Top of the page

---

Chapter 2
Administration of U.S. Trade Laws and Regulations

This chapter surveys activities related to the administration of U.S. trade laws during 2016, covering import relief laws, laws against unfair trade practices, trade adjustment assistance programs, and tariff preference programs. Tariff preference programs encompass the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, including initiatives aiding Haiti. [57]

Import Relief Laws

Safeguard Actions

This section covers safeguard actions under provisions administered by the Commission, including the global safeguards provided for in sections 201–204 of the Trade Act of 1974, and the safeguards provided for in various bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) involving the United States.

The Commission conducted no new safeguard investigations during 2016, and no U.S. safeguard measures under these provisions were in effect during any part of 2016. One petition was filed during 2016, with regard to imports of primary unwrought aluminum, but the petition was withdrawn and no investigation was conducted or determination made.

Laws against Unfair Trade Practices

Section 301

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the principal U.S. statute for addressing unfair foreign practices affecting U.S. exports of goods or services. [58] Section 301 may be used to enforce U.S. rights under bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and to respond to unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory foreign government practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Interested persons may petition the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate foreign government policies or practices, or USTR may initiate an investigation itself.

If the investigation involves a trade agreement and consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable resolution, section 303 of the Trade Act of 1974 requires USTR to use the dispute settlement procedures available under the subject agreement. If the matter is not resolved by the conclusion of the investigation, section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974 requires USTR to determine whether the practices in question fulfill any of three conditions: (1) they deny U.S. rights under a trade agreement; (2) they are unjustifiable, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce; or (3) they are unreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. If the practices fulfill either of the first two conditions, USTR must take action. [59] If the practices fulfill the third condition—that is, if they are unreasonable or discriminatory, and they burden or restrict U.S. commerce—USTR must determine whether action is appropriate and, if so, what type of action to take. [60] The time period for making these determinations varies according to the type of practices alleged.

Section 301 Investigations

USTR received no petitions under section 301 during 2016 and had only one ongoing investigation during the year, relating to European Union (EU) measures concerning meat and meat products. [61] The case concerned various meat hormone directives of the EU, which prohibit the use of certain hormones that promote growth in farm animals. The United States had successfully challenged the EU measures at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and in 1999, imposed additional ad valorem duties [62] of 100 percent on about $117 million in imports from the EU in retaliation. [63]

After a series of consultations aimed at resolving the dispute, on May 13, 2009, the United States and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU). [64] Under the MOU, the EU agreed to open a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) [65] with an in-quota tariff rate of zero for beef produced without growth-promoting hormones (i.e., “high-quality beef”) [66] in the amount of 20,000 metric tons (mt), [67] and the United States agreed to reduce the scope of the retaliation list. [68]

The MOU further provided that the parties could enter a second phase under which the EU would increase the TRQ to 45,000 mt beginning in August 2012, and the United States would lift the remaining additional duties. [69] The United States and the EU entered into the second phase of the MOU beginning August 1, 2012, and the EU increased the TRQ for high-quality beef to 45,000 mt. [70] The MOU provided that the second phase would continue for one year. In August 2013, the United States and the EU agreed to extend the second phase of the MOU for two additional years, until August 2, 2015, thereby maintaining the TRQ for high-quality beef at 45,000 mt. [71] Although the second phase of the MOU ended in August 2015, the EU has maintained the 45,000 mt TRQ for high-quality beef. [72]

In February 2016, Congress amended the 301 statute that authorized USTR to reinstate any additional duties that had been previously imposed under section 301 and then subsequently terminated. [73] The 2016 amendment provides that USTR may reinstate a 301 action following a written request from a petitioner or any representative of the domestic industry. Following the receipt of such a request, USTR must consult with the petitioner and representatives of the domestic industry and provide an opportunity for public comments. In addition, USTR must review the effectiveness of the reimposition of additional duties. This amendment would allow USTR to suspend concessions in the meat hormone dispute with the EU.

On December 9, 2016, representatives of the U.S. beef industry filed a request with USTR asking that the additional duties be reinstated. [74] On December 28, 2016, USTR issued a public notice of the request and announced a public hearing and an opportunity for public comment. [75]

Special 301

The Special 301 law [76] requires that the USTR annually identify and issue a list of foreign countries that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), or deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. persons who rely on IPR protection. [77] Under the statute, a country denies adequate and effective IPR protection if the country does not allow foreign persons “to secure, exercise, and enforce rights related to patents, process patents, registered trademarks, copyrights and mask works.” [78]

Under the statute, a country denies fair and equitable market access if it denies access to a market for a product that is protected by a copyright or related right, patent, trademark, mask work, trade secret, or plant breeder’s right through the use of laws and practices that violate international agreements or that constitute discriminatory nontariff trade barriers. [79] A country may be found to deny adequate and effective IPR protection even if it is in compliance with its obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). [80]

In addition, the Special 301 law directs the USTR to identify and list so-called “priority foreign countries.” [81] Priority foreign countries are countries that have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices with the greatest adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant U.S. products. [82] Such countries must be designated as priority foreign countries unless they are entering into good-faith negotiations, or they are making significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations to provide adequate and effective IPR protection. [83] The identification of a country as a priority foreign country triggers a section 301 investigation, [84] unless the USTR determines that the investigation would be detrimental to U.S. economic interests. [85]

In addition to identifying priority foreign countries as required by statute, the USTR has adopted a practice of naming countries to a “watch list” or a “priority watch list” when the countries’ IPR laws and practices fail to provide adequate and effective IPR protection, but the deficiencies do not warrant listing the countries as priority foreign countries. [86] The priority watch list identifies countries with significant IPR problems that warrant close monitoring and bilateral consultation. If a country on the priority watch list makes progress, it may be moved to the watch list or removed from any listing. On the other hand, a country that fails to make progress may be raised from the watch list to the priority watch list, or from the priority watch list to the list of priority foreign countries.

In February 2016, Congress enacted amendments to the special 301 statute that provided that USTR should develop an action plan for each country that has been identified as a priority watch list country and that has remained on the priority watch list for at least one year. [87] The action plan should contain benchmarks designed to assist the country to achieve, or make significant progress toward achieving, adequate and effective protection of IPRs and fair and equitable market access for U.S. persons that rely on IPR protection.

In the 2016 Special 301 review, the USTR examined the adequacy and effectiveness of IPR protection in 73 countries. [88] In conducting the review, the USTR focused on a wide range of issues and policy objectives, including:

• The deterioration in IPR protection and enforcement in a number of trading partners;

• Reported inadequate trade secret protection in China, India, and elsewhere;

• Troubling “indigenous innovation” policies that may unfairly disadvantage U.S. rights holders in markets abroad;

• Compulsory technology licensing and transfer;

• Online copyright piracy;

• Market access barriers that appear to impede access for U.S. entities that rely on IPR protection, including the pharmaceutical and medical device industries;

• The unauthorized use of unlicensed software by foreign governments;

• Digital, Internet, and broadcast piracy;

• Counterfeiting, trademark counterfeiting, and trademark rights; and

• Geographical indications’ impact on trademark protection. [89]

No country was identified as a priority foreign country in the 2016 Special 301 Report . The report identified 11 countries on the priority watch list: Algeria, Argentina, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine, and Venezuela. [90] In addition, the report identified 23 countries on the watch list. [91]

In keeping China on the priority watch list, the report highlighted longstanding concerns relating to trade secret theft, market access barriers for information and communications technology products, piracy and counterfeiting online and in physical markets, and compulsory technology transfer and licensing requirements. [92] India remained on the priority watch list in 2016 due to a lack of measurable improvement to its IPR regime. [93]

As part of the annual Special 301 process, USTR also issues a separate report on so-called notorious markets. The report, entitled 2016 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets , was issued in December 2016. USTR defines notorious markets as online or physical marketplaces that are reported to engage in or facilitate commercial-scale copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting. The report highlights those markets where the scale of this activity is such that it can cause significant harm to U.S. intellectual property rights holders. [94] The 2016 report listed over 20 online markets and over 20 physical markets in 10 countries, including markets in China and India that reportedly engage in or facilitate commercial-scale trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy.

Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations and Reviews

Antidumping Duty Investigations

The U.S. antidumping law is found in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. [95] This law offers relief to U.S. industries that are materially injured by imports that are dumped, or sold at “less than fair value” (LTFV). The U.S. government provides a remedy by imposing a special additional duty on LTFV imports.

Antidumping duties are imposed when (1) the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) has determined that imports are being, or are likely to be, sold at LTFV in the United States, and (2) the Commission has determined that a U.S. industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded by reason of such imports. (Such a conclusion is called an “affirmative determination.”) Investigations are generally initiated on the basis of a petition filed with the USDOC and the Commission by or on behalf of a U.S. industry. The USDOC and the Commission each make preliminary determinations and, if the Commission’s preliminary determination is affirmative, then each agency will make final determinations during the investigation process.

In general, imports are considered to be sold at LTFV when a foreign firm sells merchandise in the U.S. market at a price that is lower than the “normal value” of the merchandise. [96] Generally, normal value is the price the foreign firm charges for a comparable product sold in its home market. [97] Under certain circumstances, the foreign firm’s U.S. sales price may also be compared with the price the foreign firm charges in other export markets or with the firm’s cost of producing the merchandise, taking into account the firm’s “selling, general, and administrative expenses,” and its profit. Under the law, this latter basis for comparison is known as “constructed value.” [98] Finally, where the producer is located in a nonmarket economy, a comparison is made between U.S. prices and a “surrogate” normal value (its factors of production, as valued by use of a “surrogate” country). [99] A nonmarket economy country means any foreign country that the administering authority determines does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise. [100]

In all three instances, the amount by which the normal value exceeds the U.S. price is the “dumping margin.” The duty specified in an antidumping duty order reflects the weighted average dumping margins found by the USDOC, both for the specific exporters it examined and for all other exporters. [101] This rate of duty (in addition to any ordinary customs duty owed) will be applied to subsequent imports from the specified producers/exporters in the subject country, but it may be adjusted if the USDOC receives a request for an annual review. [102]

The Commission instituted 36 new antidumping investigations, and made 35 preliminary determinations and 41 final determinations in 2016. [103] As a result of affirmative final USDOC and Commission determinations, in 2016, the USDOC issued 32 antidumping duty orders on 8 products from 16 countries (table 2.1). The status of all antidumping investigations active at the Commission during 2016—including, if applicable, the date of final action—is presented in appendix table A.10. A list of all antidumping duty orders and suspension agreements (agreements to suspend investigations) [104] in effect as of the end of 2016 appears in appendix table A.11.

Table 2.1 Antidumping duty orders that became effective during 2016 a

Trade partner	Product	Range of dumping margins (percent)
Australia	Hot-rolled carbon steel flat products	29.58
Australia	Uncoated paper	138.87–222.46
Brazil	Cold-rolled steel flat products	19.58–35.43
Brazil	Hot-rolled carbon steel flat products	33.14–34.28
Brazil	Uncoated paper	22.37–41.39
Canada	Polyethylene terephthalate resin	13.6
China	Cold-rolled steel flat products	265.79
China	Corrosion-resistant steel products	209.97
China	Hydrofluorocarbon blends	101.82–216.37
China	Polyethylene terephthalate resin	104.98–126.58
China	Uncoated paper	84.05–149.00
India	Cold-rolled steel flat products	7.6
India	Corrosion-resistant steel products	3.05–4.44
India	Polyethylene terephthalate resin	8.03–19.41
India	Welded stainless pressure pipe	12.66
Indonesia	Uncoated paper	2.10–17.46
Italy	Corrosion-resistant steel products	12.63–92.12
Japan	Cold-rolled steel flat products	71.35
Japan	Hot-rolled carbon steel flat products	4.99–7.51
Mexico	Heavy-walled rectangular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes	3.83–5.21
Netherlands	Hot-rolled carbon steel flat products	3.73
Oman	Polyethylene terephthalate resin	7.62
Portugal	Uncoated paper	7.8
South Korea	Cold-rolled steel flat products	6.32–34.33
South Korea	Corrosion-resistant steel products	8.75–47.80
South Korea	Heavy-walled rectangular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes	2.34–3.82
South Korea	Hot-rolled carbon steel flat products	4.61–9.49
Taiwan	Corrosion-resistant steel products	3.77
Turkey	Heavy-walled rectangular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes	17.83–35.66
Turkey	Hot-rolled carbon steel flat products	4.15–6.77
U.K.	Cold-rolled steel flat products	5.40–25.17
U.K.	Hot-rolled carbon steel flat products	33.06

Source: Compiled by USITC from Federal Register notices.

a Antidumping duty orders become effective following final affirmative determinations by USDOC and the Commission. The rates in the table apply in addition to any ordinary customs duty owed.

Countervailing Duty Investigations

The U.S. countervailing duty law is also set forth in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. It provides for the imposition of special additional duties to offset (“countervail”) foreign subsidies on products imported into the United States. [105] In general, procedures for such investigations are similar to those under the antidumping law. Petitions are filed with the USDOC (the administering authority) and with the Commission. Before a countervailing duty order can be issued, the USDOC must find that a countervailable subsidy exists. In addition, the Commission must make an affirmative determination that a U.S. industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of an industry is materially retarded, because of the subsidized imports.

The Commission instituted 16 new countervailing duty investigations, and made 14 preliminary determinations and 25 final determinations during 2016. USDOC issued 16 countervailing duty orders on 7 products from 7 countries in 2016 as a result of affirmative USDOC and Commission determinations (table 2.2). The status of all countervailing duty investigations active at the Commission during 2016, and, if applicable, the date of final action, is presented in appendix table A.12. A list of all countervailing duty orders and suspension agreements [106] in effect at the end of 2016 appears in appendix table A.13.

Table 2.2 Countervailing duty orders that became effective during 2016 a

Trade partner	Product	Range of countervailable subsidy rates (percent)
Brazil	Cold-rolled steel flat products	11.09–11.31
Brazil	Hot-rolled carbon steel flat products	11.09–11.30
China	Cold-rolled steel flat products	254.44
China	Corrosion-resistant steel products	39.05–241.07
China	Polyethylene terephthalate resin	7.53–47.56
China	Uncoated paper	7.23–176.75
India	Cold-rolled steel flat products	10
India	Corrosion-resistant steel products	8.00–29.49
India	Polyethylene terephthalate resin	5.12–153.80
India	Welded stainless pressure pipe	3.13–6.22
Indonesia	Uncoated paper	21.21–109.14
Italy	Corrosion-resistant steel products	0.07–38.51
South Korea	Cold-rolled steel flat products	3.89–59.72
South Korea	Corrosion-resistant steel products	0.72–1.19
South Korea	Hot-rolled carbon steel flat products	3.89–58.68
Turkey	Heavy-walled rectangular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes	9.87–15.08

Source: Compiled by USITC from Federal Register notices.

a Countervailing duty orders become effective following final affirmative determinations by USDOC and the Commission. The rates in the table apply in addition to any ordinary customs duty owed.

Reviews of Outstanding Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders/Suspension Agreements

Section 751(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 requires the USDOC, if requested, to conduct annual reviews of outstanding antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders to ascertain the amount of any net subsidy or dumping margin and to determine compliance with suspension agreements. [107] Section 751(b) also authorizes the USDOC and the Commission, as appropriate, to review certain outstanding determinations and agreements after receiving information or a petition that shows changed circumstances. [108] Where a changed-circumstances review is directed to the Commission, the party that is asking to have an antidumping duty order or countervailing duty order revoked or a suspended investigation terminated has the burden of persuading the Commission that circumstances have changed enough to warrant revocation. [109] On the basis of either the USDOC’s or the Commission’s review, the USDOC may revoke an antidumping duty or countervailing duty order in whole or in part, or may either terminate or resume a suspended investigation. No changed-circumstances investigations were conducted by the Commission during 2016.

Section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 requires both the USDOC and the Commission to conduct “sunset” reviews of existing antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders and suspension agreements five years after their publication. These reviews are intended to determine whether revoking an order or terminating a suspension agreement would be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of dumping or a countervailable subsidy and to material injury. [110] If either the USDOC or the Commission reach negative determinations, the order will be revoked or the suspension agreement terminated. During 2016, the USDOC and the Commission instituted 53 sunset reviews of existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders or suspended investigations, [111] and the Commission completed 53 reviews. As a result of affirmative determinations by the USDOC and the Commission, 47 antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders were continued. Appendix table A.14 lists, by date and action, the reviews of antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders and suspended investigations completed in 2016. [112]

Section 129 Investigations

Section 129 of the U.S. Uruguay Round Agreements Act sets out a procedure by which the Administration may respond to an adverse WTO panel or Appellate Body report concerning U.S. obligations under the WTO agreements on safeguards, antidumping, or subsidies and countervailing measures. Specifically, section 129 establishes a mechanism permitting the USTR to request that the agencies concerned—the USDOC and the Commission—issue a consistency or compliance determination, where such action is appropriate, to respond to the recommendations in a WTO panel or Appellate Body report. [113]

Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India. On December 8, 2014, the WTO Appellate Body issued its report on the dispute entitled United States—Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India (DS436), and on December 19, 2014, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted that report. At the request of USTR, on September 23, 2015, USDOC commenced section 129 proceedings to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in DS436 [114] and on November 6, 2015, the Commission instituted a section 129 proceeding to issue a consistency determination under section 129(a)(4) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act that would render the Commission’s countervailing duty determination regarding subject imports from India in investigation number 701-TA-405 not inconsistent with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. [115]

On March 7, 2016, the Commission issued a section 129 Consistency Determination rendering its findings with respect to injury in the underlying countervailing duty proceeding on hot-rolled steel from India consistent with the DSB’s recommendations and rulings in DS436. [116] On April 14, 2016, USDOC issued a section 129 compliance determination with respect to subsidization and the calculation of countervailing duty rates consistent with the DSB’s recommendations and rulings in DS436. [117]

Certain Products from China. On December 18, 2014, the WTO Appellate Body issued its report on another dispute entitled United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China (DS437), and on January 16, 2015, the WTO DSB adopted that report. At the request of USTR, on April 27, 2015, USDOC commenced section 129 proceedings to comply with the DSB’s recommendations and rulings in DS437. ^[118] On March 31, 2016, April 26, 2016, and May 19, 2016, USDOC issued its final section 129 determinations to comply with the DSB’s recommendations and rulings in DS437. ^[119]

Warmwater Shrimp from Viet Nam . On November 17, 2014, the WTO dispute settlement panel issued its report on the dispute entitled United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Viet Nam (DS429). At the request of USTR, on May 20, 2016, USDOC commenced section 129 proceedings to implement certain findings of the WTO dispute settlement panel in DS429. ^[120] On July 18, 2016, USDOC issued its final section 129 determination to implement certain findings in the DS429 panel report. ^[121]

Section 337 Investigations

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, [122] prohibits certain unfair practices in the import trade. The unfair practice most frequently investigated by the Commission is patent infringement. In this context, section 337 prohibits the importation into the United States, the sale for importation, and the sale within the United States after importation of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent, provided that an industry in the United States, relating to articles protected by the patent concerned, exists or is in the process of being established. [123] Similar requirements govern investigations involving infringement of registered trademarks, registered copyrights, registered mask works, and registered vessel hull designs. In addition, the Commission has general authority to investigate other unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation and sale of products in the United States (such as products manufactured abroad using stolen U.S. trade secrets), the threat or effect of which is to destroy or injure a U.S. industry, to prevent the establishment of a U.S. industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States. [124] The Commission may institute an investigation on the basis of a complaint or on its own initiative. [125]

If the Commission determines that a violation exists, it can issue an exclusion order directing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to block the subject imports from entry into the United States, and it can hand down cease and desist orders that direct the violating parties to stop engaging in the unlawful practices. The orders enter into force unless disapproved for policy reasons by the USTR [126] within 60 days of issuance. [127]

During calendar year 2016, there were 122 active section 337 investigations and ancillary proceedings, 80 of which were instituted that year. Of these 80 new proceedings, 54 were new section 337 investigations and 26 were new ancillary (secondary) proceedings relating to previously concluded investigations. In 46 of the new section 337 investigations instituted in 2016, patent infringement was the only type of unfair act alleged. Of the remaining 8 investigations, 2 involved allegations of patent infringement and trademark infringement; 2 involved allegations of trademark infringement; 1 involved allegations of patent infringement, copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and trade dress infringement; 1 involved allegations of false advertising and unfair competition; 1 involved allegations of trademark infringement and dilution; and 1 involved allegations of price-fixing, trade secret misappropriation, and false designation of origin.

The Commission completed a total of 66 investigations and ancillary proceedings under section 337 in 2016, including 1 remand proceeding, 1 remand enforcement proceeding, 1 modification proceeding, 2 advisory opinion proceedings, 1 bond forfeiture proceeding, 1 sanctions proceeding, and 12 rescission (cancellation) proceedings. In addition, 3 general exclusion orders, 9 limited exclusion orders, and 11 cease and desist orders were issued during 2016. The Commission terminated 31 investigations without determining whether there had been a violation. Twenty-three of these investigations were terminated on the basis of settlement agreements and/or consent orders. Commission activities involving section 337 proceedings in 2016 are presented in appendix table A.15.

The section 337 investigations active in 2016 continued to involve a broad spectrum of products. As in prior years, technology products were the single largest category, with approximately 30 percent of the active proceedings involving computer and telecommunications equipment and another 7 percent involving consumer electronics. In addition, small consumer items, including lip balm, resealable plastic bags, coffee pods, and mobile device holders, were at issue in approximately 14 percent of the active proceedings; automotive, transportation, and manufacturing products were at issue in about 11 percent of the active proceedings; and pharmaceuticals and medical devices were also at issue in about 11 percent of the proceedings. The remaining 27 percent of active proceedings involved a wide variety of other types of articles, including air mattresses, hospital beds, quartz slabs, bathtub assemblies, hand dryers, aerogel insulation, athletic footwear, and coatings for optical fibers.

At the close of 2016, 56 section 337 investigations and related proceedings were pending at the Commission. As of December 31, 2016, there were 101 exclusion orders based on violations of section 337 in effect. Appendix table A.16 lists the investigations in which these exclusion orders were issued. For additional detailed information about 337 investigations instituted since October 1, 2008, see the Commission’s 337Info database, found at https://pubapps2.usitc.gov/337external .

Trade Adjustment Assistance

The United States provides trade adjustment assistance (TAA) to aid U.S. workers and firms adversely affected by import competition. [128] On June 29, 2015, President Barack Obama signed into law the Trade Preferences Extension Act (TPEA). Title IV of the TPEA—the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015 (TAARA 2015)—amended and reauthorized TAA for six years, until June 30, 2021. [129] The main TAA programs in effect in fiscal year (FY) 2016 were TAA for Workers, administered by the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), and TAA for Firms, administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). A third program, TAA for Farmers, administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), was reauthorized by Congress through the TPEA of 2015. [130] However, the U.S. Congress did not appropriate funding for new participants in this program for FY 2016. As a result, USDA did not accept any new petitions or applications for benefits in FY 2016. [131]

Selected developments in the TAA programs for workers and firms during FY 2016 are summarized below. [132]

Assistance for Workers

The TAA for Workers program gives federal assistance to eligible workers who have been adversely affected by import competition. The TAA program offers a variety of benefits and services to eligible workers, including training, assistance with healthcare premium costs, trade readjustment allowances, reemployment trade adjustment assistance, and employment and case management services. [133] Current information on provisions of the TAA for Workers program, as well as detailed information on program eligibility requirements, benefits, and available services, is available at the USDOL’s Employment and Training Administration (ETA) website for TAA, https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/ .

For petitioning workers to be eligible to apply for TAA, the Secretary of Labor must determine that they meet certain criteria relating to the reasons they were separated from their firm, including declining sales or production at their firm and increased imports of like or directly competitive articles. [134] (Workers often apply in groups based on their former firms.) Workers at firms that are or were suppliers to or downstream users of the output of TAA-certified firms may also be eligible for TAA benefits. [135]

TAARA 2015, which was in effect throughout FY 2016, has the same worker group eligibility provisions and program benefits and services as the 2011 program. [136] The differences between the TAARA 2015 program and the Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act (TAAEA) 2011 program are in the funding level for “training and other activities,” and in performance and reporting requirements. [137] The cap on training funds (funds given to states to pay for TAA training and other activities) was reduced from $575 million in the TAAEA 2011 program to $450 million in the TAARA 2015 program. [138]

In FY 2016, $626.8 million was allocated to state governments to fund the TAA for Workers program. This funding included $391.5 million for “training and other activities,” which includes funds for training, job search allowances, relocation allowances, employment and case management services, and related state administration; $209.4 million for trade readjustment allowance benefits; and $26.0 million for reemployment trade adjustment assistance benefits. [139]

Groups of workers submitted 1,453 petitions for TAA in FY 2016, up 35.4 percent from the 1,073 petitions filed in FY 2015 (table 2.3). [140] The increase was likely due to the fact that certain service sector workers, and worker groups whose jobs are adversely affected by trade from countries that are not parties to FTAs with the United States (such as China and India), became eligible for TAA under the TAARA 2015 program, and therefore filed their applications in FY 2016. The USDOL certified 1,192 petitions covering 126,844 workers as eligible for TAA, and denied 569 petitions covering 60,871 workers. [141] The largest number of petitions certified in FY 2016 was in the Midwest census region, followed by the South, the Northeast, and the West. [142] By state, California had the most workers certified (11,455 workers), followed by Pennsylvania (10,667 workers), Texas (9,908 workers), Illinois (7,266 workers), and Indiana (6,981 workers).

Table 2.3 TAA certifications, by region, FY 2016

Census region	No. of petitions certified	No. of workers covered
Midwest	342	38,923
South	311	35,567
Northeast	269	23,015
West	266	28,887
Other	4	452

Source: USDOL, ETA, email message to USITC staff, February 28, 2017.

The majority (56.5 percent, 673 petitions) of the TAA petitions certified during FY 2016 were in the manufacturing sector, covering 83,664 workers, followed by the professional, scientific, and technical services sector (12.3 percent, 147 petitions) and the information sector (6.5 percent, 77 petitions) (figure 2.1). The share of TAA petitions certified during FY 2016 for the professional, scientific, and technical services, as well as for the information sector, are both higher than those during FY 2015, which is likely due to the fact that the TAARA 2015 program reinstated the eligibility of service sector workers to apply for TAA benefits.

Figure 2.1 Share of TAA petitions certified by industry sector in FY 2016

Source: USDOL, ETA, email message to USITC staff, February 28, 2017.

Note: “Other” includes all industry sectors where less than 15 petitions were certified in FY 2016. Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.9.

Assistance for Firms

The TAA for Firms program provides technical assistance to help U.S. firms experiencing a decline in sales and employment to become more competitive in the global marketplace. [143] The program provides cost-sharing technical assistance to help eligible businesses create and implement targeted business recovery plans called Adjustment Proposals. The program pays up to 75 percent of the costs of developing the recovery plans, and firms also contribute a share of the cost of creating and implementing their recovery plans. [144] TAARA 2015 authorizes this program through FY 2021. [145] Current information on provisions of the TAA for Firms program, as well as detailed information on program eligibility requirements, benefits, and available services, is available at the USDOC’s Economic Development Administration (EDA) website for TAA, https://www.taacenters.org/ .

To be eligible for the program, a firm must show that an increase in imports of like or directly competitive articles “contributed importantly” to the decline in sales or production and to the separation or threat of separation of a significant portion of the firm’s workers. [146] The program supports a nationwide network of 11 nonprofit or university-affiliated Trade Adjustment Assistance Centers to help U.S. manufacturing, production, and service firms. [147] Firms work with these centers in a public-private framework to apply for certification of eligibility for assistance from the TAA for Firms program, and to prepare and carry out strategies to guide their economic recovery. [148] In particular, technical assistance in the form of matching funds is provided through the centers to help U.S. firms develop recovery strategies. [149] Matching funds can be applied toward the cost of hiring third-party consultants to help firms and toward the cost of developing and carrying out adjustment proposals to improve a firm’s market position and competitiveness. [150] Firms generally have up to five years to implement an approved adjustment proposal. [151]

In FY 2016, the TAA for Firms program budget authorization from Congress was $16 million, while FY 2016 actual funding appropriated for the program was $13 million. [152] During FY 2016, EDA certified 67 petitions for eligibility and approved 78 adjustment proposals. [153] The numbers are both lower than in FY 2015, when EDA certified 113 petitions and approved 120 adjustment proposals. [154]

Tariff Preference Programs

Three major U.S. programs that offer tariff preferences to developing countries were operative during 2016: the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), as amended by the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), the Haitian Hemisphere Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Acts of 2006 and of 2008 (the HOPE Acts), and the Haitian Economic Lift Program of 2010 (HELP Act). [155] The value of U.S. imports for which eligibility was claimed under these trade preference programs increased 6.5 percent from $27.7 billion in 2015 to $29.5 billion in 2016, accounting for 1.3 percent of total U.S. imports in 2016. [156]

Generalized System of Preferences

The U.S. GSP program authorizes the President to grant duty-free access to the U.S. market for certain products that are imported from designated developing countries and territories. [157] Certain additional products are allowed duty-free treatment only when imported from countries designated as least-developed beneficiary developing countries (LDBDCs). Although the President’s authority to provide duty-free treatment under the GSP program expired on July 31, 2013, President Obama signed into law a bill on June 29, 2015, that reauthorized GSP retroactively to its date of expiration (July 31, 2013) and extended coverage through December 31, 2017. [158]

The goal of the GSP program is to accelerate economic growth in developing countries by offering unilateral tariff preferences for imports into the U.S. market. An underlying principle of the GSP program is that the creation of trade opportunities for developing countries encourages broader-based economic development and creates momentum for economic reform and liberalization. The GSP program also allows U.S. companies access to products from beneficiary countries on generally the same terms that are available to competitors in other developed countries that grant similar trade preferences. [159]

Countries are designated as “beneficiary developing countries” under the GSP program by the President, although they can lose this designation based on findings of country practices that violate the provisions of the GSP statute, including inadequate protection of IPR or internationally recognized worker rights. [160] Country practice allegations are usually brought to the attention of the interagency GSP subcommittee by a petition process. Some beneficiary developing countries are also designated LDBDCs, and, as such, are eligible for GSP benefits for an additional list of about 1,500 products.

The President also designates the articles that are eligible for duty-free treatment, but may not designate articles that he determines to be “import-sensitive” in the context of the GSP. Certain goods (e.g., footwear, textiles, and apparel) are designated by statute as “import-sensitive” and thus not eligible for duty-free treatment under the GSP program. The statute also provides that countries “graduate” from the program when they become “high income,” as defined by the World Bank’s per capita income tables. [161] The statute also allows for ending the eligibility of certain imports, or imports from specific countries, under certain conditions.

Competitive need limitations (CNLs) are another important part of the GSP program’s structure. CNLs are quantitative ceilings on GSP benefits for each product and beneficiary developing country. [162] The GSP statute provides that a beneficiary developing country will lose its GSP eligibility with respect to a product if the CNLs are exceeded, though waivers may be granted under certain conditions. Two different measures for CNLs may apply to U.S. imports of a particular product from a beneficiary developing country during any calendar year. One CNL measure applies to imports from a beneficiary developing country that account for 50 percent or more of the value of total U.S. imports of that product. The other applies to imports that exceed a certain dollar value ($175 million in 2016). [163] The legislation to reauthorize the GSP program in 2006 provided that a CNL waiver in effect on a product for five or more years should be revoked if total U.S. imports from a beneficiary developing country exceed certain “super-competitive” value thresholds. [164]

The following developments with respect to the U.S. GSP program occurred in 2016: [165]

• Based on the 2015/2016 GSP Annual Review process conducted under USTR’s direction, new duty-free status under the GSP program was extended to 27 travel goods (including luggage, backpacks, handbags, and wallets) for LDBDCs and AGOA countries. A decision to extend GSP eligibility for these products for all GSP beneficiaries was deferred.

• Additional results of the 2015/2016 GSP Annual Review included denial of one petition to add a product (effervescent wine) to GSP eligibility for all countries, and deferral of action on petitions involving two other products (essential oils of lemon and ferromanganese); granting of CNL waivers for three products, each from a specific country as requested by petition (pitted dates from Tunisia, single-cell micro-organisms from Brazil, and certain non-alcoholic beverages from Thailand); and denial of one such petition (certain motor vehicle parts from India). Three products were newly excluded for exceeding CNL thresholds (a fortified fruit juice product from Philippines, certain iron/steel products, and certain motor vehicle parts, both from India); brightening agents and polyethylene terephthalate (PET) resins were removed from GSP for India; de minimis CNL waivers were granted for 111 eligible products; [166] and a decision was made not to redesignate any products that had been excluded during prior GSP reviews, but for which import levels had dropped below the threshold amounts set for the current review.

