "USTR Announces New Action . . . Emergency Response Collaboration," May 23, 2024.
[588] USTR, "United States Announces Deal with Canada and Mexico," May 17, 2019. The 2019 Joint Statement eliminated all tariffs the United States imposed under section 232 on imports of aluminum and steel products from Mexico and all retaliatory tariffs Mexico imposed on the United States as well as pending litigation between the two countries in the WTO regarding the section 232 duties. The statement also notes that consultations may be requested if imports surge meaningfully beyond historic volumes. USTR, "Readout of Senior Advisor Cara Morrow's Meeting with Mexico's Under Secretary of Economy for Foreign Trade Alejandro Encinas," January 24, 2024.
[589] USTR, "Readout of Senior Advisor Cara Morrow's Meeting with Mexico's Under Secretary of Economy for Foreign Trade Alejandro Encinas," January 24, 2024.
[590] USTR, "Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai's Meeting with Mexico's Secretary of Economy Raquel Buenrostro," February 16, 2024; USTR, "Readout of United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai's Meeting with Mexican Secretary of Economy Raquel Buenrostro," May 22, 2024.

September 29, 2023.[591] HLED mid-year reviews discuss key developments and accomplishments within the framework of four pillars: (1) strengthening regional supply chains, (2) promoting socioeconomic development in southern Mexico and Central America, (3) strengthening cooperation to mitigate cybersecurity risks, and (4) advancing workforce development. Some of the 2024 accomplishments highlighted by attending representatives included coordination on a joint semiconductor supply chain action plan, which details improving the investment climate and advancing semiconductor workforce development in Mexico. The officials also highlighted success promoting social and economic development in southern Mexico and northern Central America by leveraging various programs provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development.[592]

Developments Under the USMCA

As discussed in the "USMCA Dispute Settlement" section in chapter 5, the United States initiated the USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism 13 times against various Mexican facilities regarding the denial of labor rights in 2024. The United States also requested the establishment of five USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism dispute settlement panels in 2024.[593]

On July 20, 2022, the United States requested consultations with Mexico under the USMCA, pertaining to certain measures by Mexico that undermine U.S. companies and U.S.-produced energy in favor of Mexico's state-owned electrical utility, the Comisión Federal de Electricidad, and state-owned oil and gas company, Petróleos Mexicanos. As of December 31, 2024, the United States and Mexico continued to consult on this issue.[594]

A USMCA dispute involving genetically engineered (GE) corn was concluded in December 2024, finding that Mexico's measures were inconsistent with the USMCA.[595] Since 2020, Mexico has issued decrees phasing out glyphosate and glyphosate-containing products such as GE corn by early 2024.[596] In addition, Mexico has rejected or not provided a decision on 37 applications for cultivation of GE cotton since

[591] USTR, "2024 U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue Mid-Year Review," April 19, 2024. The HLED was relaunched in 2021 to advance shared priorities between the United States and Mexico by leveraging their strong economic integration to support economic development and reduce inequality throughout North America.
[592] USTR, "2024 U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue Mid-Year Review Fact Sheet," April 19, 2024.
[593] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 52.
[594] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 52.
[595] USTR, *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*, March 3, 2025, 96–97; Bi-National Review Panel, *Mexico—Measures Concerning Genetically Engineered Corn*, December 20, 2024.
[596] In February 2023, the deadline for phasing out glyphosate and glyphosate-containing products was extended from January 31, 2024, to March 31, 2024. Despite the phaseout period, the Mexican government has also prohibited the use of herbicide glyphosate in any programs sponsored by the government and implemented import quotas for glyphosate and glyphosate-containing products since 2021. Government of Mexico, *Decree to Replace Glyphosate (the Corn Law)*, December 31, 2020; *Decree Establishing Various Actions Regarding Glyphosate*, February 13, 2023. For more information on U.S.-Mexico engagement regarding GE corn, see USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 131; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2022*, December 2023, 183–84.

2019.[597] Three applications for the cultivation of GE cotton were submitted in 2023, but as of December 31, 2024, the Mexican government had not made a decision on these applications.[598]

China

Major developments in 2024 included the completion of the four-year review of section 301 tariffs, imposition of new U.S. export controls, restrictions on U.S. investment in sensitive technology sectors in China, and negotiations of critical mineral agreements to counteract China, as well as measures taken by the United States to prohibit the importation of goods produced by forced or convict labor in China's Xinjiang region.

Four-Year Review on Section 301 Investigations

In 2018, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) completed a section 301 investigation determining that China's acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation were unreasonable or discriminatory and burdened or restricted U.S. commerce. As a result, the United States imposed tariffs on imports from China.[599] In May 2022, USTR commenced the statutory four-year review process, followed by extensive meetings through 2023 and early 2024 to review comments and input. On May 14, 2024, USTR concluded its review, opting to maintain the existing tariffs and implement tariff increases on certain Chinese products in strategic sectors, including electric vehicles, solar cells, and medical products.[600] On September 13, 2024, USTR announced that the United States had finalized tariff increases to strengthen the actions to protect U.S. businesses and workers from China's unfair trade practices.[601] In 2024, USTR also initiated two new section 301 investigations into China, focusing on the semiconductor industry and the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors. For more information on the section 301 investigations, please see "Section 301 Investigations" in chapter 2.

U.S. Export Controls

In 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) implemented a series of targeted updates to its export controls that aimed to restrict China's ability to access certain technologies used in military applications.[602] In September 2024, BIS issued a new interim final rule imposing new export controls on quantum computing items that U.S. adversaries can use for military

---

[597] USDA, FAS, "Agricultural Biotechnology Annual," November 20, 2023, 2.
[598] USTR, *2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers*, March 31, 2025, 265. In 2021, 2022, and 2024, no applications were submitted.
[599] USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 150–51.
[600] USTR, "USTR to Take Further Action on China Tariffs," May 14, 2024.
[601] USTR, "USTR Finalizes Action on China Tariffs Following Statutory Four-Year Review," September 13, 2024.
[602] For more information on the export controls, see chapter 6, USITC, *The Year in Trade 2022*, December 2023, 187–88.

applications.[603] For an overview of U.S. export control laws, please see "National Security Investigations" in chapter 2.

In December 2024, BIS announced a package of rules designed to further limit China's capability to produce semiconductors that can be used in the next generation of advanced weapon systems and in AI and advanced computing, which have significant military applications.[604] The rules include new controls on 24 types of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and three types of software tools for developing or producing semiconductors; new controls on high-bandwidth memory; new guidance to address compliance and diversion concerns; 140 Export Administration Regulations Entity List additions and 14 modifications spanning tool manufacturers, semiconductor fabs, and investment companies in China involved in advancing China's military modernization;[605] and several regulatory changes to enhance the effectiveness of previous controls.[606]

Critical Mineral Agreement Negotiations

In 2024, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) expressed strong opposition to the U.S. initiatives to negotiate critical minerals agreements.[607] During 2023, the United States signed a critical minerals agreement with Japan and initiated negotiations with the EU and the UK to strengthen electric vehicle (EV) supply chains and ensure that EU-extracted or -processed critical minerals qualify for clean

[603] USDOC, BIS, "Department of Commerce Implements Controls on Quantum Computing and Other Advanced Technologies Alongside International Partners," September 5, 2024.

[604] In October 2022, BIS published an interim final rule to restrict the China's ability to both purchase and manufacture certain high-end semiconductors critical for military applications. As part of BIS's commitment to continually evaluating the effectiveness of export controls, it released updated rules in October 2023 and April 2024. The rules released in December 2024 built on those efforts. USDOC, BIS, Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items, 89 Fed. Reg. 96790, December 5, 2024; USDOC, BIS, "Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; Removals from the Validated End-User," December 5, 2024.

[605] The entity list under the Export Administration Regulations is a list of names of certain foreign persons—including businesses, research institutions, government and private organizations, individuals, and other types of legal persons—that are subject to specific license requirements for the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) of specified items. USDOC, BIS, "CBC FAQs-1. What Is the Entity List?," accessed June 26, 2025. USDOC, BIS, "The Entity List," accessed June 21, 2025. USDOC, BIS, "Additions to the Entity List," March 28, 2025.

[606] Beyond the export-control package announced in December 2024, BIS introduced additional measures in January 2025 to further restrict exports of advanced computing semiconductors. These actions aim to strengthen foundry due diligence and prevent diversion to China. Key measures include imposing a broader license requirement for foundries and packaging companies seeking to export certain advanced chips, mandating enhanced reporting to catch risky customers or potential diversions, and adding 16 more entities to the Export Administration Regulations Entity List; these include companies involved in semiconductor and AI development that are believed to be acting on behalf of the Chinese government to advance China's objective of achieving indigenous production of advanced chips. USDOC, BIS, "Commerce Strengthens Restrictions on Advanced Computing Semiconductors to Enhance Foundry Due Diligence and Prevent Diversion to PRC," January 15, 2025; USDOC, BIS, "Commerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China's Capability to Produce Advanced Semiconductors for Military Applications," December 2, 2024.

[607] Government of China, MOFCOM, "Ministry of Commerce Holds Regular Press Conference (December 5, 2024)," December 6, 2024.

vehicle tax credits under the Inflation Reduction Act.[608] In expressing opposition to the U.S. initiatives, MOFCOM has characterized them as discriminatory, disruptive of global competition, and in violation of WTO principles.[609] In March 2024, China filed a WTO dispute against the United States, challenging Inflation Reduction Act provisions that disqualify EV buyers from tax credits when battery components or critical minerals are sourced from certain countries, including China.[610]

China also imposed a series of stringent export controls on critical minerals vital to high-tech industries, often citing national security concerns.[611] Starting in August 2023, it restricted exports of gallium and germanium,[612] key to semiconductor manufacturing, followed in October by graphite, essential for EV battery production.[613] In December 2023, China banned the export of rare earth processing technologies, crucial for making magnets used in EVs, wind turbines, and electronics.[614] In August 2024, China imposed new controls on antimony and related elements, a critical mineral for defense, energy, and electronics.[615] In December 2024, China expanded the export controls by also banning exports of gallium, germanium, and antimony to the United States.[616]

Enforcing the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act

The United States continued enforcing the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), which took effect on June 21, 2022.[617] On July 9, 2024, the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) published a second update to the UFLPA Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People's Republic of China, which was initially issued in June

[608] For more information on critical minerals agreement negotiations with Japan, see chapter 6, Critical Minerals Agreement Negotiations, USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 144–45, 156; USTR, "Readout of Meeting with United Kingdom Secretary of State for Business and Trade," October 28, 2023. For more information on critical minerals agreement negotiations with the UK, see the "United Kingdom" section later in this chapter. USTR, "United States and Japan Sign Critical Minerals Agreement," March 28, 2023; Nikander, "The EU's Position on a Critical Minerals Agreement with the U.S.," June 26, 2023.
[609] Government of China, MOFCOM, "Ministry of Commerce Holds Regular Press Conference (December 5, 2024)," December 6, 2024.
[610] WTO, "China Initiates Dispute Regarding US Tax Credits," accessed April 18, 2025. For more information on the dispute China initiated against the United States at the WTO challenging provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act, please see the dispute settlement body section in chapter 3.
[611] Resilinc, "China's Export Restrictions on Germanium and Gallium," August 15, 2023.
[612] *Global Times*, "Chinese Commerce Ministry Approves Exports of Gallium, Germanium," accessed April 18, 2025.
[613] Reuters, "China Curbs Graphite Exports in Latest Critical Minerals Squeeze," accessed April 18, 2025.
[614] Reuters, "China Bans Export of Rare Earths Processing Tech," December 22, 2023.
[615] Reuters, "China to Limit Antimony Exports," August 16, 2024.
[616] The previous export controls covered exports to all destinations. Reuters, "China Bans Export of Critical Minerals," accessed April 18, 2025.
[617] The U.S. government estimated that since April 2017, the Chinese government has detained more than 1 million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Hui, and members of other Muslim groups, as well as some Christians. UFLPA, Pub. L. No. 117-78, 135 Stat. 1525); CBP, "Implementing the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act," January 28, 2025; UFLPA, Pub. L. No. 117-78, 135 Stat. 1525, 1529 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6901 note); USDOS, Addendum to July 2021 Advisory Exposure to Entities, September 26, 2023, 2.

2022.[618] The strategy highlights a significantly expanded UFLPA Entity List, from the initial 20 entities named in the 2022 Strategy to 107 entities by November 2024.[619] The FLETF has also identified new high-priority sectors for enforcement—polyvinyl chloride, aluminum, and seafood—to inform the trade community of supply chains that involve a higher risk of forced labor from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Since implementation of the UFLPA's rebuttable presumption, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has examined more than 10,144 shipments, valued at more than $3.59 billion by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2024, to ensure that goods made with forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are not entering the United States.[620] In FY 2024, the United States denied 1,977 shipments—valued at $240 million—entry into the country under the UFLPA.[621] Of these prohibited shipments, 13 percent—valued at $29.7 million—listed China as the country of origin.[622]

Restrictions on Inbound and Outbound Investments

Following the Executive Order issued on August 9, 2023, titled Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern (Outbound Order),[623] the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) released the final rule on October 28, 2024, imposing investment restrictions targeting China, including Hong Kong and Macau.[624] Effective January 2, 2025, the Final Outbound Investment Rule prohibits certain outbound investments by U.S. persons in Chinese and China-related companies focused on semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum computing and information technologies, and AI. It also requires U.S. persons to notify Treasury of other types of outbound investment in Chinese companies operating in these sectors.[625]

---

[618] For further discussion of the UFLPA and the FLETF, see USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 151; USTR, "Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force Publishes Updated . . . Strategy," August 1, 2023.

[619] Wilson Dozier and Kahlon, "Department of Homeland Security Updates UFLPA Entity List," December 3, 2024; USDHS, "UFLPA Entity List," accessed April 29, 2025.