• On November 13, 2016, Burma’s eligibility for GSP benefits was reinstated after the conclusion of a review of its compliance with the eligibility criteria under the GSP statute. The United States suspended Burma’s GSP benefits in 1989 due to worker rights concerns. Burma requested reinstatement in 2013. The Office of the United States Trade Representative led an extensive review of Burma’s compliance with all of the GSP eligibility criteria, and in particular of Burma’s recent record of labor reforms and strengthened worker protections. Since the new democratically elected government took office in March 2016, senior Burmese government officials have engaged closely with the United States on labor issues to demonstrate Burma’s eligibility under the GSP criteria. Designation of eligibility for GSP acknowledges the progress made to date by Burma and encourages additional progress, which the United States will continue to monitor closely, in order to address the labor concerns and challenges that remain. [167]

U.S. imports under GSP preferences increased 5.6 percent ($990.4 million) from $17.7 billion in 2015 to $18.7 billion in 2016, which accounted for 9.3 percent of total U.S. imports from GSP beneficiary countries and 0.9 percent of total U.S. imports (tables 2.4 and A.2). India was the leading source of imports entered under the GSP program in 2016, followed by Thailand and Brazil, continuing a pattern established in 2011 (appendix table A.17). These three countries together accounted for 57.7 percent of all U.S. imports under GSP, while the top five countries (including Indonesia and the Philippines) accounted for 75.0 percent of GSP imports. All five countries saw an increase in the value of their 2016 GSP imports over the previous year.

In 2016, the chemicals sector accounted for the largest increase in imports claiming eligibility under GSP (up $422.0 million), making it the top import sector. The minerals and metals sector ranked second in 2016, declining $192.6 million from 2015, when it was the top sector. Agricultural products made up the third-largest sector and also saw imports claiming eligibility increase $241.5 million over 2015. Energy-related products accounted for less than 1 percent of GSP eligible claims in 2015 and 2016, down from 4.5 percent in 2014. Crude petroleum, formerly the top U.S. import under GSP, dropped from substantial levels in previous years to zero in 2015 and 2016. [168]

Table 2.4 U.S. imports for consumption from GSP beneficiaries, 2014–16

Item	2014	2015	2016
Total imports from GSP beneficiaries (million $)	261,123	206,579	201,705
Total imports under GSP (million $)	18,799	17,694	18,684
Imports under LDBDC provisions (million $) a	871	25	55
Imports under non-LDBDC provisions (million $) b	17,929	17,669	18,629
Imports under GSP (as share of all imports from GSP countries)	7.2	8.6	9.3

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed March 25, 2017).

Note: LDBDC = least-developed beneficiary developing country. The President’s authority to provide duty-free treatment under the GSP program expired on July 31, 2013, but was renewed retroactively effective July 29, 2015.

a LDBDC-eligible products are those for which the rate of duty of “free” appears in the special rate column of the HTS, followed by the symbol “A+” in parentheses. The symbol “A+” indicates that all LDBDCs (and only LDBDCs) are eligible for duty-free treatment with respect to all articles listed in the designated provisions.

b Non-LDBDC-eligible products are those for which a rate of duty of “free” appears in the special rate column of the HTS followed by the symbols “A” or “A*” in parentheses. The symbol “A” indicates that all beneficiary countries are eligible for duty-free treatment with respect to all articles listed in the designated provisions. The symbol “A*” indicates that certain beneficiary countries (specified in general note 4(d) of the HTS) are not eligible for duty-free treatment with respect to any article listed in the designated provision.

On a product basis, gold jewelry was the top GSP import in 2016, sourced primarily from Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, Bolivia, and Pakistan. These countries accounted for 84.6 percent of U.S. imports of gold jewelry under GSP. The second-largest GSP import was certain nonalcoholic beverages (with over 90 percent of imports sourced from Thailand, the Philippines, and Brazil), followed by ferrochromium (primarily from South Africa and Turkey), parts of air conditioning machines (primarily from Thailand), and rubber gloves (primarily from Thailand and Indonesia). Among the top 25 U.S. imports under GSP, almost all increased in 2016. These included gold jewelry (up $216 million, or 64.1 percent, from 2015 levels, with Turkey accounting for the majority of the increase), compression-ignition internal combustion piston engines for vehicles other than rail and trams (up $117 million, or 358.5 percent, with Thailand primarily responsible for the increase), and polyethylene terephthalate (PET) in primary forms (up $100 million, or 112.8 percent, with Brazil responsible for the increase). Appendix tables A.18 and A.19 show the overall sectoral distribution of GSP benefits, and appendix table A.20 shows the top 25 products imported under the GSP in 2016.

African Growth and Opportunity Act

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA or Act) was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 2000 to promote stable and sustainable economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In a statement of policy in the Act, Congress expressed support for, among other things, “encouraging increased trade and investment between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa,” “reducing tariff and nontariff barriers and other obstacles to sub-Saharan African and United States trade,” and “expanding United States assistance to sub-Saharan Africa’s regional integration efforts.” [169] By providing unilateral preferential trade benefits to eligible beneficiary SSA countries, AGOA aims to promote political and economic reform in SSA, encourage regional economic integration, strengthen private sectors, and enhance commercial and political ties between the United States and SSA, as well as facilitate the development of civil society, rule of law, and political freedom in SSA countries. [170] On June 29, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 (TPEA), which extended AGOA for 10 years through September 30, 2025. [171]

AGOA expands on the U.S. GSP program by offering duty-free access to the U.S. market for all GSP-eligible products [172] and for qualifying tariff line-item products from designated SSA countries beyond those eligible under the GSP program. [173] In addition, AGOA authorizes duty-free treatment for certain textile and apparel articles made in qualifying beneficiary SSA countries. [174] In 2016, approximately 5,098 tariff lines were designated as covering products eligible for duty-free treatment under AGOA. [175]

AGOA authorizes the President to designate an SSA country as an AGOA beneficiary country if the President determines the country meets the eligibility requirements set forth in section 104(a) of the Act. [176] The Act also requires the President to review annually whether SSA countries are, or remain, eligible for AGOA benefits based on the eligibility criteria. [177] Moreover, compared to the Act, the 2015 TPEA offers additional tools for the President to use to promote compliance with AGOA eligibility criteria. One of the most notable changes is that TPEA expands the annual review process and authorizes the President to initiate an “out-of-cycle review” process at any time concerning an SSA country’s AGOA eligibility. [178]

In 2016, 38 SSA countries out of a total 48 SSA countries were eligible for AGOA benefits. [179] Of these countries, 28 were eligible for AGOA textile and apparel benefits for all or part of 2016. [180] Of the countries in the latter group, all but one (South Africa) were also eligible for additional textile and apparel benefits for lesser-developed beneficiary countries (LDBCs) for all or part of 2016. [181] Notable among these extra benefits is the third-country fabric provision for LDBCs, which allows beneficiary countries to use non-U.S., non-AGOA fabrics in apparel exports under AGOA. [182]

In 2015, the President terminated the designation of Burundi as an AGOA beneficiary, effective January 1, 2016, due primarily to concerns related to human rights, governance, and rule of law. [183] In addition, the annual review conducted in 2016 resulted in the reinstatement of the Central African Republic’s AGOA eligibility, effective January 1, 2017, as a result of steps the government of that country has taken to address rule of law issues. [184] Finally, Seychelles was graduated from eligibility for AGOA (as well as GSP) benefits effective January 1, 2017, because it was determined to be a “high-income” country. [185]

In July 2015, an out-of-cycle review of South Africa’s AGOA eligibility was initiated. [186] On November 5, 2015, the President determined that South Africa had not made continual progress toward the elimination of several longstanding barriers to U.S. trade and investment, including barriers to U.S. poultry, pork, and beef exports to South Africa. [187] On January 11, 2016, the President issued a proclamation announcing that the United States would suspend the application of duty-free treatment for all AGOA-eligible goods in the agricultural sector from South Africa. [188] The effective date for the suspension was set at March 15, 2016, to allow South Africa time to implement actions to resolve the outstanding barriers to U.S. trade. [189] South Africa subsequently came into compliance with the relevant AGOA criteria, leading to a revocation on March 14, 2016, of the earlier proclamation. [190]

In 2016, the value of U.S. imports that entered free of duty from beneficiary countries under AGOA (including GSP) was $10.6 billion, a 14.1 percent increase from 2015. These imports accounted for 52.7 percent of total imports from AGOA countries in 2016. In 2016, imports entering the United States exclusively under AGOA (excluding GSP) were valued at $9.4 billion, accounting for 46.9 percent of U.S. imports from AGOA countries (table 2.5).

Table 2.5 U.S. imports for consumption from AGOA beneficiaries, 2014–16

Item	2014	2015	2016
Total imports from AGOA countries (million $)	25,487	19,131	20,060
Imports under AGOA, including GSP (million $) a	14,245	9,267	10,577
Imports under AGOA, excluding GSP (million $)	11,874	7,984	9,404
Imports under AGOA (as a share of all imports from AGOA countries)	55.9	48.4	52.7

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed March 25, 2017)

a AGOA-eligible products are those for which a rate of duty of “free” appears in the special rate column of the HTS followed by the symbol “D” in parentheses. The symbol “D” indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are eligible for duty-free treatment with respect to all articles listed in the designated provisions. In addition, provisions of subchapters II and XIX of chapter 98 of the HTS set forth specific categories of AGOA-eligible products, under the terms of separate country designations enumerated in subchapter notes. Includes imports for which preferential tariff treatment was claimed for AGOA-eligible goods by U.S. importers under GSP, for HTS rate lines with special duty symbols “A” or “A+.”

The increase in U.S. imports under AGOA in 2016 compared to 2015 mainly reflected an increase in the value and quantity of imports of crude petroleum. [191] The value of U.S. crude petroleum imports under AGOA increased 27.9 percent ($1.3 billion) from 2015 to 2016, and the quantity increased 67.2 percent (57.3 million barrels) over the same period. [192] The top two petroleum-producing countries in SSA, Nigeria and Angola, both experienced significant increases in the value and quantity of their exports of crude petroleum to the United States under AGOA (appendix tables A.21 and A.22). [193]

The major suppliers of duty-free U.S. imports under AGOA in 2016 were Nigeria (37.0 percent of total AGOA imports), Angola (20.8 percent), South Africa (19.8 percent), Chad (8.2 percent), Kenya (4.1 percent), and Lesotho (3.1 percent). These six countries accounted for 93.1 percent of total imports by value under AGOA, an increase of 3.3 percentage points from 2015, mainly driven by a rapid increase of U.S. imports under AGOA from Nigeria (appendix table A.21).

Crude petroleum continued to be the leading import under AGOA. It accounted for 65.5 percent of the total value of AGOA imports in 2016, a 5.2 percentage point increase from 60.3 percent in 2015. The value of U.S. imports of crude petroleum under AGOA increased 27.9 percent, from $4.8 billion in 2015 to $6.2 billion in 2016 (appendix table A.22). The increase of almost 28 percent from 2015 to 2016 was mainly due to the increase of U.S. imports of such products from Nigeria, and was driven primarily by (1) a narrower price spread between the U.S. domestic crude petroleum price and the corresponding international price, which makes foreign crude more competitive; [194] (2) decreasing U.S. domestic production; [195] and (3) the similarities between the types of crude petroleum (sweet and light crude) produced in Nigeria and the United States’ own crude petroleum produced from North Dakota’s Bakken formation and Eagle Ford in Texas. [196]

Passenger motor vehicles and textile and apparel products were two other major U.S. imports under AGOA. They accounted for 15.9 percent and 9.0 percent of the value of total AGOA imports in 2016, respectively (appendix table A.22). U.S. passenger motor vehicle imports under AGOA came exclusively from South Africa, and they increased in value from $1.3 billion in 2015 to $1.5 billion in 2016.

Section 105 of AGOA required the President to establish the U.S.-SSA Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum (also known as the AGOA Forum) to discuss trade, investment, and development at an annual ministerial-level meeting with AGOA-eligible countries. [197] The 15th AGOA Forum was held in September 2016 in Washington, DC. [198] Before the meeting, the Office of the USTR had issued a report entitled “Beyond AGOA—Looking to the Future of U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment.” The report presented the case for deepening the U.S.-Africa trade and investment relationship beyond AGOA. [199] At the forum, USTR Michael Froman and officials from other U.S. government agencies pursued these goals by meeting with African trade ministers, leaders of African regional economic organizations, and representatives of the American and African countries’ private sectors and civil society to discuss issues and strategies for advancing trade, investment, and economic development in Africa, as well as ways to increase two-way U.S.-African trade. [200]

Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act

The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) was enacted in 1983 as part of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Its goal was to encourage economic growth and development in the Caribbean Basin countries by using duty preferences to promote increased production and exports of nontraditional products. [201] The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) amended CBERA in 2000 and expanded the list of qualified articles for eligible countries to include certain apparel. [202] The CBTPA also extended “NAFTA-equivalent treatment”—that is, rates of duty equivalent to those accorded to goods complying with the rules of origin applicable under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—to a number of other products previously excluded from CBERA. These products included certain tuna; crude petroleum and petroleum products; certain footwear; watches and watch parts assembled from parts originating in countries not eligible for normal trade relations (NTR) rates of duty; and certain handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and leather wearing apparel. [203] Products that are still excluded from CBERA preferential treatment include textile and apparel products not otherwise eligible for preferential treatment under CBTPA (mostly textile products) and above-quota imports of certain agricultural products subject to tariff-rate quotas (primarily sugar, beef, and dairy products). CBTPA preferential treatment provisions were extended in 2010 through September 30, 2020, while the original CBERA has no expiration date. [204] In the section that follows, the term CBERA refers to CBERA as amended by the CBTPA.

At the end of 2016, 17 countries and dependent territories were designated eligible for CBERA preferences [205] and 8 of those countries were designated eligible for CBTPA preferences. [206] Several countries have asked to be designated as eligible for benefits under CBERA, CBTPA, or both, including Turks and Caicos Islands, which requested eligibility under CBERA; Aruba, The Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, under CBTPA; [207] and Sint Maarten and Suriname, under both CBERA and CBTPA. [208]

In 2016, the value of U.S. imports under CBERA fell 43.2 percent, from $1.5 billion in 2015 to $876 million in 2016 (table 2.6). The top five imports under CBERA in 2016—methanol, T-shirts, crude petroleum, sweaters, and polystyrene—comprised over 80 percent of imports under the program and accounted for the vast majority of the total decline in 2016 (appendix table A.23). The largest decline in the value of U.S. imports under CBERA was in methanol, which fell 60.4 percent ($393 million) because both price and quantity declined 31.3 percent and 41.8 percent, respectively. Imports of crude petroleum declined mostly because of a decline in the price. In addition, the decline in U.S. imports of apparel products under CBERA, primarily from Haiti, can be attributed to a shift from such imports entering under CBTPA provisions to entering under the HOPE Acts, the Hemisphere Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 (HOPE) and of 2008 (HOPE II Act). [209]

Table 2.6 U.S. imports for consumption from CBERA/CBTPA beneficiaries, 2014–16

Item	2014	2015	2016
Total imports from CBERA/CBTPA countries (million $)	8,496	7,061	5,342
Total imports under CBERA (million $)	1,973	1,542	876
Imports under CBTPA (million $) a	589	564	392
Imports under CBERA excluding CBTPA (million $) b	1,384	978	484
Imports under CBERA (as a share of all imports from CBERA countries)	23.2	21.8	16.4

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

a CBTPA-eligible products are those for which a special duty rate appears in the special rate column of the HTS, followed by the symbol “R” in parentheses. The symbol “R” indicates that all CBTPA beneficiary countries are eligible for special duty rate treatment with respect to all articles listed in the designated provisions. In addition, subchapters II and XX of chapter 98 set forth provisions covering specific products eligible for duty-free entry, under separate country designations enumerated in those subchapters (and including former CBTPA beneficiaries—El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Panama).

b CBERA (excluding CBTPA)-eligible products are those for which a special duty rate appears in the special rate column of the HTS, followed by the symbols “E” or “E*” in parentheses. The symbol “E” indicates that all beneficiary countries are eligible for special duty rate treatment with respect to all articles listed in the designated provisions. The symbol “E*” indicates that certain articles, under general note 7(d) of the HTS, are not eligible for special duty treatment with respect to any article listed in the designated provision.

The top five products accounted for most CBERA imports in 2016. However, a large number of agricultural products were also imported under CBERA, including yams, guavas, orange juice, papayas, spices, and various vegetable and fruit preparations, although these imports were small.

U.S. imports under CBERA accounted for 16.4 percent of all U.S. imports from CBERA countries in 2016. Trinidad and Tobago continued to be the leading supplier of U.S. imports under CBERA in 2016, accounting for 43.8 percent of the total value. Haiti and Jamaica were also leading suppliers, accounting for 36.3 and 8.6 percent of the total, respectively (appendix table A.24).

Haiti Initiatives

Since 2006, CBERA has been amended several times to expand and enhance trade benefits for Haiti and to give Haitian apparel producers more flexibility in sourcing yarns and fabrics. [210] The HOPE Act of 2006 [211] and of 2008 (HOPE II Act) [212] (collectively referred to as HOPE or the HOPE Acts) amended CBERA to expand the rules of origin for inputs to apparel and wire harness automotive components assembled in Haiti and imported into the United States. [213] The HOPE Acts also provided additional trade preferences to attract new jobs to Haiti while offering incentives to encourage the use of U.S. inputs. [214] The Haitian Economic Lift Program of 2010 (HELP Act) expanded existing U.S. trade preferences (especially duty-free treatment for certain qualifying apparel regardless of the origin of inputs) for Haiti that were established under the CBTPA and HOPE Acts and extended them through September 30, 2020. [215] On June 29, 2015, President Barack Obama signed the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 into law, extending the HOPE Acts trade preferences through September 30, 2025. [216]

The extension of trade preferences for Haiti under the HOPE Acts, Haiti’s inexpensive labor costs, and its proximity to the United States have all motivated U.S. apparel firms to increase their sourcing of apparel from Haiti in recent years. [217] During 2011–15, U.S. imports of apparel from Haiti rose steadily, and such imports were expected to surpass the billion dollar mark in 2016. [218] Instead, however, U.S. imports of apparel fell 5.2 percent, from $895.5 million in 2015 to $848.5 million in 2016 (table 2.7). This decline reportedly reflected reduced demand for apparel from major U.S. retailers such as the Limited, American Apparel, Macy’s, and the Gap, which experienced bankruptcies, store closures, or job losses in 2016. [219]

Table 2.7 U.S. imports of apparel from Haiti, 2014–16 a

Item	2014	2015	2016
Total apparel imports from Haiti (million $)	854.3	895.5	848.5
Apparel imports under a trade preference program (million $)	850.5	892.5	842.9
CBERA/CBTPA (million $)	397.1	394.9	307.9
HOPE and HELP Acts (million $)	453.4	497.6	535.0
Share of total apparel imports from Haiti:	(Percent)
Apparel imports under a trade preference program	99.6	99.7	99.3
CBERA/CBTPA	46.7	44.3	36.6
HOPE and HELP Acts	53.3	55.8	63.5

Source: Official trade statistics of the Office of Textiles and Apparel , U.S. Department of Commerce .

a These data reflect detailed U.S. general import data under trade preference programs sorted by category and published by the Office of Textiles and Apparel at the U.S. Department of Commerce (accessed February 15 and March 9, 2017).

Haitian apparel production has been concentrated in high-volume, commodity cotton garments that have relatively predictable consumer demand and few styling changes. In 2016, cotton knit shirts and blouses, cotton trousers and pants, and cotton underwear continued to dominate U.S. imports of apparel from Haiti, accounting for 42.0 percent, 12.8 percent, and 9.4 percent, respectively, of the total value of U.S. apparel imports from Haiti. [220] However, the total value and respective shares of U.S. imports of these cotton products from Haiti fell from 2015 levels as the total value of U.S. imports of manmade-fiber garments (largely knit shirts and blouses and trousers and slacks) from Haiti rose 25 percent in 2016 compared with 2015. As a result, the share of U.S. imports of manmade-fiber apparel of total U.S. imports of apparel from Haiti also rose, growing from 26 percent in 2015 to 34 percent in 2016. The growth in U.S. imports of manmade-fiber apparel from Haiti reflects a general shift in demand toward these manmade-fiber products by U.S. retailers and U.S. apparel customers, such as Under Armour, Levi’s, the Gap, and Polo Ralph Lauren. [221]

The decline in U.S. apparel imports from Haiti in 2016 is not expected to continue. Although economic difficulties prompted some major U.S. retailers and brands to reduce their apparel orders from Haiti in 2016, other U.S. apparel firms continued to increase their orders. [222] Moreover, in 2016, investors from Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Bangladesh introduced or began implementing plans to expand apparel manufacturing in Haiti. [223] In June 2016, MAS Holdings, a major Sri Lankan conglomerate and intimate apparel manufacturer, announced the opening of a new plant in the Caracol Industrial Park. [224] In October 2016, Hong Kong athletic-wear supplier Winds Group stated it would open a new, 80,000 square-foot activewear factory in northwest Haiti to produce garments for U.S. apparel brands and take advantage of the HOPE/HELP trade preferences. [225] The planned expansion of Haiti’s apparel manufacturing by foreign investors is expected to add 5,000 new jobs in the next few years and encourage additional investments in the future. [226]

Virtually all (99.3 percent) of U.S. imports of apparel from Haiti entered duty free under trade preference programs in 2016. These programs offer unlimited duty-free treatment for certain apparel products and limited duty-free treatment for other apparel products made from non-originating fabrics up to certain quotas, known as tariff preference levels (TPLs). These programs have helped to revitalize and expand Haiti’s apparel industry, as evidenced by continued job growth in the sector (1,887 jobs were added in the Caracol Industrial Park alone in 2016). [227]

In 2016, Haiti accounted for nearly all (99.9 percent) of U.S. imports of apparel entering under the CBTPA. Over a third (36.6 percent) of total U.S. imports of apparel from Haiti ($307.9 million) entered under CBTPA provisions in 2016. This share was down, however, from previous years, reflecting a continued shift of U.S. apparel imports from Haiti from entering under CBTPA provisions to entering under the HOPE Acts because of the additional trade preferences that the HOPE Acts offer. The value of U.S. imports of apparel entering under the HOPE Acts rose 7.5 percent, from $497.6 million in 2015 to $535.0 million in 2016, and represented almost two-thirds (63.5 percent) of total U.S. apparel imports that entered free of duty from Haiti, up from 55.8 percent in 2015. Of the apparel imported from Haiti under the HOPE Acts in 2016, $475.7 million, or 88.9 percent, entered under TPLs. [228] Almost 30 percent ($140.4 million) of these U.S. imports of apparel from Haiti entered under the woven apparel TPL in 2016 and 70 percent ($335.2 million) entered under the knit apparel and value-added TPLs the same year. [229]

Most of the remaining U.S. imports ($59.1 million) under the HOPE Acts in 2016 entered under the Earned Import Allowance Program, a special trade program created under HOPE II in 2008 that allows the duty-free entry into the United States of certain apparel manufactured in Haiti. [230] In 2016, U.S. imports of apparel from Haiti under the program rose 3.0 percent to $59.1 million, up from $57.4 million in 2015. As in previous years, no U.S. imports of apparel entered under HTS 9820.61.45 in 2016, one of the HELP provisions added in 2010 that allows for unlimited duty-free imports of certain knit apparel. However, for the first time since 2010, when HTS 9820.63.05, a provision for home goods was also added under HELP, a small amount ($5,000) of U.S. imports of home goods from Haiti entered under the HELP Act in 2016.

Top of the page

---

Chapter 3
The World Trade Organization

This chapter covers developments in 2016 in the World Trade Organization (WTO). These include work programs and related items under the WTO General Council, as well as plurilateral agreements hosted under the WTO’s auspices. [231] The chapter also summarizes developments in major WTO dispute settlement cases during the year.

WTO

During 2016, members of the WTO continued efforts to move forward with the multilateral trade negotiations that started in 2001 under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), but made little progress. A number of delegates suggested moving to subjects not directly covered under the DDA, such as fisheries and fishery subsidies. [232] In his informal consultations with delegates during the year, the WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo, chairman of the DDA Trade Negotiating Committee, found that certain issues seemed to be gaining members’ attention. These included agricultural topics such as programs to hold food security stocks (“public stockholding”) and domestic support measures, as well as domestic regulation of services. During these consultations, the Director-General also found other subjects attracting members’ interest, including small and medium-sized enterprises, electronic commerce, and services trade facilitation. [233]

General Council

The WTO General Council held five meetings in 2016. [234] At the yearend council meeting on December 7, 2016, members agreed that the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference would be held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, December 11–14, 2017. [235]

Work Programs, Decisions, Waivers, and Reviews

In 2016, the General Council continued discussions on items under the DDA Work Program regarding small economies, least-developed developing countries, the development assistance aspects of cotton, and electronic commerce. During the year, the General Council adopted decisions on nomenclature changes in WTO tariff schedules for the 2002, 2007, and 2012 versions of the global Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). The Council also reviewed waivers agreed on previously, including the U.S. waivers related to the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) and trade preferences for the Pacific Islands and Nepal. [236]

Accessions

WTO membership rose to 164 members in 2016: Liberia joined on July 14, 2016, and Afghanistan joined on July 29, 2016 (table 3.1). Another 21 countries were in various stages of applying for membership in 2016. [237] There were 22 country observers to the WTO at yearend 2016 (table 3.2). [238] In addition, the following 8 international organizations attend WTO General Council meetings as observers: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, International Trade Centre, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Bank, and the World Intellectual Property Organization.

Table 3.1 WTO members in 2016

Country
Afghanistan	Costa Rica	Iceland	Montenegro	Slovakia
Albania	Côte d ’ Ivoire	India	Morocco	Slovenia
Angola	Croatia	Indonesia	Mozambique	Solomon Islands
Antigua and Barbuda	Cuba	Ireland	Namibia	South Africa
Argentina	Cyprus	Israel	Nepal	South Korea
Armenia	Czech Republic	Italy	Netherlands	Spain
Australia	Denmark	Jamaica	New Zealand	Sri Lanka
Austria	Djibouti	Japan	Nicaragua	Suriname
Bahrain	Dominica	Jordan	Niger	Swaziland
Bangladesh	Dominican Republic	Kazakhstan	Nigeria	Sweden
Barbados	Ecuador	Kenya	Norway	Switzerland
Belgium	Egypt	Kuwait	Oman	Taiwan c
Belize	El Salvador	Kyrgyzstan	Pakistan	Tajikistan
Benin	Estonia	Laos	Panama	Tanzania
Bolivia	European Union	Latvia	Papua New Guinea	Thailand
Botswana	Fiji	Lesotho	Paraguay	Togo
Brazil	Finland	Liberia	Peru	Tonga
Brunei Darussalam	France	Liechtenstein	Philippines	Trinidad and Tobago
Bulgaria	Gabon	Lithuania	Poland	Tunisia
Burkina Faso	Gambia	Luxembourg	Portugal	Turkey
Burma a	Georgia	Macau, China	Qatar	Uganda
Burundi	Germany	Macedonia (FYROM) b	Romania	Ukraine
Cabo Verde	Ghana	Madagascar	Russia	United Arab Emirates
Cambodia	Greece	Malawi	Rwanda	United Kingdom
Cameroon	Grenada	Malaysia	Saint Kitts and Nevis	United States of America
Canada	Guatemala	Maldives	Saint Lucia	Uruguay
Central African Republic	Guinea	Mali	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Vanuatu
Chad	Guinea-Bissau	Malta	Samoa	Venezuela
Chile	Guyana	Mauritania	Saudi Arabia	Vietnam
China	Haiti	Mauritius	Senegal	Yemen
Colombia	Honduras	Mexico	Seychelles	Zambia
Congo, Republic	Hong Kong, China	Moldova	Sierra Leone	Zimbabwe
Congo, Democratic Republic	Hungary	Mongolia	Singapore

Source: WTO, “Understanding the WTO: The Organization; Members and Observers,” July 29, 2016.

a In the WTO, Burma is known as Myanmar.

b In the WTO, Macedonia is known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, abbreviated FYROM.

c In the WTO, Taiwan is known as the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, or less formally as “Chinese Taipei.”

Table 3.2 WTO observers in 2016

Country
Algeria	Equatorial Guinea	Somalia
Andorra	Ethiopia	Sudan
Azerbaijan	Iran	Syria
Bahamas	Iraq	Timor-Leste
Belarus	Lebanon	Uzbekistan
Bhutan	Libya	Vatican (The Holy See)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	São Tomé and Príncipe
Comoros	Serbia

Source: WTO, “Understanding the WTO: The Organization; Members and Observers,” July 29, 2016.

Expansion of the Information Technology Agreement

The Information Technology Agreement (ITA), [239] concluded in December 1996, is aimed at the elimination of import duties on information and communications technology (ICT) products such as computers, telecommunications equipment, semiconductors and their manufacturing and testing equipment, software, and scientific instruments, as well as parts and accessories for such products. [240] Eighty-two WTO members are currently participants in the ITA. [241]

From 2012 to 2015, a subset of 24 ITA participants [242] held additional negotiations to expand the products covered under the ITA. On July 24, 2015, nearly all of these participants agreed to eliminate tariffs on goods from the newly agreed-on list. [243] The parties to this expansion (often called “the ITA Expansion”) agreed to phase out tariffs on an additional 201 ICT products, such as advanced semiconductors, software media, high-tech medical devices, global positioning systems, and high-tech testing instruments. [244] Because the most-favored-nation principle applies to WTO agreements, all WTO members will benefit from duty-free access to the markets of the parties to the ITA Expansion. [245]

In 2016, the parties to the ITA Expansion agreement began to implement the agreement’s expanded provisions. By yearend, a majority of participants had implemented their initial tariff commitments, with full implementation on track according to the agreement’s schedule. [246]

Agreement on Trade Facilitation

In December 2013, at the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia, WTO members concluded an Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA). The TFA seeks to expedite the movement, release, and clearance of traded goods across national borders to help increase trade flows through the multilateral trade system. In large measure the TFA works to attain these goals by making rules and their implementation more transparent—for example, via electronic publication of information about port procedures, fees, penalties, prohibitions, tariff quotas, and customs rules. [247]

In 2013, members agreed to several decisions to help implement the so-called Bali Package of outcomes from the ninth ministerial conference, one of which included a decision to implement the TFA. [248] By November 2014, members had adopted the legal protocol required to amend the WTO Agreement to include the TFA, once two-thirds of WTO members (110 out of 164) had formally accepted the TFA. [249] The WTO Preparatory Committee on Trade Facilitation was established to help bring about the TFA’s entry into force. During 2016, members reported to the committee on their national experiences with domestic reform efforts and the acceptance procedures ultimately needed to implement their TFA commitments. Despite these efforts, the agreement had not been adopted by yearend 2016. [250]

Negotiations on an Environmental Goods Agreement

Negotiations toward an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) began July 8, 2014. This agreement aims at reducing customs duties on products used to treat and benefit the environment, including goods that generate clean and renewable energy; improve energy and resource efficiency; reduce air, water, and ground pollution; manage solid and hazardous wastes; monitor environmental quality; and help to abate noise. [251] The 18 EGA participants are Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, the European Union (EU), Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United States. [252]

Participants held their first formal round of 2016 on March 2–4, discussing several circulated proposals on tariff “staging,” that is, the phasing out of tariffs over time. [253] At their 13th round of negotiations on April 18–22, 2016, participants continued discussions on proposals for tariff cuts and phaseouts, and began to focus on products identified as sensitive by various participants. [254] The next discussions, on June 20–24 and July 24–29, were held among small or bilateral groupings. These discussions sought to overcome sensitivities about tariff elimination or phaseouts for certain goods. [255]

In the September 19–23 round, participants sought to narrow the types of environmental products that would be included on the final list, which was pared to some 300 tariff lines nominated by EGA participants. [256] A number of participants also endorsed the goal of a yearend target for reaching a final agreement. [257] During the October 16–20 negotiating round, EGA participants held further small-group discussions focused on product categories considered contentious by the chairman of EGA talks. [258]

The 18th round of EGA negotiations was held November 26–December 2, and a concluding ministerial meeting was scheduled for December 3–4. [259] Whereas progress was reported at the talks that began in November, participants were unable to overcome remaining differences in time to conclude negotiations by the scheduled ministerial meeting.