[620] A rebuttable presumption means that it is assumed the goods were made with forced labor and are therefore banned from entering the United States unless the importer can provide strong, clear evidence to prove otherwise and convince U.S. Customs and Border Protection that the goods were not made with forced labor or that the law does not apply to them. CBP, "Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Statistics," accessed April 19, 2025.

[621] CBP, "Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Statistics," accessed August 15, 2025.

[622] CBP, "Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Statistics," accessed August 15, 2025.

[623] On August 9, 2023, the President issued the Outbound Order declaring a national emergency to address the threat to the United States posed by certain countries of concern, which seek to develop and exploit sensitive or advanced technologies or products critical for military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities. EOP, Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern, 88 Fed. Reg. 54867 (August 11, 2023).

[624] Treasury, OIS, Provisions Pertaining to U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern, 89 Fed. Reg. 90398 (November 15, 2024); Treasury, "Outbound Investment Security Program," February 8, 2025.

[625] Treasury, OIS, Provisions Pertaining to U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern, 89 Fed. Reg. 90398 (November 15, 2024); Treasury, "Outbound Investment Security Program," February 8, 2025; Clark et al., "Treasury Publishes Final Outbound Investment Restrictions with Focus on Tech Sector and China," accessed April 19, 2025.

Concerned that short video platform TikTok poses a significant national security threat to the United States because it collects Americans' data and has the potential to spread disinformation, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a data privacy bill on March 13, 2024, requiring ByteDance, the Chinese owner of TikTok, to divest from the platform within six months. The measure was later incorporated into a larger foreign aid package and passed by the Senate on April 23, 2024.[626] On April 24, 2024, the President signed the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA) into law. This law mandated that ByteDance, TikTok's Chinese parent company, divest its U.S. operations within 270 days or face a nationwide ban. TikTok expressed strong opposition to the legislation, asserting that it would harm businesses and infringe on free expression for millions of Americans. In 2024, the company also indicated plans to challenge the law in court, citing constitutional concerns.[627] Under PAFACA, a 90-day extension is possible when a path to qualified divestiture has been identified, substantial progress toward execution is evident, and legally binding agreements are in place to facilitate the divestiture.[628]

United Kingdom

The Atlantic Declaration continued to be the primary coordination mechanism between the United States and the UK on trade-related issues. Along with a U.S.-UK summit in May 2024, the United States and the UK took several steps in 2024 to fulfill commitments made in the declaration. These included the second U.S.-UK Strategic Sanctions Dialogue, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on AI Safety, and the Strategic Dialogue on Biological Security. The UK also continued to engage with individual U.S. state governments on trade matters.

The Atlantic Declaration

In June 2023, the United States and the UK issued the Atlantic Declaration for a Twenty-First Century U.S.-UK Economic Partnership (Atlantic Declaration).[629] The declaration outlines a partnership of U.S.-UK cooperation on several economic challenges, including strengthening critical technology supply chains,

[626] PAFACA of 2024, Pub. L. No. 118–50, 138 Stat. 895, 960; Smalley, "Bills Targeting Data Brokers and TikTok Approved," accessed April 19, 2025; Tech Policy Press, "Tracker Detail, Protecting Americans From Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act—H.R. 7521," accessed August 15, 2025.
[627] The U.S. Supreme Court upheld PAFACA and required ByteDance, the TikTok app's Chinese parent company, to divest its interest in TikTok by January 19, 2025, or face a nationwide ban. Getahun, "TikTok Leaders Are Pretty Surprised," accessed April 19, 2025. Holland & Knight, "U.S. Supreme Court Upholds TikTok Sale-or-Ban Law," January 17, 2025.
[628] TikTok ceased operations in the United States on January 18, 2025, and was removed from app stores. However, upon taking office, President Trump issued an executive order delaying enforcement of the ban by 75 days, later extending it by another 75 days to June 19, 2025, to allow time for a potential sale. On June 19, 2025, President Trump issued another executive order postponing enforcement of the ban until September 17, 2025. Feiner, "Trump's Plans to Save TikTok May Fail," March 24, 2025; PAFACA of 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-50, 138 Stat. 956; EOP, Further Extending the TikTok Enforcement Delay, 90 Fed. Reg. 26913 (June 19, 2025).
[629] Government of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister's Office, DBT, "UK and US Launch First-of-Its Kind Economic Partnership," June 8, 2023.

enhancing cooperation on data and technological development, and developing new opportunities for investment.[630]

On April 1, 2024, the United States and the UK signed an MOU on AI Safety, following through on commitments made at the 2023 AI Safety Summit.[631] Under the MOU, the United States and the UK laid out plans on building a common, collaborative approach to AI safety testing through sharing capabilities, expertise, and personnel between the two governments to ensure the risks associated with AI development can be handled effectively.[632]

On May 21, 2024, U.S. and UK officials met to discuss progress and next steps on fulfilling key objectives under the Atlantic Declaration. Officials reviewed 2024 accomplishments such as the launch of a Strategic Dialogue on Biological Security, the second U.S.-UK Sanctions Dialogue, and the signing of an MOU on AI Safety. U.S. and UK officials also discussed future goals, such as promoting growth in critical and emerging technologies, enhancing information sharing on tech-related risks and opportunities, building resilient clean energy supply chains, and investing in infrastructure in developing markets.[633]

Engagement Between U.S. States and the UK Government

In 2024, the UK government remained engaged with individual U.S. state governments to pursue state-level MOUs on issues concerning trade and economic development. Since 2022, the UK has sought to address trade barriers with the United States through these bilateral trade and investment relationships with individual state governments.[634] The UK government signed one new MOU with Texas and attended three working group meetings with state officials from North Carolina, Indiana, and Florida in 2024, fewer than the four MOUs signed and five working group meetings attended in 2023.[635]

---

[630] White House, "The Atlantic Declaration: A Framework for a Twenty-First Century U.S.-UK Economic Partnership," June 8, 2023.

[631] As part of the Atlantic Declaration, in November 2023 the UK government hosted the AI Safety Summit, bringing together international governments, AI companies, and civil society groups to discuss coordinated action on the risks of AI. Shortly after, the U.S. and UK governments created their respective AI Safety Institutes, which facilitate progress on the commitments and objectives outlined in the MOU.

[632] Government of the United Kingdom, "Collaboration on the Safety of AI," April 2, 2024; USDOC, "U.S. and UK Announce Partnership on Science of AI Safety," April 1, 2024.

[633] Government of the United Kingdom, "Atlantic Declaration Action Plan," May 22, 2024.

[634] Government of the United Kingdom, DBT, "UK MOUs with US States on Economic Cooperation and Trade Relations," March 14, 2024; Broadbent and Bongongo, "An Innovative Trade Strategy-U.S. States Strike Individual MoU's with the U.K. Government," accessed May 17, 2024.

[635] Officials at the working group meetings typically discussed past progress under their bilateral MOUs and worked on identifying future opportunities for growth, particularly in government procurement and bilateral trade and investment goals. Government of the United Kingdom, DBT, "UK Signs Trade Pact with Second Biggest US State—Texas," March 13, 2024; Government of the United Kingdom, "UK and State of North Carolina Hold Third Working Group Meeting," February 6, 2024; Government of the United Kingdom, "UK and the State of Indiana Hold Second Working Group Meeting," March 26, 2024; Government of the United Kingdom, "UK and Florida Hold Inaugural Working Group Meeting," May 7, 2024; USITC, *The Year in Trade 2023*, September 2024, 154–55.

On March 13, 2024, the UK and the Texas state government signed a Statement of Mutual Cooperation. Similar to the MOUs the UK has signed with other U.S. states, the statement seeks to boost bilateral trade and investment between the two economies by tackling barriers affecting UK and Texas firms, particularly in energy, the life sciences, and professional business services. As of year-end 2024, Texas was the eighth, and largest, U.S. state to sign a trade MOU with the UK.[636]

Other Developments in 2024

On September 9, 2024, the United States, the UK, and Australia signed an MOU to establish the U.S.-UK-Australia Supply Chain Resilience Cooperation Group, which aims to strengthen strategic collaboration in addressing risks to critical supply chains. The three governments agreed to cooperate on data sharing and joint action to build resilience in priority supply chains. This includes developing and launching an early-warning pilot focused on identifying and monitoring potential disruptions and risks to the telecommunications supply chain, thereby creating trilateral communications channels to share relevant information and facilitating cooperative responses to disruptions.[637]

On April 16, 2024, the United States and the UK held the eighth U.S.-UK SME Dialogue to discuss how the two governments can continue supporting SME participation in trade to expand bilateral trade and investment.[638] Government officials and over 85 U.S. and UK SMEs and business organizations in attendance discussed opportunities for SMEs in the creative industries, how SMEs can leverage the digital economy, improving SME access to finance, and trade barriers that U.S. and UK SMEs face. Additionally, the U.S. and UK Intellectual Property Toolkits were announced during the dialogue, providing U.S. and UK SMEs with guidance on how to protect their intellectual property within the other country.[639]

---

[636] Government of the United Kingdom, DBT, "UK Signs Trade Pact with Second Biggest US State—Texas," March 13, 2024.
[637] Government of the United Kingdom, DBT, "UK, US and Australia Sign Supply Chain Resilience Pact," September 11, 2024.
[638] USTR, "8th United States-United Kingdom Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise Dialogue in Belfast," April 16, 2024.
[639] Government of the United Kingdom, "Statement on the UK-U.S. SME Dialogues," April 17, 2024.

Bibliography

Addendum to Decision No. 5 of the Free Trade Commission of the CUSMA, T-MEC, and USMCA ('The Agreement'), May 22, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Addendum%20to%20USMCA%20FTC%20Decison%20No.%205.pdf.

Aiyar, Shekhar, Jiaqian Chen, Christian Ebeke, Roberto Garcia-Saltos, Tryggvi Gudmundsson, Anna Illyina, et al. "Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism." International Monetary Fund. Staff Discussion Notes No. SDN/2023/001, January 2023. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2023/01/11/Geo-Economic-Fragmentation-and-the-Future-of-Multilateralism-527266.

Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP). Summary Report on the Americas Partnership Public-Private Dialogue on Trade Facilitation. 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Compendium_Americas%20Partnership%20TF%20Dialogue%20-%202024.pdf.

An Act Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2024, and for Other Purposes. Pub. L. No. 118–50, 138 Stat. 895. 2024. https://www.govinfo.gov/bulkdata/PLAW/118/public/PLAW-118publ50.xml.

Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2799aa–2. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2010-title22/html/USCODE-2010-title22-chap39.htm.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). "About APEC." January 1, 2024. https://www.apec.org/about-us/about-apec.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). "APEC Peru 2024 Priorities Page." Accessed March 21, 2025. https://www.apec.org/2024-peru-priorities.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). "APEC Project Funding Sources." April 2025. https://www.apec.org/projects/funding-sources.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). "APEC Putrajaya Vision 2040." October 2023. https://www.apec.org/about-us/about-apec/apec-putrajaya-vision-2040.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). "APEC Secretariat." Accessed March 21, 2025. https://www.apec.org/about-us/apec-secretariat.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). "APEC: Overview." March 2022. https://www.apec.org/projects/projects-overview.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). "Capacity Building Needs Initiative." May 2025. https://www.apec.org/groups/committee-on-trade-and-investment/cti/cbni.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). "FTA/RTA Information Sharing." March 2025. https://www.apec.org/groups/committee-on-trade-and-investment/cti/info.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “How APEC Operates.” October 2023. https://www.apec.org/about-us/how-apec-operates.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Korea Sets Ambitious Priorities for APEC 2025: Building a Sustainable Tomorrow.” News release, December 17, 2024. https://www.apec.org/press/news-releases/2024/korea-sets-ambitious-priorities-for-apec-2025--building-a-sustainable-tomorrow.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Leaders in Focus: APEC 2024 and Inclusive Growth.” News release, December 9, 2025. https://www.apec.org/press/news-releases/2024/leaders-in-focus--apec-2024-and-inclusive-growth.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Working Level.” October 2023. https://www.apec.org/about-us/how-apec-operates/working-level.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 2024 APEC Leaders’ Machu Picchu Declaration. November 16, 2025. https://www.apec.org/meeting-papers/leaders-declarations/2024/2024-apec-leaders'-machu-picchu-declaration.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). *APEC Committee on Trade and Investment 2024: Annual Report to Ministers*. November 2024. https://www.apec.org/docs/default-source/publications/2024/11/224_cti_annual-report-to-ministers.pdf?sfvrsn=d18d7f13_1.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Ichma Statement on A New Look at the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific Agenda. Leaders’ Declarations, November 16, 2024. https://www.apec.org/meeting-papers/leaders-declarations/2024/2024-apec-leaders'-machu-picchu-declaration/ichma-statement-on-a-new-look-at-the--free-trade-area-of-the-asia-pacific-agenda.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Lima Roadmap to Promote the Transition to the Formal and Global Economies (2025–2040). Leaders’ Declarations, November 16, 2024. https://www.apec.org/meeting-papers/leaders-declarations/2024/2024-apec-leaders'-machu-picchu-declaration/lima-roadmap-to-promote-the-transition-to-the-formal-and-global-economies-(2025-2040).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). *Phase Three of Supply-Chain Connectivity Framework Action Plan 2022-2026 (Endorsed, 23 August 2022)*. Third Committee on Trade and Investment Meeting, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Publication No. 2022/SOM3/CTI/012. August 27, 2022. https://mddb.apec.org/Documents/2022/CTI/CTI3/22_cti3_012.pdf.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). San Francisco Principles on Integrating Inclusivity and Sustainability into Trade and Investment Policy. Leaders’ Declarations, November 17, 2023. https://www.apec.org/meeting-papers/leaders-declarations/2023/2023-leaders-declaration/san-francisco-principles-on-integrating-inclusivity-and-sustainability-into-trade-and-investment-policy.

Bi-National Review Panel. *Mexico—Measures Concerning Genetically Engineered Corn*. Report No. Mex-USA-2023-31-01. December 20, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Final%20Report%20ENG.pdf.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board). “Foreign Exchange Rates—H-10.” Accessed May 6, 2025. https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/.

Broadbent, Meredith, and Joyce Bongongo. “An Innovative Trade Strategy- U.S. States Strike Individual MoU’s with the U.K. Government.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. Accessed May 17, 2024. https://www.csis.org/programs/scholl-chair-international-business/projects/innovative-trade-strategy-us-states-strike.

Canada-Mexico-United States Secretariat (USMCA Secretariat). “Publications.” Accessed April 14, 2025. https://can-mex-usa-sec.org/secretariat/report-rapport-reporte.aspx?lang=eng.

Canada-Mexico-United States Secretariat (USMCA Secretariat). “Trade Agreements Secretariat E-Filing System.” Accessed April 14, 2025. https://itatasb2c.b2clogin.com/273317c2-6fdc-4d1f-8000-6d9fc6ca17a3/b2c_1_tasportalapp/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?client_id=380dcc7e-7e25-4594-90d9-ca2efc305ba3&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Ftasefiling.powerappsportals.us%2Fsignin-aad-b2c_1&response_type=code%20id_token&scope=openid&state=OpenIdConnect.AuthenticationProperties%3DerQw3vTvnoUzcBWWGphUK41u8MoRgXIwwnwcAAV2LSqFEmlKTXb_JB_6Am6DPAP1Bi6RHYNfqkk5fSCNLjAlAlHbT_oWrBnoSi2UrHqs0E9tA9iwce_qg9F4fUYX-iXq2u0QQiv9sLjQeq9MjhyQPMvGA1oyVBqzop51B8VOvOMDRq7835GnjvsN7nIyJ6UZPCFUjYwD78jUCpKMvq7z2dDN2lDZkoTB82Z2YFDEpHIQK9C2viom597UPVjfAYVAaUkjhxzyBmpjDCTiv-_3XG_cylqrjMwyFkBZwOrP7k0eQAaWJqD_6kpA-v4RoP935uy6l5QpdCIERT6Yn-dA3jfPPnMoUW7xUE1inB7vCso-VEDp9yLI1YzbLu94hcb8TushOJimOwtkZBaUWuvSX29ySzqBKRu0dg3cSTlZuAovfWBHb4vJFVB4lKKhrGoLKJ5_6fxVl9wHBJ9aEzsrZPDA9-a6KcwATGnQcF9nnbe8CMxjJ9cqYqLk0rXUIoiGBSInoeSZIv2yOoNDY5SX3EzRZSeaZ51wc10pXz8vctGEtT6dF4ennExAYYrlotYGAaOIiU2OAPwI-4h33oSpPUXTovZO04DRXNRD7CGn6idE1Lz6o94ecjXcV7tD8KPv&response_mode=form_post&nonce=638856956293897713.OGYwMTQ4MjMtZjRkYy00NjhkLWFhZDYtZjQxZWQ3Yjk3ZGExN2VhYmRkYmMtNGZmNC00YzZiLTlkYTQtMzNkNGFiYjA4YjMx&ui_locales=en-US&x-client-SKU=ID_NET472&x-client-ver=6.35.0.0.

Cannistra, Daniel, and Ivy Xun. “Commerce Publishes Final Amendments on Trade Remedy Regulations.” Crowell and Moring, January 6, 2025. https://www.cmtradelaw.com/2025/01/commerce-publishes-final-amendments-on-trade-remedy-regulations/.

Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2707. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2023-title19/html/USCODE-2023-title19-chap15.htm.

Caribbean Community (CARICOM). “Who We Are—CARICOM.” Accessed May 28, 2025. https://caricom.org/our-community/who-we-are/.

Clark, Harry, Jeanine P. McGuinness, Elizabeth Zane, Gregory Hume, and Evgeniya Shakina. “Treasury Publishes Final Outbound Investment Restrictions with Focus on Tech Sector and China.” Orrick, Herrington, and Sutcliffe, accessed April 19, 2025. https://www.orrick.com/en/Insights/2024/11/Treasury-Publishes-Final-Outbound-Investment-Restrictions-With-Focus-on-Tech-Sector-and-China?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

Congressional Research Service (CRS). "Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): FAQ." Legislation. Accessed July 22, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11232.

Congressional Research Service (CRS). *The U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018*. Report No. R46814. June 7, 2021. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46814.

Determinations and Ongoing Monitoring: Investigations Concerning Vietnam's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Illegal Timber. 86 Fed. Reg. 55681. October 6, 2021. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2021-10-06/2021-21809.

Durham, Mary Park. "Where Is the U.S. Dollar Headed in 2025?" *JP Morgan Asset Management—On the Minds of Investors*. January 3, 2025. https://am.jpmorgan.com/us/en/asset-management/adv/insights/market-insights/market-updates/on-the-minds-of-investors/where-is-the-us-dollar-headed-in-2025/.

European Commission (EC). "Commission Launches First Investigation under EU International Procurement Instrument." Press release, April 23, 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2044.

European Commission (EC). "Commission to Assess next Steps for Tackling Discrimination in China's Public Procurement market for Medical Devices." Press release, January 13, 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_252.

European Commission (EC). "EU Imposes Duties on Unfairly Subsidised Electric Vehicles from China While Discussions on Price Undertakings Continue." Press release, October 28, 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5589.

European Commission (EC). "EU-US Hold Fourth Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue." Press release, April 10, 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1952.

European Commission (EC). "EU-US Trade and Technology Council." Accessed April 1, 2025. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-us-trade-and-technology-council_en.

European Commission (EC). "Trade and Economic Security: China." May 21, 2025. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en.

European Commission (EC). "What is eInvoicing." Accessed August 29, 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-building-blocks/sites/spaces/DIGITAL/pages/467108851/What%2Bis%2BeInvoicing.

European Commission (EC). *A New European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU Readiness through a Responsive and Resilient European Defence Industry*. March 5, 2024. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/643c4a00-0da9-4768-83cd-a5628f5c3063_en?filename=EDIS%20Joint%20Communication.pdf.

European Commission (EC). EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council. *Report on the Workshop on the Promotion of Good Quality Jobs for a Successful, Just and Inclusive Green Economy*. January 30, 2024. https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/en/EU-US-TTC/posts/report-workshop-promotion-good-quality-jobs-successful-just-and-inclusive-green-economy-30-jan-2024.

European Union (EU). Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2022 on the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union's public procurement and concession markets and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the public procurement and concession markets of third countries (International Procurement Instrument—IPI) (Text with EEA relevance). June 23, 2022. https://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1031/oj/eng.

Executive Office of the President (EOP). Actions by the United States Related to the Statutory 4-Year Review of the Section 301 Investigation of China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation. 89 Fed. Reg. 44541. May 20, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/05/20/2024-11193/actions-by-the-united-states-related-to-the-statutory-4-year-review-of-the-section-301-investigation.

Executive Office of the President (EOP). Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern. 88 Fed. Reg. 54867. August 11, 2023. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/11/2023-17449/addressing-united-states-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in.

Executive Office of the President (EOP). Assignment of Certain Functions Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 70 Fed. Reg. 43251. July 21, 2005. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2005-07-26/05-14889.

Executive Office of the President (EOP). Executive Order 11846—Administration of the Trade Agreements Program. 40 Fed. Reg. 14291. March 27, 1975. https://www.federalregister.gov/executive-order/11846.

Executive Office of the President (EOP). Executive Order 14310—Further Extending the TikTok Enforcement Delay. 90 Fed. Red. 26913. June 19, 2025. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/24/2025-11682/further-extending-the-tiktok-enforcement-delay.

Executive Office of the President (EOP). Proclamation 10133—To Continue Facilitating Positive Adjustment to Competition From Imports of Large Residential Washers. 86 Fed. Reg. 6541. January 14, 2021. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2021-01-21/2021-01466.

Executive Office of the President (EOP). Proclamation 10339—To Continue Facilitating Positive Adjustment to Competition From Imports of Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (Whether or Not Partially or Fully Assembled Into Other Products). 87 Fed. Reg. 7357. February 9, 2022. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/02/09/2022-02906/to-continue-facilitating-positive-adjustment-to-competition-from-imports-of-certain-crystalline.

Executive Office of the President (EOP). Proclamation 10779—To Further Facilitate Positive Adjustment to Competition From Imports of Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (Whether or Not Partially or Fully Assembled Into Other Products). 89 Fed. Reg. 53333. June 26, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/06/26/2024-14143/to-further-facilitate-positive-adjustment-to-competition-from-imports-of-certain-crystalline-silicon.

Executive Office of the President (EOP). Proclamation 10790—To Further Facilitate Positive Adjustment to Competition From Imports of Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (Whether or Not Partially for Fully Assembled Into Other Products). 89 Fed. Reg. 66181. August 15, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/15/2024-18444/to-further-facilitate-positive-adjustment-to-competition-from-imports-of-certain-crystalline-silicon.

Executive Office of the President (EOP). Proclamation 10857—To Facilitate Adjustment to Competition From Imports of Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber. 89 Fed. Reg. 92015. November 8, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/20/R1-2024-26714/to-facilitate-positive-adjustment-to-competition-from-imports-of-fine-denier-polyester-staple-fiber.

Executive Office of the President (EOP). Proclamation 9693—To Facilitate Positive Adjustment to Competition From Imports of Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (Whether or Not Partially or Fully Assembled Into Other Products) and for Other Purposes. 83 Fed. Reg. 3541. January 25, 2018. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/06/26/2024-14143/to-further-facilitate-positive-adjustment-to-competition-from-imports-of-certain-crystalline-silicon.

Export Control Reform. 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title50/chapter58&edition=prelim.

Extension of Certain Trade Benefits to Sub-Saharan Africa. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3741. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2023-title19/pdf/USCODE-2023-title19-chap23.pdf.

Extension of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. Pub. L. No. 116-164, 134 Stat. 758. 2020. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-116publ164.

EY. “The Latest on BEPS and Beyond - October 2023 Edition.” October 18, 2023. https://www.ey.com/en_gl/technical/tax-alerts/the-latest-on-beps-and-beyond---october-2023-edition.

Facing Fentanyl Inc. Petition for Relief Under Section 301: The People’s Republic of China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Supporting Illicit Fentanyl Trade. October 17, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Facing%20Fentanyl%20301%20Petition_Part1_A_(Narrative)%20(1).pdf.

Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New York Fed). *Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations, October–December 2024*. February 13, 2025. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/news/markets/2024/q4-2024-fx-quarterly-report.

Federal Trade Commission (FTC). "EU-US Hold Fourth Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue." April 11, 2024. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/04/eu-us-hold-fourth-joint-technology-competition-policy-dialogue.

Feiner, Lauren. "Trump's Plans to Save TikTok May Fail to Keep It Online, Democrats Warn." *The Verge*, March 24, 2025. https://www.theverge.com/news/635019/tiktok-ban-deadline-extension-trump-markey-van-hollen-booker.

Getahun, Hannah. "TikTok Leaders Are Pretty Surprised that a Bill to Ban TikTok Is Zooming Through Congress: Report." *Business Insider*, March 10, 2024. https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-leaders-surprised-ban-bill-congress-2024-3.

Global Times (China). "Chinese Commerce Ministry Approves Exports of Gallium, Germanium in Accordance with Law." September 21, 2023. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202309/1298641.shtml.

Goodger, Dave. *WTM Global Travel Report 2024: Leisure Travel Reaches 5.5 Trillion USD with Focus on Emerging Markets and Cost-Effective Experience.* Tourism Analytics, November 8, 2024. https://tourismanalytics.com/2/post/2024/11/wtm-global-travel-report-2024-leisure-travel-reaches-55-trillion-usd-with-focus-on-emerging-markets-and-cost-effective-experience.html.

Government of Canada. "Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada." Global Affairs Canada (GAC), July 25, 2007. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng.

Government of Canada. "Digital Services Tax." September 12, 2024. https://www.canada.ca/en/services/taxes/excise-taxes-duties-and-levies/digital-services-tax.html.

Government of Canada, Department of Finance. "Canada Rescinds Digital Services Tax to Advance Broader Trade Negotiations with the United States." News releases, June 29, 2025. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2025/06/canada-rescinds-digital-services-tax-to-advance-broader-trade-negotiations-with-the-united-states.html.

Government of Canada. Department of Finance. "Digital Services Tax Act." Backgrounders, December 14, 2021. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2021/12/digital-services-tax-act.html.

Government of China. Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). "Ministry of Commerce Holds Regular Press Conference (December 5, 2024)." Accessed April 18, 2025. https://english.mofcom.gov.cn/News/PressConference/art/2024/art_154e2df66a0e424c84307c680986fc47.html.

Government of Mexico. *Decree Establishing the Actions to Be Carried out by the Agencies and Entities That Make up the Federal Public Administration, within the Scope of Their Powers, to Gradually Replace the Use, Acquisition, Distribution, Promotion and Import of the Chemical Substance Called Glyphosate and the Agrochemicals Used in Our Country That Contain It as an Active Ingredient, for Sustainable and Culturally Appropriate Alternatives , Which Allow Production to Be Maintained and Are Safe for Human Health, the Biocultural Diversity of the Country and the Environment.* December 31, 2020. https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5609365&fecha=31/12/2020#gsc.tab=0.

Government of Mexico. *Decreto por que se establecen diversas acciones en materia de glifosato y maíz genéticamente modificado. (Decree establishing various actions regarding glyphosate and genetically modified corn*.) February 13, 2023. https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5679405&fecha=13/02/2023#gsc.tab=0.

Government of Saudi Arabia. “The 8th Saudi-US Trade & Investment Council Meeting to Expand Bilateral Trade and Investment Opportunities.” News. Accessed July 30, 2025. https://gaft.gov.sa/en/media-center/news/pages/tifa2024-2.aspx.