At yearend 2016, the EGA chair leading the negotiations noted that participants seemed likely to find consensus over an “A list” of more than 250 out of roughly 300 tariff lines under discussion; the remaining “B list” items were considered more sensitive to some participants and likely to require political-level decisions. [260] As a consequence, further work was considered necessary in 2017 before the participants could resolve their remaining points of disagreement. [261]

Discussions on Fisheries Subsidies

As part of the 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, WTO members agreed to open negotiations to clarify and improve WTO rules and disciplines on fisheries subsidies to address overcapacity and overfishing. [262] Work on fisheries subsidies advanced in the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules (NGR), and following the 2011 pause in the overall Doha Round negotiations, resumed in the lead-up to the 2015 WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi, Kenya. [263] With members’ views sharply divided on the subject, however, no consensus was reached, although all parties agreed that work on fisheries subsidies should continue in 2016. [264]

In June 2016, NGR members expressed strong interest in developing new international rules on fisheries subsidies, but continued to disagree on how to do so. [265] On September 14, 2016, a group of 13 “like-minded” WTO members issued a joint statement on beginning preparations for new negotiations for an “ambitious, high-standard” plurilateral WTO agreement to prohibit harmful fisheries subsidies, while at the same time working in parallel with all WTO members toward a wider multilateral agreement. [266] The 13 members of this coalition are Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Singapore, Switzerland, United States, and Uruguay. [267] By yearend, three other WTO members—Brazil, Iceland, and Panama—had joined this initiative. [268]

In December 2016, at the yearend meeting of the NGR, WTO members discussed several new proposals to strengthen disciplines on fisheries subsidies with an aim of reaching an outcome at the next ministerial conference, scheduled for December 2017 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Also at this meeting of the NGR, Canada reported that the separate group of coalition members who were participating in the plurilateral initiative would hold their first substantive meeting in early 2017, and that any NGR member wishing to take part could join. Canada said that 16 members had signaled their interest by yearend 2016. [269]

Selected Plurilateral Agreements Already in Force

Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft

The plurilateral WTO Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft was signed in 1980, and commits only those WTO members that have accepted its disciplines to eliminate tariffs on civil aircraft and other obligations related to civil aircraft. There were 32 signatories to the agreement in 2016, with 20 of them EU member states. [270] With the addition of Tajikistan (see below), there were 25 country observers to the committee, as well as several international organizations with observer status. [271]

The Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft held one regular meeting during the year, on November 3, 2016. During the meeting, the committee granted observer status to Tajikistan. The committee chair also suggested opening proposed work on revising the agreement’s Product Coverage Annex through informal consultations. Such revision would aim to bring the annex into conformity with the 2012 HS. Neither the regular committee nor the technical subcommittee under the Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft met during 2016. [272]

Agreement on Government Procurement

At the end of 2016, there were 19 parties to the 1994 WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). [273] In 2012, the parties to the GPA 1994 formally adopted a revised agreement that expanded access to government procurement markets. The revised agreement entered into force in April 2014. In 2016, Ukraine and Moldova became full parties to the GPA 1994 on April 18 and July 14, respectively, when each deposited its formal instrument of acceptance of the agreement. Also in 2016, three parties—Ukraine, Moldova, and South Korea—became full parties to the revised agreement. As of yearend 2016, all parties to the GPA 1994 except Switzerland were also parties to the revised agreement. [274]

Kazakhstan was approved during the year to become an observer in the Committee on Government Procurement, which oversees operation of both the original and the revised Agreement on Government Procurement. This addition brought the number of country observers in the committee to 29, in addition to a number of international organizations. In 2016, Russia asked to open accession negotiations to the GPA, bringing the number of accessions in progress to nine countries. [275]

The WTO Committee on Government Procurement held four meetings in 2016: February 17, June 22, October 18, and November 28. In June, the committee agreed to the Decision of Arbitration Procedures for the revised GPA, which provides a tool to resolve disputes when parties are in the process of modifying or clarifying coverage under the revised agreement. [276] The committee also continued with its various work programs, notably those dealing with access to government procurement activities for small and medium-sized enterprises, the collection and reporting of statistical data on government procurement, the promotion of environmental sustainability in the parties’ procurement processes, and restrictions and exclusions in parties’ annexes to the agreement. [277]

Dispute Settlement Body

This section offers several pieces of information about the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). It provides (1) a tally of new requests for consultations filed by WTO members during calendar year 2016 under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); (2) a table that lists the new panels established during calendar year 2016 (involving all WTO members) to review matters raised in complaints under the DSU; and (3) short summaries of the procedural and substantive issues in disputes involving the United States that moved to the panel stage during 2016, along with summaries of panel and Appellate Body reports involving the United States that were issued or adopted during 2016.

Box 3.1 provides an overview of the WTO dispute settlement process, and table 3.3 lists the disputes (involving all WTO members) that moved from the consultation stage to the more formal panel litigation stage during 2016. The titles of the disputes listed in table 3.3 also serve as an indication of the types of subject matter that reached the more formal litigation stage during 2016.

Table 3.3 WTO dispute settlement panels established during 2016

Case no.	Complainant	Respondent	Case name	Panel established
DS493	Russian Federation	Ukraine	Ukraine––Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate from Russia	April 22, 2016
DS494	Russian Federation	European Union	European Union––Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia (Second complaint)	December 16, 2016
DS499	Ukraine	Russian Federation	Russia––Measures Affecting the Importation of Railway Equipment and Parts Thereof	December 16, 2016
DS502	European Union	Colombia	Colombia––Measures Concerning Imported Spirits	September 26, 2016
DS504	Japan	South Korea	Korea––Anti-Dumping Duties on Pneumatic Valves from Japan	July 4, 2016
DS505	Canada	United States	United States––Countervailing Measures on Supercalendered Paper from Canada	July 21, 2016
DS508	United States	China	China––Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials	November 8, 2016
DS509	European Union	China	China––Duties and Other Measures concerning the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials	November 23, 2016

Source: Derived from WTO, “Dispute Settlement: The Disputes---Chronological List of Disputes” (accessed May 19, 2017).

The summaries of issues in dispute in this section of the report are based entirely on information in publicly available documents, including summaries published online by the WTO, summaries included in USTR’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda and 2016 Annual Report , and summaries included in USTR press releases. They should not be regarded as comprehensive or as reflecting a U.S. government or Commission interpretation of the issues raised or addressed in the disputes or in panel or Appellate Body reports. A table showing procedural developments during 2016 in disputes in which the United States was the complainant or respondent appears in appendix table A.25.

This section focuses on developments during 2016. Several disputes in which panels had been established in 2015 were active during 2016, with decisions expected in 2017; the panel decisions in these cases will be summarized in the Commission’s 2018 report. [278] Two disputes were resolved through additional consultations. In dispute DS489, China—Measures Related to Demonstration Bases and Common Service Platforms Programmes , the United States and China held additional consultations following the establishment of a panel in 2015 and reached agreement in April 2016 on a memorandum of understanding. Under the memorandum, China agreed to terminate the export subsidies it had provided through the Demonstration Bases-Common Service Platform program. [279] Dispute DS501, China—Tax Measures Concerning Certain Domestically Produced Aircraft , was resolved following consultations between the United States and China on January 29, 2016, when China rescinded discriminatory tax exemptions on certain domestically produced aircraft. [280] Two other disputes dating back to 2010 and 2012 and involving U.S. antidumping measures on certain shrimp from Vietnam were resolved in 2016, after panel and Appellate Body recommendations and rulings, when Vietnam and the United States reached a mutually agreed solution. [281]

This section also generally focuses only on developments through the panel and Appellate Body stage and does not include matters that arise after the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopts panel or Appellate Body reports in the original dispute. As indicated in box 3.1, dispute litigation often continues beyond the adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report, particularly when the defending party is the “losing” party. Issues may arise about the reasonableness of the time sought by the losing party to implement findings and recommendations, the adequacy of actions taken by that party to comply with the findings and recommendations, and possible compensation and retaliation. Matters may be referred to the original panel or to a new panel for further findings and recommendations on compliance and other matters, and when appropriate, the parties may seek the help of an arbitrator to resolve matters.

Appendix table A.25 sets out a timeline for procedural actions in most of the active WTO dispute settlement cases, including procedural actions at the implementation, compliance, and compensation/retaliation stages. A number of disputes were still active during 2016 well after the panel or Appellate Body report had been adopted, including two high-profile disputes brought by the United States and the European Communities, [282] respectively, against each other’s large civilian aircraft measures. [283] Several other proceedings of note were underway during 2016 after adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports. These involved a dispute with respect to U.S. measures relating to the importation, marketing, and sale of tuna and tuna products; [284] a dispute relating to measures imposed by India on certain agricultural products from the United States; [285] and a dispute relating to China’s antidumping and countervailing measures on broiler products from the United States. [286]

New Requests for Consultations and New Panels Established

During 2016, WTO members filed 17 requests for WTO dispute settlement consultations in new disputes, which represented an increase from the 13 new requests filed in 2015 and 14 filed in 2014. [287] Of the 17 new requests filed during 2016, the United States was involved in 8 (as complainant in 3 and respondent in 5), as compared with 3 of the 13 requests in 2015 (as complainant in 2 and as respondent in 1) and 3 of the 14 requests filed in 2014 (as complainant in 1 and respondent in 2). [288] During 2016, the United States and China were the two WTO members most often named in new disputes, either as the complaining or responding party—the United States was the complaining or responding party in 8 disputes and China in 6. In terms of new disputes filed during 2016, the United States and Brazil each filed 3, while China, the EU, India, and Japan each filed 2, and Canada, Morocco, and Turkey each filed 1. The countries named as the respondents in those disputes were the United States (in 5 disputes), China (in 4), and Colombia, the EU, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Russia, South Korea, and Thailand in 1 each. [289]

Eight new dispute settlement panels were established during 2016 (table 3.3). The United States was the complaining party in one of these panel proceedings, and the responding party in one. The 8 new panels established in 2016 represent a decrease from the 16 panels established in 2015, the 13 panels established in 2014, and the 12 panels established in 2013.

Requests for Consultations Filed during 2016 in Which the United States Was the Complaining Party or the Responding Party

Requests in Which the United States Was the Complaining Party

All three new disputes filed by the United States during 2016 concerned measures taken by China. As of the end of 2016, a panel had been established to consider one of the disputes and the other two disputes were still in consultations. In the first dispute (DS508), filed on July 13, 2016, the United States requested consultations with China regarding China’s export duties on various forms of antimony, cobalt, copper, graphite, lead, magnesia, talc, tantalum, and tin. On July 19, 2016, the United States requested supplementary consultations on additional related issues. On October 13, 2016, the United States requested establishment of a panel, and the DSB established a panel on November 8, 2016. As of the end of 2016, the panel had not been composed. The issues raised in this dispute are summarized in the next section. [290]

In the second dispute (DS511), filed on September 13, 2016, the United States requested consultations with China regarding certain measures through which China appears to provide domestic support in favor of agricultural producers, in particular those producing wheat, indica rice, japonica rice, and corn. The United States claimed that the measures appear to be inconsistent with Articles 3.2, 6.3, and 7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture. As of the end of 2016, the matter was in consultations. [291]

In the third dispute (DS517), filed on December 15, 2016, the United States requested consultations with China concerning China’s administration of its tariff-rate quotas, including those for wheat, short- and medium-grain rice, and corn. The United States claimed that the measures appear to be inconsistent with Articles X:3(a), XI:1, and XIII:3(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, and Paragraph 1.2 of Part I of China’s Protocol of Accession. As of the end of 2016, the matter was in consultations. [292]

Requests in Which the United States Was the Responding Party

The United States was the named respondent in five new disputes filed during 2016. As of the end of 2016, a panel had been established and composed to consider one of the disputes, and the remaining four were still in consultations. In the first dispute (DS503), filed on March 3, 2016, India requested consultations with the United States regarding certain measures (1) allegedly imposing increased fees on certain applicants for L-1 and H-1B categories of non-immigrant visas, and (2) relating to a numerical commitment for H-1B visas. India claimed that the measures are inconsistent with certain articles of the GATS and paragraphs 3 and 4 of the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services. As of the end of 2016, the matter was in consultations. [293]

In the second dispute (DS505), filed on March 30, 2016, Canada requested consultations with the United States regarding countervailing duties adopted by the United States on supercalendered paper and the investigation underlying the imposition of those duties. When consultations did not resolve the dispute, Canada requested the establishment of a panel. The DSB established a panel on July 21, 2016, and a panel was composed (by the Director-General) on August 31, 2016. [294] The issues raised in this dispute are summarized in more detail in the next section.

In the third dispute (DS510), filed on September 9, 2016, India requested consultations with the United States concerning certain measures in the energy sector relating to domestic-content requirements and subsidies instituted by the governments of the states of Washington, California, Montana, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Michigan, Delaware, and Minnesota. India claimed that the measures appear to be inconsistent with Articles III:4, XVI:1 and XVI:4 of the GATT 1994, Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS Agreement), and Articles 3.1(b), 3.2, 5(a), 5(c), 6.3(c), and 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). At the end of 2016, the dispute was in consultations. [295]

In the fourth dispute (DS514), filed on November 11, 2016, Brazil requested consultations with the United States concerning the imposition of certain countervailing measures with respect to cold- and hot-rolled steel flat products from Brazil, and certain aspects of the investigations underlying those measures. Brazil claimed that the measure appears to be inconsistent with certain articles and annexes of the SCM Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. As of the end of 2016, the matter was in consultations. [296]

In the fifth dispute (DS515), filed on December 12, 2016, China requested consultations with the United States concerning certain provisions of U.S. law relating to the determination of normal value for nonmarket economy countries in antidumping proceedings involving products from China. China claimed that the measures appear to be inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.2,9.2, 18.1, and 18.4 of the Antidumping Agreement, Articles I:1, VI:1, and VI:2 of the GATT 1994, and Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement. As of the end of 2016, the matter was in consultations. [297]

Panels Established during 2016 at the Request of the United States

As shown in table 3.3, the DSB established one new panel in 2016 at the request of the United States. This panel concerned China’s export restraints on certain raw materials (DS508). As of the end of 2016, the panel had not been composed. The issues raised and procedural history of the dispute are summarized below.

China — Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials (DS508)

The United States filed this dispute on July 13, 2016. The United States requested consultations with China regarding China’s export restraints on the exportation of antimony, cobalt, copper, graphite, lead, magnesia, talc, tantalum, and tin. The export restraints include export quotas, export duties, and additional requirements that impose restrictions on the trading rights of enterprises seeking to export various forms of the materials, such as prior export performance requirements. [298]

The United States claimed that the measures appear to be inconsistent with Paragraph 11.3 of Part I of China’s Accession Protocol. The United States also considered that the measures appear to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to the United States directly or indirectly under China’s Accession Protocol. On July 19, 2016, the United States requested supplementary consultations concerning alleged restrictions on the export of various forms of antimony, chromium, indium, magnesia, talc, and tin. The United States claimed that the alleged restrictions appear to be inconsistent with Paragraphs 2(A)(2), 5.1, and 11.3 of Part I of China’s Accession Protocol as well as paragraph 1.2 of the Accession Protocol (to the extent that it incorporates paragraphs 83, 84, 162, and 165 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China), and Articles X:3(a) and XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The United States also considered that the alleged restrictions appear to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to the United States directly or indirectly under the cited agreements. On October 13, 2016, the United States requested the establishment of a panel, and the DSB established a panel at its meeting on November 8, 2016. As of end of 2016, the panel had not been composed. [299]

Panels Established during 2016 in Which the United States Was the Named Respondent

The DSB established one panel during 2016 in which the United States was the named respondent. This panel, established at the request of Canada, concerned U.S. countervailing duties on supercalendered paper from Canada (DS505). As of the end of 2016, the panel had been composed. The issues raised and the procedural history of the dispute are summarized below.

United States — Countervailing Measures on Supercalendered Paper from Canada (DS505)

In this dispute, Canada challenged countervailing duties adopted by the United States on supercalendered paper and the investigation underlying the imposition of those duties. Canada’s request for consultations also concerned alleged ongoing conduct regarding the application of adverse facts available to “discovered” information during the course of a countervailing duty investigation. Canada claimed that the measures are inconsistent with certain articles of the SCM Agreement [300] and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994. On June 9, 2016, Canada requested the establishment of a panel. The DSB established a panel on July 21, 2016, and a panel was composed (by the Director-General) on August 31, 2016. [301]

Panel and Appellate Body Reports Issued and/or Adopted during 2016 That Involve the United States

During 2016, the DSB adopted panel and/or Appellate Body reports addressing original disputes [302] in five cases in which the United States was the complainant or a respondent (table 3.4). The reports in those disputes are summarized below.

Table 3.4 WTO dispute settlement panel and Appellate Body (AB) reports circulated or adopted in 2016 in which the United States was a party

Case no.	Complainant	Respondent	Case name	Date of report circulation or adoption
DS456	United States	India	India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules	AB report circulated (Sept. 16, 2016), adopted (Oct. 14, 2016)
DS464	South Korea	United States	United States—Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea	AB report circulated (Sept. 7, 2016), adopted (Sept. 26, 2016)
DS471	China	United States	United States—Certain Methodologies and their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China	Panel report circulated (Oct. 19, 2016), appealed to AB
DS478	United States	Indonesia	Indonesia—Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals, and Animal Products	Panel report circulated (Dec. 22, 2016)
DS487	European Union	United States	United States—Conditional Tax Incentives for Large Civil Aircraft	Panel report circulated (Nov. 28, 2016), appealed to AB

Derived from WTO, “Dispute Settlement: The Disputes—Chronological List of Disputes” (accessed May 19, 2017).

Reports in Which the United States Was the Complainant

India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (DS456)

In its request for consultations in this dispute filed on February 6, 2013, the United States challenged certain measures of India relating to domestic-content requirements under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (NSM) for solar cells and solar modules. The United States claimed that the measures appear to be inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, and Articles 3.1(b), 3.2, 5(c), and 25 of the SCM Agreement. The United States also claimed that the measures appear to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to the United States directly or indirectly under the cited agreements. On February 10, 2014, the United States requested supplementary consultations concerning certain measures of India relating to domestic-content requirements under Phase II of the NSM for solar cells and solar modules. After consultations failed to resolve the dispute, on April 14, 2014, the United States requested that a panel be established. The DSB established a panel on May 23, 2014, and the panel was composed on September 24, 2014. [303]

The panel issued its final public report was on February 24, 2016, finding in favor of the United States on all claims. The panel found that India’s domestic-content requirements under the NSM are inconsistent with India’s national treatment obligations under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. It found India’s requirements to accord “less favorable” treatment to imported solar cells and modules than accorded to like products of Indian origin because Indian solar power developers were permitted to bid for and maintain certain power generation contracts only by using domestic produced equipment, and not using imported equipment. India appealed the decision to the WTO Appellate Body on April 20, 2016. The Appellate Body issued its report on September 16, 2016. The Appellate Body affirmed the panel’s finding that India’s domestic-content requirements under the NSM are inconsistent with India’s national treatment obligations under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. It also affirmed the panel’s rejection of India’s defensive claims under Articles III:8(a), XX(j), and XX(d) of the GATT 1994. [304]

On October 14, 2016, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified by the Appellate Body report. On November 8, 2016, India informed the DSB that it intended to implement the DSB’s recommendations and rulings in the dispute. On December 1, 2016, the United States and India informed the DSB that in order to allow enough time for them to discuss a mutually agreed period, they had agreed on deadlines for arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. [305]

Indonesia — Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals, and Animal Products (DS478)

The United States, joined by New Zealand, challenged certain measures imposed by Indonesia relating to the importation of horticultural products, animals, and animal products. The United States claimed that the measures are inconsistent with Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994; Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture; Articles 1.2, 1.5, 1.6, 2.2, 3.2, 3.3, 5.1, and 5.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement; and Articles 2.2 and 2.15 of the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection. [306]

The United States requested consultations with Indonesia on May 8, 2014. When consultations failed to resolve the dispute, on March 18, 2015, the United States and New Zealand requested the WTO to establish a panel. On May 20, 2015, the DSB established a single panel to examine this dispute and DS477, which had been brought by New Zealand and involved similar claims. On October 8, 2015, the Director-General composed the panel. [307]

The panel circulated its report on December 22, 2016, and found all of Indonesia’s import-restricting measures for horticultural products and animal products are inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The panel also found that Indonesia has failed to demonstrate that the challenged measures are justified under any general exception available under the GATT 1994. [308]

Reports in Which the United States Was the Respondent

United States — Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea (DS464)

In this dispute South Korea claimed the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties by the United States on large residential washers from South Korea, as well as certain methodologies used by the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC), are inconsistent with Articles 1, 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 11, and 18.4 of the Antidumping Agreement; Articles 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 10, 14, and 19.4 of the SCM Agreement; Articles VI, VI:1, VI:2, and VI:3 of the GATT 1994; and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. South Korea requested consultations with the United States on August 29, 2013, and after consultations failed to resolve the dispute, on December 5, 2013, South Korea requested establishment of a panel. The DSB established a panel on January 22, 2014, and the Director-General composed the panel on June 20, 2014. [309]

The panel circulated its report on March 11, 2016. The panel found that aspects of USDOC’s antidumping determination were inconsistent with the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement. These included the USDOC’s determination to apply an alternative, average-to-transaction comparison methodology, and the application of that methodology to all transactions rather than just to so-called pattern transactions. The panel rejected other claims asserted by South Korea, including South Korea’s argument that USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 by determining the existence of a pattern exclusively on the basis of quantitative criteria. The panel found, however, that aspects of USDOC’s differential pricing methodology are inconsistent “as such” with the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement. The panel also found that the United States’ use of zeroing when applying the average-to-transaction comparison methodology is inconsistent with the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 and Article 2.4, both “as such” and as applied in the washers antidumping investigation. In addition, the panel made several findings on the countervailing-duty issues raised by South Korea. The panel found that USDOC’s disproportionality analysis, in its original and remand determinations, was inconsistent with Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement. But the panel rejected South Korea’s remaining claims, i.e., its claim that USDOC’s regional specificity determination was inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement, and its claims concerning the proper quantification of subsidy ratios. [310]

On April 19, 2016, the United States appealed certain of the panel’s findings, and on April 25, 2016, South Korea also filed an appeal. The Appellate Body circulated its report on September 7, 2016. It upheld several of the panel’s findings under the Antidumping Agreement, including the panel’s finding that the average-to-transaction comparison methodology should be applied only to so-called pattern transactions, the panel’s finding that the use of zeroing is inconsistent with the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 and Article 2.4, both “as such” and as applied, and the panel’s finding that the differential pricing methodology is inconsistent “as such” with the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement. The Appellate Body reversed other findings made by the panel. For instance, the Appellate Body found that an investigating authority must assess the price differences at issue on both a quantitative and qualitative basis, and it mooted the panel’s finding concerning systemic disregarding, finding instead that the combined application of comparison methodologies is impermissible. With respect to the countervailing duty issues, the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s rejection of South Korea’s regional specificity claim, but found that certain aspects of USDOC’s calculation of subsidy rates were inconsistent with Article 19.4 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994. [311]

The DSB adopted the panel and Appellate Body reports on September 26, 2016. On October 26, 2016, the United States stated its intention to implement the DSB’s recommendations and rulings, and said it would need a reasonable period of time to do so. On December 9, 2016, South Korea requested the reasonable period of time be determined by binding arbitration. [312]

United States — Certain Methodologies and Their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China (DS471)

In this dispute China claimed the U.S. use of certain methodologies in antidumping investigations regarding a number of products from China is inconsistent with Articles 2.4.2, 6.1, 6.8, 6.10, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, and Annex II of the Antidumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. The Chinese products covered by these investigations included certain coated paper suitable for high-quality print graphics using sheet-fed presses; certain oil country tubular goods; high-pressure steel cylinders; polyethylene terephthalate film, sheet, and strip; aluminum extrusions; certain frozen and canned warmwater shrimp; certain new pneumatic off-the-road tires; crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not assembled into modules; diamond sawblades and parts thereof; multilayered wood flooring; narrow woven ribbons with woven selvedge; polyethylene retail carrier bags; and wooden bedroom furniture. China requested consultations with the United States on December 3, 2013, and after consultations failed to resolve the dispute, on February 13, 2014, China requested the establishment of a panel. The DSB established a panel on March 26, 2014, and the Director-General composed the panel on August 28, 2014. [313]

The panel circulated its report on October 19, 2016. The panel found that a number of aspects of the “targeted dumping methodology” applied by USDOC in three challenged investigations were not inconsistent with the requirements of the AD Agreement, including certain quantitative aspects of Commerce’s methodology. However, the panel found fault with other aspects of USDOC’s methodology and with USDOC’s explanation of why resort to the alternative methodology was necessary. The panel also found that USDOC’s application of the alternative methodology to all sales, rather than only to so-called pattern sales, and USDOC’s use of “zeroing” in connection with the alternative methodology were inconsistent with the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement.

In addition, the panel found that USDOC’s use of a rebuttable presumption that all producers and exporters in China comprise a single entity under common government control—the China-government entity—to which a single antidumping margin is assigned, both as used in specific proceedings and generally, is inconsistent with certain obligations in the AD Agreement concerning when exporters and producers are entitled to a unique antidumping margin or rate. Finally, the panel agreed with the United States that China had not established that USDOC has a general norm whereby it uses adverse inferences to pick information that is adverse to the interests of the China-government entity in calculating its antidumping margin or rate. The panel also decided to exercise judicial economy with respect to the information USDOC used in particular proceedings. On November 18, 2016, China notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the panel. [314]

United States — Conditional Tax Incentives for Large Civil Aircraft (DS487)

In this dispute the EU alleged that conditional tax incentives established by the state of Washington in relation to the development, manufacture, and sale of large civil aircraft constitute specific subsidies within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement and prohibited subsidies that are inconsistent with Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. The EU requested consultations with the United States on December 19, 2014. After consultations failed to resolve the matter, on February 12, 2015, the EU requested establishment of a panel. The DSB established a panel on February 23, 2015, and the Director-General composed the panel on April 22, 2015. [315]

The panel circulated its report on November 28, 2016. The panel found that all seven Washington state aerospace tax incentives at issue are subsidies, but only the business and occupation (B&O) tax incentive is a prohibited subsidy. In particular, the panel report found the EU failed to demonstrate that (1) the aerospace tax measures are de jure contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods with respect to the First Siting Provision in Washington state’s Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill (ESSB 5952) considered separately; (2) the reduced B&O tax rate for the manufacture and sale of commercial airplanes is de jure contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods with respect to the Second Siting Provision in ESSB 5952 considered separately; and (3) the aerospace tax measures are de jure contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods with respect to the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision considered jointly. The panel report also found that (1) the seven aerospace tax measures at issue constitute a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement; (2) the Washington state B&O tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under the 777X program is inconsistent with Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement; and (3) the United States acted inconsistently with Article 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. On December 16, 2016, the United States appealed certain issues of law and legal interpretations in the panel report. [316]

Top of the page

---

Chapter 4
Selected Regional and Bilateral Trade Activities

This chapter summarizes trade-related activities during 2016 in two major multilateral organizations—the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. It also covers developments during the year in the negotiation of a Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), as well as activities conducted under trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

The OECD provides a forum for member governments to review and discuss economic, social, and other policy experiences affecting their market economies, as well as engage with other major nonmember economies to address issues facing the global economy. On July 1, 2016, Latvia became the 35th member of the OECD. [317]

Ministerial Council Meeting

The OECD held its 2016 Ministerial Council Meeting on June 1–2, 2016, in Paris, France. [318] The meeting focused on the theme of enhancing productivity and inclusive growth, including policies that support skills and jobs and that leverage the benefits accruing from innovation by firms and the increased digitization of information. As part of the effort to boost productivity and growth, the ministers highlighted recent trade initiatives, such as the expanded Information Technology Agreement and the Trade Facilitation Agreement, both under the World Trade Organization (WTO). They also called for the conclusion of negotiations toward an Environmental Goods Agreement and a Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). [319] In addition, they encouraged continued OECD work on trade in value added (TiVA), Trade Facilitation Indicators, and the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index to help understand more fully how open trade can increase productivity and growth. To help raise productivity, the ministers agreed that investments are needed in education and skills that promote quality jobs as a response to rapid technological changes, such as digitization. At the same time, they noted that the risks of job losses from automation are relatively modest. [320]

Trade Committee

The OECD Trade Committee met twice in 2016, at its 168th session on April 21–22 and at its 169th session on November 3–4. [321] At the April meeting, the committee discussed its draft work program for 2017–2018 and prepared for the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in June 2016, as well as other upcoming events. The Trade Committee also continued discussions with several countries––Colombia, Costa Rica, and Lithuania––in various stages of accession to the OECD. [322] In May 2016, the Trade Committee formally presented its draft work program for 2017–2018, as agreed upon at the April 2016 meeting. The work program will have four primary areas of focus over the next two years: (1) trade liberalization, (2) trade in services, (3) trade and domestic policies, and (4) the OECD Arrangement on Export Credits. [323]

At its November 2016 meeting, the Trade Committee met with representatives from the world’s 20 major economies, known as the Group of 20 (G20). [324] Major topics of discussion included how to strengthen agricultural trade policies, how best to structure reforms concerning trade policy and trade flows, and how to overcome barriers to trade in services. Members also discussed how trade in environmental goods and services can support the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals as well as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its annual Conference of Parties (COP). It was noted that during its 21st session in Paris in 2015 (COP21 or the 2015 Paris Climate Conference) the COP had reviewed the Convention implementation. [325] Other discourse touched on OECD work on digitization, as well as the trade costs of regulatory divergence. [326]

Working Party of the Trade Committee

The Working Party of the Trade Committee (TCWP) reported at the April 2016 meeting on its activities since the Trade Committee last met in November 2015. [327] The chair of the working party updated progress made in the technical work on the value-creating role of trade in services, among other things, under the Trade Committee’s 2015–2016 work program.

In November 2016, the TCWP reported that it had finalized several documents under its work program. One document develops a framework for international regulatory cooperation, while another includes regional and country studies that address global value chains in various locations (Latin America, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and Chile). Also, two country studies analyze services trade and policy in Brazil and India, respectively, using the OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI). [328] The TCWP also reported on approaches to studying the cost of services trade restrictions using the STRI, a priority previously expressed by members of the Trade Committee. The working party reported on the four elements for this project, set out in papers already underway: “The Trade Effects of Regulatory Differences”; “The Trade Effect of Services Trade Restrictions”; “STRI: Services Trade Restrictiveness, Mark-ups and Competition”; and “Trade Cost in Services: Estimation with Firm-level Data.” [329]

The TCWP met again on December 13–14, 2016. [330] At this meeting, the TCWP discussed trade in services, including the cost of services trade restrictions to firms and their foreign affiliates; services in global value chains in the context of the increased bundling of goods and services in international trade; how to value services commitments currently found in trade agreements; and subjects involving the OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index. The working party also touched on how state-owned enterprises might better regulate international trade and investment, restrictive measures concerning government procurement, applications of the OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators, digital trade, and local-content policies in the context of mineral-exporting countries. [331]

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Background

Established in 1989 and composed of 21 member economies, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a regional economic forum. [332] Since its inception, APEC has aimed to increase prosperity in the region by supporting regional economic integration and by promoting inclusive and sustainable growth. [333] APEC decisions are made by consensus, and commitments are undertaken voluntarily. [334]

The operational structure of APEC is divided into the policy level and the working level. At the policy level, the annual APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting sets overarching policy direction, while the annual APEC ministerial meeting, sectoral ministerial meetings, senior officials meetings, and APEC Business Advisory Council meetings provide strategic policy recommendations. [335] At the working level, four core committees, including the Committee on Trade and Investment, carry out activities and projects. [336] The APEC Secretariat is based in Singapore. [337]

Adopted by APEC member economies in 1994 in Bogor, Indonesia, the Bogor Goals are a set of targeted goals for creating a free and open trade and investment area in the Asia-Pacific region. [338] APEC works in three key areas toward the Bogor Goals: (1) trade and investment liberalization that reduces and eventually eliminates tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and investment; (2) business facilitation, which focuses on reducing business transaction costs and improving market access and efficiency; and (3) economic and technical cooperation that provides training in all APEC member economies to build their capacities to promote trade, investment, and sustainable, inclusive economic growth. [339]

At the core of APEC work is the Regional Economic Integration agenda. Initiatives under this program include pursuing the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), a comprehensive free trade agreement among APEC member economies; improving the ease of doing business; streamlining customs procedures; and carrying out structural reforms in APEC member economies. [340]

2016 APEC Developments

In 2016, Peru served as the APEC chair and hosted major APEC meetings. [341] Under its leadership, APEC focused on “quality growth and human development” and sought to pursue four priorities: “investing in human capital development; modernizing micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs); fostering the regional food system; and advancing the regional economic integration and growth agenda.” [342]

In 2016, various APEC meetings and workshops were organized, carrying out discussions and/or training on a wide range of topics. Examples included human resource development; MSMEs’ entry into global and regional markets; food trade and regional food security; barriers to trade, investment, and competition; digital trade and the Internet economy; climate change and energy security; and green growth, among others. [343] At the Economic Leaders’ Meeting on November 19–20, 2016, APEC leaders and ministers agreed to a number of outcomes from 2016, including preventing trade barriers, creating more transparent and open regulatory cultures, and reducing trade costs by improving the efficiency of supply chains. [344]

The Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) reported good progress in advancing APEC’s objectives in 2016, highlighting (1) the implementation of the Investment Facilitation Action Plan, especially in the priority areas of transparency, investor risk reduction, and business regulation simplification; (2) the launch of the APEC Virtual Knowledge Center on Services, an interactive hub for stakeholders; (3) progress made by member economies in carrying out tariff reduction commitments for the APEC list of environmental goods; (4) the survey of regulatory measures in environmental services; and (5) projects implemented to facilitate the use of intellectual property rights by MSMEs. [345] The Second-Term Review of the Bogor Goals, as well as progress on the creation of the FTAAP and global value chain (GVC) cooperation in 2016, are described separately in the sections below.

The Second-Term Review of the Bogor Goals [346]

In 2016, APEC conducted the Second-Term Review of the Bogor Goals. [347] This review assessed progress on trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, while identifying the weak areas where APEC economies can focus their efforts in upcoming years.

The review highlighted the following findings: [348]

• Trade and investment flows by APEC economies have increased significantly since the 1990s, though trade slowed down after the 2008 global financial crisis.

• The overall most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff in the APEC region fell from an average of 11.0 percent in 1996 to 5.5 percent in 2014, while the share of zero-tariff product lines among all product lines in APEC tariff schedules rose from 27.3 percent in 1996 to 45.4 percent in 2014. However, tariff rates remained relatively high in sectors related to agriculture (e.g., dairy products, beverages and tobacco, and cereals and preparations).

• APEC economies have increasingly applied nontariff measures that affect trade.

• The regulations governing services sectors in the APEC region have become less restrictive and more competition friendly, but the level of openness varies across sectors as well as among APEC economies.

• Foreign investors’ perceptions of investment restrictions remain negative, as they continue to face obstacles that increase the costs of investment, despite APEC governments’ efforts to implement measures that facilitate investment and improve the investment climate.

• Efforts on trade facilitation in the APEC region have led to improved logistics, and in general, trade across borders has become faster and cheaper.

• Employment levels have not fully recovered since the 2008 global financial crisis, even though progress on economic growth and social development has reduced poverty and improved living standards.

• APEC economies have mixed performances in achieving economic growth that is environmentally sustainable.

Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)

In 2006, APEC economies agreed to “examine the long-term prospects of a FTAAP.” [349] At the 2014 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, APEC leaders endorsed Annex A—The Beijing Roadmap for APEC’s Contribution to the Realization of the FTAAP (Beijing Roadmap). This document listed the actions needed to create the FTAAP, including launching a Collective Strategic Study on Issues Related to the Realization of the FTAAP (Study). [350]

In 2016, APEC reported the completion of the Study. The Study reviews the APEC region’s economies; touches upon the next-generation trade and investment issues (discussed below) that should be considered in an eventual FTAAP; describes the various tariff and nontariff measures (NTMs) in the APEC region that affect trade and investment; evaluates the level of coverage of existing regional trade agreements (RTAs) and FTAs, as well as other ongoing regional undertakings (e.g., the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership); [351] and analyzes the challenges and opportunities involved in realizing the FTAAP. [352]

Among the next-generation trade and investment issues highlighted in the Study are “facilitating global supply chains; enhancing SME [small and medium-sized enterprises] participation in global production chains; promoting effective, non-discriminatory, and market-driven innovation policy; transparency in RTAs/FTAs; and manufacturing-related services in supply chains and value chains.” [353]

The NTMs identified by the Study that affect trade and investment include sanitary and phytosanitary measures; technical barriers to trade; import licenses; quantitative restrictions; and regulatory measures that restrict market entry or foreign participation, or impede cross-border services delivery, investment protection, and investment dispute settlement. [354]

The Study recommends advancing regional economic integration through capacity-building projects, technical assistance, and policy-based solutions. [355]

In November 2016, APEC leaders endorsed the Study and its executive summary. They then issued the Lima Declaration on FTAAP , instructing officials to consider next steps towards the eventual realization of the FTAAP. [356]

Global Value Chain Development and Cooperation

In 2013, APEC economic leaders agreed to promote global value chain (GVC) development and cooperation in the APEC region on the basis of previous work on connectivity. [357] In 2014, APEC member economies endorsed the APEC Strategic Blueprint for Promoting Global Value Chains Development and Cooperation (Blueprint) as the mechanism they would use to strengthen economic cooperation within the global and regional value chain network. [358] Under the Blueprint, nine work streams have been set up. [359] The United States leads two GVC work streams, one on “addressing trade and investment issues that impact GVCs,” and the other on “APEC GVCs and Trade in Value Added (TiVA) measurement.” [360]

The CTI noted substantial progress made in 2016 on the work stream on “APEC GVCs and TiVA Measurement,” including convening the Third Technical Group meeting in February 2016 in Lima, Peru, and holding the second capacity-building workshop and the Fourth Technical Group meeting in October 2016 in Bangkok, Thailand. At these meetings and the workshop, the group discussed technical issues and identified technical assistance needs related to data sources and compilation methodologies that will be used to construct the APEC TiVA database. [361]

The CTI also noted progress in other areas of GVC cooperation in 2016. Highlights included a public-private dialogue in August 2016 on enhancing the integration of regional value chains in Asia with those in Latin America and the Caribbean; three subregional, public-private dialogues on improving the investment climate for GVC development; and a draft report on how to improve APEC developing economies’ participation in GVCs. [362]

Negotiations on a Trade in Services Agreement

In July 2012, a number of WTO members released a joint statement expressing their intent to open negotiations toward a plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), in part as a response to the slow pace of services negotiations under the multilateral framework of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). [363] Initially numbering 20 participants in 2013 when negotiations were launched, there were 23 participants by yearend 2016. [364]

TiSA participants conducted 21 negotiating rounds during 2013–16, and aimed at finishing negotiations by December 2016. [365] However, the parties were unable to conclude by yearend and agreed to reconvene in 2017 to take stock of areas in need of ongoing technical work, although no new rounds were scheduled. [366]

While the structure of the agreement and sectors to be covered under the TiSA are evolving, the agreement is thought to be structured in four basic parts: (I) the core text; (II) market access and national treatment commitments; (III) sectoral annexes; and (IV) institutional matters. [367] The core text builds on provisions in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and includes horizontal provisions that apply to all parts of the agreement. The market access and national treatment commitments will contain an individual party’s schedules and any listed exceptions or nonconforming measures. The sectoral annexes set out disciplines for particular services sectors and issues. The institutional provisions lay out the basic rules for how the TiSA functions, addressing dispute settlement, amendments to the agreement, new membership, and possible future multilateralization, among other things.

Although still a work in progress, by yearend 2016 approximately 19 sectoral annexes had been proposed according to several governments. [368] These include annexes on (1) delivery services, (2) direct-selling services, (3) domestic regulation, (4) electronic commerce, (5) energy-related services, (6) environmental services, (7) export subsidies, (8) facilitation of patient mobility, (9) financial services, (10) government procurement, (11) localization, (12) movement of natural persons, (13) professional services, (14) state-owned enterprises, (15) telecommunications, (16) transparency, (17) transport services––air, (18) transport services––maritime, and (19) transport services––road. [369]

Trade and Investment Framework Agreements

By year end 2016, the United States had entered into 55 trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs) (table 4.1). TIFAs provide a framework to expand trade and investment and a forum to resolve trade and investment issues between the United States and various trading partners. These TIFAs cover a range of matters, including market access, labor, the environment, protection of intellectual property rights, and capacity building. TIFA councils meet to discuss these issues on a regular basis. [370] In 2016, two new TIFAs (with Argentina and Laos) were signed and various TIFA councils met.

Table 4.1 U.S. trade and investment framework agreements in 2016

Type and name	Date signed
Bilateral
U.S.-Afghanistan TIFA	September 21, 2004
U.S.-Algeria TIFA	July 13, 2001
U.S.-Angola TIFA	May, 2009
U.S.-Argentina TIFA	March 23, 2016
U.S.-Armenia TIFA	May 7, 2015
U.S.-Bahrain TIFA a	June 18, 2002
U.S.-Bangladesh TICFA	November 25, 2013
U.S.-Brunei TIFA	December 16, 2002
U.S.-Burma TIFA	May 21, 2013
U.S.-Cambodia TIFA	July 14, 2006
U.S.-Egypt TIFA	July 1, 1999
U.S.-Georgia TIFA	June 20, 2007
U.S.-Ghana TIFA	February 26, 1999
U.S.-Iceland TICF	January 15, 2009
U.S.-Indonesia TIFA	July 16, 1996
U.S.-Iraq TIFA	July 11, 2005
U.S.-Kuwait TIFA	February 6, 2004
U.S.-Laos TIFA	February 25, 2016
U.S.-Lebanon TIFA	November 30, 2006
U.S.-Liberia TIFA	February 15, 2007
U.S.-Libya TIFA	May 20, 2010
U.S.-Malaysia TIFA	May 10, 2004
U.S.-Maldives TIFA	October 17, 2009
U.S.-Mauritius TIFA	September 18, 2006
U.S.-Mongolia TIFA	July 15, 2004
U.S.-Mozambique TIFA	June 21, 2005
U.S.-Nepal TIFA	April 15, 2011
U.S.-New Zealand TIFA	October 2, 1992
U.S.-Nigeria TIFA	February 16, 2000
U.S.-Oman TIFA a	July 7, 2004
U.S.-Pakistan TIFA	June 25, 2003
U.S.-Philippines TIFA	November 9, 1989
U.S.-Qatar TIFA	March 19, 2004
U.S.-Rwanda TIFA	June 7, 2006
U.S.-Saudi Arabia TIFA	July 31, 2003
U.S.-South Africa TIFA	June 18, 2012 b
U.S.-Sri Lanka TIFA	July 25, 2002
U.S.-Switzerland TICF	May 25, 2006
U.S.-Taiwan TIFA	September 19, 1994
U.S.-Thailand TIFA	October 23, 2002
U.S.-Tunisia TIFA	October 2, 2002
U.S.-Turkey TIFA	September 29, 1999
U.S.-Ukraine TICA	April 1, 2008
U.S.-United Arab Emirates TIFA	March 15, 2004
U.S.-Uruguay TIFA c	January 25, 2007
U.S.-Vietnam TIFA	June 21, 2007
U.S.-Yemen TIFA	February 6, 2004
Regional
U.S.-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) TIFA d	August 25, 2006
U.S.-Caribbean Community (CARICOM) TIFA e	May 28, 2013
U.S.-Central Asian TIFA (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)	June 1, 2004
U.S.-Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) TIFA f	October 29, 2001
U.S.-East African Community TIFA (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda)	July 16, 2008
U.S.-Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) g	August 5, 2014
U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Framework Agreement for Trade, Economic, Investment, and Technical Cooperation (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates)	September 25, 2012
U.S.-West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) TIFA h	April 24, 2002

Source: USTR, “Trade and Investment Framework Agreements,” n.d. (accessed March 15, 2017).

Note: TICF stands for Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum, TICA stands for Trade and Investment Cooperation Agreement, and TICFA stands for Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum Agreement. All are considered TIFAs by USTR. For more information, see USTR, “Trade and Investment Framework Agreements” (accessed March 15, 2017).

a Bahrain and Oman have both FTAs and TIFAs in effect with the United States.

b The United States-South Africa TIFA was amended on June 18, 2012, and replaces the original TIFA, signed on February 18, 1999.

c On October 2, 2008, the United States and Uruguay signed a TIFA protocol on trade and environment and a TIFA protocol on trade facilitation.

d The 10 countries of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam (Brunei), Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

e The 15 members of CARICOM are Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. It also has 5 associate members: Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

f The 19 members of COMESA are Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

g The 15 members of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

h The 8 members of WAEMU are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

Developments in TIFA Negotiations during 2016

On March 23, 2016, U.S. and Argentine officials signed a TIFA. The agreement establishes a U.S.-Argentina Council on Trade and Investment to discuss bilateral trade and investment and related issues, with the goal of facilitating dialogue on a range of issues, including intellectual property rights, market access, and agriculture. [371] In 2016, U.S. exports to Argentina totaled $8.6 billion and imports from Argentina were valued at $4.7 billion. The top three U.S. exports to Argentina by value were petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals ($1.2 billion); civilian aircraft, engines, and parts ($646.3 million); and medicaments ($263.2 million). These three exports comprised 24.5 percent of all U.S. exports to Argentina in 2016. [372] The top three imports were biodiesel ($1.2 billion), wine ($305.5 million), and crude petroleum ($206.4 million). These three imports made up 37.3 percent of all U.S. imports from Argentina in 2016. [373]

On November 7, 2016, the U.S.-Argentina TIFA council met for the first time in Buenos Aires, Argentina. [374] The two sides discussed several topics, including WTO dispute settlement, trade facilitation, and reducing excess steel capacity, and agreed to establish an Innovation and Creativity Forum for Economic Development. This forum will focus on several topics of mutual interest, including geographical indications, industrial designs, and protection of intellectual property rights; it held its first meeting on December 6, 2016. [375] Argentina had requested that the United States reconsider redesignating Argentina as a beneficiary country under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In response, the USTR announced at the meeting that they would initiate a public review process to determine whether Argentina meets GSP eligibility criteria. [376]

On February 25, 2016, officials from the United States and Laos signed a TIFA. The agreement establishes a forum for dialogue between the United States and Laos on trade and investment issues, including intellectual property, labor, environment, capacity building, and issues pertaining to Laos’s membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). [377] Further, U.S. officials worked with Laos to support its implementation of its WTO accession commitments, as well as commitments under the U.S.-Laos Bilateral Trade Agreement, which extends normal trade relations status to products of Laos. [378]

In 2016, U.S. exports to Laos totaled $30.9 million and imports from Laos were valued at $55.0 million. The top three U.S. exports to Laos by value were synthetic woven fabrics ($11.2 million), nonindustrial diamonds ($4.8 million), and construction machinery parts and attachments ($1.3 million). These top three exports represented 55.9 percent of all U.S. exports to Laos in 2016. [379] The top three U.S. imports from Laos by value were telephone sets ($10.7 million), nonindustrial diamonds ($9.3 million), and silicon ($6.6 million). These imports represented 48.4 percent of total U.S. imports from Laos in 2016. [380]

Developments in Existing TIFAs during 2016

During 2016, the following TIFA councils met:

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

On February 17, 2016, U.S and ASEAN officials met in San Francisco, California, to attend the U.S.-ASEAN TIFA council meeting. The parties focused on the environment, investment, transparency, information and communications technology, SME development, trade facilitation, and technical barriers to trade and regulatory barriers. [381]

Central Asia

On April 5, 2016, officials of the governments of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the United States convened in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, for the 10th anniversary of the Council Meeting of the U.S.-Central Asia TIFA. The parties discussed trade, transit, and investment issues among the Central Asian countries, as well as expanding exports from the region under the U.S. GSP. Working group proposals included the creation of a regional International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation group to implement customs reforms and a Women’s Economic Empowerment Working Group to promote women’s entrepreneurship. [382]

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

On February 8, 2016, U.S. and COMESA officials met in Lusaka, Zambia, to hold the eighth meeting of the U.S.-COMESA TIFA. Topics of discussion included the U.S.-COMESA trade and investment relationship under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), agricultural productivity and trade, deepening bilateral trade, and business and investment policies in the region. [383]

East African Community (EAC)

On September 27, 2016, United States and EAC officials held a meeting of the U.S.-EAC TIFA. The meeting focused on the implementation of the EAC-U.S. “Cooperation Agreement on Trade Facilitation, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and Technical Barriers to Trade,” which was signed in February 2015. Officials also discussed efforts to increase bilateral trade through AGOA and strategic ways to deepen the U.S.-EAC Trade and Investment Partnership. [384]

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

On September 27, 2016, U.S. and ECOWAS officials met in Washington, DC, for the second meeting of the U.S.-ECOWAS TIFA council. A range of topics were discussed, including activities in support of trade and investment objectives, the long-term U.S.-ECOWAS trade relationship, and expanding the trade and investment relationship. [385]

Indonesia

On April 12, 2016, the United States and Indonesia met in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, under the U.S.-Indonesia TIFA. The parties discussed Indonesia’s economic reforms and liberalization agenda, TPP outcomes, investment issues, intellectual property, localization requirements for the high-tech sector, agricultural import requirements, and cooperation on environmental issues. [386]

Mozambique

On November 8, 2016, the United States and Mozambique held the fifth meeting of the U.S.-Mozambique TIFA in Maputo, Mozambique. The parties discussed the U.S.-Mozambique Trade Africa partnership, as well as ways to improve Mozambique’s business and investment climate and to increase bilateral trade and investment. [387]

Nepal

On June 10, 2016, the United States and Nepal held the second TIFA council meeting in Washington, DC. The two sides discussed strengthening bilateral trade and investment ties, trade facilitation, intellectual property, global value chains, and capacity building. Nepal also requested technical assistance to assist with integration into global value chains, address capacity constraints, and maximize its use of U.S. trade preferences. [388]

Pakistan

On October 18, 2016, the United States and Pakistan convened the eighth meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan TIFA Council in Islamabad, Pakistan. The parties discussed market access for U.S. beef products, tax predictability for U.S. businesses, and the electronic filing of customs documents. [389]

Philippines

On March 18, 2016, officials from the United States and the Philippines met in Washington, DC, to hold a meeting of the U.S.-Philippines TIFA. The parties focused on several issues, including investment, intellectual property, customs, and agriculture. Officials also discussed ways to deepen cooperation on issues pertaining to WTO, APEC, and ASEAN. [390]

Sri Lanka

On April 28, 2016, the 12th U.S.-Sri Lanka TIFA council meeting was held in Washington, DC. To facilitate two-way trade and investment, the two sides adopted a U.S.-Sri Lanka Joint Action Plan to Boost Trade and Investment. The plan’s five-year objectives include reforming Sri Lanka’s trade and investment regime; improving the competitiveness of Sri Lanka’s exports; promoting interaction between U.S. and Sri Lankan business communities; strengthening workers’ rights and environmentally sustainable manufacturing practices; reforming the educational sector to be responsive to the needs of business; and increasing the participation of women in business and trade. [391]

Taiwan

On October 4, 2016, U.S. and Taiwan officials met in Washington, DC, to convene the 10th TIFA council meeting. The parties discussed a range of trade and investment issues, including intellectual property protection and enforcement, transparency, technical barriers to trade, and agricultural issues, such as the removal of barriers on U.S. beef and pork. [392]

Tunisia

On March 22, 2016, the United States and Tunisia held the sixth meeting of the U.S.-Tunisia TIFA council in Washington, DC. The council focused on several topics to facilitate bilateral trade and investment, including branding strategies for Tunisian firms, female entrepreneurship, and the development of Tunisia’s intellectual property rights protection regime. The Tunisian delegation also stated their intent to ratify the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and become an observer to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement. [393]

Ukraine

On October 5, 2016, the United States and Ukraine held the sixth meeting of the U.S.-Ukraine Trade and Investment Council in Washington, DC. The parties discussed several issues regarding the enhancement of bilateral trade and investment, including the enforcement and protection of intellectual property rights, Ukraine’s regulatory regime, and expanding Ukraine’s use of the United States GSP. Officials also discussed reforms to Ukraine’s business climate, specifically regarding Ukraine’s efforts to increase transparency and predictability for both foreign and domestic businesses. [394]

Uruguay

On May 11, 2016, the United States and Uruguay held the seventh Trade and Investment Council meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay. The parties addressed a range of issues, including trade facilitation, the digital economy, opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses, market access, and ongoing trade initiatives. [395]

Top of the page

---

Chapter 5
U.S. Free Trade Agreements

This chapter summarizes developments related to U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) during 2016. It describes trends in U.S. merchandise trade with FTA partners, features highlights of the status of U.S. FTA negotiations during the year, and summarizes major activities and dispute settlement developments involving the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other U.S. FTAs in force during 2016.

U.S. Trade with FTA Partners in 2016

The United States was party to 14 FTAs involving a total of 20 countries as of December 31, 2016. Starting with the most recent, the FTAs in force during 2016 were the U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) (entered into force in 2012); the U.S.-Colombia TPA (2012); the U.S.-Korea FTA (2012); the U.S.-Oman FTA (2009); the U.S.-Peru TPA (2009); a multiparty FTA with the countries of Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) that includes the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (entered into force 2006–2007) and Costa Rica (2009); the U.S.-Bahrain FTA (2006); the U.S.-Morocco FTA (2006); the U.S.-Australia FTA (2005); the U.S.-Chile FTA (2004); the U.S.-Singapore FTA (2004); the U.S.-Jordan FTA (2001); NAFTA, with Canada and Mexico (1994); and the U.S.-Israel FTA (1985).

U.S. Total Merchandise Trade with FTA Partners

Total two-way merchandise trade between the United States and its 20 FTA partners was $1.4 trillion in 2016, which accounted for 39.1 percent of total U.S. merchandise trade with the world. The value of U.S. exports to FTA partners totaled $676.6 billion, a 4.7 percent decline from $710.3 billion in 2015, which reflected the 3.3 percent decline in total U.S. exports to the world in 2016. U.S. exports to most FTA partners declined in 2016; the exceptions were exports to Jordan, Morocco, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua (and to CAFTA-DR combined). U.S. imports from FTA partners were valued at $748.8 billion, a 3.3 percent decline from $774.3 billion in 2015. The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with all FTA partners increased 12.9 percent to $66.7 billion in 2016 (tables 5.1–5.3).

U.S. trade with the two NAFTA countries (Canada and Mexico) continued to contribute the most to all U.S. trade with FTA partners. In 2016, these countries accounted for $1.1 trillion, or 75.0 percent, of total U.S. trade with its FTA partners. From 2015 to 2016, the value of U.S. exports to NAFTA countries fell 3.8 percent ($19.4 billion) to $496.9 billion. U.S. imports from NAFTA countries fell 3.4 percent ($20.3 billion), to $572.2 billion from 2015 to 2016. The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with its NAFTA partners fell 1.2 percent to $75.3 billion in 2016 because U.S. imports decreased more than U.S. exports to its NAFTA partners (tables 5.1–5.3).

U.S. trade with non-NAFTA FTA partners was valued at $356.2 billion in 2016, which was a 5.2 percent decrease from 2015. U.S. exports to these FTA partners decreased 7.4 percent ($14.3 billion), from $193.9 billion in 2015 to $179.7 billion in 2016. U.S. imports from these partners decreased 2.9 percent ($5.2 billion) from $181.8 billion in 2015 to $176.6 billion in 2016. U.S. exports decreased more than imports, which caused the U.S. merchandise trade surplus with its non-NAFTA FTA partners to decline 74.4 percent to $3.1 billion.

Table 5.1 Total U.S. exports to FTA partners, by FTA partner, 2014–16

FTA partner	2014	2015	2016	% change 2015–16
	Million $
NAFTA	553,148	516,354	496,920	-3.8
Canada	312,817	280,609	265,961	-5.2
Mexico	240,331	235,745	230,959	-2.0
Non-NAFTA	211,935	193,946	179,683	-7.4
Israel	15,065	13,539	13,197	-2.5
Jordan	2,050	1,359	1,495	10.0
Chile	16,542	15,445	12,941	-16.2
Singapore	30,072	28,472	26,868	-5.6
Australia	26,682	25,036	22,225	-11.2
Morocco	2,102	1,625	1,866	14.8
Bahrain	1,060	1,271	902	-29.0
CAFTA-DR	31,128	28,722	28,866	0.5
Oman	2,015	2,355	1,784	-24.3
Peru	10,056	8,726	8,029	-8.0
South Korea	44,625	43,446	42,266	-2.7
Colombia	20,068	16,287	13,099	-19.6
Panama	10,470	7,664	6,144	-19.8
FTA partner total	765,083	710,300	676,603	-4.7
World total	1,621,172	1,502,572	1,453,721	-3.3
FTA partner share of world (%)	47.2	47.3	46.5

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Table 5.2 U.S. imports from FTA partners, by FTA partner, 2014–16

FTA partner	2014	2015	2016	% change 2015–16
	Million $
NAFTA	645,017	592,564	572,218	-3.4
Canada	349,278	296,156	278,067	-6.1
Mexico	295,739	296,408	294,151	-0.8
Non-NAFTA	186,943	181,769	176,566	-2.9
Israel	23,007	24,477	22,206	-9.3
Jordan	1,401	1,492	1,557	4.4
Chile	9,479	8,772	8,799	0.3
Singapore	16,502	18,267	17,801	-2.6
Australia	10,697	10,894	9,534	-12.5
Morocco	995	1,012	1,022	1.0
Bahrain	965	902	768	-14.9
CAFTA-DR	28,412	23,750	23,384	-1.5
Oman	978	907	1,109	22.2
Peru	6,079	5,053	6,249	23.7
South Korea	69,680	71,759	69,932	-2.5
Colombia	18,316	14,075	13,796	-2.0
Panama	432	408	408	-0.1
FTA partner total	831,961	774,332	748,784	-3.3
World total	2,356,366	2,248,232	2,189,183	-2.6
FTA partner share of world (%)	35.3	34.4	34.2

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Table 5.3 U.S. merchandise trade balance with FTA partners, by FTA partner, 2014–16

FTA partner	2014	2015	2016	% change 2015–16
	Million $
NAFTA	-91,869	-76,209	-75,298	1.2
Canada	-36,461	-15,547	-12,106	22.1
Mexico	-55,408	-60,663	-63,192	-4.2
Non-NAFTA	24,992	12,177	3,117	-74.4
Israel	-7,942	-10,938	-9,009	17.6
Jordan	649	-133	-62	53.0
Chile	7,062	6,673	4,141	-37.9
Singapore	13,571	10,205	9,068	-11.1
Australia	15,985	14,142	12,690	-10.3
Morocco	1,107	613	844	37.6
Bahrain	95	368	134	-63.7
CAFTA-DR	2,716	4,973	5,482	10.2
Oman	1,037	1,448	675	-53.4
Peru	3,976	3,672	1,780	-51.5
South Korea	-25,055	-28,313	-27,666	2.3
Colombia	1,752	2,212	-696	( a )
Panama	10,039	7,255	5,736	-20.9
FTA partner total	-66,877	-64,032	-72,181	-12.7
World total	-735,194	-745,660	-735,462	1.4

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

a Not meaningful.

U.S. Imports Entered under FTAs

The value of U.S. imports entered under FTAs totaled $374.2 billion in 2016, which accounted for half (50.0 percent) of total U.S. imports from FTA partners and 17.1 percent of U.S. imports from the world (tables 5.4–5.5).

Table 5.4 U.S. imports for consumption entered under FTAs, by FTA partner, 2014–16

FTA partner	2014	2015	2016	% change 2015–16
	Million $
NAFTA	356,958	316,160	301,946	-4.5
Canada	174,737	140,727	131,152	-6.8
Mexico	182,220	175,432	170,794	-2.6
Non-NAFTA	58,792	56,802	72,296	27.3
Israel	2,952	2,907	2,741	-5.7
Jordan	1,217	1,349	1,357	0.6
Chile	4,940	4,861	4,694	-3.4
Singapore	1,565	1,654	1,833	10.8
Australia	4,701	5,123	3,630	-29.2
Morocco	242	256	189	-26.3
Bahrain	540	527	498	-5.3
CAFTA-DR	12,854	13,518	13,658	1.0
Oman	611	599	814	35.8
Peru	3,414	2,732	2,659	-2.6
South Korea	17,110	17,831	34,823	95.3
Colombia	8,614	5,405	5,345	-1.1
Panama	32	41	54	31.9
FTA partner total	415,750	372,962	374,242	0.3

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Table 5.5 Ratio of U.S. imports for consumption under FTAs to U.S. general imports, by partner, 2014–16

FTA partner	2014	2015	2016
	Percent
NAFTA	55.3	53.4	52.8
Canada	50.0	47.5	47.2
Mexico	61.6	59.2	58.1
Non-NAFTA	31.4	31.2	40.9
Israel	12.8	11.9	12.3
Jordan	86.8	90.4	87.1
Chile	52.1	55.4	53.3
Singapore	9.5	9.1	10.3
Australia	43.9	47.0	38.1
Morocco	24.3	25.3	18.5
Bahrain	56.0	58.4	64.9
CAFTA-DR	45.2	56.9	58.4
Oman	62.4	66.1	73.4
Peru	56.2	54.1	42.6
South Korea	24.6	24.8	49.8
Colombia	47.0	38.4	38.7
Panama	7.4	10.0	13.3
FTA partner total	50.0	48.2	50.0

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

The value of U.S. imports entered under FTAs in 2016 increased $1.3 billion (0.3 percent), up from $373.0 billion in 2015. FTA imports from South Korea grew $17.0 billion (95.3 percent), which represented the largest increase. The growth was primarily driven by a large increase in motor vehicle imports, which became duty free under the FTA on January 1, 2016. Imports under FTAs from Oman and Panama also increased, by 35.8 percent ($215 million) and 31.9 percent ($13 million), respectively; however, they changed from much smaller baselines. Combined imports from NAFTA partners decreased 4.5 percent ($14.2 billion), which was mostly due to a decrease in energy-related imports from both Canada and Mexico, and road tractor imports from Mexico.

Jordan remained the partner with the highest ratio of imports entered under an FTA to total imports, with a ratio of 87.1 percent (table 5.5). Other countries with notably high ratios include Oman (73.4 percent), Bahrain (64.9 percent), and Mexico (58.1 percent). CAFTA-DR countries as a whole also had a high ratio, at 58.4 percent. Each CAFTA-DR partner also had large shares, except for Costa Rica, for which the ratio was just 33.1 percent. The partners with the smallest shares of imports entered under an FTA to total imports continued to be Singapore (10.3 percent), Israel (12.3 percent), and Panama (13.3 percent). The imports from these countries often entered the United States free of duty under normal trade relations rates.

Developments in FTA Negotiations during 2016

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

On February 4, 2016, the United States and 11 other countries party to the agreement signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) following the conclusion of negotiations in 2015. [396] Over the course of 2016, the U.S. administration worked to prepare the agreement for congressional consideration; however, both of the leading presidential candidates expressed opposition to the TPP as drafted, and the implementing legislation was not submitted to Congress by yearend 2016. [397] In January 2017, President Donald Trump instructed the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to formally withdraw from TPP discussions. [398]

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement

Launched in 2013, the United States and the European Union (EU) continued negotiations in 2016 towards a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement. Four rounds of negotiations were held in 2016 (table 5.6), with the goal of completing “an ambitious, comprehensive and high-standard agreement this year.” [399] Meetings between USTR Michael Froman and EU Trade Minister Cecilia Malmström intensified in 2016, but certain areas of the agreement still needed “significant work” at yearend. [400] All of the rounds, except the 15th round in October 2016, included meetings with stakeholders, including representatives from academia, business, labor, and environmental and consumer groups.

Table 5.6 Timetable of major TTIP negotiations, 2016

Date	Negotiating round
February 22–26	12th round, Brussels, Belgium
April 25–29	13th round, New York, NY
July 11–15	14th round, Brussels, Belgium
October 3–7	15th round, New York, NY

Source: USTR, “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,” https://ustr.gov/ttip (accessed March 22, 2017).

During the year, the two parties made progress in all areas of the negotiations, including market access, regulatory issues, and rules. In the area of market access, negotiators entered the year with an agreement to eliminate duties on 97 percent of tariff lines. [401] During 2016, negotiations centered on reducing or eliminating transition periods on those tariff lines for which duties were not immediately eliminated at entry into force of the agreement. [402] In July, the EU made its first market access offer in financial services, [403] which had been delayed by the EU until the United States agreed to include financial services regulatory cooperation in TTIP. [404] Although an agreement was not reached, a related bilateral forum separate from TTIP, in which financial sector regulatory issues have been discussed since 2002, was enhanced, renamed, and had its first meeting in July. [405] In the area of government procurement, both sides presented first offers in February. [406] The U.S. chief TTIP negotiator said it was the most ambitious offer the United States had made in any trade agreement, including the TPP. [407] But the EU said it was seeking more market access, [408] including procurement opportunities at the Federal Aviation Administration and in rail transportation. [409]

Both sides indicated that progress has been made in the regulatory area. [410] Discussions advanced in 2016 on regulatory cooperation and on good regulatory practices, which aim to set out principles and rules that the United States and EU can apply in developing regulations. [411] For example, progress was made on developing a framework for regulatory cooperation that would facilitate greater compatibility in future regulations and on strengthening transparent rulemaking by ensuring opportunities for public input. [412] Discussions moved forward on technical barriers to trade, including progress on reducing duplicative product testing and certification requirements, as well as on devising ways to increase participation by stakeholders in the development of each other’s product standards. [413] Both sides continued to discuss how to organize a regulatory cooperation forum. [414]

Talks also addressed regulatory compatibility in nine sectors, including motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, medical devices, cosmetics, textiles, engineering services, information and communication technologies, and pesticides. During the final negotiating round of 2016, the U.S. chief negotiator noted that good progress had been made in resolving conceptual and language differences in the auto, pharmaceutical, and medical device sectors. [415] Also, the two sides made progress in 2016 on updating a mutual recognition agreement from 1998 on good manufacturing practices for drug inspections. [416]

Negotiations also progressed during the year on labor; the environment; customs and trade facilitation; small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); energy; intellectual property rights, including geographical indications; competition; state-owned enterprises; investor protection; and state-to-state dispute settlement. [417] In the 12th round in February, the EU presented its approach on investment protection and dispute resolution, and views were exchanged for the first time. [418] During the 13th round, the U.S. chief negotiator said that customs and trade facilitation, competition, and SMEs were at a “very advanced state of negotiation.” [419]

In a joint report on the status of negotiations as of the end of 2016, the United States and EU said that the following areas still required “significant work”: (1) the most sensitive tariff lines (the final 3 percent of tariff lines); (2) market access in service sectors; (3) sanitary and phytosanitary measures; (4) mutual recognition of professional qualifications; (5) government procurement; (6) standards and conformity assessment procedures; (7) investor protection; (8) labor and environmental protection; (9) electronic commerce; (10) energy; and (11) trademarks, generic names, and geographical indications. [420]

Developments in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) [421]

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among the United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into force on January 1, 1994. All of the agreement’s provisions were implemented, as scheduled, by the three parties by January 1, 2008, with the exception of the NAFTA cross-border trucking provisions. [422]

NAFTA’s central oversight body is the Free Trade Commission, which is responsible for overseeing NAFTA’s implementation and elaboration, as well as activities under its dispute settlement provisions. The commission has not met since 2012. However, officials of the three member countries have met regularly to expand and deepen trade and investment opportunities in North America. [423]

The following sections describe the major activities of NAFTA’s Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) and Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) during 2016, as well as dispute settlement activities under NAFTA Chapters 11 and 19 for the year.