Government of the United Kingdom (UK). “Atlantic Declaration Action Plan.” May 22, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/atlantic-declaration-action-plan.

Government of the United Kingdom (UK). “Collaboration on the Safety of AI: UK-US Memorandum of Understanding.” April 2, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/collaboration-on-the-safety-of-ai-uk-us-memorandum-of-understanding/collaboration-on-the-safety-of-ai-uk-us-memorandum-of-understanding.

Government of the United Kingdom (UK). “Second US-UK Strategic Sanctions Dialogue: Joint Statement.” May 9, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-by-the-us-department-of-state-and-uk-foreign-commonwealth-and-development-office.

Government of the United Kingdom (UK). “Statement on the UK-U.S. SME Dialogues—Northern Ireland.” April 17, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-on-the-uk-us-sme-dialogues-northern-ireland.

Government of the United Kingdom (UK). “UK and Florida Hold Inaugural Working Group Meeting.” May 7, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-florida-hold-inaugural-working-group-meeting.

Government of the United Kingdom (UK). “UK and State of North Carolina Hold Third Working Group Meeting.” February 6, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-state-of-north-carolina-hold-third-working-group-meeting.

Government of the United Kingdom (UK). “UK and the State of Indiana Hold Second Working Group Meeting.” March 26, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-the-state-of-indiana-hold-second-working-group-meeting.

Government of the United Kingdom (UK). Department for Business and Trade (DBT). "UK MOUs with US States on Economic Cooperation and Trade Relations." March 14, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-mous-with-us-states-on-economic-cooperation-and-trade-relations.

Government of the United Kingdom (UK). Department for Business and Trade (DBT). "UK Signs Trade Pact with Second Biggest US State—Texas." Press release, March 13, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-signs-trade-pact-with-second-biggest-us-state-texas.

Government of the United Kingdom (UK). Department for Business and Trade (DBT). "UK, US and Australia Sign Supply Chain Resilience Pact." News release, September 11, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-us-and-australia-sign-supply-chain-resilience-pact.

Government of the United Kingdom (UK). Prime Minister's Office and Department for Business and Trade (DBT). "UK and US Launch First-of-Its Kind Economic Partnership." June 8, 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-us-launch-first-of-its-kind-economic-partnership.

Government of Trinidad and Tobago. Ministry of Trade, Investment and Tourism. "Minister Gopee-Scoon Participates in CARICOM Ministerial Discussions with US Trade Representative." August 3, 2024. https://tradeind.gov.tt/minister-gopee-scoon-participates-in-caricom-ministerial-discussions-with-us-trade-representative/.

Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-171, 124 Stat. 1194. 2010. https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ171/PLAW-111publ171.pdf.

Holland & Knight. "U.S. Supreme Court Upholds TikTok Sale-or-Ban Law." January 17, 2025. https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2025/01/us-supreme-court-upholds-tiktok-sale-or-ban-law.

International Air Transport Association (IATA). "Global Air Passenger Demand Reaches Record High in 2024." Press release, January 30, 2025. https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/2025-releases/2025-01-30-01/.

International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1710, 50 U.S.C. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title50/chapter35&edition=prelim.

International Labour Organization (ILO). "Informal Economy and Atypical Forms of Employment." January 3, 2012. https://www.ilo.org/resource/informal-economy-and-atypical-forms-employment.

International Labour Organization (ILO). *27th Compliance Synthesis Report Under HOPE*. 2024. https://betterwork.org/wp-content/uploads/BWH_27th-Compliance-Synthesis-Report-Under-HOPE-August-2024.pdf.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). "Transcript of World Economic Outlook October 2024 Press Briefing." October 22, 2024. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/10/22/tr102224-weo-transcript.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). IMF DataMapper. World Economic Outlook (April 2025). Inflation rate and average consumer prices: annual percentage change. April 2025. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/AS5/DA.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). *Japan: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Japan*. Country Report No. 25/82. April 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2025/04/01/Japan-2025-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-565846.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database. April 22, 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2025/april.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database. Groups and aggregates information. April 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2025/april/groups-and-aggregates.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). *World Economic Outlook Update: Global Growth: Divergent and Uncertain*. January 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/01/17/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2025.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). *World Economic Outlook, April 2025: A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts*. April 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025.

International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1–130.17. 2024. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-22/chapter-I/subchapter-M/part-120#part-120.

Investigations Related to Bilateral Safeguard Actions, 19 C.F.R. §§ 206.31–206.37. 2025. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-19/chapter-II/subchapter-B/part-206/subpart-D.

Kerriou, Anne. "Containers: 2024 Ranking of the World's Major Ports." Upply, accessed April 28, 2025. https://market-insights.upply.com/en/containers-2024-ranking-of-the-worlds-major-ports.

McMinimy, Mark A. *Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers*. Congressional Research Service. Report No. R40206. August 1, 2016. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R40206.pdf.

Moessner, Richhild, Dora Xia, and Fabrizio Zampolli. "Global Inflation and Global Monetary Policy Tightening: Implications for the Euro Area." *Intereconomics* 58, no. 3 (June 11, 2023): 151–54. https://doi.org/10.2478/ie-2023-0031.

Nandi, Shreya. "IPEF Trade Pillar: India Doubts Benefits Amid SE Asian Scepticism." November 22, 2023. https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/benefits-of-being-part-of-ipef-negotiations-insignificant-say-officials-123112200892_1.html.

Nikander, Christine. "The EU's Position on a Critical Minerals Agreement with the U.S." The E-Waste Column, June 26, 2023. https://www.theewastecolumn.com/database/mineral-security/the-eu-s-position-on-a-critical-minerals-agreement-with-the-u-s.

Northwest Horticultural Council (NHC). “Australia Closes Market to U.S. Cherries Due to Reported Pest Detection.” July 3, 2024. https://nwhort.org/australia-closes-market-to-u-s-cherries-due-to-reported-pest-detection/.