Commission for Labor Cooperation

The CLC, composed of a ministerial council and an administrative secretariat, was established under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). The NAALC is a supplemental agreement to NAFTA that aims to promote effective enforcement of domestic labor laws and foster transparency in administering them. The CLC is responsible for implementing the NAALC. Each NAFTA partner has a national administrative office (NAO) within its labor ministry to act as the contact point with the other parties, the secretariat, other government agencies, and the public. The United States’ NAO is the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs in the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). [424] Another NAO function is to receive and respond to public communications on labor law matters arising in another NAALC country. Each NAO establishes its own domestic procedures for reviewing and responding to public communications. The NAOs and the secretariat also carry out the cooperative activities of the CLC, including seminars, conferences, joint research projects, and technical assistance. [425]

In 2016, the USDOL and the Mexican Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS) published a joint report on the educational and outreach activities completed in 2015 about the rights of workers under H-2A and H-2B visas. [426] In the United States, the USDOL held 29 outreach events reaching more than 2,300 workers and 1,000 employers. In Mexico, STPS held 11 events reaching almost 1,600 individuals. [427]

In July 2016, the Mexican NAO received a submission from two former H-2 workers, the Centro de los Derechos del Migrante (Center for Migrant Rights), and 27 other organizations, alleging gender discrimination in the U.S. H-2 system. The Mexican NAO accepted the submission for review in August of the same year. [428]

Also in 2016, the U.S. NAO published its Public Report of Review of U.S. Submission 2015-04 (Mexico) concerning Mexico’s obligations regarding workers’ rights under the NAALC. [429] In 2015, the USDOL received a submission from four groups: the United Food and Commercial Workers Local 770, the Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (Authentic Workers’ Front), the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, and the Project on Organizing, Development, Education, and Research. The USDOL accepted the submission for review on January 11, 2016.

The report, published in July 2016, indicates that there was too little evidence to support specific conclusions about complaints that the Mexican government failed to effectively enforce certain aspects of its labor laws at the chain of stores referenced in the submission. However, the report notes that USDOL has had longstanding concerns about protection contracts and the factors that facilitate them, such as structural bias in the Conciliation and Arbitration Boards that administer labor justice in Mexico. The report also indicated that recent steps taken by the government of Mexico and reforms that had been proposed would address the factors underlying these concerns, if they were effectively implemented. [430] Mexico’s Congress approved one of those proposed reforms—the constitutional reform that abolishes the Conciliation and Arbitration Boards and creates a system of labor courts—in November 2016. [431] The report recommends expeditious passage and implementation of the reform.

The U.S. NAO will continue to monitor and engage with the Mexican government on these and other issues mentioned in the submission. Other issues include pregnancy discrimination and the misuse of government-sponsored volunteer programs in retail stores. [432]

Commission for Environmental Cooperation

The CEC was established under article 8 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. This supplemental agreement, which came into force at the same time as NAFTA, is designed to support the environmental goals of NAFTA, which are to protect and improve the environment, support sustainable development, and increase cooperation in reaching these goals. [433] The CEC was established to support cooperation among the parties to reach these goals. [434]

Articles 14 and 15 of the supplemental agreement provide citizens and nongovernmental organizations with a mechanism to help enforce environmental laws in the NAFTA countries. Article 14 governs alleged violations submitted for review by the CEC. It sets out guidelines about criteria for submissions and parties that can file complaints. Article 15 outlines the CEC Secretariat’s obligations in considering the submissions and publishing findings in the factual record. [435] At the end of 2016, three complaint files remained active under Articles 14 and 15, two of which were submitted in 2016. All three active files involved Mexico (table 5.7).

Table 5.7 Active files as of yearend 2016 under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation

Case title	Case number	First filed	Country a	Status
La Primavara Forest	SEM-15-001	July 20, 2015	Mexico	The Secretariat informed the CEC Council that the Secretariat considers that the submission warrants development of a factual record.
Agricultural Waste Burning in Sonora	SEM-16-001	Jan. 22, 2016	Mexico	The Secretariat informed the CEC Council that the Secretariat considers that the submission warrants development of a factual record.
Monterrey VI Aqueduct	SEM-16-002	July 11, 2016	Mexico	The Secretariat received a response from the concerned government party and began considering whether to recommend a factual record.

Source: CEC, “Submission on Enforcement Matters: Active Submissions” (accessed March 15, 2017).

a Refers to the country against which an allegation was filed.

At the 23rd regular session of the CEC Council on September 9, 2016, in Mérida, Yucatán, Mexico, the Council focused on “Sustainable Communities and Ecosystems” as well as on “Youth and the Environment in North America.” The CEC’s Joint Public Advisory Committee also hosted a public forum on biodiversity and climate change. [436] The CEC Ministerial Statement noted that several significant milestones for the three countries occurred in 2016, including the signing of the Paris Agreement on climate change as well as the North American Leaders Summit. The summit was held in Ottawa, Canada, on June 29, 2016, and the North American leaders launched an Action Plan on Climate, Clean Energy, and Environmental Partnership there. The 24th session will be held in 2017 in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada. [437]

The Border Environment Cooperation Commission and the North American Development Bank were created in 1993 to address environmental issues in the U.S.-Mexico border region. [438] As of December 31, 2016, the bank had contracted a total of nearly $2.8 billion in loans and grants, of which 96 percent has been disbursed for use in 216 environmental infrastructure projects. [439]

Dispute Settlement

The dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA Chapters 11 (Investment) and 19 (Review and Dispute Settlement in Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Matters) cover a variety of areas. [440] The sections below describe developments during 2016 in NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state disputes and Chapter 19 binational reviews of final determinations of antidumping and countervailing cases. Appendix table A.26 presents an overview of developments in NAFTA Chapter 19 dispute settlement cases to which the United States was a party in 2016.

Chapter 11 Dispute Settlement Developments

Chapter 11 of NAFTA includes provisions designed to protect cross-border investors and to make it easier to settle investment disputes. Under subpart B of Chapter 11, an individual investor who alleges that a NAFTA country has breached its investment obligations under Chapter 11 may pursue arbitration through internationally recognized channels or remedies available in the host country’s domestic courts. [441] A key feature of the Chapter 11 arbitral provisions is the enforceability in domestic courts of final awards made by arbitration tribunals. [442] In 2016, there were five active Chapter 11 cases filed against the United States, four of them filed by Canadian investors and one filed by Mexican investors; [443] one filed by U.S. investors against Canada; [444] and one filed by U.S. investors against Mexico. [445]

Chapter 19 Dispute Panel Reviews

Chapter 19 of NAFTA contains a mechanism that provides for a binational panel to review final determinations made by national investigating authorities in antidumping and countervailing duty cases. [446] Such a panel serves as an alternative to judicial review by domestic courts and may be established at the request of any involved NAFTA country. [447] At the end of 2016, the NAFTA Secretariat listed six binational panels active under Chapter 19 (table 5.8). Four of the six active cases challenged the Mexican agency’s determinations on products from the United States, and two challenged U.S. agencies’ determinations on products from Canada and Mexico. [448]

Table 5.8 NAFTA Chapter 19 binational panels, active reviews through 2016

Country	Filed by	Case number	National agencies’ final determination a	Case title
Mexico
	United States	MEX-USA-2012-1904-01	SE Antidumping Administrative Review	Chicken Thighs and Legs
	United States	MEX-USA-2012-1904-02	SE Antidumping Administrative Review	Ethylene Glycol Monobutyl Ether
	United States	MEX-USA-2015-1904-01	SE Antidumping Administrative Review	Ammonium Sulphate
	United States	MEX-USA-2016-1904-01	SE Antidumping Administrative Review	Ethylene Glycol Monobutyl Ether
United States
	Canada	USA-CDA-2015-1904-01	USDOC Antidumping Administrative Review	Supercalendered Paper
	Mexico	USA-MEX-2014-1904-02	USITC Injury Determination	Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bar

Source: NAFTA Secretariat, “Status Report of Panel Proceedings—Chapter 19 Active Cases” (accessed March 15, 2017).

a In Canada, final dumping and subsidy determinations are made by the Canada Border Services Agency, and injury determinations are made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal. In Mexico, all determinations are made by the Secretariat of the Economy. In the United States, dumping and subsidy determinations are made by the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC), and injury determinations are made by the USITC. NAFTA Secretariat, “Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions” (accessed March 15, 2017).

Developments in Other FTAs Already in Force during 2016

In 2016, U.S. officials met with FTA partners for discussions on a variety of matters, including dispute settlement, labor issues, enhancing trade and investment, and environmental issues. Highlights of these consultations are presented in this section.

Twelve of the 14 U.S. FTAs have investment provisions designed to protect foreign investors and their investments and to facilitate the settlement of investment disputes. [449] According to the U.S. Department of State, among the U.S. FTAs that provide for investor-state dispute settlements, there are ongoing investor disputes under NAFTA (as discussed above), the U.S.-Chile FTA, CAFTA-DR, the U.S.-Peru TPA, and the U.S.-Oman FTA. [450]

Thirteen of the 14 U.S. FTAs have labor provisions to protect worker rights and facilitate cooperation on labor issues. [451] By yearend 2016, USDOL and other agencies had acted on labor complaints made by interested parties in seven FTA partners: Bahrain, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Peru. In 2016, USDOL received one submission, under the labor chapter of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. USDOL also released two review reports, one on the submission filed against Mexico under the NAALC, the other on the submission filed against Peru under the labor chapter of the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement. [452] For more detailed information regarding these developments, see the section on each respective FTA in this chapter.

U.S.-Australia FTA

On May 3, 2016, officials from the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement Joint Committee held a meeting to review implementation of the U.S.-Australia FTA, including issues related to goods and services, investment, and intellectual property. [453]

CAFTA-DR

The central oversight body for the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is the Free Trade Commission, comprising the U.S. Trade Representative and the trade ministers of the other CAFTA-DR parties or their designees. [454] In August 2016, technical-level staff of the parties met in Managua, Nicaragua, to follow up on agreements made during the previous Free Trade Commission meeting in 2015 to advance technical and administrative implementation issues. [455]

Labor

In October 2016, USDOL issued its fifth periodic review on implementation of the recommendations in its 2013 report. The original report found evidence of apparent and potential violations of labor law in the Dominican sugar sector, while the 2016 review noted positive steps taken by the Dominican Republic and the sugar industry to address these concerns. [456]

Environment

Officials responsible for trade and environment under CAFTA-DR held several meetings in 2016 to discuss environmental cooperation funding, the monitoring and implementation of environmental obligations under the agreement, and preparation for senior-level meetings of the Environmental Affairs Council. The council met in July 2016 in San Salvador, El Salvador, to mark the 10-year anniversary of CAFTA-DR. [457]

U.S.-Chile FTA

The central oversight body for the U.S.-Chile FTA is the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Commission, composed of the U.S. Trade Representative and Chile’s Director General of International Economic Affairs or their designees. This commission held its 11th meeting in December 2016. The commission recognized the value of discussions about the implementation of Chapter 17 (IPR) and further reviewed implementation of the FTA, including the need to update product-specific rules of origin to reflect the 2017 changes to the global Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (Harmonized System) used to classify traded goods. It reaffirmed the parties’ goal of resolving concerns about sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) and continued cooperation on these matters. [458]

Labor

The FTA Labor Chapter establishes a Labor Cooperation Mechanism for the United States and Chile to work together to improve labor standards and advance common commitments. In June 2016, a delegation from the Chilean Ministry of Labor visited Washington, DC. Their agenda included a working-group meeting of the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor and a visit to the Job Corps center of the U.S. Department of Labor. Chile has enacted several pieces of labor legislation over the past decade that are relevant to the FTA Labor Chapter, including guaranteeing the rights of workers to collective bargaining in 2016. Effective April 2017, this law limits employers’ power to replace striking workers, expands collective bargaining rights to some temporary workers and apprentices, and removes obstacles that previously inhibited bargaining beyond the individual enterprise level. The USDOL, in its annual report on child labor, found that Chile has made significant progress in the areas of law enforcement, policy, legislative efforts, and social programs. [459]

U.S.-Colombia TPA

The central oversight body for the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement is the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Commission, composed of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Colombian Minister of Trade, Industry, and Tourism or their designees. In 2016, the United States and Colombia continued to work together to carry out initiatives launched at the commission’s 2012 meeting, including the elimination of tariffs for certain goods, the establishment of certain elements related to the dispute settlement mechanism, and updating the agreement’s rules of origin. [460]

Labor

The agreement’s entry into force was accompanied by the Action Plan Related to Labor Rights (Action Plan) for Colombia, developed jointly by the parties and launched in 2011. The year 2016 marked the five-year anniversary of the Action Plan. In 2016, the Colombian government continued implementing the plan, including issuing a presidential decree to crack down on illegal forms of subcontracting. Ongoing engagement between U.S. and Colombian officials in 2016 included videoconferences with Colombia’s Minister of Labor, a July meeting in Washington, DC, with the Minister of Labor, and a November mission to Colombia by USTR and USDOL officials. [461]

In May 2016, labor unions and nongovernmental organizations in the United States and Colombia filed a public submission with USDOL, alleging that the government of Colombia had failed to effectively enforce labor laws and had not adopted laws to protect labor rights. The USDOL accepted this submission and began the detailed review process in July 2016. The review considers all information provided by the submitters, the government of Colombia, and others with knowledge of the issue. [462]

U.S.-Israel FTA

The central oversight body for the U.S.-Israel FTA is the U.S.-Israel Joint Committee. The Joint Committee met in February 2016 to discuss potential efforts to increase bilateral trade and investment. The parties also discussed specific impediments to bilateral trade related to standards and customs practices. In addition, Israel proposed resuming negotiations on a permanent U.S.-Israel Agreement on Trade in Agricultural Products (ATAP). Initially negotiated in 1996, ATAP allowed U.S. products preferential market access to Israel, but did not conform to the U.S.-Israel FTA’s objective of free trade in agricultural products. ATAP was renegotiated in 2004 to include additional market access opportunities in agricultural products and was to remain in effect until December 2008. ATAP has been extended on an annual basis since 2008 after Israel and the United States were unable to conclude a successor agreement. In July, the United States revised modalities for a new permanent ATAP agreement. These proposals are being reviewed by both sides. [463]

U.S.-Jordan FTA

The U.S.-Jordan Joint Committee met in May 2016 to discuss labor issues, technical barriers to agricultural trade, acceptance of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement, and Jordan’s accession to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement. After the meetings concluded, the issue of licensing imports of poultry from the United States was resolved, allowing U.S. poultry to be imported into Jordan. [464]

U.S.-Korea FTA (KORUS)

The Joint Committee is the central oversight committee under the U.S.-Korea FTA. It is responsible for supervising the agreement’s implementation, coordinating the work of other committees, and resolving issues that may arise. [465] In 2016, nine committees and working groups established under KORUS met to discuss issues related to the agreement. Highlights of these meetings are detailed below:

The Committee on Trade in Goods discussed the South Korean Customs Service’s interpretation of the FTA’s rules of origin and verification procedures, resulting in the closure of two outstanding customs reviews of U.S. manufacturers. The committee also discussed U.S. concerns about new customs clearance procedures for express delivery packages at Incheon airport.

The Medicines and Medical Devices Committee discussed South Korea’s import pricing system, South Korea’s patent linkage system, and updates on draft regulations related to pharmaceutical drugs in South Korea.

The Professional Services Working Group focused on potential efforts to enhance trade in professional services.

The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Matters discussed South Korea’s process for reviewing and approving new biotechnology events, [466] outstanding plant and animal market access issues, and issues pertaining to maximum residue limits in pesticides. [467]

In November 2016, U.S. and South Korean officials held technical-level conversations related to the KORUS labor chapter. The parties also discussed cooperative efforts to facilitate corporate compliance with international labor standards in global supply chains. [468]

U.S.-Morocco FTA

In October 2016, U.S. and Moroccan officials held an Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary FTA Subcommittee meeting in Washington, DC. The meeting covered a variety of issues, including exports of bovine genetics and pet food from the United States to Morocco. [469]

Labor

In 2016, the government of Morocco passed a domestic worker law that addresses an issue of concern that was raised by the United States during a 2014 meeting of the FTA Subcommittee on Labor. This law, which takes effect in August 2017, extends protections and benefits to workers by setting a minimum wage, limiting weekly hours of work, providing a day of rest, and establishing a minimum age of employment. [470]

U.S.-Panama TPA

In November 2016, the Free Trade Commission, the central oversight body of the U.S.-Panama TPA, held a meeting to review progress on implementing the TPA. The committee also discussed next steps on outstanding intellectual property commitments and concerns related to bilateral trade in agricultural products. In December 2016, the parties agreed to update the TPA’s rules of origin to correspond to changes in the system of product names (nomenclature) used in the international Harmonized System. During the year, the two sides also made progress on establishing the dispute settlement infrastructure under the agreement. [471]

Labor

The TPA includes a labor chapter requiring both countries to adopt and maintain fundamental labor rights, to enforce their labor laws, and to avoid waiving or deviating from these laws in a way that would affect trade or investment. In February 2016, U.S. and Panamanian officials met in Washington, DC, to discuss labor law enforcement issues and best practices in the areas of child labor, wage-and-hour protections, and occupational safety and health. [472]

Environment

The November 2016 meeting of the Free Trade Commission also included discussions on the next steps in staffing an independent secretariat. The secretariat mechanism is responsible for encouraging the public to take part in identifying environmental enforcement issues and is to consider public submissions about the enforcement of environmental laws. [473]

U.S.-Peru TPA

The main oversight body of the U.S.-Peru TPA is the U.S.-Peru Free Trade Commission. In 2016, the commission continued work on sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade, with much of the work centering on logging issues under the Annex on Forest Sector Governance. In March 2016, following technical-level exchanges and engagements between Peruvian officials and USTR and USDA, an official letter was finalized with Peru that resulted in the removal of trade restrictions related to bovine spongiform encephalopathy. [474]

Labor

In March 2016, USDOL issued a report in response to the public submission filed under the Labor chapter of the TPA by the International Labor Rights Forum and seven Peruvian workers’ organizations. The submission alleged that the government of Peru had failed to adopt and maintain laws that protect labor rights and to enforce existing labor laws. USDOL’s report raised concerns regarding freedom of association as well as questions about labor law enforcement. [475]

Environment

In 2016, the two countries held several meetings to discuss and monitor issues in implementing the TPA’s environment chapter and its Annex on Forest Sector Governance. [476]

In February 2016, the USTR requested that the government of Peru verify that certain wood products exported to the United States in 2015 adhered to applicable Peruvian laws and regulations. Peru’s subsequent investigation showed that a significant portion of these timber shipments did not comply with Peruvian laws on trade in timber products. In August 2016, the Timber Committee issued a set of recommendations to address this violation, and in November 2016 the USTR reached an agreement with Peru on a concrete set of actions. [477]

In November 2016, officials from the United States and Peru conducted several meetings in Lima, Peru, under the Environmental Affairs Council, the Subcommittee on Forest Sector Governance, and the Environmental Cooperation Commission. [478]

Top of the page

---

Chapter 6
U.S. Trade Relations with Selected Trading Partners

This chapter reviews U.S. bilateral trade relations with 10 selected trading partners. Among these are some of the United States’ major trading partners in 2016, as well as others that are notable as a result of recent changes to U.S. bilateral trade relations. This year, the report covers the following trading partners: the European Union (EU), China, Canada, Mexico, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Brazil, and Cuba (ordered by the value of their two-way merchandise trade). For each trading partner, the chapter summarizes U.S. bilateral trade, including two-way merchandise and private services trade, the U.S. trade balance, U.S. merchandise exports, and U.S. merchandise imports. That description is followed by summaries of the major bilateral trade-related developments during 2016.

European Union

U.S.-EU Trade

The EU as a single entity is the United States’ largest two-way (exports plus imports) trading partner in terms of both goods and services. The value of U.S. merchandise trade with the 28 member states of the EU declined 1.8 percent, from $699.6 billion in 2015 to $687.0 billion in 2016. However, the EU share of U.S. trade increased for the third year in a row, from 18.7 percent in 2015 to 18.9 percent in 2016, as total U.S. trade with the world declined by more than U.S. trade with the EU. The U.S. trade deficit with the EU fell $9.2 billion from $155.6 billion in 2015 to $146.3 billion in 2016 as U.S. imports from the EU dropped more than U.S. exports to the EU (figure 6.1). At the same time, the United States continued to register a trade surplus in services with the EU, increasing $0.9 billion in 2016 to $61.4 billion (figure 6.2). The EU accounted for 32.8 percent ($397.8 billion) of U.S. two-way trade in services in 2016. The United Kingdom was the EU’s largest services trader with the United States, with 29.2 percent of the EU total, followed by Germany and France. [479]

The EU became the largest market for U.S. merchandise exports in 2016, surpassing Canada, which had ranked as the largest export market in 2015. U.S. exports to the EU were stable, falling just 0.6 percent to $270.3 billion in 2016. Leading U.S. exports to the EU included civilian aircraft, engines, and parts; medicaments (medicines); blood fractions (e.g., antiserum); refined petroleum products; and hand-executed paintings, drawings, and pastels.

The EU was the second-largest source of U.S. imports, following China. U.S. imports from the EU decreased 2.5 percent, from $427.6 billion in 2015 to $416.7 billion in 2016. Leading U.S. imports were passenger motor vehicles, medicaments, blood fractions, refined petroleum products, and parts of turbojets and turbopropellers. U.S.-EU merchandise trade data are shown in appendix tables A.27 through A.30.

Figure 6.1 U.S. merchandise trade with the EU, 2012–16

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.5.

Figure 6.2 U.S. private services trade with the EU, 2012–16 a

Source: USDOC, BEA, U.S. International Transactions, Services, & IIP, International Transactions data, tables 1.2 and 1.3, March 21, 2017.

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.7.

a Data for 2016 are preliminary.

Trade Developments

The major focus of the U.S.-EU trade relationship in 2016 was negotiations to conclude the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement. TTIP trade negotiators aimed to complete the negotiations in 2016, but issues remained at yearend. [480] The Transatlantic Economic Council continued its work in parallel to TTIP, focusing primarily on long-term regulatory cooperation. Other notable developments in 2016 included a U.S.-EU agreement on the Privacy Shield, a framework that allows U.S.-based companies to transfer personal data from the EU to the United States consistent with EU law, and negotiations to conclude an agreement on insurance and reinsurance. These are described below. [481]

In December 2016, the United States took initial steps toward reinstating trade action against the EU in a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute that began in 1996 over the EU’s ban on meat treated with certain growth-promoting hormones (DS26). [482] Although a bilateral memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed in 2009 in an effort to resolve the disagreement, the United States claims that its beef industry has been prevented from gaining the intended benefits from the MOU. [483] There were also developments in other WTO dispute settlement cases involving the United States and the EU in 2016. A compliance panel report was circulated in September 2016 that addressed the long-running complaint by the United States about EU measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft (DS316). Also, a panel report was circulated in November 2016 in the complaint by the EU regarding conditional tax incentives, established by Washington state, for large civil aircraft (DS487). For more information about WTO dispute settlement cases, see chapter 3 and appendix table A.25.

Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC)

The Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) was launched in 2007 to promote bilateral cooperation aimed at lowering transatlantic barriers to trade and investment in order to strengthen integration and growth. [484] The TEC’s efforts tend to be long term and focus on aligning “transatlantic standards and regulation to enable the growth of innovative, export-oriented industries in the United States and the EU.” [485] On November 30, 2016, U.S. and EU officials met for the first time since November 2015 to review progress and discuss new opportunities for collaboration to support innovation and growth. [486]

A report of the meeting noted progress in 2016 on the following: [487]

• Electric vehicles : Work continued on developing common standards, test procedures, and tools to promote universal compatibility and interoperability between electric vehicles, supply equipment, and electric power supply infrastructure. In 2016, the two sides agreed to cooperate on battery testing, energy efficiency of electric and hybrid vehicles, interoperability of smart grids (upgraded “intelligent” electricity networks), electromagnetic compatibility, and wider standardization work. [488]

• E-health : To encourage the more effective use of information and communications technology for delivery of health services, work continued in two areas: (1) developing and promoting the use of internationally recognized standards to enable the exchange of patient summary records globally, and (2) developing common curricula to train health workers on health-related information and communications technology to build skilled e-health workforces in the United States and EU. In July 2016, the two sides updated the e-health roadmap, which lays out the vision, challenges, and action plans, including specific deliverables, of the work on standards and workforce development, as well as newer work to encourage innovation in the e-health industry. [489]

• Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) : Work continued on enhancing cooperation to promote trade and investment opportunities for U.S. and EU SMEs. The seventh U.S.-EU SME workshop was held in June 2016, in Tallinn, Estonia, to exchange best practices and discuss topics including access to finance, intellectual property rights (IPRs), access to standards, and entrepreneurship. U.S. and EU negotiators of the SME chapter in TTIP also met with SME representatives at the workshop to discuss their needs and expectations of TTIP. In addition, the United States and EU worked together to support SME events at several international fairs and at a cluster matchmaking event to help SMEs find strategic partners in thematic areas of mutual interest. [490]

• The bio-based economy : Work continued on developing guidance on the nature of bio-based products, data collection, and benchmarking, as well as on aligning international standards in this sector.

• Nanotechnology : Regular meetings continued in 2016 to exchange information on regulatory and scientific developments to help inform decision-making in the United States and the EU.

• Raw materials : TEC participants continued to share best practices and develop approaches to ensure fair access to and responsible use of critical raw materials, in part to avoid future trade disruptions. [491]

TEC officials also agreed at the annual meeting to add one new area for cooperation. The two sides agreed to explore opportunities for cooperating on ocean research projects to help support sustainable economic activities in the Atlantic. [492]

U.S.-EU Privacy Shield

EU data protection regulations allow the transmission of EU personal data to third countries only if the country is deemed to provide an adequate level of protection by reason of domestic law or international commitments. [493] In February 2016, the United States and EU announced a new method for companies to transfer personal data from the EU to the United States that is consistent with EU law. The new framework—the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield—replaces the Safe Harbor agreement that was invalidated by the European Court of Justice in October 2015. [494] On July 12, 2016, the Privacy Shield entered into force when the European Commission deemed the Privacy Shield framework adequate to enable data transfers under EU law. [495]

Company participation in the Privacy Shield is voluntary. To participate, a company must certify that it will comply with the data-handling requirements of the Privacy Shield. The U.S. Department of Commerce began accepting certifications to the Privacy Shield from U.S. companies on August 1, 2016. [496]

The Privacy Shield framework consists of four broad areas, including: [497]

1. The Privacy Shield principles, which are a code of conduct or set of obligations on U.S.-based companies regarding the handling of data transferred from the EU to the United States. To become a Privacy Shield participant, a company must commit to comply with these principles so that the commitment becomes enforceable under U.S. law. For example, a participant must ensure accountability for data transferred to third parties, and must provide free and accessible dispute resolution.

2. Oversight and enforcement of the program by the U.S. government. For example, the U.S. government will verify that companies have met self-certification requirements before the certification is finalized, and will proactively monitor participating companies.

3. A new ombudsperson, located at the U.S. Department of State. This new mechanism aims to facilitate the processing of requests relating to national security access to data transmitted to the United States from the EU.

4. Safeguards and limitations on U.S. government access to data in the areas of national security and law enforcement. [498]

The Privacy Shield framework also provides for an annual review of the program by U.S. and EU officials.

Agreement on Insurance and Reinsurance

In 2016, U.S. and EU officials met five times to negotiate an agreement on insurance and reinsurance, although a final agreement was not concluded by yearend. [499] The aim of the United States was to ensure that a new agreement would “level the regulatory playing field for U.S.-based insurers and reinsurers operating [in the EU]” following the January 1, 2016, implementation of a new insurance regulatory regime in the EU, known as Solvency II. [500] Solvency II [501] requires that U.S. insurers and reinsurers be deemed equivalent to EU providers in order to ensure continued access to the EU market. [502] Three major areas of prudential insurance supervision were the subject of negotiations: group supervision, exchange of information between supervisory authorities on both sides, and reinsurance supervision, including collateral. [503]

China

U.S.-China Trade

In 2016, China remained the United States’ largest single-country trading partner based on two-way merchandise trade, accounting for 15.9 percent of total U.S. merchandise trade. U.S. two-way merchandise trade with China amounted to $578.6 billion in 2016, a decrease of 3.5 percent over the $599.3 billion recorded in 2015. The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China, which fell $20.1 billion to $347.0 billion in 2016, remained higher than the U.S. trade deficit with any other trading partner. The contraction of this deficit was attributable to a $20.4 billion decrease in U.S. merchandise imports from China, while U.S. merchandise exports to China decreased by much less, $297 million (figure 6.3). In 2016, China continued to be the United States’ fourth-largest single-country trading partner based on two-way services trade of $69.0 billion. U.S. services trade with China has been increasing in recent years; it amounted to 5.7 percent of total U.S. services trade in 2016, compared to 5.3 percent in 2015 and 4.9 percent in 2014. The U.S. services trade surplus with China increased $4.2 billion in 2016 to $37.0 billion, as a result of growing U.S. exports. In 2016, U.S. services exports to China grew $5.2 billion, or 10.8 percent, while U.S. services imports from China grew $995 million, or 6.6 percent, relative to the year before (figure 6.4).

Figure 6.3 U.S. merchandise trade with China, 2012–16

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.5.

Figure 6.4 U.S. private services trade with China, 2012–16 a

Source: USDOC, BEA, U.S. International Transactions, Services, & IIP, International Transactions data, tables 1.2 and 1,3, March 21, 2017.

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.7.

a Data for 2016 are preliminary.

China was the third-largest single-country destination for U.S. merchandise exports in 2016, behind Canada and Mexico. U.S. merchandise exports to China amounted to $115.8 billion in 2016, decreasing 0.3 percent, or $297 million, relative to 2015. The slight drop in U.S. exports to China in 2016 was broadly reflective of shrinking demand from China, given that its imports from all countries in the world decreased 5.1 percent relative to 2015. [504] Leading U.S. exports to China in 2016 were civilian aircraft, engines, and parts (12.6 percent of total U.S. exports to China) and soybeans (12.3 percent). Other leading U.S. exports to China included processors and controllers, machines for semiconductor or integrated circuit manufacturing, and cellphones. Exports of passenger motor vehicles, when combined, constitute the third largest U.S. export product to China at $8.9 billion. [505]

In 2016, U.S. merchandise imports from China amounted to $462.8 billion, representing 21.1 percent of all U.S. goods imports in that year. While this was more than imports from any other country, U.S. merchandise imports from China fell 4.2 percent relative to the year before. Leading 2016 U.S. imports from China were cellphones; portable computers and tablets; telecommunications equipment; tricycles, scooters, and related toys; and computer parts and accessories. U.S.-China merchandise trade data are shown in appendix tables A.31 through A.34.

Trade Developments

Among the prominent trade developments that unfolded in 2016 between the United States and China were certain dispute settlement cases between the two countries. Since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, the United States has filed 21 of the 39 complaints against China under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and China has filed 10 such complaints against the United States. [506] In 2016, the United States filed 3 new complaints against China. On July 13, 2016, the United States requested consultations with China regarding China’s export duties on certain raw materials, including antimony, cobalt, copper, graphite, lead, magnesia, talc, tantalum, and tin. [507] On September 13, 2016, the United States requested consultations with China regarding certain measures through which China appears to provide domestic support in favor of agricultural producers producing wheat, indica rice, japonica rice, and corn. [508] Finally, on December 15, 2016, the United States requested consultations with China regarding China’s administration of its tariff-rate quotas, including those on wheat, short- and medium- grain rice, long-grain rice, and corn. [509] On December 12, 2016, China requested consultations with the United States concerning certain provisions of U.S. law pertaining to the determination of normal value for “nonmarket economy” countries in antidumping proceedings involving products from China. [510] Developments in these and other WTO dispute settlement proceedings during 2016 are described in more detail in chapter 3 and appendix table A.25.

In 2016, the most prominent U.S.-China bilateral trade issues were discussed during three key meetings: at the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) held in June 2016; on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in September 2016; and at the annual Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) held in November 2016. The S&ED, established in 2009, is a high-level forum in which the United States and China can discuss a wide range of bilateral and global political, strategic, security, and economic issues. The JCCT, established in 1983, is a forum for the highest-level dialogue on bilateral trade issues and is broadly considered a vehicle for promoting commercial relations. In 2016, major topics addressed by U.S. and Chinese officials in these and other discussions included China’s protection and enforcement of IPRs; overcapacity in China’s steel industry; and policies that have restricted market access of U.S. exports, including information and communications technology products and services.

Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement

The United States and China have long held consultations on IPR issues, particularly since China’s WTO accession and its acceptance of the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. [511] As a result, China has undertaken substantial legal and judicial reforms, although U.S. companies continue to report problems, most notably on issues related to the enforcement of pre-existing IPR laws and on the protection of trade secrets. [512]

In its 2016 Special 301 Report , the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) described recent IPR-related policy developments in China, as well as ongoing IPR-related problems. [513] The report notes that in its continuing efforts to update its laws and regulations on copyrights, patents, trade secrets, drug review and approvals, and IP components of its 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law, the Chinese government introduced new measures in draft legislation. Those measures offer domestic Chinese industry officials and entrepreneurs a means of participating in the policy development process. [514] They also include the use of market mechanisms to help guide policy makers’ research and development initiatives. [515] In addition, China initiated a capacity-building three-year pilot study on the merits of specialized intellectual property courts, including those in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Moreover, at the November 2016 JCCT meeting, China made a series of IPR-related commitments. These included commitments to end bad-faith trademark filings, joint efforts with U.S. government agencies to train U.S. and Chinese SMEs on IPR protection in e-commerce, implementation measures to end illegal online broadcasting of sporting events, and initiatives to decrease the likelihood of trade secret misappropriation (e.g., lowering judicial requirements for information that may contain trade secrets, and increased protection of information when sensitive company data is required for judicial review). [516]

Despite these developments, U.S. companies continued to report ineffective protection of IPRs in all forms, including patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and protection of pharmaceutical test data. Consequently, USTR’s 2016 Special 301 Report again placed China on its “Priority Watch List,” noting particular concerns with trade secret theft, measures that favor domestically owned intellectual property in the name of promoting innovation, online copyright piracy, trade of counterfeit goods, and technology transfer requirements. [517] In addition, USTR again named Chinese online and physical marketplaces that reportedly engage in and facilitate substantial copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting in its 2016 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets . [518]

China ’ s Excess Capacity in Steel

The United States and China intensified their focus on China’s excess production of steel and other metals in 2016 through a series of bilateral discussions. Efforts included a September 2016 meeting between President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping, a December 2016 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity at the G20, and high-level discussions at the 2016 JCCT and U.S.-China S&ED. [519] Both countries agreed to promote the establishment of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity and to actively participate in and strengthen information sharing. [520] Such a forum is intended to create a venue for identifying market-distorting policies, developing best practices, and encouraging countries to realign industrial production with market trends. [521] By December 2016, the United States and China had also agreed to hold an informal U.S.-China JCCT Steel Dialogue in 2017. Such a specialized component of the JCCT is intended to allow both countries to share information on global steel capacity, production, and trade gathered since the 2016 JCCT Steel Dialogue. [522]

China’s steelmaking capacity exhibited robust growth in the past 10 years, and since the early 2000s, it has accounted for the majority of the world’s total steel capacity growth. [523] This growth in steel capacity was led by strong demand in China, which increased from an estimated 612.1 million metric tons (mt) to 740.4 million mt between 2010 and 2014. [524] However, by 2014, amid the slowdown in China’s real estate market, China’s demand for steel started to decline for the first time since 1995. [525] This loss in demand motivated many steel producers in China to increase their steel exports. [526] According to USTR, three key factors dramatically decreased the relative competitiveness of U.S. steel producers and exporters in 2016: the doubling of Chinese-led global excess capacity in the steel industry between 2000 and 2014, the rise in China’s steel exports on global markets, and the precipitous drop in steel prices associated with subsidization in China and other countries. [527]

Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Security Policy

According to USTR, a series of new Chinese policies may impose major restrictions on a wide range of foreign ICT products and services. [528] Given that these Chinese government measures called for the adoption of “secure and controllable” ICT products and services, USTR was concerned that such initiatives would add significant costs to foreign companies operating in China, and that China’s long-term goal would be eventually to replace its imports of such products and services. [529]

In 2016, the United States and China made progress in addressing these concerns in their highest-level bilateral discussions. During the November JCCT meeting, for example, China stated that its “secure and controllable” policies were not aimed at limiting or preventing commercial sales opportunities for foreign ICT suppliers. China also stated that such policies were not intended to impose nationality-based conditions and restrictions on commercial ICT purchases, sales, or users. In 2016, China also agreed to notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade about relevant technical regulations of its policy measures, in accordance with their WTO obligations. [530]

Cybersecurity Law

In November 2016, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China enacted a new Cybersecurity Law aimed at tightening government control over information flows and technology products. [531] The enactment of this law, together with the National Security Law of 2015, raised concerns among U.S. technology companies that businesses would be compelled to provide their source codes and trade secrets to the Chinese government. [532] U.S. technology firms were also concerned that such measures may help the Chinese government favor domestic technology firms over foreign businesses. [533] USTR considered these to be measures that would affect broader Chinese industrial and economic policy, and stated that the new Cybersecurity Law would impose far-reaching and onerous trade restrictions on imported ICT products and services in China. [534]

At the conclusion of the U.S.-China S&ED meeting in June 2016, China committed to keeping its Cybersecurity Law consistent with WTO agreements. It also affirmed that this law was nondiscriminatory in nature and ensured that it would not impose nationality-based conditions or restrictions on the purchase, sale, or use of ICT products by commercial enterprises. [535] Both the United States and China committed to keeping their cybersecurity measures generally applicable to their commercial sector and not to limit or prevent commercial sales opportunities for foreign suppliers of ICT products or services. [536]

Canada

U.S.-Canada Trade

Canada was the second-largest U.S. single-country trading partner in 2016 after China, having fallen, in 2015, from the top position it held for a number of years. The value of U.S. merchandise trade with Canada fell 5.7 percent in 2016 to $544.0 billion, accounting for 14.9 percent of total U.S. merchandise trade in 2016, compared to 15.4 percent in 2015. Both U.S. exports and imports with Canada continued to decline in 2016, but U.S. imports decreased more than exports, resulting in the narrowing of the bilateral trade deficit in 2016 to $12.1 billion (figure 6.5). The 22.1 percent decrease ($3.4 billion) in the U.S. trade deficit with Canada between 2015 and 2016 largely resulted from the steep decline in energy-related imports.

Canada remained the second-largest single-country U.S. trading partner in services in 2016, after the UK. Canada’s two-way services trade with the United States fell $1.7 billion in 2016 to $83.0 billion, representing  6.8 percent of all U.S. services trade with the world. Nonetheless, it still ranked ahead of that of Japan ($71.4 billion), China ($69.0 billion), and Mexico ($53.9 billion). U.S. exports of services to Canada continued to fall from their peak of $62.5 billion in 2013 to $53.7 billion in 2016, a decline of 4.2 percent from 2015. At the same time, U.S. imports of services from Canada rose slightly, by 2.1 percent, to $29.3 billion in 2016 (figure 6.6). As a result, the U.S. surplus in services with Canada narrowed further in 2016 to $24.4 billion, a decrease of 10.9 percent from 2015.

In 2016, Canada became the United States’ second-largest export market for goods after the EU, losing its long-time position as the largest U.S. export market. U.S. exports of goods to Canada declined 5.2 percent ($14.6 billion), from $280.6 billion in 2015 to $266.0 billion in 2016. The top U.S. exports to Canada in 2016 included passenger motor vehicles; motor vehicles for goods transport; civilian aircraft, engines, and parts; and light oils. U.S. exports to Canada declined in nearly all sectors in 2016, but the drop in U.S. exports of energy products to Canada was especially significant; these fell $5.9 billion (26.7 percent). [537] Declines in exports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas accounted for most of this decline.

In 2016, Canada became the United States’ third-largest single-country import source, behind China and Mexico, falling from second in previous years. The top U.S. imports from Canada included crude petroleum, passenger motor vehicles, natural gas, and coniferous sawn wood. U.S. imports from Canada were $278.1 billion, down 6.1 percent ($18.1 billion) from the previous year. This decline was largely a result of a $15.7 billion decline in the value of U.S. imports of energy-related products from Canada. Crude petroleum—the top U.S. import from Canada—declined by $10.8 billion in 2016, refined petroleum products by $2.4 billion, light oils by nearly $1.0 billion, and natural gas by $0.9 billion. U.S.-Canada merchandise trade data are shown in appendix tables A.35 through A.38.

Figure 6.5 U.S. merchandise trade with Canada, 2012–16

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.5.

Figure 6.6 U.S. private services trade with Canada, 2012–16 a

Source: USDOC, BEA, U.S. International Transactions, Services, & IIP, International Transactions data, tables 1.2 and 1,3, March 21, 2017.

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.7.

a Data for 2016 are preliminary.

Trade Developments

In 2016, the United States and Canada continued to explore renewal of the Canada-United States Softwood Lumber Agreement, which had expired in October 2015. Also, the Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council met to review progress in various sectors. These topics are discussed in more detail below. Finally, U.S. dairy producers expressed concern about the implementation of a new price class of milk (class 6) in Ontario and Manitoba in 2016. These pricing regulations might affect U.S. exports of ultra-filtered milk. [538]

Softwood Lumber

The 2006 U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) officially expired on October 12, 2015, following a two-year extension agreed on January 23, 2012. [539] The agreement contained a one-year grace period for renegotiation (“standstill”), during which U.S. lumber interests could not file any trade litigation.

On March 10, 2016, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada instructed their trade agencies to explore options for addressing the issue of the softwood lumber industry in both countries and to report on their discussions. [540] On June 29, 2016, the President and Prime Minister released a joint statement saying that both governments would continue to work together to reach a durable new agreement on softwood lumber that would address the differences between the two sides, bearing in mind the expiration of the legal standstill after October 12, 2016. [541]

Absent a new agreement, the U.S. lumber industry petitioned the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) and the USITC on November 25, 2016, [542] to initiate antidumping and countervailing duty investigations concerning imports of certain softwood lumber products from Canada. [543]

Canada and the United States held talks about bilateral trade in softwood lumber on the margins of the December 3–4, 2016, WTO ministerial meeting, but reached no conclusion. [544]

Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council

In February 2011, the Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC) was formed to identify regulatory issues that hinder cross-border trade and investment but that might be mitigated by technical collaboration between the two governments. The RCC engages business and consumer groups to help find areas where regulatory cooperation between the two countries can help improve health and safety in the process of promoting economic growth. [545]

On May 4–5, 2016, the United States and Canada held the annual RCC stakeholder event in Washington, DC. U.S. departments and agencies—including the U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and Transportation; the Environmental Protection Agency; the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration—met with their Canadian counterparts to explore the regulatory situation in over 20 areas. These sectors included crop protection, workplace chemicals, food safety, energy efficiency, transport of dangerous goods, aquaculture, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and “connected” vehicles (vehicles with electronic links for safety puposes). [546] Such RCC meetings help identify opportunities for regulatory streamlining and cooperation that can be developed as part of these agencies’ annual work plans. [547] In addition, the RCC and U.S.-Canada Consultative Committee on Agriculture held various technical workshops as part of the work plan development in the agricultural area.

Mexico

U.S.-Mexico Trade

In 2016, Mexico was the United States’ third-largest single-country merchandise trading partner, following China and Canada. Merchandise trade between the two countries slipped 1.3 percent to $525.1 billion in 2016, accounting for 14.4 percent of U.S. trade with the world. While both imports and exports declined in 2016, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit with Mexico rose $2.5 billion to $63.2 billion, since U.S. exports to Mexico declined more than U.S. imports did (figure 6.7). At the same time, the U.S. trade surplus in services with Mexico shrank 22.3 percent to $7.2 billion in 2016 (figure 6.8), largely a result of increasing U.S. services imports from Mexico. Mexico continued to be the United States’ sixth-largest single-country trading partner for services in 2016, after the UK, Canada, Japan, China, and Germany.

Mexico remained the United States’ second-largest single-country export market in 2016, accounting for 15.9 percent of total U.S. exports to the world. U.S. merchandise exports to Mexico totaled $231.0 billion, a decrease of 2.0 percent from 2015. In 2016, the leading U.S. exports to Mexico were computer parts and accessories; refined petroleum products; parts and accessories for motor vehicles; telecommunications equipment; civilian aircraft, engines, and parts; and corn.

Figure 6.7 U.S. merchandise trade with Mexico, 2012–16

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.5.

Figure 6.8 U.S. private services trade with Mexico, 2012–16 a

Source: USDOC, BEA, U.S. International Transactions, Services, & IIP, International Transactions data, tables 1.2 and 1.3, March 21, 2017.

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.7.

a Data for 2016 are preliminary.

Mexico was the United States’ second-largest single-country import source in 2016 and accounted for 13.4 percent of U.S. total imports. In 2016, U.S. merchandise imports from Mexico fell 0.8 percent to $294.2 billion, driven by a large decrease in the value of U.S. imports of energy-related products. Leading U.S. imports from Mexico included passenger motor vehicles; motor vehicles for goods transport; computers; telecommunications equipment; color TV reception apparatus; and crude petroleum. U.S.-Mexico merchandise trade data are shown in appendix tables A.39 through A.42.

Trade Developments

To strengthen the U.S.-Mexico commercial and economic relationship, a new High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) was established in 2013. Developments in 2016 regarding the HLED and NAFTA’s cross-border trucking provisions are described below.

High-Level Economic Dialogue

On September 20, 2013, U.S. and Mexican officials launched the High-Level Economic Dialogue, a cabinet-level group that meets annually. The HLED is a forum for bilateral economic cooperation to promote economic growth, job creation, and global competitiveness for both Mexico and the United States. [548] The HLED work plan has three pillars: promoting competitiveness and connectivity; fostering economic growth, productivity, entrepreneurship, and innovation; and partnering for regional and global leadership. [549] According to the USDOC, the HLED has been a valuable mechanism to advance both countries’ strategic economic and trade priorities, serving as an instrument of cooperation on regional priorities. [550]

On February 25, 2016, U.S. and Mexican officials held the third cabinet-level meeting of the HLED in Mexico City to review their accomplishments and set new priorities for 2016. [551] At the meeting, the U.S. and Mexican governments agreed to continue work in the areas of energy, modern borders, workforce development, regulatory cooperation, partnering in regional and global leadership, and stakeholder engagement. [552]

Energy

In 2016, the United States and Mexico formally founded the U.S.-Mexico Energy Business Council and held its inaugural meeting in December. [553] The council’s objective is to bring together U.S. and Mexican energy industry representatives to discuss issues of mutual interest and ways to strengthen the U.S.-Mexico relationship on trade, investment, and competitiveness in the energy sector. [554]

Modern Borders

The United States and Mexico continued to make progress on border infrastructure projects. In 2016, U.S. and Mexican government officials inaugurated the Tornillo-Guadalupe Port of Entry and International Bridge in Tornillo, Texas. The port of entry, for which ground was broken in July 2011, connects Tornillo, Texas, and Guadalupe, Mexico, replacing the Fabens-Caseta Port of Entry completed in 1938. [555] The Tornillo-Guadalupe project is intended to improve international trade and environmental conditions, as well as relieve congestion in the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez metropolitan area. It will increase capacity and lanes both on the bridge and at the port of entry. Moreover, it will now allow commercial traffic to use the bridge to cross between the United States and Mexico, as pedestrians and personal vehicles already do. [556] This project adds to the border infrastructure projects of previous years, such as the West Rail Bypass Bridge connecting Brownsville, Texas, and Matamoros, Tamaulipas, which opened in August 2015. The West Rail Bypass Bridge was the first new international rail bridge constructed between the two nations in 100 years. [557]

Also in 2016, a second cargo pre-inspection pilot project was inaugurated at the Mesa de Otay Port of Entry, Baja California. Under the program, certain cargo is to be pre-inspected in Mexico before crossing the border into the United States. The programs are designed to improve the flow of trade by reducing the number of inspections, shortening wait times, and lowering transaction costs. [558] The first Cargo Pre-Inspection Program pilot was established at the Laredo International Airport, Texas, and began operations on October 15, 2015. [559]

Cross-Border Trucking between the United States and Mexico

Under the cross-border trucking commitments in Chapter 12 of NAFTA, Mexican trucks were allowed to provide cross-border truck services throughout the United States beginning in 2000. However, the implementation of these provisions was delayed because of U.S. safety concerns. [560] To address these concerns, the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) launched the U.S.-Mexico Cross-Border Long-Haul Trucking Pilot Program on October 14, 2011. [561] The program concluded on October 10, 2014. [562]

On January 9, 2015, the U.S. Department of Transportation submitted a report on the pilot program to Congress showing that the Mexican companies’ violations, driver violations, and vehicle out-of-service rates reflected the same level of safety as U.S. and Canadian-headquartered motor carriers. [563] As a result, as of January 15, 2015, the FMCSA began accepting applications from Mexico-domiciled motor carriers interested in conducting long-haul operations beyond the U.S. commercial zones. [564]

In 2016, reports from the FMCSA indicated that Mexican-owned or Mexico-domiciled motor carriers were operating more safely than U.S. carriers on U.S. roads. For instance, FMCSA data from 2016 showed that roadside inspections of Mexican-owned or Mexico-domiciled carriers resulted in driver out-of-service rates—that is, rates of violations serious enough to halt drivers’ trips immediately [565] —of 0.86 percent, compared with a rate of 4.9 percent for all motor carriers on U.S. highways. [566]

Japan

U.S.-Japan Trade

In 2016, Japan remained the United States’ fourth-largest single-country trading partner in terms of two-way merchandise trade, accounting for 5.4 percent of total U.S. merchandise trade. U.S. merchandise trade with Japan increased 0.9 percent, from $193.8 billion in 2015 to $195.5 billion in 2016. The increase in total bilateral merchandise trade was attributable to an $821.6 million increase in U.S. exports to Japan and a corresponding $837.7 million increase in U.S. imports from Japan. As a result of these changes, in 2016 the U.S. merchandise trade deficit with Japan grew slightly ($16.1 million) to $68.9 billion (figure 6.9). In 2016, Japan was once again the United States’ third-largest single-country trading partner based on two-way services trade. U.S. services exports to Japan increased $195 million, or 0.4 percent, to $44.0 billion in 2016, while U.S. services imports from Japan also increased, growing $1.0 billion, or 3.9 percent, to $27.4 billion. As a result, the U.S. surplus in services trade with Japan narrowed to $16.7 billion from $17.5 billion the year before (figure 6.10).

Japan remained the fourth-largest destination for U.S. merchandise exports in 2016, accounting for 4.4 percent of global U.S. exports. Between 2015 and 2016, U.S. exports to Japan increased 1.3 percent, from $62.4 billion in 2015 to $63.2 billion in 2016. Leading U.S. exports to Japan were civilian aircraft, engines, and parts; corn; medicaments; liquefied propane; and medical instruments and appliances.

Japan remained the fourth-largest source of U.S. merchandise imports in 2016, accounting for 6.0 percent of global U.S. imports. The value of U.S. imports from Japan increased 0.6 percent in 2016, from $131.4 billion in 2015 to $132.2 billion in 2016. Leading U.S. imports from Japan were passenger motor vehicles, parts for airplanes or helicopters, motor vehicle gearboxes, and parts for printers. U.S.-Japan merchandise trade data are shown in appendix tables A.43–A.46.

Figure 6.9 U.S. merchandise trade with Japan, 2012–16

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.5.

Figure 6.10 U.S. private services trade with Japan, 2012–16 a

Source: USDOC, BEA, U.S. International Transactions, Services, & IIP, International Transactions data, tables 1.2 and 1,3, March 21, 2017.

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.7.

a Data for 2016 are preliminary.

Trade Developments

Economic dialogue between the United States and Japan in 2016 focused on a variety of topics, including agricultural trade issues; transparency in pricing and regulation in Japan’s medical device and pharmaceutical sectors; and market access issues in Japan’s insurance market. These topics are discussed in more detail below. In addition, the United States and Japan worked on other trade issues of interest at the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. These included WTO dispute settlement matters; expansion of the WTO Information Technology Agreement; the plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement; an “Intellectual Property and Innovation Education and Diffusion” initiative with the WTO TRIPS Council; and environmental goods tariff reductions, as well as next-generation issues such as digital trade. [567]

Agricultural Products

Japan remained an important market for U.S. agricultural exports in 2016. In that year, U.S. agricultural exports to Japan amounted to $12.1 billion, and related negotiations focused on market access issues associated with rice, pork, fish, and seafood (see appendix table A.45).

In 2016, U.S. officials noted a variety of issues associated with Japan’s rice market. Despite the fact that Japan is the United States’ second-largest export market for rice, Japan’s importation and distribution systems are considered highly regulated and nontransparent by USTR. [568] Japan’s established 682,000 mt tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on imported rice is managed by its Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries through two types of tenders—ordinary minimum access (OMA) tenders and simultaneous-buy-sell (SBS) tenders. [569] Most imported rice is purchased through OMA tenders for government-held stocks and is used for industrial food processing, livestock feed, or food aid. [570] Meanwhile, the SBS tenders, which provide important access to Japan’s more highly valued table rice market, [571] were suspended temporarily from October to December 2016. [572] USTR is monitoring Japan’s rice import system in light of the market access issues U.S. rice exporters face and Japan’s WTO import commitments. [573] In 2016, the United States’ 246,740 metric tons of rice exports to Japan were valued at $236 million. [574]

Japan’s fluctuating and unpredictable tariffs on U.S. pork meat were also a subject of U.S. concern in 2016. [575] Japan’s tariff on pork is established by a “gate price” system that applies an ad valorem tariff (of 4.3 percent) when the import value is greater than or equal to an established reference price, and an additional tariff when the value of the pork meat imports falls below a given reference price. Japan is the largest export market for U.S. pork and pork products on a value basis and is a market that has shown increased demand. In 2016, U.S. exports of fresh or frozen pork meat to Japan amounted to nearly $1.5 billion and accounted for about 35 percent of all U.S. exports of this commodity. [576]

High Japanese tariffs on several fish and seafood products remained a recurring topic in bilateral trade negotiations in 2016. In 2016, U.S. exports of fish and seafood amounted to nearly $666 million to Japan alone. [577] Moreover, Japan is the third-largest market for these U.S. exports, after Canada and China. [578] In addition to high tariffs on these products, U.S. exporters also face import quotas on Alaska pollock, cod, Pacific whiting, mackerel, sardines, squid, and Pacific herring, as well as on products such as pollock roe, cod roe, and surimi. Although Japan has reduced tariffs, increased import quota volumes, and lowered associated administrative burdens, the import quotas continued to be reported to be a barrier to U.S. exporters in 2016. [579] Furthermore, while Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare revised existing standards and specifications for food, which includes seafood, in February 2016, the effects of these changes on U.S. exports are yet to be determined. [580]

Medical Devices and Pharmaceuticals

In 2016, the United States and Japan continued to address longstanding barriers to U.S. medical device and pharmaceutical exports to Japan. Although there have been improvements in Japan’s regulatory review process for medical devices and pharmaceuticals in recent years, U.S. concerns continue over broader transparency issues as they relate to pricing and regulation. [581] For example, the Pricing for Market Expansion scheme that was introduced in April 2016 dramatically cut the prices of drugs on the Japanese market if the drug achieved higher sales than anticipated. [582] The ad hoc nature of the price reductions in both 2015 and 2016, and the unusually short stakeholder consultation period beforehand, led the U.S. government in 2016 to request that the Japanese government follow a more transparent process and provide stakeholders with enough time to provide meaningful input. [583]

In 2016, U.S. medical device exports to Japan amounted to $4.1 billion, or 10.4 percent of U.S. medical device exports worldwide. In 2016, Japan was the United States’ second-largest market for medical devices. [584] The United States also exported $3.8 billion of pharmaceutical products to Japan in 2016, representing 8.2 percent of total U.S. pharmaceutical exports in that year. [585] In 2016, Japan was the third-largest market for U.S. pharmaceutical exports after Belgium and the Netherlands. [586]

Insurance Market

The United States and Japan continued to hold high-level discussions on market access issues related to Japan’s insurance market in 2016. Despite important legal changes, Japan’s postal life insurance system, run by Japan Post Holdings, has continued to dominate Japan’s insurance market. [587] However, the United States and Japan have been regularly discussing ways of allowing greater international competition within Japan’s insurance market. In 2016, Japan Post imposed a limit on the amount of insurance they could provide and a cap on the types of financial activities and products they could offer. [588] Such market measures have historically limited the extent to which Japan Post dominated its country’s local insurance market. [589] However, as of April 2016, the Japanese government allowed Japan Post to raise the per-customer deposit cap from 10 million yen to 13 million yen (about $92,000 to $120,000) and to raise the per-policyholder insurance coverage cap from 13 million yen to 20 million yen (about $120,000 to $184,000). [590]

Other developments have also had the potential to impact the position of Japan Post Holdings. Under the TPP, U.S. insurance companies would have been granted open access to the Japan Post Insurance distribution network, allowing them to compete under equivalent conditions. [591] Outside the TPP framework, Japan Post Holdings began a process of wide-scale privatization in late 2015, which influenced market dynamics in this segment of Japan’s economy. [592] Japan Post Holdings’ sale of its shares is expected to take place in July 2017. [593]

Republic of Korea

U.S.-Korea Trade

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was the United States’ sixth-largest single-country merchandise trading partner in 2016. Two-way merchandise trade was valued at $112.2 billion in 2016, falling from $115.2 billion in 2015. In spite of this decline, the share of U.S. trade with South Korea remained unchanged from 2015 and accounted for 3.1 percent of U.S. trade with the world. The United States recorded a $27.7 billion merchandise trade deficit with South Korea in 2016, a 2.3 percent decrease from $28.3 billion in 2015 as U.S. imports from South Korea declined more than U.S. exports to South Korea (figure 6.11). In 2016, South Korea continued to be the tenth-largest single-country services trading partner based on two-way trade. U.S. exports of services to South Korea increased 5.1 percent in 2016, reaching a five-year high of $21.3 billion. At the same time, U.S. imports of services from South Korea remained relatively stable, declining 0.1 percent to $8.8 billion. As a result of these two trends, the U.S. trade surplus in services with South Korea rose from $11.4 billion in 2015 to $12.5 billion in 2016, an increase of 9.1 percent (figure 6.12).

Figure 6.11 U.S. merchandise trade with South Korea, 2012–16

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.5.

Figure 6.12 U.S. private services trade with South Korea, 2012–16 a

Source: USDOC, BEA, U.S. International Transactions, Services, & IIP, International Transactions data, tables 1.2 and 1,3, March 21, 2017.

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.7.

a Data for 2016 are preliminary.

U.S. merchandise exports to South Korea were valued at $42.3 billion in 2016, declining 2.7 percent ($1.2 billion) from 2015. Because South Korean imports from all sources declined, the share of United States’ exports in total South Korean imports rose from 10.1 percent to 10.6 percent in 2016. [594] Among the leading U.S. exports to South Korea were civilian aircraft, engines, and parts; processors or controllers; machines for the manufacture of semiconductor devices or electronic integrated circuits; helicopters; and corn. Exports of passenger motor vehicles, when combined, were valued at $1.6 billion in 2016, increasing 23.1 percent from $1.3 billion. [595]

U.S. merchandise imports from South Korea totaled $69.9 billion in 2016, a decrease of 2.5 percent ($1.8 billion) from 2015. Leading U.S. imports from South Korea included passenger vehicles, cellphones, blood fractions (e.g., antiserum), refined petroleum products, and photosensitive semiconductor devices. U.S.-South Korea merchandise trade data are shown in appendix tables A.47 through A.50.

Trade Developments

In 2016, U.S. trade relations with South Korea occurred within the framework of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA), as discussed below and in chapter 5. Additional dialogue focused on supporting the growth of the digital economy and the information and communications technology industry in both countries while also recognizing the importance of privacy and data protection. Other trade developments included the WTO dispute regarding U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty measures on large residential washers from South Korea; the panel report for this dispute was circulated on March 11, 2016, and the Appellate Body report was circulated on September 7, 2016. [596]

U.S.-Korea FTA

The U.S.-Korea FTA, commonly referred to as KORUS, entered into force on March 15, 2012. In terms of value of trade covered, it is the second-largest U.S. FTA after NAFTA. [597] As of January 1, 2017, six rounds of tariff cuts have taken place under the agreement, with tariffs eliminated on approximately 95 percent of consumer and industrial products. [598] As of January 1, 2016, imports of passenger vehicles from the United States enter South Korea duty free. [599] See chapter 5 for more information on the U.S.-Korea FTA.

Information Technology and Digital Trade

In August 2016, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S.-Korea Business Council, and U.S.-Japan Business Council had their first Trilateral Digital Economy Steering Committee meeting. This initiative aims to bring together government and nongovernment efforts revolving around the digital economy. [600] For example, the group aims to develop initiatives that promote an open Internet and seamless data flows.

In September 2016, representatives of the U.S. and South Korean governments, industry, and nongovernmental organizations attended the third bilateral Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Policy Forum. The two-day forum’s objective was to provide an opportunity to discuss issues such as supporting the growth of the digital economy as well as the ICT industry in both countries. Both sides affirmed support for policies that promote innovation, trade, investment, and growth, while also emphasizing the importance of privacy and data protection. [601]

India

U.S.-India Trade

In 2016, India became the United States’ 9th-largest single-country trading partner (based on two-way merchandise trade), rising from 10th-largest in 2015. U.S. two-way merchandise trade with India increased 2.2 percent to $67.7 billion in 2016. In addition, India’s share of total U.S. merchandise trade with the world rose to 1.9 percent, up from 1.8 percent in 2015, continuing a slow but steady increase in India’s share of U.S. merchandise trade with the world over recent years. Although U.S. exports to India went up slightly in 2016, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit with India rose 4.2 percent to $24.3 billion in 2016 as imports grew even more than exports (figure 6.13). Although India was again the United States’ seventh-largest single-country services trading partner, based on two-way trade, it continued to be the only top trading partner with which the United States has a services trade deficit; however, this trade deficit has slowly decreased since 2014. In 2016, U.S. exports again rose slightly more than U.S. imports of services, which resulted in a 1.6 percent decline in the U.S. services trade deficit to $6.8 billion (figure 6.14). Total U.S. services trade with India grew 10.3 percent to $46.7 billion in 2016.

U.S. merchandise exports to India increased 1.1 percent from $21.5 billion in 2015 to $21.7 billion in 2016. Leading U.S. exports to India in 2016 were nonindustrial diamonds; nonmonetary gold; civilian aircraft, engines, and parts; almonds; and petroleum coke.

U.S. merchandise imports from India increased 2.7 percent in 2016 to $46.0 billion. Leading U.S. imports from India in 2016 were nonindustrial diamonds, medicaments, gold jewelry, light oils, and frozen shrimp. [602] U.S. merchandise trade data are shown in appendix tables A.51 through A.54.

Figure 6.13 U.S. merchandise trade with India, 2012–16

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.5.

Figure 6.14 U.S. private services trade with India, 2012–16 a

Source: USDOC, BEA, U.S. International Transactions, Services, & IIP, International Transactions data, tables 1.2 and 1,3, March 21, 2017.

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.7.

a Data for 2016 are preliminary.

Trade Developments

There were several active WTO dispute settlement proceedings involving the United States and India in 2016. In March, India requested consultations with the United States about measures concerning non-immigrant temporary work visas. [603] In July, the United States requested arbitration regarding a dispute with India concerning the importation of certain agricultural products on the basis that India failed to bring its measures into compliance within the agreed reasonable period of time. [604] In September, India requested consultations with the United States regarding alleged domestic-content requirements in the renewable energy sector provided by several U.S. states. [605] Finally, in October 2016, the Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified by the Appellate Body report, regarding India’s purchase power agreements with solar firms and domestic-content requirements. [606] For more information on WTO dispute settlement cases, see chapter 3.

In 2016, the United States and India continued dialogue on improving bilateral trade and investment, including IPR protection. In June 2016, President Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in Washington, DC, for their third major bilateral summit. The second U.S.-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue was held in New Delhi, India, in August 2016 and was co-chaired by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker, External Affairs Minister of India Sushma Swaraj, and Minister of State for Commerce and Industry of India Nirmala Sitharaman. A number of topics were discussed, including trade and investment, improving the ease of doing business, and standards cooperation. The Trade Policy Forum and IPR protection, two important areas of bilateral dialogue in 2016, are discussed in detail below.

India and United States Trade Policy Forum

On October 20, 2016, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman and India’s Minister of Commerce and Industry Nirmala Sitharaman met in Delhi for the 10th ministerial-level meeting of the India and United States Trade Policy Forum. This meeting covered several topics that are the focus of established inter-ministerial working groups, including agriculture, trade in goods and services, promoting investment, manufacturing, and IPRs. [607]

Agriculture

The United States and India noted the need to establish science- and risk-based regulations that are grounded in international standards and guidelines and also agreed to share best practices between their sanitary and phytosanitary authorities. Minister Sitharaman and Ambassador Froman recognized each other’s requests, agreeing to explore the possibility of enhanced market access for specific agricultural products, such as the export of grapes from India and the export of cherries and alfalfa hay from the United States. The two sides also discussed regulations relating to the import and export of boric acid, as well as U.S. concerns regarding market access for dairy products. [608]

Services

The United States and India recognized the role of the services sector in the United States and India and discussed efforts to promote foreign investment in key service sectors. The United States called upon India to relax local-sourcing requirements in single-brand retail trade. Both parties agreed to address market access and trade costs for pharmaceutical products and medical devices through technical discussions, and also agreed to continue their work on visa issues to facilitate the movement of professionals and experts. The two sides agreed to promote the digital economy through an open Internet and to explore the adoption of joint principles that ensure an open Internet. They also agreed to further the digital agenda that was adopted at the India-U.S. Information Communication and Technology Working Group. [609]

Manufacturing

The United States and India committed to exchange information on standards, conformity assessment procedures, and the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement in the electronics sector, a mutual-recognition arrangement for information technology security evaluations. Both parties highlighted the importance of predictability and transparency in the creation of new rules and agreed to continue to share best practices and information on public stakeholder consultations before framing laws or policy. In addition, both parties noted their desire to take appropriate action on the recommendations of the U.S.-India CEO Forum. [610]

Intellectual Property

India has been on USTR’s Priority Watch List or has been designated a priority foreign country since 1989. India remained on the Priority Watch List in the 2016 Special 301 Report due to concerns about weak protection and enforcement of IPR. Of concern are inadequate trade secret protection; the production, domestic distribution, and export of counterfeit pharmaceuticals; and online piracy. The High-Level Working Group on Intellectual Property under the Trade Policy Forum (discussed above) held several meetings in 2016 focusing on creating stronger IPR protection and enforcement in India. In 2016, workshops were also held on copyright and trade secrets. [611]

Similarly, USTR notes in its 2016 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets report that “numerous markets in India have appeared in past lists, with no identified meaningful, effective response by the Indian government.” [612] Several markets were highlighted for counterfeit apparel, pirated media, and counterfeit auto parts. [613]

Taiwan

U.S.-Taiwan Trade

In 2016, Taiwan was the United States’ 10th-largest single-economy trading partner, dropping from the 9th position that it held in 2015. U.S. trade with Taiwan accounted for 1.8 percent of total U.S. trade with the world. U.S. two-way merchandise trade with Taiwan amounted to $65.4 billion in 2016, a decrease of 2.1 percent from $66.8 billion in 2015. The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with Taiwan fell $1.8 billion, from $15.0 billion in 2015 to $13.3 billion in 2016 (figure 6.15). As described below, U.S. trade flows with Taiwan remained heavily dependent upon consumer electronics—most notably computer components. Also in 2016, the U.S. services trade surplus with Taiwan fell $763 million relative to the year before, from $4.3 billion in 2015 to $3.5 billion in 2016. The decline in the services trade surplus was attributable to a $739 million (6.2 percent) decline in U.S. services exports to Taiwan and a $24 million (0.3 percent) increase in U.S. services imports from Taiwan in 2016 (figure 6.16).