Northwest Horticultural Council (NHC). “Australia to Reopen Market to Pacific Northwest Cherries Starting July 15.” July 10, 2024. https://nwhort.org/australia-to-reopen-market-to-pacific-northwest-cherries-starting-july-15/.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “1st USMCA Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Dialogue.” April 22, 2022. https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/small-business/1st-usmca-small-and-medium-sized-enterprise-dialogue.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “2024 U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue Mid-Year Review Fact Sheet.” April 19, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2024/april/2024-us-mexico-high-level-economic-dialogue-mid-year-review-fact-sheet.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Ambassador Katherine Tai Statement on GAO Report on USMCA Autos Interagency Coordination.” Press release, January 31, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/january/ambassador-katherine-tai-statement-gao-report-usmca-autos-interagency-coordination.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Americas Partnership: Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Trade Track.” Accessed May 15, 2025. https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/western-hemisphere/americas-partnership.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).” Accessed May 26, 2025. https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-basin-initiative-cbi.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Chapter 31 Disputes.” Accessed May 14, 2025. https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/dispute-settlement-proceedings/fta-dispute-settlement/usmca/chapter-31-disputes.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force Publishes Updated Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Strategy.” Press release, August 1, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/august/forced-labor-enforcement-task-force-publishes-updated-uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-strategy.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Free Trade Agreements.” Accessed May 21, 2025. https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Inaugural Meeting of the Trade and Environment Committee of the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Trade Track.” Press release, September 25, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/september/inaugural-meeting-trade-and-environment-committee-americas-partnership-economic-prosperity-trade.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)." Accessed May 12, 2024. https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/indo-pacific-economic-framework-prosperity-ipef.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) Pillar I: Trade." September 2022. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/IPEF%20Pillar%201%20Ministerial%20Text%20(Trade%20Pillar)_FOR%20PUBLIC%20RELEASE%20(1).pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Joint Statement on the 7th United States-Nepal Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Council Meeting." Press release, September 18, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/september/joint-statement-7th-united-states-nepal-trade-and-investment-framework-agreement-council-meeting.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Joint Statement of the First In-Person Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity." Press release, August 2, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/august/joint-statement-first-person-meeting-trade-ministers-americas-partnership-economic-prosperity.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Joint Statement of the First Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity." Press release, Accessed April 15, 2025. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/march/joint-statement-first-meeting-trade-ministers-americas-partnership-economic-prosperity.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Joint Statement of the Sixth United States-Peru FTA Free Trade Commission Meeting." Press release, February 16, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/february/joint-statement-sixth-united-states-peru-fta-free-trade-commission-meeting.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Joint U.S.-U.K. Statement on a Cooperative Framework for Large Civil Aircraft." Press release, June 17, 2021. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/june/joint-us-uk-statement-cooperative-framework-large-civil-aircraft.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Department of Commerce, Small Business Administration, and UK Government Convene the 8th United States-United Kingdom Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise Dialogue in Belfast." Press release, April 16, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/office-us-trade-representative-department-commerce-small-business-administration-and-uk-government.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Readout from U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) Deputies Meeting." Press release, September 16, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/september/readout-us-eu-trade-and-technology-council-ttc-deputies-meeting.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Meeting with Ministers from CARICOM Member States.” Press release, October 21, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/october/readout-ambassador-katherine-tais-meeting-ministers-caricom-member-states.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Meeting with Republic of Korea Trade Minister Cheong Inkyo.” Press release, March 15, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/march/readout-ambassador-katherine-tais-meeting-republic-korea-trade-minister-cheong-inkyo.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of Ambassador Jayme White’s September Meeting with Canada’s Deputy Minister for International Trade Rob Stewart.” Press release, September 21, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/september/readout-ambassador-jayme-whites-meeting-canadas-deputy-minister-international-trade-rob-stewart.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Meeting with United Kingdom Secretary of State for Business and Trade Kemi Badenoch.” Press release, October 28, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/october/readout-ambassador-katherine-tais-meeting-united-kingdom-secretary-state-business-and-trade-kemi.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Meeting with European Commission Executive Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis.” Press release, January 29, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/january/readout-ambassador-katherine-tais-meeting-european-commission-executive-vice-president-valdis.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Meeting with Mexico’s Secretary of Economy Raquel Buenrostro.” Press release, February 16, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/february/readout-ambassador-katherine-tais-meeting-mexicos-secretary-economy-raquel-buenrostro.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of Americas Partnership Council for Trade and Competitiveness Meeting.” Press release, February 15, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/february/readout-americas-partnership-council-trade-and-competitiveness-meeting.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of April Negotiating Round under the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership.” Press release, April 20, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/april/readout-april-negotiating-round-under-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of April 2-12 Negotiating Round Under the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership.” Press release, April 15, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/readout-april-2-12-negotiating-round-under-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of August 5–9 Negotiating Round Under the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership.” Press release, August 9, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/august/readout-august-5-9-negotiating-round-under-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of Crafting the Green Transatlantic Marketplace Stakeholder Event Under the Transatlantic Initiative for Sustainable Trade.” Press release, February 1, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/february/readout-crafting-green-transatlantic-marketplace-stakeholder-event-under-transatlantic-initiative.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of January 29-31 Negotiating Round Under the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership.” Press release, February 6, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/february/readout-january-29-31-negotiating-round-under-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of June 3–7 Negotiating Round Under the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership.” Press release, June 7, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/june/readout-june-3-7-negotiating-round-under-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of Negotiating Round Under the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade.” Press release, May 3, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/readout-negotiating-round-under-us-taiwan-initiative-21st-century-trade.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of Senior Advisor Cara Morrow’s Meeting with Mexico’s Under Secretary of Economy for Foreign Trade Alejandro Encinas.” Press release, January 24, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/january/readout-senior-advisor-cara-morrows-meeting-mexicos-under-secretary-economy-foreign-trade-alejandro.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of September 2024 Negotiating Round Under the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership.” Press release, October 1, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/october/readout-september-2024-negotiating-round-under-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai’s Meeting with Bahrain’s Minister of Industry and Commerce Abdulla Bin Adel Fakhro.” Press release, June 26, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/june/readout-united-states-trade-representative-katherine-tais-meeting-bahrains-minister-industry-and.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Readout of United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai’s Meeting with Mexican Secretary of Economy Raquel Buenrostro.” Press release, May 22, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/readout-united-states-trade-representative-katherine-tais-meeting-mexican-secretary-economy-raquel.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Statement by USTR Spokesperson Adam Hodge on Canada's Digital Services Tax as Described in Canada's Notice of Ways and Means Motion to Introduce an Act to Implement a Digital Services Tax." Press release, December 15, 2021. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/december/statement-ustr-spokesperson-adam-hodge-canadas-digital-services-tax-described-canadas-notice-ways.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tai on Section 301 Petition Relating to Fentanyl and Precursor Chemicals." Press release, December 2, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/december/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-section-301-petition-relating-fentanyl-and-precursor-chemicals.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tai on the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization." Press release, March 3, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/march/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-thirteenth-ministerial-conference-world-trade-organization.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tai on European Union's International Procurement Instrument Investigation." Press release, April 24, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-european-unions-international-procurement-instrument.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tai on European Union Anti-Subsidy Duties on Battery Electric Vehicle Imports from the People's Republic of China." Press release, October 7, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/october/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-european-union-anti-subsidy-duties-battery-electric-vehicle.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Statement from USTR Spokesperson Sam Michel on U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade Signing Ceremony." Press release, June 1, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/june/statement-ustr-spokesperson-sam-michel-us-taiwan-initiative-21st-century-trade-signing-ceremony.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Small Business Administration, and Department of Commerce Convene the Third USMCA Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Dialogue." Press release, May 17, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/office-us-trade-representative-small-business-administration-and-department-commerce-convene-third.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "The United States, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom Announce Extension of Agreement on the Transition from Existing Digital Services Taxes to New Multilateral Solution Agreed by the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework." Press release, February 15, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/february/united-states-austria-france-italy-spain-and-united-kingdom-announce-extension-agreement-transition.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "Trade & Investment Framework Agreements." Accessed March 18, 2024. https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Trade Agreements.” Accessed May 21, 2025. https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “U.S. Formally Accepts WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.” Press release, April 12, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/april/what-they-are-saying-us-formally-accepts-wto-agreement-fisheries-subsidies.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). U.S. Request for RRM Panel - San Martin. August 22, 2023. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/US%20Request%20for%20RRM%20Panel%20-%20San%20Martin.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). U.S. Request for RRM Panel - Atento Servicios 04.15.2024. April 15, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US%20Request%20for%20RRM%20Panel%20-%20Atento%20Servicios%2004.15.2024%20Final.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). U.S. Request for RRM Panel - Minera Camino Rojo Mine. December 12, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Camino%20Rojo%20Panel%20Request%20with%20Communication%20to%20Mex%202024.12.12.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). U.S. Request for RRM Panel - Bader de México. December 18, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Bader%20Panel%20Request%20-%20Final.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). U.S. Request for RRM Panel - Industrias Tecnos. December 18, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Bader%20Panel%20Request%20-%20Final.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). U.S. Request for RRM Panel - Pirelli Neumáticos. December 18, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Pirelli%20Panel%20Request%20-%20Final.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai to Take Further Action on China Tariffs After Releasing Statutory Four-Year Review.” May 14, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/us-trade-representative-katherine-tai-take-further-action-china-tariffs-after-releasing-statutory.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “U.S.-EU Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council.” Press release, April 8, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/us-eu-joint-statement-trade-and-technology-council.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade: Negotiating Mandate.” August 17, 2022. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/US-Taiwan%20Negotiating%20Mandate%20(Final).pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States and Taiwan Announce the Launch of the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade.” Press release, June 1, 2022. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/june/united-states-and-taiwan-announce-launch-us-taiwan-initiative-21st-century-trade.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Kenya Announce the Launch of the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership." Press release, July 14, 2022. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/july/united-states-and-kenya-announce-launch-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Kenya Conclude Opening Round Under the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership." Press release, February 10, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/february/united-states-and-kenya-conclude-opening-round-under-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Kenya to Hold First Negotiating Round under Their Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership." Press release, March 16, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/march/united-states-and-kenya-hold-first-negotiating-round-under-their-strategic-trade-and-investment.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Kenya to Hold Third Negotiating Round Under the Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership." Press release, January 25, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/january/united-states-and-kenya-hold-third-negotiating-round-under-strategic-trade-and-investment.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Kenya to Hold Fourth Negotiating Round Under the Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership." Press release, March 27, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/march/united-states-and-kenya-hold-fourth-negotiating-round-under-strategic-trade-and-investment.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Taiwan to Hold Negotiating Round for the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade." Press release, April 26, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/united-states-and-taiwan-hold-negotiating-round-us-taiwan-initiative-21st-century-trade.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Kenya to Hold Fifth Negotiating Round Under Their Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership." Press release, May 9, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/united-states-and-kenya-hold-fifth-negotiating-round-under-their-strategic-trade-and-investment.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Kenya Joint Statement after the Fifth Round of U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations." Press release, May 17, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/united-states-and-kenya-joint-statement-after-fifth-round-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Kenya to Hold Sixth Negotiating Round Under the Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership." Press release, May 24, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/united-states-and-kenya-hold-sixth-negotiating-round-under-strategic-trade-and-investment.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Kenya Invite Public Participation in Stakeholder Listening Session During Sixth Negotiating Round Under the Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership." Press release, June 3, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/june/united-states-and-kenya-invite-public-participation-stakeholder-listening-session-during-sixth.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Kenya to Hold Seventh Negotiating Round Under the Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership." Press release, July 30, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/july/united-states-and-kenya-hold-seventh-negotiating-round-under-strategic-trade-and-investment.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Kenya to Hold Eighth Negotiating Round Under the Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership." Press release, September 9, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/september/united-states-and-kenya-hold-eighth-negotiating-round-under-strategic-trade-and-investment.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States and Türkiye Hold Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Joint Council Meeting." Press release, April 30, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/united-states-and-turkiye-hold-trade-and-investment-framework-agreement-joint-council-meeting.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Mechanism Labor Matter at Autoliv Steering Wheels Mexico." Press release, January 22, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/january/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-mechanism-labor-matter-autoliv-steering.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at Goodyear SLP Facility." Press release, February 5, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/february/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-matter-goodyear-slp.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Mechanism Labor Matter at Fujikura Automotive Mexico." Press release, February 13, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/february/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-mechanism-labor-matter-fujikura.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Mechanism Labor Matter at Asiaway Automotive Components México, S. de R.L. de C.V." Press release, February 16, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/february/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-mechanism-labor-matter-asiaway.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at Draxton Facility." Press release, April 9, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-matter-draxton-facility.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at Teklas Automotive Facility.” Press release, April 9, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-matter-teklas.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter to Restore Workers’ Rights at Minera Tizapa Facility.” Press release, May 30, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-matter-restore-workers.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Mechanism Labor Matter at Servicios Industriales González, S.A. de C.V.” Press release, May 30, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-mechanism-labor-matter-servicios.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at RV Fresh Foods Facility.” Press release, July 15, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/july/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-matter-rv-fresh-foods.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at Volkswagen de México Facility.” Press release, August 26, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/august/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-matter-volkswagen-de.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Mechanism Labor Matter at Impro Industries Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.” Press release, September 17, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/september/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-mechanism-labor-matter-impro-industries.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Announces Successful Resolution of Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Matter at Odisa Facility.” Press release, December 20, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/december/united-states-announces-successful-resolution-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-matter-odisa-facility.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Announces Deal with Canada and Mexico to Lift Retaliatory Tariffs.” Press release, May 17, 2019. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/may/united-states-announces-deal-canada-and.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States and Japan Sign Critical Minerals Agreement.” Press release, March 28, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/march/united-states-and-japan-sign-critical-minerals-agreement.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Prevails in USMCA Dispute on Biotech Corn.” Press release, December 20, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/december/united-states-prevails-usmca-dispute-biotech-corn.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Requests First Ever USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Panel at Grupo Mexico Mine.” Press release, August 22, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/august/united-states-requests-first-ever-usmca-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-panel-grupo-mexico-mine.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Requests Second Ever USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel.” Press release, April 16, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/united-states-requests-second-ever-usmca-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-dispute-settlement-panel.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Minera Camino Rojo Mining Facility.” Press release, December 12, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/december/united-states-requests-usmca-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-dispute-settlement-panel-minera-camino.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Bader de Mexico Facility.” Press release, December 18, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/december/united-states-requests-usmca-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-dispute-settlement-panel-bader-de-mexico.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Industrias Tecnos Facility.” Press release, December 18, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/december/united-states-requests-usmca-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-dispute-settlement-panel-industrias.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Requests USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Dispute Settlement Panel at Pirelli Neumáticos Facility.” Press release, December 18, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/december/united-states-requests-usmca-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-dispute-settlement-panel-pirelli.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Requests USMCA Dispute Settlement Consultations on Canada’s Digital Services Tax.” Press release, August 30, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/august/united-states-requests-usmca-dispute-settlement-consultations-canadas-digital-services-tax.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Seeks Mexico’s Review of Alleged Denial of Workers’ Rights at Atento Servicios, S.A. de C.V.” Press release, January 19, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/january/united-states-seeks-mexicos-review-alleged-denial-workers-rights-atento-servicios-sa-de-cv.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States, Canada, and Mexico Joint Statement of the Fourth Meeting of the USMCA//CUSMA//T-MEC Free Trade Commission.” May 23, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/united-states-canada-and-mexico-joint-statement-fourth-meeting-usmcacusmat-mec-free-trade-commission.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States, Canada, and Mexico Joint Statement of the Fourth Meeting of the USMCA//CUSMA//T-MEC Free Trade Commission.” Press release, May 23, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/united-states-canada-and-mexico-joint-statement-fourth-meeting-usmcacusmat-mec-free-trade-commission.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism Panel Releases Determination Regarding Grupo México Mine; Biden-Harris Administration Will Continue Seeking to Enforce USMCA Labor Obligations and Advance Workers’ Rights.” Press release, May 13, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/usmca-rapid-response-labor-mechanism-panel-releases-determination-regarding-grupo-mexico-mine-biden.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR and the European Commission Host Principals’ Meeting of the U.S.-EU Tripartite Trade and Labor Dialogue with Union and Business Leaders.” Press release, April 8, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/ustr-and-european-commission-host-principals-meeting-us-eu-tripartite-trade-and-labor-dialogue-union.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR and the U.S. Department of Labor Meet with South Korean Officials to Discuss Labor Rights, Free Trade.” Press release, April 27, 2022. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/april/ustr-and-us-department-labor-meet-south-korean-officials-discuss-labor-rights-free-trade.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Announces Entry into Force of First Agreement under U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade.” Press release, December 9, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/december/ustr-announces-entry-force-first-agreement-under-us-taiwan-initiative-21st-century-trade.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Announces Enforcement Action under the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement.” Press release, September 19, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/september/ustr-announces-enforcement-action-under-us-peru-trade-promotion-agreement.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Announces Joint U.S.-E.U. Cooperative Framework for Large Civil Aircraft.” Press release, June 15, 2021. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/june/ustr-announces-joint-us-eu-cooperative-framework-large-civil-aircraft.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Announces New Action to Improve Emergency Response Collaboration Under the USMCA.” Press release, May 23, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/ustr-announces-new-action-improve-emergency-response-collaboration-under-usmca.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Finalizes Action on China Tariffs Following Statutory Four-Year Review.” Press release, September 13, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/september/ustr-finalizes-action-china-tariffs-following-statutory-four-year-review.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Invites Public Participation in Stakeholder Listening Session During Fifth United States-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiating Round.” Press release, May 13, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/ustr-invites-public-participation-stakeholder-listening-session-during-fifth-united-states-kenya.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Presents Oral Argument Before USMCA Biotech Corn Dispute Panel.” Press release, July 1, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/july/ustr-presents-oral-argument-usmca-biotech-corn-dispute-panel.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Releases Second Biennial Report on the Operation of the USMCA with Respect to Trade in Automotive Goods.” Press release, July 1, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/july/ustr-releases-second-biennial-report-operation-usmca-respect-trade-automotive-goods.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Releases Summaries from First U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations.” Press release, May 23, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/may/ustr-releases-summaries-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership-negotiations.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Releases Summaries from Fourth U.S.–Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations.” Press release, April 5, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/ustr-releases-summaries-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership-negotiations.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Releases Summaries from U.S.-Taiwan 21st Century Trade Initiative Negotiations.” Press release, April 5, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/april/ustr-releases-summaries-us-taiwan-21st-century-trade-initiative-negotiations.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Releases Summaries from Sixth U.S.–Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations.” Press release, May 31, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/ustr-releases-summaries-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership-negotiations.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Releases Summaries from Seventh U.S. – Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations.” Press release, August 27, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/august/ustr-releases-summaries-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership-negotiations.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR to Hold Virtual Hearing on USMCA Autos.” Press release, February 5, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/february/ustr-hold-virtual-hearing-usmca-autos.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). "USTR, Department of Labor, and the European Commission Host Meeting of the U.S.-European Union Trade and Labor Dialogue." September 26, 2024. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/september/ustr-department-labor-and-european-commission-host-meeting-us-european-union-trade-and-labor.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *2024 Biennial Report on the Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act*. June 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2024%20AGOA%20Biennial%20Report%206-27-2024%20PDF_0.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *2024 Special 301 Report*. April 25, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2024%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report*. March 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/The%20Presidents%202024%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202023%20Annual%20Report.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *2024 USTR Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Nepal Trade Preference Program (NTPP)*. 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2024%20Nepal%20TPP%20Report%20to%20Congress%20Final.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *2024 USTR Annual Report on the Implementation of the Technical Assistance Improvement and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation (TAICNAR) Program and Assessment of Producer Eligibility*. June 18, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Haiti%20HOPE%20II%20Report%20to%20Congress%202024_FINAL_0.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers*. March 31, 2025. https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2025/march/ustr-releases-2025-national-trade-estimate-report.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report*. March 3, 2025. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2025/2025%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20WTO%20at%2030%20and%202024%20Annual%20Report%2002282025%20--%20FINAL.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Annex A, Chapter 31 of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), Facility-Specific Rapid-Response Labor Mechanism. July 1, 2020. https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/dispute-settlement-proceedings/fta-dispute-settlement/usmca/chapter-31-annex-facility-specific-rapid-response-labor-mechanism.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Chapter 34 of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), Final Provisions. July 1, 2020. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/34_Final_Provisions.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Determination on Action and Ongoing Monitoring: Vietnam's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Currency Valuation. 86 Fed. Reg. 40675. July 28, 2021. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/07/28/2021-16095/determination-on-action-and-ongoing-monitoring-vietnams-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Extension of Exclusions and Request for Comments: China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation. 88 Fed. Reg. 90225. December 29, 2023. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/29/2023-28770/extension-of-exclusions-and-request-for-comments-chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *Findings of the Investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974*. March 22, 2018. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *Four-Year Review of Actions Taken in the Section 301 Investigation: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation*. May 14, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/05.14.2024%20Four%20Year%20Review%20of%20China%20Tech%20Transfer%20Section%20301%20(Final)_0.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Initiation of Investigation; Notice of Hearing and Request for Public Comments: Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute. 84 Fed. Reg. 15028. April 12, 2019. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/Preliminary_Product_List.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Initiation of Section 301 Investigation, Hearing, and Request for Public Comments: Nicaragua's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Rule of Law. 89 Fed. Reg. 101088. December 13, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/13/2024-29422/initiation-of-section-301-investigation-hearing-and-request-for-public-comments-nicaraguas-acts.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance. 89 Fed. Reg. 29424. April 22, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/04/22/2024-08515/initiation-of-section-301-investigation-chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-targeting-the-maritime.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: Vietnam's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to the Import and Use of Illegal Timber. 85 Fed. Reg. 63639. October 8, 2020. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/10/08/2020-22270/initiation-of-section-301-investigation-vietnams-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to-the-import.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Initiation of Section 301 Investigation; Hearing; and Request for Public Comments: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance. 89 Fed. Reg. 106725. December 30, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/30/2024-31306/initiation-of-section-301-investigation-hearing-and-request-for-public-comments-chinas-acts-policies.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *Joint Declaration: Enhancing eInvoicing Interoperability Between the United States and the EU*. Accessed April 1, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/240312%20Joint%20Declaration%20einvoicing%20final%20text_US.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *Joint U.S.- EU Catalogue of Best Practices on Green Public Procurement*. Accessed April 1, 2025. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/EU-US%20TTC6_Annex_GPP%20Best%20Practices.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Notice of Action and Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China's Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, Request for Comments. 90 Fed. Reg. 17114. April 23, 2025. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/23/2025-06927/notice-of-action-and-proposed-action-in-section-301-investigation-of-chinas-targeting-the-maritime.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Notice of Determination and Request for Comments Concerning Action Pursuant to Section 301: France's Digital Services Tax. 84 Fed. Reg.66956. December 6, 2019. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/12/06/2019-26325/notice-of-determination-and-request-for-comments-concerning-action-pursuant-to-section-301-frances.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Notice of Determination Pursuant to Section 301: Vietnam's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Currency Valuation. 86 Fed. Reg. 6732. January 22, 2021. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/22/2021-01352/notice-of-determination-pursuant-to-section-301-vietnams-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Notice of Extension of Certain Exclusions: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation. 89 Fed. Reg. 46948. May 30, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/05/30/2024-11904/notice-of-extension-of-certain-exclusions-chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to-technology.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Notice of Interagency Labor Committee for Monitoring and Enforcement Final Procedural Guidelines for Petitions Pursuant to the USMCA. 88 Fed. Reg. 40914. June 22, 2023. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/22/2023-12865/notice-of-interagency-labor-committee-for-monitoring-and-enforcement-final-procedural-guidelines-for.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Notice of Modification: China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation (89 Fed. Reg. 76581). September 18, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/18/2024-21217/notice-of-modification-chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to-technology-transfer.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Notice of Modification: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation. 89 Fed. Reg. 101682. December 16, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/16/2024-29462/notice-of-modification-chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to-technology-transfer.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Procedures for Requests to Exclude Certain Machinery Used in Domestic Manufacturing from Actions Pursuant to the Section 301 Investigation of China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation. 89 Fed. Reg. 83755. October 17, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/17/2024-23880/procedures-for-requests-to-exclude-certain-machinery-used-in-domestic-manufacturing-from-actions.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *Report on France's Digital Services Tax Prepared in the Investigation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (France DST Report)*. December 2, 2019. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_On_France%27s_Digital_Services_Tax.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization*. February 2020. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_on_the_Appellate_Body_of_the_World_Trade_Organization.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *Report on Vietnam's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Currency Valuation*. January 15, 2021. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/Vietnamcurrency301report.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning the Annual Review of Country Eligibility for Benefits Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act for Calendar Year 2025. 89 Fed. Reg. 42052. May 14, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/05/14/2024-10482/request-for-comments-and-notice-of-public-hearing-concerning-the-annual-review-of-country.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Regarding the 2024 Special 301 Review. 88 Fed. Reg. 84869. December 6, 2023. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-12-06/pdf/2023-26737.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Requests for Comments and Public Hearing About the Administration's Action Following a Determination of Import Injury with Regard to Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber. 89 Fed. Reg. 63465. August 5, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/05/2024-17138/request-for-comments-and-public-hearing-about-the-administrations-action-following-a-determination.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Requests for Comments on Proposed Modifications and Machinery Exclusion Process in Four-Year Review of Actions Taken in the Section 301 Investigation: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation. 89 Fed. Reg. 46252. May 28, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/05/28/2024-11634/request-for-comments-on-proposed-modifications-and-machinery-exclusion-process-in-four-year-review.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *Section 301 Investigation: Report on China's Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance*. January 16, 2025. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/USTRReportChinaTargetingMaritime.pdf.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Suspension of Action: Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in the Large Civil Aircraft Dispute. 86 Fed. Reg. 36313. July 9, 2021. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/07/09/2021-14550/suspension-of-action-enforcement-of-us-wto-rights-in-the-large-civil-aircraft-dispute.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). *US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade Public Summaries – Part Two*. April 5, 2024. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US%20Taiwan%20Initiative%20on%2021st%20Century%20Trade%20Public%20Summaries%20%E2%80%93%20Part%20Two.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "2024 Ministerial Council Statement." May 3, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/events/2024/5/oecd-ministerial-council-meeting-2024/2024-Ministerial-Council-Statement.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)." Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises." Legal Instruments, accessed April 28, 2025. https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0144.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "Fiji Joins the Inclusive Framework on BEPS and Participates in the Agreement to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy." May 27, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/announcements/2024/05/fiji-joins-the-inclusive-framework-on-beps-and-participates-in-the-agreement-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.html.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "Green Growth and Sustainable Development Forum & Global Forum on Trade 2024." October 11, 2024. https://www.oecd-events.org/ggsd-2024.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "Members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS." May 28, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issues/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-composition.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "Members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS that have approved the July 2023 Outcome Statement on the Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy." May 28, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issues/beps/oecd-g20-inclusive-framework-members-outcome-statement-on-two-pillar-solution-to-address-tax-challenges-arising-from-digitalisation-july-2023.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "Moldova Joins the Inclusive Framework on BEPS and Participates in the Agreement to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy." May 28, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/announcements/2024/05/moldova-joins-the-inclusive-framework-on-beps-and-participates-in-the-agreement-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.html.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "OECD and G20." Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.oecd.org/g20/.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "OECD Ministerial Council Meeting 2024." May 2, 2024. https://www.oecd-events.org/meeting-of-the-council-at-ministerial-level-2024/en/.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "OECD Ministerial Council Statement and Outcomes." Press release, May 3, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/press-releases/2024/05/oecd-ministerial-council-statement-and-outcomes-2024.html.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "OECD 60th Anniversary." Accessed April 28, 2025. https://p00f5244272.eu.racontr.com/index.html.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "OECD Legal Instruments." Accessed April 28, 2025. https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/about.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "OECD Member Countries and Partners." Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS Takes a Further Step on the Implementation of the Amount B of Pillar One." September 26, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/announcements/2024/09/oecd-g20-inclusive-framework-on-beps-takes-a-further-step-on-the-implementation-of-the-amount-b-of-pillar-one.html.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "Organisational Structure." Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.oecd.org/about/structure/.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy." October 8, 2021. https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-october-2021.htm.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "Statement on the Definitions of Qualifying Jurisdiction within the Meaning of Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 of the Simplified and Streamlined Approach." June 2024. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/support-materials/2024/02/pillar-one-amount-b_41a41e1e/statement-qualifying-jurisdiction-definitions-section-5-2-section-5-3-simplified-streamlined-approach.pdf/_jcr_content/renditions/original./statement-qualifying-jurisdiction-definitions-section-5-2-section-5-3-simplified-streamlined-approach.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Sustainable Agricultural Productivity to Address Food Systems Challenges: Measurement, Data, Drivers and Policies.” Events, October 28, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/en/events/2024/10/sustainable-agricultural-productivity-to-address-food-systems-challenges-measurement-data-drivers-and-policies.html.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Semiconductor Informal Exchange Network.” Accessed May 26, 2025. https://www.oecd.org/en/networks/semiconductor-informal-exchange-network.html.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy.” News release, October 8, 2021. https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-october-2021.htm.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “The OECD: Better Policies for Better Lives.” Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.oecd.org/about/.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Trade and Agriculture Directorate.” Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.oecd.org/agriculture/about/