In 2016, U.S. merchandise exports to Taiwan amounted to $26.0 billion, a 0.7 percent increase from $25.9 billion in 2015. Leading U.S. exports to Taiwan were civilian aircraft, engines, and parts; machines for semiconductor or integrated circuit manufacturing; processors and controllers; memories; and microchips.

In 2016, U.S. merchandise imports from Taiwan amounted to $39.3 billion, a 3.9 percent decrease from $40.9 billion in 2015. Leading U.S. imports were microchips, telecommunications equipment, computer parts and accessories, processors and controllers, and semiconductor storage devices. U.S.-Taiwan merchandise trade data are shown in appendix tables A.55 through A.58.

Figure 6.15 U.S. merchandise trade with Taiwan, 2012–16

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.5.

Figure 6.16 U.S. private services trade with Taiwan, 2012–16 a

Source: USDOC, BEA, U.S. International Transactions, Services, & IIP, International Transactions data, tables 1.2 and 1,3, March 21, 2017.

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.7.

a Data for 2016 are preliminary.

Trade Developments

As described below, the U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) has served as a key mechanism for U.S.-Taiwan dialogue on trade issues in the absence of official diplomatic ties. In 2016, U.S.-Taiwan trade relations focused on IPR-related issues; access to Taiwan’s agricultural market; certain technical barriers to trade; and issues associated with Taiwan’s investment review procedures.

U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement

The U.S.-Taiwan TIFA, signed in 1994, has served as the main forum for discussing bilateral trade and investment issues and strengthening commercial ties. [614] The 10th annual TIFA Council meeting, which continues to be held under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, was on October 4, 2016, in Washington, DC. [615] Discussions in that forum, and in the working groups leading up to that forum, focused on IPR-related issues and market access for U.S. agricultural, biotech, and medical device exports. [616] Other prominent points raised during the 2016 TIFA meetings included certain technical barriers in Taiwan’s agricultural and cosmetics industry and certain investment approval procedures, both described in greater detail below.

Intellectual Property Rights

At the 2016 TIFA meeting, the United States recognized progress that was made with respect to Taiwan’s pharmaceutical IPR protection and its commitment to strengthen engagement on IPR legislation. [617] The United States also recognized Taiwan’s enhanced promotion of intellectual property-related educational material, and its enhanced enforcement cooperation with the United States. [618] In September 2016, Taiwan also extended the mandatory notice and comment period for new trade, investment, and IPR-related regulations and laws from 14 to 60 days, especially helpful to foreign firms. [619] With regard to transparency, both the United States and Taiwan agreed to continue exchanging views on pending revisions to Taiwan’s Copyright Act. [620]

Agricultural Barriers

At the 2016 TIFA meeting, the United States and Taiwan also agreed that more progress was needed on a broad range of agricultural trade issues. The United States was mostly concerned about the degree to which biotechnology played a role in Taiwan’s agricultural trade policies, and expressed strong interest that Taiwan remove bans on U.S. pork and certain beef products produced using ractopamine. [621] During the 2016 discussions, the U.S. trade negotiators also expressed continued concerns over barriers U.S. beef offal exporters have experienced in Taiwan. [622] A resolution to these issues is still pending.

Technical Barriers to Trade

Technical barriers to trade have been one of the most pronounced U.S.-Taiwan bilateral trade issues in recent years. During the 2016 TIFA Council meeting, discussions of these technical barriers largely revolved around the labeling of agricultural goods, the regulation of cosmetic products, and procedures for registering new chemicals. [623]

With respect to the first issue, discussion at the 2016 TIFA Council meeting addressed the transparency and rationale for Taiwan’s newly implemented biotechnology labeling requirements for prepackaged foods, food additives, and unpackaged foods. [624] The new rules require corn syrup, for example, to be labeled “genetically engineered,” as it is made from biotechnology corn, yet beverages made using corn syrup are exempt from such labeling. While the rationale for this difference in labeling is based on a 3 percent biotechnology content threshold, the United States sought clarity in its bilateral dialogues with Taiwan regarding the justification for regulatory measures that have been implemented. [625]

On September 9, 2016, Taiwan’s Cabinet imposed new regulatory requirements for Taiwan’s cosmetic industry by amending the Statute for Control of Cosmetic Hygiene (recently renamed the Cosmetic Hygiene Control Act). While such measures still require legislative approval, the Taiwan Food and Drug Administration drafted guidelines in 2016 on the new approval processes. These guidelines require additional product information files, product notifications, and good manufacturing practices, while also affecting product claims, advertisements, and confidential business information.

U.S. stakeholders have been concerned about short transition times associated with the changes, and that such additional requirements would place a large burden on the industry by requiring them to provide additional pre-market documentation. After consultations with the Taiwan Food and Drug Administration, U.S. stakeholders were assured that both pre-market approval and the documentation associated with post-market surveillance would not be needed during the transition to the new system. Since those consultations, USTR has been advocating for appropriate transition periods for related products, such as toothpaste, breath fresheners, and sunscreen. These were not previously covered under the Statute for Control of Cosmetic Hygiene, and their manufacturers would need time to adapt to the new regulatory system. In 2016, USTR also raised concerns about the proportionality of punishment for infractions in advertising for related products. [626]

Investment Barriers

During the October 2016 TIFA meeting, U.S. and Taiwanese trade officials discussed issues related to Taiwan’s investment review practices. Specifically, USTR was concerned about transparency and consistency in Taiwan’s practices for reviewing proposed foreign investments, given that proposed amendments to eliminate approval requirements for foreign investments that were less than $1 million did not pass Taiwan’s legislative branch. [627] Following those bilateral consultations in 2016, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs proposed a new set of related amendments, whose outcomes are not yet known.

In 2016, USTR expressed concerns about the predictability of Taiwan’s investment approval procedures and openness to foreign investment in areas deemed sensitive (e.g., in the media industry and for transactions involving private equity). [628] In that year, authorities in Taiwan closely scrutinized several foreign investment applications, which contributed to ongoing concerns by U.S. stakeholders. According to USTR, investment applications can be subject to long review periods, repetitive requests for documentation, and ad hoc interventions from elected officials who are not part of the normal regulatory review process. [629]

Brazil

U.S.-Brazil Trade

In 2016, Brazil was the United States’ largest South American trading partner. Two-way merchandise trade between the United States and Brazil decreased 4.5 percent to $56.5 billion from $59.1 billion in 2015, and although Brazil’s share of total U.S. merchandise trade remained at 1.6 percent, its position dropped from the 12th-largest single-country merchandise trading partner in 2015 to the 14th-largest in 2016. This downward trend in bilateral merchandise trade was primarily caused by a decrease in U.S. exports to Brazil in recent years, in part due to an overall economic downturn, political uncertainty highlighted by the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, and low international crude oil prices. [630] Nonetheless, the United States recorded a merchandise trade surplus with Brazil of $4.1 billion in 2016, slightly less than the 2015 surplus of $4.2 billion (figure 6.17). In terms of services trade, U.S. exports of services to Brazil fell for a second year, declining $3.2 billion (11.4 percent) to $24.8 billion. U.S. services imports from Brazil declined by a larger share (13.4 percent), but less by value ($1.0 billion), to reach $6.7 billion in 2016 (figure 6.18). As a result of the larger decline in exports, the services trade surplus dropped 10.7 percent, from $20.2 billion in 2015 to $18.0 billion in 2016, and Brazil became the United States’ ninth-largest single-country trading partner in services, falling from eighth in 2015.

In 2016, U.S. merchandise exports to Brazil fell 4.3 percent, from $31.7 billion in 2015 to $30.3 billion in 2016. U.S. exports to Brazil in most sectors declined in 2016, but exports of energy-related products and agricultural products increased in 2016, though they did not reach 2014 levels. As in previous years, the top U.S. exports to Brazil were civilian aircraft, engines, and parts (14.6 percent of total U.S. merchandise exports to Brazil) and refined petroleum products (9.8 percent of total U.S. exports). Other leading U.S. exports included light oils, medicaments, and bituminous coal.

Figure 6.17 U.S. merchandise trade with Brazil, 2012–16

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.5.

Figure 6.18 U.S. private services trade with Brazil, 2012–16 a

Source: USDOC, BEA, U.S. International Transactions, Services, & IIP, International Transactions data, tables 1.2 and 1,3, March 21, 2017.

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.7.

a Data for 2016 are preliminary.

U.S. merchandise imports from Brazil dropped 4.7 percent, from $27.5 billion in 2015 to $26.2 billion in 2016, largely driven by declines in U.S. imports of energy-related products and of minerals and metals. Leading U.S. imports from Brazil included airplanes and other aircraft; crude petroleum; unroasted coffee; chemical wood pulp, soda, or sulfate; and semifinished iron or non-alloy steel products. U.S.-Brazil merchandise trade data are shown in appendix tables A.59 through A.62.

Trade Developments

In 2016, the United States and Brazil continued to advance their bilateral trade relationship via the third meeting of the United States-Brazil Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (first ministerial meeting) and via the U.S.-Brazil Commercial Dialogue. In these official meetings, participants discussed topics including economic cooperation, trade facilitation, and standards and conformity assessment. Also, after years of talks, Brazil’s barriers to U.S. exports of beef and beef products were removed. These topics are described in more detail below. Additionally, on November 11, Brazil requested consultations at the WTO with the United States over U.S. countervailing duty measures on hot- and cold-rolled steel products from Brazil. [631]

U.S.-Brazil Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation — Third Meeting

The Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the United States and Brazil, which was signed in March 2011, was designed to expand the trade and investment relationship between the two countries on a broad range of key issues, including trade facilitation, IPRs, and technical barriers to trade. [632] To achieve the Agreement’s goals, the two countries have held three formal meetings. The March 30, 2016, meeting, held in Washington, DC, was the third meeting of the United States-Brazil Commission on Economic and Trade Relations and the first ministerial-level meeting. Preceding the official meeting, officials held technical-level discussions focused on trade and investment issues such as market access; the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), of which Brazil is a beneficiary; tax and labor issues; and greater cooperation on WTO issues and agricultural trade. [633]

At the ministerial meeting, topics discussed included national trade agendas, bilateral and multilateral trade, WTO issues, and the challenges of global excess steel capacity. Ministers also highlighted several developments, such as the signing and delivery of Brazil’s letter of acceptance of the Trade Facilitation Agreement to the WTO and the work of the United States-Brazil Commercial Dialogue. Additionally, ministers discussed the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cotton (which concluded a WTO dispute on cotton); [634] reducing restrictions on the participation of U.S. insurance firms in the Brazilian market; cooperation on standards and conformity assessment; and the development and passing of a Patent Prosecution Highway pilot program by U.S. and Brazilian intellectual property agencies that would accelerate review of patent applications and facilitate information sharing between the two offices to speed the patenting process. [635] Brazil is expected to host the next meeting of the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation in 2017. [636]

U.S.-Brazil Commercial Dialogue

On June 28–29, 2016, U.S. and Brazilian officials met in Washington, DC, for the 14th meeting and 10th anniversary of the U.S.-Brazil Commercial Dialogue. The U.S.-Brazil Commercial Dialogue encourages the exchange of ideas on a number of subjects assigned to the following five working groups: Trade Partnership, Industry and Investments, Services, Standards, and Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights. [637]

In this meeting, officials continued to discuss ways to strengthen the U.S.-Brazil bilateral trade relationship. Officials stated that working groups have helped expedite trade procedures by encouraging the use of electronic signatures and fostering greater collaboration on measurement sciences to standardize trade administrative procedures. Other topics discussed were advances in trade facilitation; support for SMEs; retail and e-commerce; concerns on express delivery; greater interaction in professional services; cooperation in business intelligence to provide services trade data; and regulatory cooperation. [638] Moreover, officials announced plans to continue advancing discussions by encouraging greater collaboration across working groups, incorporating other relevant government stakeholders, and increasing private sector participation. Finally, officials also participated in a roundtable briefing hosted by the Brazil-U.S. Business Council. [639]

Bilateral Trade of Beef and Beef Products

On August 1, 2016, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced that the USDA and Brazil’s Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply had agreed to allow access for U.S. beef and beef products in the Brazilian market for the first time since 2003. Although beef and beef products from the United States have been classified as a negligible risk for bovine spongiform encephalopathy by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), U.S. beef and beef products had been banned from the Brazilian market due to concerns about the disease. Given this decision to allow U.S. beef products to enter the Brazilian market, the USDA also stated that both Brazil and the United States would update their administrative procedures to immediately start trade. [640]

In a separate decision, after completing a multiyear review on U.S. food safety regulations for countries that export meat, poultry, and egg products to the United States, USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service concluded that Brazil’s food safety standards for meat products such as beef are equivalent to those of the United States. As a result, the United States can import fresh, chilled, or frozen beef from Brazil. [641] As of September 2016, five plants were considered eligible to export fresh beef to the United States, and expectations for increasing trade were high. [642]

Cuba

U.S.-Cuba Trade

Although U.S. restrictions have limited bilateral trade, the U.S.-Cuba bilateral trade relationship has changed markedly since President Obama’s December 2014 statement announcing a shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba. [643] Since then, government officials from both countries have held a number of meetings and U.S. policies were amended to allow increased trade. In 2015, at the request of the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, the Commission examined the effects of U.S. restrictions on U.S. exports to Cuba, as well as potential barriers to trade and investment in Cuba, in Overview of Cuban Imports of Goods and Services and Effects of U.S. Restrictions . This report was the third report on Cuba trade published by the Commission. [644]

Cuba continues to be a small export market for the United States, with total exports reaching $247.2 million in 2016 (figure 6.19). Before the 2014 policy change, exports to Cuba were limited to medicine and medical goods as well as products allowed under the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000; the vast majority of these were agricultural commodities. [645] The 2015 and 2016 amendments to U.S. regulations (see below) removed certain financing restrictions on non-agricultural goods and allowed an expanded range of U.S. exports of manufactured goods to Cuba, including telecommunications equipment. U.S. exports to Cuba had declined consistently from 2012 to 2015, but increased 37.2 percent in 2016 from 2015 levels, although they are still below 2014 levels.

While U.S. exports of manufactured goods to Cuba have increased since 2014, a significant portion (nearly 90 percent) of U.S. exports continues to be agricultural products, with much of the remaining U.S. exports consisting largely of crop protection chemicals and medical supplies. As in recent years, frozen chicken was the top U.S. export to Cuba in 2016, valued at $106 million and accounting for 42.9 percent of all U.S. exports to Cuba. Other major U.S. exports to Cuba included corn ($39 million, or 15.8 percent of U.S. exports to Cuba) and soybean oilcake ($36 million, or 14.6 percent of U.S. exports). These, plus soybeans and soybean oil, make up the top five U.S. exports to Cuba, and together accounted for over 85 percent of U.S. exports to Cuba in 2016. Data on U.S. merchandise exports to Cuba are shown in appendix tables A.63 through A.64.

Figure 6.19 U.S. merchandise trade with Cuba, 2012–16

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Underlying data can be found in appendix table B.5.

Due to U.S. restrictions dating from the 1960s, there were no direct U.S. imports from Cuba in 2016. [646] However, as a result of changes in U.S. policy that allowed the importation of certain goods produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs, some coffee produced in Cuba was imported, indirectly, into the United States that year. [647] Nespresso USA secured licensing from the U.S. Department of Treasury to ship coffee, grown in Cuba and processed and packaged in Europe, to the United States. [648] The first shipments of the Nespresso coffee product went on sale in the United States in August 2016. [649]

Trade Developments

Commercial travel to Cuba, which had been previously restricted, resumed in 2016. In June, six U.S. airlines were approved to begin scheduled flights to Cuba, and the first commercial flight in 55 years between the two countries occurred on August 31, 2016, with a JetBlue Airways flight from Fort Lauderdale to Santa Clara, Cuba. [650] The Adonia , owned by Carnival Corporation, became the first cruise ship to travel between the United States and Cuba on May 2, 2016. [651] As a result of the amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) since January 2015, described below, other U.S. firms have entered the Cuban market. In March 2016, Starwood Hotels signed three new hotel deals in Cuba, taking over and renovating three existing hotels in Havana. [652] The first of those hotels reopened in July 2016. [653] In December 2016, Google signed a deal with the Cuban government to allow the company to install servers in Cuba that will store some of the company’s most popular content, increasing the speed of Google websites on the island. [654]

Amendments to the CACR and EAR

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced three sets of amendments to the CACR and EAR in 2016. The amendments that went into effect on January 27 authorized additional U.S. exports to Cuba, including telecommunications equipment and additional agricultural products; removed restrictions on payment and credit financing terms for the authorized export of non-agricultural goods; and facilitated travel to Cuba for authorized purposes. [655]

In March 2016, OFAC and BIS further amended the CACR and EAR, easing restrictions on exports to the Cuban private sector and authorizing individual people-to-people educational travel. The amendments also authorized fund transfers from banks outside of the United States that pass through U.S. financial institutions before being transferred to banks outside the United States (known as “U-turn transactions”) in which Cuba or Cuban nationals have an interest. Additionally, U.S. banking institutions were authorized to process U.S. dollar-denominated transactions presented indirectly by Cuban banks, and U.S. banks were authorized to open bank accounts for Cuban nationals. The amendments also expanded the definition of an authorized “business presence” in Cuba to include exporters of goods that are authorized for export or re-export to Cuba, and the mail, shipping, and parcel services that facilitate these transactions. [656]

In October 2016, OFAC and BIS further amended the CACR and EAR. These amendments authorized, among other things, trade in more products, including consumer goods for personal use; removed limits on the value of Cuban-origin products brought back by U.S. travelers; clarified that only authorized “agricultural commodities” are subject to the payment and finance limitations of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act; authorized joint medical research projects with Cuban nationals; and allowed the importation of Cuban-origin pharmaceuticals approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration into the United States. [657]

Bibliography

American Institute in Taiwan. “United States and Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreements Council Meeting.” Press release, September 2016. https://ait.org.tw/en/pressrelease-pr1650.html .

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “APEC 2016: Quality Growth and Human Development.” https://www.apec2016.pe/peru-host-2016/ (accessed April 14, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Peru’s Priorities for 2016.” https://www.apec2016.pe/perus-priorities-for-2016/ (accessed January 20, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 2016 Committee on Trade and Investment Annual Report to Ministers , November 2016. https://publications.apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=1788 .

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “About APEC.” https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC (accessed January 23, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Annex A: Lima Declaration on FTAAP.” In 2016 Leaders’ Declaration . 24th APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, Lima, Peru, November 20, 2016. https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2016/2016_aelm/2016_Annex%20A.aspx (accessed January 23, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Annex A: The Beijing Roadmap for APEC’s Contribution to the Realization of the FTAAP.” In 2014 Leaders’ Declaration . 22nd APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, Beijing, China, November 11, 2014. https://www.apec.org/meeting-papers/leaders-declarations/2014/2014_aelm/2014_aelm_annexa.aspx (accessed January 23, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Annex B: APEC Strategic Blueprint for Promoting Global Value Chains Development and Cooperation.” In 2014 Leaders’ Declaration . 22nd APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, Beijing, China, November 11, 2014. https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2014/2014_aelm/2014_aelm_annexb.aspx (accessed January 23, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). APEC at a Glance, 2015 , February 2015. https://publications.apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=1610 .

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Bogor Goals.” Fact sheet, May 13, 2015. https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Fact-Sheets/Bogor%20Goals.aspx .

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Events Calendar, 2016.” https://www.apec.org/Events-Calendar.aspx?year=2016 (accessed April 6, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “How APEC Operates.” https://www.apec.org/About-Us/How-APEC-Operates.aspx (accessed January 23, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “How APEC Operates: Policy Level.” https://www.apec.org/About-Us/How-APEC-Operates/Policy-Level (accessed March 21, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “How APEC Operates: Working Level.” https://www.apec.org/About-Us/How-APEC-Operates/Working-Level (accessed March 21, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Member Economies.” https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies.aspx (accessed January 23, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “News Releases in 2016.” https://www.apec.org/Press/News-Releases.aspx?year=2016&topic=All (accessed January 20, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Pathways to FTAAP.” https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2010/2010_aelm/pathways-to-ftaap.aspx (accessed January 23, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Regional Economic Integration Agenda.” https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Fact-Sheets/Regional-Economic-Integration-Agenda.aspx (accessed March 22, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). “Scope of Work.” https://www.apec.org/About-Us/How-APEC-Operates/Scope-of-Work.aspx (accessed January 23, 2017).

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Second-Term Review of APEC’s Progress towards the Bogor Goals: APEC Region , November 2016. https://publications.apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=1775 .

Baertlein, Lisa, and Marcy Nicholson. “Cuban Coffee Returning to U.S. but Only for Nespresso Brewers.” Reuters, June 20, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-coffee-nestle-idUSKCN0Z61E3 .

Balding, Christopher. “Why China Can’t Stop Capital Outflows.” Bloomberg , December 5, 2016. https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-06/why-china-can-t-stop-capital-outflows .

Baschuk, Bryce. “Environment––Environmental Trade Talks Collapse over Product List Discord.” Bloomberg BNA: International Trade Daily , no. 234, December 6, 2016.

Bloomberg. “Japanese Government Seeks to Privatize Japan Post,” January 16, 2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=10852227 .

Castano Freeman, Ivan. “Bright Outlook for Haiti’s Apparel Industry in 2016.” Just-style.com, February 16, 2016. https://www.just-style.com/pap.aspx?ID=120614 (fee required).

Castano Freeman, Ivan. “Haiti Garment Exports Set to Rise despite Hurricane.” Just-style.com, October 13, 2016. https://www.just-style.com/pap.aspx?ID=129049 (fee required).

Castano Freeman, Ivan. “Hong Kong’s Winds Group to Open Haiti Factory.” Just-style.com, October 26, 2016. https://www.just-style.com/pap.aspx?ID=129144 (fee required).

Cheng, Evelyn. “Mexican Peso Plunges More Than 12% to Record Low vs. Dollar on Trump Election Upset.” CNBC.com , November 9, 2016. https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/08/mexican-peso-hits-2-month-high-against-us-dollar-as-election-day-kicks-off.html .

Coalition of Services Industries (CSI). “The Trade in Services Agreement (TISA).” https://servicescoalition.org/negotiations/trade-in-services-agreement (accessed March 13, 2017).

Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). “About Submission on Enforcement Matters.” https://www.cec.org/about-us/public-engagement-and-transparency/about-submissions-enforcement-matters (accessed March 15, 2017).

Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). “About the CEC.” https://www.cec.org/about-us/about-cec (accessed March 17, 2017).

Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). “CEC Ministerial Statement—2016: Twenty-third Regular Session of the CEC Council.” Council statement, Mérida, Yucatan, Mexico, September 9, 2016. https://www.cec.org/about-us/council-statements/cec-ministerial-statement-2016 .

Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). “North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.” https://www.cec.org/about-us/NAAEC (accessed March 17, 2017).

Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). Submission on Enforcement Matters Compliance Tracker. “Active Submissions.” https://www4.cec.org/sem-tracker/tracker.html (accessed March 13, 2017).

Congressional Research Service (CRS). Digital Trade and U.S. Policy, by Rachel F. Fefer, Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, and Wayne M. Morrison. CRS Report R44565, January 13, 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44565.pdf .

Congressional Research Service (CRS). Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firm , by Rachel F. Fefer. CRS Report RS20210, September 1, 2016. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20210.pdf .

Congressional Research Service (CRS). Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and Its Role , by J.F. Hornbeck. CRS Report R41922, August 5, 2013. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41922.pdf .

Congressional Research Service (CRS). Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations: Overview and Issues for Congress , by Rachel F. Fefer. CRS Report R44354, January 3, 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44354.pdf .

Congressional Research Service (CRS). U.S. International Investment Agreements: Issues for Congress , by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Martin A. Weis. CRS Report R43052, April 29, 2013. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43052.pdf .

Corrigan, Dara. Remarks to the Food and Drug Law Institute’s Global Business Conference, Washington, DC, March 16, 2016. https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/speeches/ucm500667.htm .

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Country Report: Brazil, April 2017. https://country.eiu.com/FileHandler.ashx?issue_id=405276824&mode=pdf (fee required).

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Country Report: Canada , April 2017. https://country.eiu.com/FileHandler.ashx?issue_id=785282062&mode=pdf (fee required).

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Country Report: China , April 2017. https://country.eiu.com/FileHandler.ashx?issue_id=925308076&mode=pdf (fee required).

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Country Report: India , April 2017. https://country.eiu.com/FileHandler.ashx?issue_id=2005272584&mode=pdf (fee required).

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Country Report: Japan , April 2017. https://country.eiu.com/FileHandler.ashx?issue_id=45302388&mode=pdf (fee required).

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Country Report: Mexico , April 2017. https://country.eiu.com/FileHandler.ashx?issue_id=845308868&mode=pdf (fee required).

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Country Report: South Korea , April 2017. https://country.eiu.com/FileHandler.ashx?issue_id=1565299740&mode=pdf (fee required).

EcoNote. China: Assessing the Global Impact of a Chinese Slowdown. Soci é té Générale Report no. 32, July 2016. https://www.societegenerale.com/sites/default/files/documents/Econote/Chinese-slowdown-assessing-the-global-impact-EcoNote.pdf .

Dreyer, Iana. “EU, US Negotiators Officially Drop Aim of Concluding TTIP in 2016.” EurActive, October 10, 2016. https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/eu-us-negotiators-officially-drop-aim-of-concluding-ttip-in-2016/ .

European Commission (EC). Economic Outlook after the UK Referendum: A First Assessment for the Euro Area and the EU . Institutional Paper 32, July 20, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/economy-finance/economic-outlook-after-uk-referendum-first-assessment-euro-area-and-eu_en .

European Commission (EC). “Fourteenth Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Joint Press Conference by Ignacio Garcia Bercero, and Dan Mullaney.” Video, July 15, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?ref=I124723 .

European Commission (EC). “Interoperability and E-Mobility.” https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/interoperability-and-e-mobility (accessed February 27, 2017).

European Commission (EC). Report of the 14th Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership , July 2016. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/august/tradoc_154837.pdf .

European Commission (EC). Report of the 15th Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership , October 2016. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/october/tradoc_155027.pdf .

European Commission (EC). “Transatlantic Economic Council: Cooperation on Innovation for Growth.” News release, November 30, 2016. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1591 .

European Commission (EC). “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—State of Play,” April 27, 2016. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154477.pdf .

European Commission (EC). “TTIP: The Finish Line and How to Get There.” Speech by Cecilia Malmström, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, June 29, 2016. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/june/tradoc_154698.pdf .

European Commission (EC). The Twelfth Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) . Public report, March 2016. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154391.pdf .

European Parliament. Directorate-General for External Policies. Policy Department. “The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA): An End to Negotiations in Sight?” by Elina Viilup. Policy paper, DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2015_311 EN, October 12, 2015. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/570448/EXPO_IDA(2015)570448_EN.pdf .

European Parliament. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). EU-US Negotiations on TTIP: A Survey of Current Issues , by Laura Puccio. EPRS Report PE586.606, July 2016. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_IDA(2016)586606 .

EY. “EY Global Trade: Quarterly Update.” TradeWatch 15, no. 2 (June 2016). https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-trade-watch-june-2016/$FILE/ey-trade-watch-june-2016.pdf .

Foreso, Cynthia, Wen Jin Yuan, and Anton Yang. “Africa’s Crude Petroleum Exports Declined Due to a Shrinking U.S. Market.” Executive Briefings on Trade, U.S. International Trade Commission, July 2015. https://usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/ebot_africancrudeoilexportsforesoyangyuan7-6-15.pdf .

Frank, Marc. “Google Signs Internet Deal with Cuba’s Telecommunications Monopoly.” Reuters, December 12, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/cuba-usa-google-idUSL1N1E717E .

Government of Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). “Trade in Services Agreement––News.” https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/trade-in-services-agreement/news/Pages/news.aspx (accessed March 23, 2017).

Government of Canada. “Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council E-Newsletter,” March 2016 (modified April 15, 2016). https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/corporate/transparency/acts-regulations/canada-us-regulatory-cooperation-council/e-newsletter-march-2016.html .

Government of Canada. Global Affairs Canada (GAC). “WTO Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA),” modified December 14, 2016. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/env/plurilateral.aspx?lang=eng .

Government of Colombia. Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Tourism (MinComercio). “Rondas de Negociación e Informes del Acuerdo sobre el Comercio de Servicios (TiSA)” [Negotiating rounds and reports on the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)], last modified March 17, 2017. https://www.tlc.gov.co/publicaciones/31213/descargar.php?id=80463 .

Government of New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). “Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA).” https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/tisa/ (accessed March 24, 2017).

Government of the United States of America and Government of Canada. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Extending the Softwood Lumber Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada, as Amended . Article 1––Extension of the SLA 2006, January 23, 2012. U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) website, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/Trade%20Topics/enforcement/softwood%20lumber/Extension%20to%20the%20U.S.-Canada%202006%20Softwood%20Lumber%20Agreement.pdf .

Government of Germany. “Participants of the G20 Summit in Hamburg.” https://www.g20.org/Webs/G20/EN/G20/Participants/participants_node.html (accessed January 19, 2017).

Herrara, Chabeli. “Carnival’s Adonia, the Ship That Took Americans to Cuba, Will Leave the Island in June.” Miami Herald , November 23, 2016. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourism-cruises/article116771698.html .

IHS Markit. Global Trade Atlas (GTA) database. https://www.gtis.com/ (accessed February 27, 2017).

Inside U.S. Trade . “TPP’s Fate in Lame-Duck Uncertain As Congress Leaves Until November.” Vol. 34, No. 38, September 29, 2016. https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/tpps-fate-lame-duck-uncertain-congress-leaves-until-november .

Inside U.S. Trade . “WTO Members Stalled over Future Negotiations, U.S. Advocates Plurilaterals.” Vol. 34, no. 20, May 20, 2016. https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/wto-members-stalled-over-future-negotiations-us-advocates-plurilaterals .

International Air Transport Association (IATA). “Air Passenger Market Analysis,” January 2016. https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/passenger-analysis-jan-2017.pdf .

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). “Environmental Goods Agreement Negotiators Bargain on Coverage.” Bridges 20, no. 24, June 30, 2016. https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/environmental-goods-agreement-negotiators-bargain-on-coverage .

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). “Environmental Goods Agreement Negotiators Discuss Tariff Cut Offers.” Bridges 20, no. 15, April 28, 2016. https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/environmental-goods-agreement-negotiators-discuss-tariff-cut-offers .

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). “Environmental Goods Agreement Negotiators Eye Next Steps.” Bridges 20, no. 9, March 10, 2016. https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/environmental-goods-agreement-negotiators-eye-next-steps .

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). “Environmental Goods Agreement Participants Prepare Final Push.” Bridges 20, no. 32, September 29, 2016. https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/environmental-goods-agreement-participants-prepare-final-push .

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). “Environmental Goods Agreement Negotiators Prepare for December Deadline.” Bridges 20, no. 36, October 27, 2016. https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/environmental-goods-agreement-negotiators-prepare-for-december-deadline .

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). “Ministerial Talks to Clinch Environmental Goods Agreement Hit Stumbling Block.” Bridges , Biores, December 8, 2016. https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/ministerial-talks-to-clinch-environmental-goods-agreement-hit-stumbling .

International Monetary Fund (IMF). Brazil . IMF Country Report no. 16/348, November 2016. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16348.pdf .

International Monetary Fund (IMF). World Economic Outlook Database. April 2017 Edition. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.aspx (accessed May 15, 2017).

Marsh, Sarah. “Charcoal Becomes First Cuban Export to United States in Half a Century.” Reuters, January 5, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-export-idUSKBN14Q0DB .

Mussell, Al. “Understanding the Dynamics of Milk Pricing and Revenue in a Time of Change.” Agri-Food Economic Systems (Canada). Independent Agri-Food Policy Note, May 2016. https://www.agrifoodecon.ca/uploads/userfiles/files/milk%20pricing%20briefing%20note%20may%2018%202016.pdf .

NAFTA Secretariat. “Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions.” https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Overview-of-the-Dispute-Settlement-Provisions (accessed March 15, 2017).

NAFTA Secretariat. “Status Report of Panel Proceedings—Chapter 19 Active Cases.” https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Status-Report-of-Panel-Proceedings (accessed March 15, 2017).