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Trust in Global Co-Operation: The Vision for the OECD for the next Decade.” October 5, 2021. https://www.oecd.org/en/about/legal/trust-in-global-cooperation-the-vision-for-the-oecd-for-the-next-decade.html.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “The OECD’s Contribution to Promoting Open Markets and a Rules-Based International Trading System in Good Working Order.” June 8, 2023. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/events/2023/6/The-OECD-Contribution-to-Promoting-Open-Markets-and-a-Rules-Based-International-Trading-System-in-Good-Working-Order.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Women Entrepreneurs in Global Supply Chains.” Events, November 6, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/en/events/2024/11/women-entrepreneurs-in-global-supply-chains.html.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). *2024 Annual Update on OECD Standard-Setting*. May 3, 2024. https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/api/download/?uri=/public/general-info-file/45334bb7-9a4c-41cf-805f-f4e8947dce5e.pdf&name=Standards%20-%20Annual%20Report%202024.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct*. June 8, 2023. https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/mneguidelines/.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). *OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index: Policy Trends up to 2024*. February 12, 2024. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/oecd-services-trade-restrictiveness-index_b9e5c870-en.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). *OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2024 Issue 2*. December 4, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-outlook-volume-2024-issue-2_d8814e8b-en.html.

Protecting Americans' Data from Foreign Adversaries Act (PAFACA) of 2024. Division 1 of Pub. L. No. 118-50, 138 Stat. 895, 960. https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ50/PLAW-118publ50.pdf.

Resilinc. "China's Export Restrictions on Germanium and Gallium." August 15, 2023. https://www.resilinc.com/blog/germanium-and-gallium-china-export-restrictions/.

Reuters. "China Bans Export of Critical Minerals to US as Trade Tensions Escalate." December 3, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/china-bans-exports-gallium-germanium-antimony-us-2024-12-03/.

Reuters. "China Bans Export of Rare Earths Processing Tech over National Security." December 22, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/china-bans-export-rare-earths-processing-technologies-2023-12-21/.

Reuters. "China Curbs Graphite Exports in Latest Critical Minerals Squeeze." October 20, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/china-curbs-graphite-exports-latest-critical-minerals-squeeze-2023-10-20/.

Reuters. "China to Limit Antimony Exports in Latest Critical Mineral Curbs." CNN (reposting), August 15, 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/15/tech/china-antimony-export-ban-intl-hnk/index.html.

Smalley, Suzanne. "Bills Targeting Data Brokers and TikTok Approved in House Committee." March 7, 2024. https://therecord.media/bills-tiktok-data-brokers-advance-congress.

Statement of Administrative Action on the Uruguay Round Agreements. H.R. Doc. 103-316, 103rd Congress. October 8, 1994. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CREC-1994-10-08/CREC-1994-10-08-pt1-PgE143.

Stilwell, Matthew, and Elisabeth Tuerk. "Non-Violation Complaints and the TRIPS Agreement: Considerations for WTO Members." Center for International Environmental Law. May 2001. https://www.ciel.org/Publications/Assessment_Trips_article711.pdf.

Temporary Importations Under Bond, 19 C.F.R. §§ 10.31–10.40. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-19/chapter-I/part-10/subpart-A/subject-group-ECFR936eee413ff07c6.

Third World Network (TWN). "IFD Proponents Press for More Discussions after MC13." March 4, 2024. https://twn.my/title2/wto.info/2024/ti240307.htm.

Title IV of the Trade Act, codified at 19 U.S.C.

Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act (TAAEA). Title II of Pub. L. No. 112-40, §§ 201–217, 125 Stat. 403. 2011. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ40/pdf/PLAW-112publ40.pdf.

Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act (TAARA) of 2015. Title IV of P.L. No. 114-27,0020§§ 401–407, 129 Stat. 373. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-114publ27/pdf/PLAW-114publ27.pdf.

Trade Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2497b. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2023-title19/pdf/USCODE-2023-title19-chap12.pdf.

Trade Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978. 1975. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-10384/pdf/COMPS-10384.pdf.

Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1862). 2015. https://www.congress.gov/bill/87th-congress/house-bill/11970/text.

Trade Expansion Program. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1991. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2023-title19/html/USCODE-2023-title19-chap7.htm.

Trade Facilitation and Enforcement Act of 2015. 19 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4454. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title19/chapter28&edition=prelim.

Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015. Pub. L. No. 114-27, 129 Stat. 362. 2015. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1295/text.

Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFPLA). Pub. L. No. 117-78, 132 Stat. 1525. 2021. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-117publ78.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Statistics.” Accessed April 19, 2025. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/trade/uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-statistics.

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). *Mexico Publishes Decree to Ban Glyphosate and GE Corn*. January 6, 2021. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Mexico%20Publishes%20Decree%20to%20Ban%20Glyphosate%20and%20GE%20Corn_Mexico%20City_Mexico_01-06-2021.

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). *Agricultural Biotechnology Annual*. November 20, 2023. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_Mexico%20City_Mexico_MX2023-0052

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “Bureau of Industry and Security.” https://www.bis.gov/.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework: Timeline.” Accessed April 9, 2025. https://www.commerce.gov/ipef/timeline.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “Pillar I – Fair and Resilient Trade.” Accessed April 7, 2025. https://www.commerce.gov/ipef/pillar-i.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “Raimondo, IPEF Ministers Welcome Continued Progress at Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) Virtual Ministerial Meeting | U.S. Department of Commerce.” Press release, March 14, 2024. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/03/raimondo-ipef-ministers-welcome-continued-progress-indo-pacific.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “Secretary Raimondo, IPEF Ministers Welcome Upcoming Entry into Force of the Clean Economy Agreement, Fair Economy Agreement, and Agreement on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and Commit to Continued Progress at Virtual Ministerial.” Press release, September 24, 2024. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/09/secretary-raimondo-ipef-ministers-welcome-upcoming-entry-force-clean.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “U.S. and IPEF Partners Establish Supply Chain Bodies and Convene First Virtual Meetings Under Landmark Supply Chain Agreement.” Press release, July 30, 2024. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/07/us-and-ipef-partners-establish-supply-chain-bodies-and-convene-first.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “U.S. and UK Announce Partnership on Science of AI Safety.” Press release, April 1, 2024. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/04/us-and-uk-announce-partnership-science-ai-safety.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). “International Trade in Goods and Services.” Accessed June 24, 2025. https://www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-investment/international-trade-goods-and-services.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Interactive Data Application database. International Data; International Transactions, Services, and Investment Positions (IIP) Tables. Table 3.1, “U.S. International Trade in Services.” International Transactions. Accessed June 24, 2025. https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/?reqid=62&step=6&isuri=1&tablelist=51&product=1.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). “U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December and Annual 2024.” News release, February 5, 2025. https://www.bea.gov/news/2025/us-international-trade-goods-and-services-december-and-annual-2024.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). “Gross Domestic Product, 4th Quarter and Year 2024 (Third Estimate), GDP by Industry, and Corporate Profits.” March 27, 2025. https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; Removals from the Validated End-User (VEU) Program. 89 Fed. Reg. 96830. December 5, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/05/2024-28267/additions-and-modifications-to-the-entity-list-removals-from-the-validated-end-user-veu-program.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Commerce Control List Additions and Revisions; Implementation of Controls on Advanced Technologies Consistent with Controls Implemented by International Partners. 89 Fed. Reg. 72926. September 6, 2024. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2024-09-06/2024-19633.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Revisions of the Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariff Exclusions Process. 89 Fed. Reg. 43740. May 20, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/05/20/2024-10725/revisions-of-the-section-232-steel-and-aluminum-tariff-exclusions-process.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). "Department of Commerce Implements Controls on Quantum Computing and Other Advanced Technologies Alongside International Partners." September 5, 2024. https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-implements-controls-quantum-computing-other-advanced-technologies-alongside.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; Removals from the Validated End-User. 89 Fed. Reg. 96830. December 5, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/05/2024-28267/additions-and-modifications-to-the-entity-list-removals-from-the-validated-end-user-veu-program.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items. 89 Fed. Reg. 96790. December 5, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/05/2024-28270/foreign-produced-direct-product-rule-additions-and-refinements-to-controls-for-advanced-computing.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). "Commerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China's Capability to Produce Advanced Semiconductors for Military Applications." Press release, December 2, 2024. https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-export-controls-restrict-chinas-capability-produce-advanced-semiconductors-military.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Economic Development Administration (EDA). *Fiscal Year 2021 Annual Report to Congress—Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program*. 2022. https://www.eda.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/FY2021-TAAF-Annual-Report-to-Congress.pdf.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Economic Development Administration (EDA). "Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms." Accessed February 7, 2025. https://www.eda.gov/taaf.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). International Trade Administration (ITA). Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA). "AGOA Preferences: Country Eligibility, Apparel Eligibility, and Textile Eligibility." January 8, 2024. https://www.trade.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/AGOA%20Eligibility%20Chart%201_08_2024.xlsx.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). International Trade Administration (ITA). Regulations Improving and Strengthening the Enforcement of Trade Remedies Through the Administration of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws. 89 Fed. Reg. 20766. March 25, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/25/2024-05509/regulations-improving-and-strengthening-the-enforcement-of-trade-remedies-through-the-administration.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). International Trade Administration (ITA). United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), Article 10.12: Binational Panel Review: Notice of Request for Panel Review. 89 Fed. Reg. 19808. March 20, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/20/2024-05662/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement-usmca-article-1012-binational-panel-review-notice-of-request.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). International Trade Administration (ITA) and U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Regulations Enhancing the Administration of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Trade Remedy Laws. Part II: Rules and Regulations. 89 Fed. Reg. 101694. December 16, 2024. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2024-12-16/2024-29245.

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Ripe Olives From Spain: Implementation of Determination Under Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. 88 Fed. Reg. 3384. January 19, 2023. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/01/19/2023-00930/ripe-olives-from-spain-implementation-of-determination-under-section-129-of-the-uruguay-round.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (USDHS). “UFLPA Entity List.” Accessed April 29, 2025. https://www.dhs.gov/uflpa-entity-list.

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). “TAA Termination Impacts: By the Numbers.” Fact sheet, March 3, 2025. https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/tradeact/pdfs/TAA_Termination_Fact_Sheet.pdf.

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). “Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers.” Accessed February 7, 2025. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/tradeact.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity.” Accessed April 15, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada.” Accessed April 11, 2025. https://www.state.gov/nafta-cases-filed-against-the-government-of-canada/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Cases Filed Against the United Mexican States.” Accessed April 11, 2025. https://www.state.gov/cases-filed-against-the-united-mexican-states.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Joint Statement of the Minerals Security Partnership.” Press release, March 4, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-minerals-security-partnership/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Joint Statement of the Minerals Security Partnership Principals’ Meeting 2024.” Press release, September 27, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-minerals-security-partnership-principals-meeting-2024/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Joint Statement on the High-Level Minerals Security Partnership Forum Event in New York City.” Press release, September 27, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-high-level-minerals-security-partnership-forum-event-in-new-york-city/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Launch of Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity’s Semiconductor Workforce Symposium: Expanding the Supplier Ecosystem.” Press release, July 17, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/launch-of-americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperitys-semiconductor-workforce-symposium-expanding-the-supplier-ecosystem/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Minerals Security Partnership.” Accessed April 1, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction.” Accessed May 13, 2025. https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-arms-control-and-international-security-affairs/bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/office-of-conventional-arms-threat-reduction/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Secretary Blinken Officially Launches the Minerals Security Partnership Forum with the European Commission.” Press release, April 5, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/secretary-blinken-officially-launches-the-minerals-security-partnership-forum-with-the-european-commission/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Statement on the First High-Level Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) Forum Event.” Press release, July 18, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/statement-on-the-first-high-level-minerals-security-partnership-msp-forum-event/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “U.S. Department of State and Inter-American Development Bank Collaborate on Semiconductor Initiative in the Western Hemisphere.” July 17, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-and-inter-american-development-bank-collaborate-on-semiconductor-initiative-in-the-western-hemisphere/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “U.S. State Department and the OECD Lead Efforts at Semiconductor Network Meeting to Promote Global Supply Chain Resilience and Transparency.” Press release, September 27, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-state-department-and-the-oecd-lead-efforts-at-semiconductor-network-meeting-to-promote-global-supply-chain-resilience-and-transparency/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “United States Commits $30 Million in Technical Assistance for Sustainable Investment Through Americas Partnership.” Press release, July 17, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/united-states-commits-30-million-in-technical-assistance-for-sustainable-investment-through-americas-partnership/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB). “Fostering Innovation: Reflections on the Americas PartnershipSemiconductor Workforce Symposium.” September 16, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/fostering-innovation-reflections-on-the-americas-partnershipsemiconductor-workforce-symposium/.

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Notification of Meetings of the United States-Bahrain Subcommittee on Environmental Affairs and Joint Forum on Environmental Cooperation. 89 Fed. Reg. 11332. February 14, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/02/14/2024-03027/notification-of-meetings-of-the-united-states-bahrain-subcommittee-on-environmental-affairs-and.

U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). "Joint Statement from the United States, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Regarding a Compromise on a Transitional Approach to Existing Unilateral Measures During the Interim Period Before Pillar 1 Is in Effect." Press release, October 21, 2021. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0419.

U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). "Office of Foreign Assets Control." Accessed May 13, 2025. https://ofac.treasury.gov/.

U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). "Outbound Investment Security Program." February 8, 2025. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/outbound-investment-program.

U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). Office of Investment Security (OIS). "Provisions Pertaining to U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern." 89 Fed. Reg. 90398. November 15, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/15/2024-25422/provisions-pertaining-to-us-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in.

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). *International Trade: USTR Should Improve Coordination on New Automotive Rules of Origin*. Report No. GAO-24-106330. January 31, 2024. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106330.

U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC). "DFC and IDB Invest Expand the Americas Partnership Platform by Creating a New Co-Financing Framework to Promote Sustainable Development in Latin America and the Caribbean." Media release, April 16, 2024. https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-and-idb-invest-expand-americas-partnership-platform-creating-new-co.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). "The 2025 Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS) Item Count." Accessed April 14, 2025. https://www.usitc.gov/tariff_affairs/documents/2025_hts_item_count.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Program Usage, Trends, and Sectoral Highlights*. June 2023. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5419.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act: Impact on U.S. Industries and Consumers and on Beneficiary Countries*. Publication No. 5446. September 2023. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5446.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act: Impact on U.S. Industries and Consumers and on Beneficiary Countries. Publication No. 5662. September 2025. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5662.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (Whether or Not Partially or Fully Assembled into Other Products): Investigation No. TA-201-75; Vol. 1: Determination and Views of Commissioners.* Publication No. 4739. November 2017. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/safeguards/pub4739-vol_i.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Partially or Fully Assembled into Other Products: Monitoring Developments in the Domestic Industry; Investigation No. TA-201-075 (Second Monitoring).* Publication No. 5494. February 2024. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/other/pub5494.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *Economic Impact of Section 232 and 301 Tariffs on U.S. Industries*. Publication No. 5405. March 2023. https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/332/pub5405.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber: Investigation No. 201-78*. Publication No. 5536. August 2024. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/safeguards/pub5536.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2025) Basic Edition*. Publication No. 5575. January 2025. https://hts.usitc.gov/download?release=2025HTSBasic&releaseDate=12%2F10%2F2024.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Hearing transcript in connection with Investigation No. 332–606, *Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act: Impact on U.S. Industries and Consumers and on Beneficiary Countries*. February 20, 2025. https://edis.usitc.gov/internal/attachment/844027-2326590.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb (USITC DataWeb)/U.S. Census Bureau (Census). Accessed various dates. https://dataweb.usitc.gov/.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Investigation No. TA-201-78, Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber. 89 Fed. Reg. 71422. September 3, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/03/2024-19673/fine-denier-polyester-staple-fiber.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Investigation No. TA-201-078, Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber; Institution of Investigation, Scheduling of Public Hearings, and Determination that the Investigation Is Extraordinarily Complicated. 89 Fed. Reg. 18435. March 13, 2024. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/13/2024-05338/fine-denier-polyester-staple-fiber-institution-of-investigation-scheduling-of-public-hearings-and.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *Shifts in U.S. Merchandise Trade 2014*. Publication No. 4356. June 2015. https://www.usitc.gov/research_and_analysis/trade_shifts_2014/trade_metrics.htm.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *The Year in Trade 2019: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program; 71st Report*. Publication No. 5055. August 2020. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5055.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *The Year in Trade 2020: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program; 72nd Report*. Publication No. 5228. September 2021. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5228.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *The Year in Trade 2021: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program; 73rd Report*. Publication No. 5349. August 2022. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5349.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *The Year in Trade 2022: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program; 74th Report*. Publication No. 5476. December 2023. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5476.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *The Year in Trade 2023: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program; 75th Report*. Publication No. 5547. September 2024. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5547.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact of U.S. Preference Programs on Haiti's Economy and Workers*. Publication No. 5397. December 2022. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5397.pdf.

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). *USMCA Automotive Rules of Origin: Economic Impact and Operation: 2025 Report*. Publication No. 5642. July 2025. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5642.pdf.

United Nations (UN). "Special Treatment Regarding Obligations and Flexibilities under WTO Rules." Accessed May 23, 2025. https://www.un.org/ldcportal/content/special-treatment-regarding-obligations-and-flexibilities-under-wto-rules.

United Nations (UN). "Trade-Related Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building." Accessed May 1, 2025. https://www.un.org/ldcportal/content/trade-related-technical-assistance-and-capacity-building.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). "High Freight Rates Strain Global Supply Chains, Threaten Vulnerable Economies." News release, October 22, 2024. https://unctad.org/news/high-freight-rates-strain-global-supply-chains-threaten-vulnerable-economies.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). *Global Trade Update: The Role of Tariffs in International Trade*. March 2025. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditcinf2025d1.pdf.

United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA). "Caribbean Community (CARICOM)." Accessed May 26, 2025. https://dppa.un.org/en/caribbean-community-caricom.

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Indices of Industrial Production (IIP) database. May 13, 2025. https://stat.unido.org/data/table?dataset=iip#data-browser.

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). *World Manufacturing Production: Quarterly Report, Q4 2024*. March 19, 2025. https://stat.unido.org/portal/storage/file/publications/qiip/World_Manufacturing_Production_2024_Q4.pdf.

United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). "World Tourism Barometer and Statistical Annex." January 2025. https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/abs/10.18111/wtobarometereng.2025.23.1.1.

United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (USMCA Implementation Act). 19 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4732. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title19/chapter29&edition=prelim.

Uruguay Round Trade Agreements. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3624. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2023-title19/html/USCODE-2023-title19-chap22.htm.

von der Leyen, Ursula. "Mission Letter to Andrius Kubilius." September 17, 2024. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/1f8ec030-d018-41a2-9759-c694d4d56d6c_fr?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20KUBILIUS.pdf.

White House. "East Room Declaration of the Leaders of the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity." Briefing Room, November 3, 2023. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/03/east-room-declaration-of-the-leaders-of-the-americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity/.

White House. "Fact Sheet: President Biden Hosts Inaugural Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Leaders' Summit." Briefing Room, November 3, 2023. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/03/fact-sheet-president-biden-hosts-inaugural-americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity-leaders-summit/.

White House. "Joint Declaration on The Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity." Briefing Room, January 27, 2023. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/APEP-Joint-Declaration-English-FINAL.pdf.

White House. "Readout of U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council Fifth Ministerial Meeting." Briefing Room, January 31, 2024. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/31/readout-of-u-s-eu-trade-and-technology-council-fifth-ministerial-meeting/.

White House. "Remarks by President Biden at the Inaugural Ceremony of the Ninth Summit of the Americas." Briefing Room, June 8, 2022. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/06/08/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-inaugural-ceremony-of-the-ninth-summit-of-the-americas/.

White House. "Statement from President Joe Biden on H.R. 4004, the United States-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade First Agreement Implementation Act." Briefing Room, August 7, 2023. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/07/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-h-r-4004-the-united-states-taiwan-initiative-on-21st-century-trade-first-agreement-implementation-act/.

White House. “Statement on Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.” Briefing Room, May 23, 2022. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/statement-on-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/.

White House. “The Atlantic Declaration: A Framework for a Twenty-First Century U.S.-UK Economic Partnership.” Briefing Room, June 8, 2023. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/06/08/the-atlantic-declaration-a-framework-for-a-twenty-first-century-u-s-uk-economic-partnership/.

Wilson Dozier, Monica, and Amandeep S. Kahlon. “Department of Homeland Security Updates UFLPA Entity List: 29 Chinese Companies Added to List for Ties to Use of Forced Labor.” Bradley Arant Boult Cummings. *BuildSmart* (blog), December 3, 2024. https://www.buildsmartbradley.com/2024/12/department-of-homeland-security-updates-uflpa-entity-list-29-chinese-companies-added-to-list-for-ties-to-use-of-forced-labor/.

World Bank Group. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Cases Database. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/case-database.

World Bank. “Global Economic Prospects.” (January 2025). https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/f983c12d-d43c-4e41-997e-252ec6b87dbd/content.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.” Trade Topics, accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/fish_e/fish_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “China Initiates Dispute Regarding US Tax Credits for Electric Vehicles, Renewable Energy.” News release, accessed April 18, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/ds623rfc_28mar24_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Chronological List of Disputes Cases.” Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, accessed April 22, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Panel Established to Review Certain Tax Credits under US Inflation Reduction Act.” News release, September 23, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/dsb_23sep24_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement Activity.” December 31, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body.” Accessed May 8, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “DS577: United States—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Ripe Olives from Spain.” Dispute Settlement, October 25, 2023. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds577_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "DS623: United States—Certain Tax Credits Under the Inflation Reduction Act." Dispute Settlement, accessed April 18, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds623_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "General Council News Archives." Accessed March 5, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/committee_arc_e.htm?Subj=GC&extraSubj=&bodyCode=GC.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "General Council." Accessed February 24, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gcounc_e/gcounc_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "Information Technology Agreement — An Explanation." Accessed August 20, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/itaintro_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement." Fact sheet, September 4, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invfac_public_e/2024_09_24_ifd_factsheet_english.pdf

World Trade Organization (WTO). "Investment Facilitation for Development—Members Parties." Accessed April 16, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invfac_public_e/invfac_participation_list_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "Least-Developed Countries." Accessed April 16, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "MC13 Ends with Decisions on Dispute Reform, Development; Commitment to Continue Ongoing Talks." News release, March 1, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/mc13_01mar24_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "MC14 Host Cameroon Formally Accepts Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies." News release, December 16, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/fish_16dec24_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "Members and Observers." Accessed February 24, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "Members Submitting Acceptance of Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies." Trade Topics, accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/fish_e/fish_acceptances_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "Members Voice Support for Early Start of Director-General Selection Process." News release, July 22, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/gc_22jul24_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "Ministerial Conferences." Accessed February 24, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Ministers Approve WTO Membership of Comoros and Timor-Leste at MC13.” News release, February 26, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/acc_26feb24_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Nominations for Director-General Closed; Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala Confirmed as Sole Candidate.” News release, November 9, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/dgsel_09nov24_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Overview of the WTO Secretariat.” Accessed February 24, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Overview: A Navigational Guide.” Accessed February 24, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Plurilaterals: Of Minority Interest.” Accessed February 24, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “The History of the Multilateral Trading System.” Accessed February 24, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/history_e/history_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “The Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement.” Accessed April 16, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invfac_public_e/invfac_intro_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Thirteenth WTO Ministerial Conference News.” Accessed March 4, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/mc13_arc_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Three-Quarters of Members Mark Finalization of IFD Agreement, Request Incorporation into WTO.” News release, February 25, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/infac_25feb24_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “United States—Certain Tax Credits Under the Inflation Reduction Act.” Document No. WT/DS623/3, July 16, 2024. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DS/623-3.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “What Is the WTO?” Accessed February 24, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “WTO Accessions.” Accessed February 24, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “WTO Director-General: Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala.” Accessed February 24, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dg_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). “WTO Dispute Settlement Gateway.” Accessed April 22, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "WTO General Council Meeting, May 20–21, 2025, United States Interventions as Delivered." Accessed September 2, 2025. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Issue_Areas/Trade%20Organizations/WTO%20Remarks%20and%20Mentions/WTO%20GENERAL%20COUNCIL%20MEETING%20US%20INTERVENTIONS%20AS%20DELIVERED.pdf.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "WTO General Council Reappoints Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as Director-General for a Second Term." News release, November 29, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/gc_29nov24_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "WTO Legal Texts." Accessed August 20, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "WTO Organization Chart." Accessed February 24, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org2_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "WTO Technical Assistance and Training." Trade Topics, Accessed May 1, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Abu Dhabi Ministerial Declaration. March 4, 2024. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/DEC.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. June 17, 2022. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/33.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). *Annual Report 2023*. 2023. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/ar23_e.pdf.

World Trade Organization (WTO). General Council. Incorporation of the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement into Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement. May 14, 2024. https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/external-relations/wto/5509-wto-general-council-incorporation-of-the-investment-facilitation-for-development-agreement-into-annex-4-of-the-wto-agreement-revision-2-14-may-2024/file.html.

World Trade Organization (WTO). *Global Trade Outlook and Statistics*. April 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_outlook25_e.pdf.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. April 15, 1994. https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh Agreement). Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). April 15, 1994. https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_07_e.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Ministerial Conference. Declaration on the Precise, Effective and Operational Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. March 2, 2024. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/36.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Ministerial Conference. Joint Ministerial Declaration on the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement. February 25, 2024. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/17.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Ministerial Conference. Ministerial Decision: Dispute Settlement Reform. March 4, 2024. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/37.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Ministerial Conference. Ministerial Decision: TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complains. March 4, 2024. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/39.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Ministerial Conference. Ministerial Decision: Work Programme on Electronic Commerce. March 4, 2024. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/38.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Ministerial Conference. Ministerial Decision: Work Programme on Small Economies. March 4, 2024. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/33.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Ministerial Conference. Ministerial Decision: WTO Smooth Transition Support Measures in Favor of Countries Graduated from the LDC Category. March 4, 2024. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/34.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). Ministerial Conference. Ministerial Declaration: Strengthening Regulatory Cooperation to Reduce Technical Barriers to Trade. March 4, 2024. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/35.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). "U.S. Objectives for a Reformed Dispute Settlement System." July 5, 2023. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/Jobs/DSB/4.pdf&Open=True.

World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO Stats database. International trade statistics. Accessed April 16, 2025. https://stats.wto.org/.

Appendix A: Tables for Figures

Table A.1 Change in real gross domestic product, by the world economy and selected major economies, annual, 2023–24

In percentages. Corresponds to figure 1.1.

Economy	2023	2024
World	3.5	3.3
India	9.2	6.5
China	5.4	5.0
United States	2.9	2.8
Mexico	3.3	1.5
Canada	1.5	1.5
United Kingdom	0.4	1.1
European Union	0.4	0.9
Japan	1.5	0.1

Source: IMF, WEO Database, April 22, 2025; USDOC, BEA, table 1 “Real Gross Domestic Product and Related Measures: Percent Change From Preceding Period,” accessed June 26, 2025

Note: Individual economies ordered by 2024 GDP growth rates, from highest to lowest.

Table A.2 Change in global output and trade, annual, 2015–24

In percentages. Corresponds to figure 1.2.

Year	Real GDP	Volume of Exports of Goods and Services
2015	3.439	3.192
2016	3.261	2.365
2017	3.84	5.353
2018	3.653	3.683
2019	2.947	1.233
2020	−2.667	−8.091
2021	6.605	10.889
2022	3.645	5.397
2023	3.493	1.110
2024	3.292	3.869

Source: IMF, WEO Database, April 22, 2025.

Table A.3 Change in consumer prices, by the world economy and selected major economies, 2023–24
In percentages. Corresponds to figure 1.3.

Economy	2023	2024
World	6.6	5.7
India	5.4	4.7
Mexico	5.5	4.7
United States	4.1	3.0
Japan	3.3	2.7
European Union	6.3	2.6
United Kingdom	7.3	2.5
Canada	3.9	2.4
China	0.2	0.2

Source: IMF, WEO Database, “Inflation, average consumer prices, percent change,” April 22, 2025.
Note: Individual economies ordered by 2024 GDP growth rate, from highest to lowest.

Table A.4 Change in manufacturing output, by the world economy and selected major economies, annual, 2023–24
In percentages. Corresponds to figure 1.4.

Country	2023	2024
World average	1.2	2.2
China	4.7	6.7
India	6.5	4.2
European Union	−0.8	−2.5
Mexico	−0.3	−0.3
United States	−0.3	−0.4
United Kingdom	1.7	−1.0
Japan	−1.2	−1.8
Canada	−0.4	−3.2

Source: UNIDO, IIP Database, accessed May 13, 2025.
Note: EU average represents a simple unweighted average manufacturing output growth across 27 member countries. Individual economies ordered by 2024 GDP growth rate, from highest to lowest.

Table A.5 Percent change in global manufacturing output, by ISIC industry, 2023–24

In percentages. ISIC = the International Standard Industrial Classification; n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified. Corresponds to figure 1.5.

ISIC Code	Sector description	Percentage change in 2023–24
26	Computer, electronic and optical	9.8
20	Chemicals and chemical products	4.3
E	Water supply, sewerage and waste management	3.6
21	Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, etc.	3.6
30	Other transport equipment	3.5
D	Electricity, gas, steam & air conditioning	3.5
24	Basic metals	3.0
17	Paper and paper products	2.7
19	Coke and refined petroleum products	2.7
33	Repair and installation of machinery/equipment	2.4
C	Total manufacturing	2.2
13	Textiles	2.1
22	Rubber and plastics products	1.9
15	Leather and related products	1.7
27	Electrical equipment	1.7
10	Food products	1.5
14	Wearing apparel	1.4
25	Fabricated metal products, except machinery	1.3
29	Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers	0.7
11	Beverages	0.7
32	Other manufacturing	0.4
B	Mining and quarrying	0.0
18	Printing and reproduction of recorded media	−0.7
12	Tobacco products	−0.7
16	Wood products, excluding furniture	−0.8
31	Furniture	−1.1
28	Machinery and equipment n.e.c.	−1.4
23	Other non-metallic mineral products	−2.1

Source: UNIDO, IIP database, accessed May 13, 2025.

Table A.6 The nominal U.S. dollar appreciation against the currencies of major U.S. trading partners in 2024, in percent

In percentages. Corresponds to figure 1.6.

Currency	Change
Nominal Broad Dollar Index	9.0
Mexican peso	23.4
Japanese yen	11.7
Canadian dollar	9.1
Euro	6.9
Indian rupee	2.8
Chinese yuan	2.8
British pound	1.8

Source: USITC calculations based on Federal Reserve Board, “Foreign Exchange Rates—H.10,” May 6, 2025.

Table A.7 Merchandise exports by the global top five exporters, annual, 2023–24

In billions of dollars. European Union data exclude intra-EU trade. Corresponds to figure 1.7.

Economy	2023	2024
China	3,379.0	3,576.8
European Union	2,764.6	2,795.7
United States	2,020.5	2,061.7
Japan	717.3	707.0
South Korea	632.2	683.6

Source: WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade Statistics, Merchandise Trade Values, Annual, accessed June 25, 2025; USITC DataWeb/Census, total exports, accessed June 23, 2025.

Table A.8 Merchandise imports by the global top five importers, annual, 2023–24

In billions of dollars. European Union data exclude intra-EU trade. Corresponds to figure 1.8.

Economy	2023	2024
United States	3,076.8	3,266.4
European Union	2,727.6	2,633.9
China	2,556.9	2,587.2
United Kingdom	791.5	816.0
Japan	785.8	742.6

Source: WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade Statistics, Merchandise Trade Values, Annual, accessed June 25, 2025; USITC DataWeb/Census, general imports, accessed June 23, 2025.

Table A.9 Commercial services exports, by services trade category, annual, 2023–24

In billions of dollars. Corresponds to figure 1.9.

Category	2023	2024
Travel	1,533	1,740
Transport	1,370	1,483
Goods-related services	280	299
Other commercial services	4,781	5,239
Total	7,964	8,762

Source: WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade in Commercial Services, by Main Sector, Annual, accessed July 14, 2025.

Note: Data for 2024 are preliminary.

Table A.10 Commercial services exports, by the global top five exporters, annual, 2023–24

In billions of dollars. European Union data exclude intra-EU trade. Corresponds to figure 1.10.

Economy	2023	2024
European Union	1,535.6	1,674.7
United States	1,045.1	1,152.7
United Kingdom	583.1	644.6
China	379.6	444.4
Singapore	357.9	395.2

Source: WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade Statistics, Trade in Commercial Services, by Main Sector, Annual, accessed August 1, 2025. USDOC, BEA, "International Transactions, International Services, and International Investment Position Tables," International Transactions, table 3.1, U.S. International Trade in Services, accessed June 24, 2025.

Table A.11 Commercial services imports, by the global top five importers, annual, 2023–24

In billions of dollars. European Union data exclude intra-EU trade. Corresponds to figure 1.11.

Economy	2023	2024
European Union	1,373.9	1,470.8
United States	761.8	840.9
China	549.0	607.5
United Kingdom	358.7	398.7
Singapore	326.0	350.8

Source: WTO, WTO Stats, International Trade Statistics, Trade in Commercial Services, by Main Sector, Annual, accessed August 1, 2025. USDOC, BEA, "International Transactions, International Services, and International Investment Position Tables," International Transactions, table 3.1, U.S. International Trade in Services, accessed June 24, 2025.