North American Development Bank (NADB). “Summary of Project Implementation Activities: Active Projects,” December 31, 2016. https://www.nadb.org/pdfs/FreqUpdates/ProjectMatrix.pdf (accessed March 15, 2017).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “2016 Ministerial Council Statement––’Enhancing Productivity for Inclusive Growth.’” Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level, June 1–2, 2016. C/MIN(2016)8/FINAL, June 2, 2016. https://www.oecd.int/olis/portal/site/olisnet/ .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Capacity Developments in the World Steel Industry,” February 2016. https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/Capacity-Developments-Steel-Industry.pdf .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Chair’s Summary––’Enhancing Productivity for Inclusive Growth.’” Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level, June 1–2, 2016. C/MIN(2016)9, June 7, 2016. https://www.oecd.int/olis/portal/site/olisnet/ .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Country Statistical Profiles: Key Tables from OECD.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profiles-key-tables-from-oecd_20752288 (accessed April 11, 2017).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Enhancing Productivity for Inclusive Growth.” https://www.oecd.org/mcm/ (accessed January 17, 2017).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Global Interim Economic Outlook,” March 7, 2017. https://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/Will-risks-derail-the-modest-recovery-OECD-Interim-Economic-Outlook-March-2017-presentation.pdf .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Global Value Chains.” https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/global-value-chains.htm (accessed April 3, 2017).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Members and Partners.” https://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (accessed January 17, 2017).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “OECD Economic Surveys: Japan 2017,” April 13, 2017. https://www.oecdbookshop.org/browse.asp?pid=title-detail&lang=en&ds=&ISB=9789264272170 .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Trade and Agriculture Directorate (TAD). Trade Committee (TC). “Draft Agenda: Trade Committee––3–4 November 2016––OECD Conference Centre, Paris, France.” TAD/TC/A(2016)2, October 14, 2016. https://www.oecd.int/olis/portal/site/olisnet/ .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Trade and Agriculture Directorate (TAD). Trade Committee (TC). “Draft Agenda: Trade Committee––Confidential Session––4 November 2016––OECD Conference Centre, Paris, France.” TAD/TC/A(2016)2/ANN, October 14, 2016. https://www.oecd.int/olis/portal/site/olisnet/ .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Trade and Agriculture Directorate (TAD). Trade Committee (TC). “Draft Agenda: Working Party of the Trade Committee––13–14 December 2016––Paris, France.” TAD/TC/WP/A(2016)4, December 9, 2016. https://www.oecd.int/olis/portal/site/olisnet/ .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Trade and Agriculture Directorate (TAD). Trade Committee (TC). “Draft Programme of Work and Budget (PWB) 2017–18 of the Trade Committee.” TAD/TC(2016)1/REV2, May 31, 2016. https://www.oecd.int/olis/portal/site/olisnet/ .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Trade and Agriculture Directorate (TAD). Trade Committee (TC). “Draft Summary Record: Trade Committee––Confidential Session––22 April 2016––OECD Conference Centre, Paris, France.” TAD/TC/M(2016)1/ANN, September 26, 2016. https://www.oecd.int/olis/portal/site/olisnet/ .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Trade and Agriculture Directorate (TAD). Trade Committee (TC). “Draft Summary Record: Trade Committee––Plenary Session––21–22 April 2016––OECD Conference Centre, Paris, France.” TAD/TC/M(2016)1, September 26, 2016. https://www.oecd.int/olis/portal/site/olisnet/ .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Trade and Agriculture Directorate (TAD). Trade Committee (TC). “Reforming Trade in Services––Insights from New OECD Analysis––OECD Conference Centre––3–4 November 2016.” TAD/TC(2016)10, October 13, 2016. https://www.oecd.int/olis/portal/site/olisnet/ .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Trade and Agriculture Directorate (TAD). Trade Committee (TC). “Report from the Chair of the Working Party of the Trade Committee (WPTC)––21–22 April 2016––OECD Headquarters, Paris.” TAD/TC/RD(2016)2, April 20, 2016. https://www.oecd.int/olis/portal/site/olisnet/ .

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Trade and Agriculture Directorate (TAD). Trade Committee (TC). “Report from the Chair of the Working Party of the Trade Committee (WPTC)––3–4 November 2016––OECD Conference Centre, Paris.” TAD/TC/RD(2016)1, November 2, 2016. https://www.oecd.int/olis/portal/site/olisnet/ .

Reuters. “China’s Foreign Reserves Just Plunged to the Lowest since 2011.” Fortune , November 7, 2016. https://fortune.com/2016/11/07/china-foreign-reserves-yuan-depreciation/ .

Reuters. “U.S. Dollar Soars on Bets That Donald Trump Could Spur Inflation.” Fortune , November 14, 2016. https://fortune.com/2016/11/14/donald-trump-victory-dollar-inflation/ .

Sesin, Carmen. “Nestle’s Nespresso Now Selling Cuban Coffee for U.S. Market.” NBCNews, August 19, 2016. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/nestle-s-nespresso-now-selling-cuban-coffee-u-s-market-n634286 .

Sonapi Parc Industriel de Caracol (Haiti). Sonapi Parc Industriel de Caracol 2016 Year End Report . https://www.ute.gouv.ht/bm/documents/Q4_YEAR_2016_PIC.pdf .

Starwood Hotels & Resorts. “Starwood Hotels & Resorts Announces Groundbreaking Expansion to Cuba,” April 4, 2016. https://www.starwoodmediacentre.com/eame/starwood/news/2016/04/04/starwood-hotels-and-resorts-announces-groundbreaking-expansion-to-cuba?locale=en_GB .

Starwood Hotels & Resorts. “Starwood Hotels & Resorts Makes Historic Debut with the Opening of Four Points Havana,” July 7, 2016. https://www.starwoodmediacentre.com/uki/four-points/news/2016/07/07/starwood-hotels-resorts-makes-historic-debut-with-the-opening-of-four-points-havana?locale=en_GB .

Trade Reports International Group (TRIG). “EGA Negotiators Miss Mark.” Washington Trade Daily , December 5, 2016.

Trans-Atlantic Business Council. “TABC Welcomes U.S.-EU Agreement Permitting Continued Access to EU Market for U.S. Insurers and Reinsurers.” Press release, January 13, 2016. https://www.transatlanticbusiness.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/TABC-Press-Release-TABC-Welcomes-U.S.-EU-Agreement-Permitting-Continued-Access-to-EU-Market-for-U.S.-Insurers-and-Reinsurers.pdf .

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Session 21. Paris Agreement . https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf .

U.S. Chamber of Commerce. “U.S. Chamber Launches Trilateral Digital Economy Steering Committee,” August 30, 2016. https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-launches-trilateral-digital-economy-steering-committee .

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). “Economics and Trade Bulletin,” December 6, 2016. https://www.uscc.gov/Research/december-2016-trade-bulletin .

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). “USDA on Tainted Brazilian Meat: None Has Entered U.S., 100 Percent Re-Inspection Instituted.” Press release, March 22, 2017. https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2017/03/22/usda-tainted-brazilian-meat-none-has-entered-us-100-percent-re .

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Economic Research Service (ERS). Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States (FATUS): Calendar Year; By Year; Top 15 U.S. Agricultural Export Destinations, by Year, March 31, 2016. https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/foreign-agricultural-trade-of-the-united-states-fatus/calendar-year/ .

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Economic Research Service (ERS). “Japan—Trade,” last updated October 11, 2016. https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/countries-regions/japan/trade (accessed March 11, 2017).

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Japan: Grain and Feed Update , by Keiko Fujibayashi. GAIN Report Number JA6040, October 18, 2016. https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20and%20Feed%20Update_Tokyo_Japan_10-18-2016.pdf .

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Japan Issues New Safety Standards for Agriculture and Food; Report Categories: Sanitary/Phytosanitary/Food Safety , by Suguru Sato. GAIN Report Number 6001, January 25, 2016. https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Japan%20Issues%20New%20Safety%20Standards%20for%20Agriculture%20and%20Food%20_Tokyo_Japan_1-25-2016.pdf .

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Japan: Livestock and Products Annual; 2016 Market Situation Update and 2017 Outlook , by Kakuyu Obara. GAIN Report Number JA6019, September 9, 2016. https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Livestock%20and%20Products%20Annual_Tokyo_Japan_9-10-2016.pdf .

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Livestock and Products Annual, by Joao Silva and Nicolas Rubio . GAIN Report Number BR 1614, September 8, 2016. https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Livestock%20and%20Products%20Annual_Brasilia_Brazil_8-30-2016.pdf .

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). “USDA Announces Reopening of Brazilian Market to U.S. Beef Exports.” Press release, August 1, 2016. https://www.fas.usda.gov/newsroom/usda-announces-reopening-brazilian-market-us-beef-exports .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce,” February 29, 2016. https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=015t00000004qAg .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “Fact Sheet: High-Level Economic Dialogue; Three Years of Achievements.” U.S.-Mexico HLED, December 8, 2016. https://trade.gov/hled/HLED%20Fact%20Sheet-Dec82016.pdf .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “Fact Sheet: Overview of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework for Interested Participants,” July 12, 2016. https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/fact_sheet-_eu-us_privacy_shield_7-16_sc_cmts.pdf .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “Key New Requirements: EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework; Key New Requirements for Participating Companies.” https://www.privacyshield.gov/Key-New-Requirements (accessed February 23, 2017).

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “Privacy Shield Overview.” https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview (accessed February 23, 2017).

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “Statement by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman Following the Launch of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity.” Press release, December 17, 2016. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2016/12/statement-us-secretary-commerce-penny-pritzker-and-us-trade .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework: FAQs.” https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/faqs-eu-us_privacy_shield_7-16_sc_cmts.pdf (accessed February 23, 2017).

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “U.S. and Mexican Officials Celebrate the Inauguration of the Port of Entry and International Bridge in Tornillo, Texas.” Press release, February 4, 2016. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2016/02/us-and-mexican-officials-celebrate-inauguration-port-entry-and .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “U.S. Departments of Commerce and Energy Appoint Inaugural U.S. Section of the Newly Formed U.S.-Mexico Energy Business Council.” Press release, June 30, 2016. https://www.trade.gov/press/press-releases/2016/us-departments-of-commerce-and-energy-appoint-inaugural-us-section-of-us-mexico-energy-business-council-063016.asp .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker Delivers Remarks at Inauguration of the Tornillo-Guadalupe Port of Entry and International Bridge.” Press release with speech, February 4, 2016. https://www.commerce.gov/news/secretary-speeches/2016/02/us-secretary-commerce-penny-pritzker-delivers-remarks-inauguration .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). “Annual Revision of the U.S. International Transactions Accounts,” by C. Omar Kebbeh and Eric Bryda. Survey of Current Business 96, no. 7 (July 2016). https://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2016/07%20July/0716_annual_revision_of_international_transactions_accounts.pdf .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). “Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter and Annual 2016 (Third Estimate).” News release, March 30, 2017. https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Interactive data: International Transactions, Services, & International Investment Position (IIP), International Transactions, tables 1.2 and 1.3, U.S. International Trade in Services, March 21, 2017. https://bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm (accessed March 21, 2017).

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Interactive data: International Transactions, Services, and International Investment Position (IIP), International Transactions, Table 3.1, “U.S. International Trade in Services,” March 21, 2017. https://bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm (accessed March 21, 2017).

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Interactive data: table 2.3, U.S. Trade in Services, by Country or Affiliation and by Type of Service, India, December 19, 2016. https://bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm (accessed March 22, 2017).

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). “U.S. International Transactions: Fourth Quarter and Year 2016.” News release, March 21, 2017. https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/transactions/2017/pdf/trans416.pdf .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Economic Development Administration (EDA). Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Report to Congress: Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program . https://www.eda.gov/pdf/annual-reports/taaf/FY15-TAAF-Annual-Report-to-Congress.pdf (accessed March 13, 2017).

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Economic Development Administration (EDA). “Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms.” https://www.eda.gov/pdf/about/TAAF-Program-1-Pager.pdf (accessed March 2, 2017).

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). International Trade Administration (ITA). “AGOA: General Country Eligibility Provisions.” https://trade.gov/agoa/eligibility/ (accessed March 21, 2017).

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). International Trade Administration (ITA). “AGOA Preferences: Country Eligibility, Apparel Eligibility, and Textile Eligibility (Category 0 and Category 9).” Excel table, December 20, 2016. https://otexa.trade.gov/SpreadSheets/AGOA_ELIGIBILITY_INCL_CAT_0.xls .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). International Trade Administration (ITA). “Japan Country Commercial Guide: Japan—Openness to and Restriction on Foreign Investment,” January 24, 2017. https://www.export.gov/article?id=Japan-openness-to-foreign-investment .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). International Trade Administration (ITA). “Joint Statement of the 14th Edition of the Brazil-U.S. Commercial Dialogue.” Press release, June 29, 2016. www.trade.gov/press/press-releases/2016/us-brazil-comm-dialogue-statement.pdf .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). International Trade Administration (ITA). “Trade Data Basics,” updated August 25, 2015. https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/referenceinfo/tg_ian_001872.asp .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). International Trade Administration (ITA). “United States and Brazil Celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the U.S.-Brazil Commercial Dialogue.” Press release, June 29, 2016. https://www.trade.gov/press/press-releases/2016/us-brazil-celebrate-10th-anniversary-of-us-brazil-commercial-dialogue-062916.asp .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). International Trade Administration (ITA). “U.S.-Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council: United States and Canada Announce the 2016 Annual Work Plans.” https://trade.gov/rcc/ (accessed March 20, 2017).

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA). “Major Shippers Report: U.S. General Imports by Country,” May 1, 2017. https://otexa.trade.gov/msrcty/v2450.htm .

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (USCBP). “CBP Commissioner Inaugurates Cargo Pre-Inspection Program Pilot at Mesa de Otay.” Press release, January 12, 2016. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-commissioner-inaugurates-cargo-pre-inspection-program-pilot-mesa .

U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). “Memorandum of Understanding on a Patent Prosecution Highway Pilot Program,” November 24, 2015. www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/PPH_MOU_and_Workplan_USPTO-INPI.pdf .

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). “Submission under U.S.-Colombia TPA.” https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/fta-submissions (accessed March 14, 2017).

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). “The Colombian Labor Action Plan: A Five Year Update,” April 11, 2016. https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/2016_Colombia_action_plan_report_FINAL.pdf .

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). “Fifth Periodic Review of Implementation of Recommendations in the U.S. Department of Labor’s Public Report of Review of Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic),” October 5, 2016. https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ilab/reports/Fifth%20Periodic%20Review%20of%20Implementation%20of%20Recommendations%20in%20DOL%27s%20Report%20of%20Review%20of%20Submission%202011-03.pdf .

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA). “Division of Monitoring and Enforcement of Trade Agreements (META).” https://www.dol.gov/ilab/about/offices/ (accessed March 15, 2017).

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA). “North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: A Guide,” October 2005. https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalcgd.htm .

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA). North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: Public Report of Review of U.S. Submission 2015-04 (Mexico) , July 8, 2016. https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/070816-Chedraui-report.pdf .

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA). Public Report on Outreach Events Pursuant to U.S.-Mexico Ministerial Consultations on Public Communications MEX 2003-1, 2005-1, and 2011-1 under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation , 2016. https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ilab/reports/Public%20Report%20-%20H-2%20Events%20(FINAL%20for%20Publication).pdf .

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA). “Submissions under the Labor Provisions of Free Trade Agreements.” https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade /fta-submissions (accessed March 1, 2017).

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA). United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement: Public Report of Review of U.S. Submission 2015-01 (Peru) , March 18, 2016. https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/Public_Report_of_Review_of_US_Submission_2015-01.pdf .

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). Employment and Training Administration (ETA). “TAA Program Benefits and Services under the 2015 Amendments,” updated June 28, 2016. https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/2015_amend_benfits.cfm .

U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). Employment and Training Administration (ETA). Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers Program—Fiscal Year 2015 . https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/docs/AnnualReport15.pdf (accessed March 15, 2017).

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “AGOA Forum 2016,” September 26, 2016. https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/af/rt/agoa/2016/index.htm .

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Joint Statement on the 3rd U.S.-Republic of Korea ICT Policy Forum.” Press release, September 12, 2016. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/09/261772.htm .

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). “Joint Statement on the Second India-U.S. Strategic and Commercial Dialogue,” August 31, 2016. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/08/261405.htm .

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB). “2012 Investment Climate Statement—Canada,” June 2012. https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191123.htm .

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EUR). “The State Department’s Section 515.582 List,” April 22, 2016. https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/515582/237471.htm .

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR). “Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration between the United States of America and the European Union,” April 30, 2007. https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/130772.htm .

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR). “Joint Statement on the 7th U.S.-EU SME Best Practices Workshop in the Framework of the Transatlantic Economic Council,” June 2, 2016. https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2016/260932.htm .

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR). “Transatlantic Economic Council Facilitators’ Report to Stakeholders,” November 30, 2016. https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2016/265818.htm .

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR). “Transatlantic eHealth/Health IT Cooperation Roadmap,” July 28, 2016. https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2016/260926.htm .

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR). “Transatlantic eHealth/Health IT Cooperation Roadmap: Annex—Actions and Deliverables,” July 28, 2016. https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2016/260928.htm .

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA). “U.S. Relations with Haiti.” Fact sheet, March 23, 2017. https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982.htm .

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Office of the Legal Adviser. International Claims and Investment Disputes (L/CID). https://www.state.gov/s/l/c3433.htm (accessed March 15, 2017).

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Office of the Legal Adviser. International Claims and Investment Disputes (L/CID). “NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations: Cases Filed against the Government of Canada.” https://www.state.gov/s/l/c3740.htm (accessed March 15, 2017).

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Office of the Legal Adviser. International Claims and Investment Disputes (L/CID). “NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations: Cases Filed against the United Mexican States.” https://www.state.gov/s/l/c3742.htm (accessed March 15, 2017).

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Office of the Legal Adviser. International Claims and Investment Disputes (L/CID). “NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations: Cases Filed against the United States of America.” https://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm (accessed March 15, 2017).

U.S. Department of State (USDOS). Secretary of State, Washington, DC. “19th Round of TiSA Negotiations (State 84866),” July 28, 2016.

U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). “U.S. Transportation Secretary Foxx Approves U.S. Airlines to Begin Scheduled Service to Cuba.” News release, June 10, 2016. https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-transportation-secretary-foxx-approves-us-airlines-begin-scheduled-service-cuba .

U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). “U.S. Transportation Secretary Foxx Arrives in Cuba on First Scheduled Flight in Over 50 Years.” News release, August 31, 2016. https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-transportation-secretary-foxx-arrives-cuba-first-scheduled-flight-over-50-years .

U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). “Out-of-Service (OOS) Rates (Mexican-Owned or Mexico-Domiciled Carriers),” March 24, 2017. https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SafetyProgram/spRptMex.aspx?rpt=MXOOS .

U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). “Roadside Inspection Out-of-Service (OOS) Rates,” March 24, 2017. https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SafetyProgram/spRptRoadside.aspx?rpt=RDOOS .

U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). United States Cross-Border Long-Haul Trucking Pilot Program: Report to Congress , January 2015. https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/mission/policy/united-states-mexico-cross-border-long-haul-trucking-pilot-program-report-congress .

U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). “United States to Expand Trade Opportunities with Mexico through Safe Cross-Border Trucking.” News release, January 9, 2015. https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/newsroom/united-states-expand-trade-opportunities-mexico-through-safe-cross-border-trucking .

U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology (OST-R). Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office. “Connected Vehicle Basics.” https://www.its.dot.gov/cv_basics/cv_basics_what.htm (accessed April 5, 2017).

U.S. Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury). “Bilateral Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and Reinsurance [U.S.-EU Covered Agreement].” Fact sheet, January 18, 2017. https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/Covered-Agreement-Fact-Sheet-(011317)-FINAL.PDF .

U.S. Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury). “Improvements in EU-U.S. Regulatory Cooperation.” Press release, July 19, 2016. https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0521.aspx .

U.S. Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury). “Joint U.S.-EU Financial Regulatory Forum Joint Statement.” Press release, July 25, 2016. https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0528.aspx .

U.S. Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury). “Treasury and Commerce Announce Further Amendments to Cuba Sanctions Regulations.” Fact sheet, October 14, 2016. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_fact_sheet_10142016.pdf .

U.S. Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury). “Treasury and Commerce Announce Further Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions Regulations.” Fact sheet, January 27, 2016. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/fact_sheet_01262016.pdf .

U.S. Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury). “Treasury and Commerce Announce Significant Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions Regulations Ahead of President Obama’s Historic Trip to Cuba.” Fact sheet, March 15, 2016. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_fact_sheet_03152016.pdf .

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Crude Oil Production database. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_a.htm (accessed April 14, 2017).

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). “Despite Growth Late in the Year, U.S. Crude Oil Production Decreased in 2016,” by Matt French. Today in Energy , March 20, 2017. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30412 .

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Petroleum and Other Liquids: Exports by Destination database. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_exp_dc_NUS-Z00_mbbl_a.htm (accessed April 9, 2016).

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Spot Prices for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, Official Statistics, Summary Statistics database. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm (accessed March 16, 2017).

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). U.S. Exports database. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_exp_a_EP00_EEX_mbblpd_a.htm (accessed April 14, 2017).

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). U.S. Imports by Country of Origin database. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_a.htm (accessed April 14, 2017).

U.S. Federal Reserve. “Foreign Exchange Rates—H.10.” https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/summary/indexn96_b.htm (accessed April 12, 2017).

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). “Letter to the Honorable Max Baucus and the Honorable Dave Camp Concerning the Follow-up on the Haiti Earned Import Allowance Program,” December 14, 2012. https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650894.txt .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 22nd Report 2013–14 . USITC Publication 4567. Washington, DC: USITC, September 2015. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4567.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and Indigenous Innovation Policies on the U.S. Economy . USITC Publication 4226. Washington, DC: USITC, May 2011. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). China: Intellectual Property Infringement, Indigenous Innovation Policies, and Frameworks for Measuring the Effects on the U.S. Economy . USITC Publication 4199. Washington, DC: USITC, November 2010. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Economic Impact of U.S. Sanctions with Respect to Cuba. USITC Publication 3398. Washington, DC: USITC, February 2001. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3398.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). “Frequently Asked Questions.” Shifts in U.S. Merchandise Trade, 2015 . USITC Publication 4641. Washington, DC: USITC, September 2016. https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/research_and_analysis/tradeshifts/2015/d3/digest_hts8_dir_-final.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2017) Basic Edition, February 2017. USITC Publication 4660. Washington, DC: USITC, 2017. https://hts.usitc.gov/current .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2016), Annotated for Statistical Reporting Purposes, 2016. USITC Publication 4588. Washington, DC: USITC, 2016. https://hts.usitc.gov/view/release?release=chapter98 .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Hot-Rolled Steel Products from India . USITC Publication 4599. Washington, DC: USITC, March 2016. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/701_731/pub4599.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb (DataWeb). Based on official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). https://dataweb.usitc.gov (accessed various dates).

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Overview of Cuban Imports of Goods and Services and Effects of U.S. Restrictions . USITC Publication 4597. Washington, DC: USITC, March 2016. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4597.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Textiles and Apparel: Effects of Special Rules for Haiti on Trade, Markets, and Industries. USITC Publication 4016. Washington, DC: USITC, June 2008. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4016.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors. USITC Publication 4607. Washington, DC: USITC, May 2016. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4607.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). U.S. Agricultural Sales to Cuba: Certain Economic Effects of U.S. Restrictions . USITC Publication 3932. Washington, DC: USITC, July 2007. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3932.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). The Year in Trade 2015: Operation of the Trade Agreement Program, 67th Report, USITC Publication 4627. Washington, DC: USITC, July 2016. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4627.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). The Year in Trade 2014: Operation of the Trade Agreement Program, 66th Report . USITC Publication 4543. Washington, DC: USITC, July 2015. https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/332/old_pub4543.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). The Year in Trade 2013: Operation of the Trade Agreement Program, 65th Report . USITC Publication 4481. Washington, DC: USITC, July 2014. https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/332/pub4481.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). The Year in Trade 2012: Operation of the Trade Agreement Program, 64th Report . USITC Publication 4416. Washington, DC: USITC, July 2013. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4416.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). The Year in Trade 2011: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 63rd Report. USITC Publication 4336. Washington, DC: USITC, July 2012. https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/332/pub4336.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). The Year in Trade 2010: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 62nd Report. USITC Publication 4247. Washington, DC: USITC, July 2011. https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/332/pub4247_0.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). The Year in Trade 2009: Operation of the Trade Agreement Program, 61st Report . USITC Publication 4174. Washington, DC: USITC, July 2010. https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/332/pub4174_0.pdf .

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). The Year in Trade 2008: Operation of the Trade Agreement Program, 60th Report . USITC Publication 4091. Washington, DC: USITC, July 2009. https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/332/pub4091_0.pdf .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2017 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers . Washington, DC: USTR, March 2017. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/NTE/2017%20NTE.pdf .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2017 Trade Policy Agenda and 2016 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program . Washington, DC: USTR, March 2017, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/AnnualReport2017.pdf .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2016 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers . Washington, DC: USTR, March 2016. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-NTE-Report-FINAL.pdf .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2016 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets . Washington, DC: USTR, December 2016. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-Out-of-Cycle-Review-Notorious-Markets.pdf .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2016 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance. Washington, DC: USTR, January 2017. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-China-Report-to-Congress.pdf .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2016 Special 301 Report to Congress . Washington, DC: USTR, April 2016. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-Report.pdf .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2016 Trade Policy Agenda and 2015 Annual Report. Washington, DC: USTR, March 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-publications/2016/2016-trade-policy-agenda-and-2015-Annual-Report .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2015 Trade Policy Agenda and 2014 Annual Report . Washington, DC: USTR, March 2015. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015%20AR%20Compiled%20FINAL_0.pdf .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Addressing Steel Excess Capacity and Its Impacts: Ensuring a Level Playing Field for American Businesses and Workers.” Fact sheet, April 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2016/april/addressing-steel-excess-capacity-its .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Beyond AGOA—Looking to the Future of U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment , September 2016. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-AGOA-Report.pdf .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “GSP in Use—Country Specific Information.” https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized-system-preferences-gsp/gsp-use-%E2%80%93-coun (accessed April 4, 2017).

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “India and United States Joint Statement on the Trade Policy Forum.” Press release, October 20, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/october/%E2%80%8BIndia-US-Joint-Statement-TPF .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Tunisia Council on Trade and Investment.” Press release, March 22, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/march/joint-statement-US-Tunisia-council-trade-investment .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Joint Statement on the 2nd Joint U.S.-Nepal Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA) Council Meeting.” Press release, June 10, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/june/joint-statement-2nd-joint-us-nepal .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Joint Statement on the 12th Joint U.S.-Sri Lanka Trade and Investment Framework Council Meeting.” Press release, April 28, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/april/joint-statement-12th-joint-us-sri .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Joint Statement on the Results of the Council Meeting of the U.S.-Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).” Press release, April 5, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/april/joint-statement-results-council .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Joint Statement on the United States-Ukraine Trade and Investment Council.” Press release, October 5, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/october/joint-statement-united-states .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Joint Statement on U.S.-EU Negotiations for a Bilateral Agreement on Insurance and Reinsurance Measures.” Press release, December 12, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/december/joint-statement-us-eu-negotiations .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Joint Statement Regarding Fisheries Subsidies,” September 14, 2016. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/09142016_STATEMENT_joint_statement_fisheries_partners_FINAL.pdf .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Obama Administration Takes Action to Address European Union’s Unfair Trade Practices against U.S. Beef Industry.” Press release, December 22, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/december/obama-administration-takes-action .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Obama Administration Undertaking Global Initiative to Prohibit Harmful Fishing Subsidies.” Press release, September 14, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/september/obama-administration-undertaking .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Opening Remarks by U.S. and EU Chief Negotiators for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) Round 15 Press Conference.” Press release, October 7, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/october/opening-remarks-us-and-eu-chief .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Opening Remarks by U.S. and EU Chief Negotiators from the New York Round of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations.” Press release, April 29, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speechestranscripts/2016/april/opening-remarks-us-and-eu-chief .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Statement by Assistant USTR Dan Mullaney at the 14th Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiating Round.” Speech transcript, July 15, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speechestranscripts/2016/july/statement-assistant-ustr-dan .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Statement on Meeting of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.” Press release, December 15, 2014. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2014/December/Statement-on-meeting-US-Korea-FTA-Joint-Committee .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Trade and Investment Framework Agreements.” https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements (accessed March 15, 2017).

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.” https://ustr.gov/ttip (accessed March 22, 2017).

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States and Argentina Hold Ministerial-Level Meeting of the Council on Trade and Investment under the United States-Argentina Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.” Press release, November 7, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/november/us-and-argentina-hold-ministerial .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States and Argentina Sign Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.” Press release, March 23, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/march/united-states-and-argentina-sign .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States and Brazil Hold Third Meeting of the Commission on Economic and Trade Relations under the United States-Brazil Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation.” Press release, March 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/march/united-states-and-brazil-hold-third .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States and Indonesia Explore Initiatives to Increase Trade and Investment.” Press release, April 12, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/april/united-states-and-indonesia-explore .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States and Laos Sign Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.” Press release, February 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/february/united-states-and-laos-sign-trade .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States and Philippines Strengthen Engagement on Trade.” Press release, March 18, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/march/united-states-and-philippines .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States and Taiwan Deepen Dialogue on Trade and Investment Priorities.” Press release, October 2015. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/united-states-and-taiwan-deepen .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States and Taiwan Hold Dialogue on Trade and Investment Priorities.” Press release, October 4, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/october/united-states-and-taiwan-hold .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States and Uruguay Hold Meeting of the Trade and Investment Council under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.” Press release, May 11, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/may/US-Uruguay-Hold-Trade-Investment-Council-Meeting-Under-TIFA .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “United States Reinstates Trade Preference Benefits for Burma Following Review of Eligibility Criteria.” Press release, September 14, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/september/united-states-reinstates-trade .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “U.S.-China Joint Fact Sheet on the 27th U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade,” Fact sheet, January 17, 2017. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2017/january/us-china-joint-fact-sheet-27th-us .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “U.S.-EU Joint Report on T-TIP Progress to Date.” Press release, January 17, 2017. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/january/us-eu-joint-report-t-tip-progress-0 .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Guidebook , September 2016. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/GSP-Guidebook-September-16-2016.pdf .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.” https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta (accessed April 4, 2017).

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “U.S. Press Statement at the Close of the T-TIP Round in Brussels.” Speech transcript, February 26, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speechestranscripts/2016/February/US-Press-Statement-TTIP-Round-Brussels .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Froman, Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack Announce Continued EU Market Access for American Producers of High-Quality Beef.” Press release, August 1, 2013. https://www.ustr.gov/Froman-Vilsack-Announce-Continued-EU-Market-Access-for-American-Beef-Producers .

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “USTR Releases Special 301 Report on Protection of American Intellectual Property Rights Across the World.” Press release, April 30, 2016. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/april/ustr-releases-special-301-report .

Wall, Anne, and Mike Harney. Letters (identical) to Richard Shelby, Sherrod Brown, Orrin Hatch, Ron Wyden, Jeb Hensarling, Maxine Waters, Kevin Brady, and Sander Levin (members of the Senate Finance Committee and of the U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means) from the Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury) and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), November 20, 2015. https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/Covered%20Agreement%20Letters%20to%20Congress.pdf .

Ward, Jill, and Lukanyo Mnyanda. “Brexit Pains: The Pound Takes a Serious Pounding.” Bloomberg Businessweek , October 28, 2016. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-28/brexit-pains-the-pound-takes-a-serious-pounding .

White House. “Fact Sheet: United States-Argentina Relationship.” March 23, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/23/fact-sheet-united-states-%E2%80%93-argentina-relationship-0 .

White House. “Fact Sheet: United States-Canada Relationship.” March 10, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/10/fact-sheet-united-states-%E2%80%93-canada-relationship .

White House. “Global Economic Growth and Steel Excess Capacity,” by Adewale Adeyemo. White House Blog , September 14, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/09/14/global-economic-growth-and-steel-excess-capacity .

White House. “Joint Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President.” Press release, June 29, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/30/joint-statement-prime-minister-canada-and-president .

White House. “Joint Statement: The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century.” Press release, June 7, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/07/joint-statement-united-states-and-india-enduring-global-partners-21st .

White House. “Remarks by President Obama at Hannover Messe Trade Show Opening.” Speech transcript, April 24, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/24/remarks-president-obama-hannover-messe-trade-show-opening .

White House. “Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes.” Press release, December 17, 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-president-cuba-policy-changes .

White House. Office of the Vice President. “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Mexico High Level Economic Dialogue.” Press release, September 20, 2013. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/20/fact-sheet-us-mexico-high-level-economic-dialogue .

White House. Office of the Vice President. “Joint Statement: 2016 U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue.” Press release, February 25, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/joint-statement-2016-us-mexico-high-level-economic-dialogue .

World Bank. “Research: Commodity Markets; World Bank Commodity Price Data, Annual Prices, 2014–2016,” April 3, 2017, https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Accessions: DG Azevêdo Welcomes Afghanistan as 164th WTO member.” News release, July 29, 2016. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/acc_afg_29jul16_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Accessions: DG Azevêdo Welcomes Liberia as 163rd WTO member.” News release, July 14, 2016. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/acc_lbr_14jul16_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Agreement on Government Procurement: Parties, Observers and Accessions.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (accessed April 13, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Briefing Note: Negotiations on Rules—Anti-dumping and Subsidy Disciplines (including Fisheries Subsidies) and Regional Trade Agreements.” Updated March 2016. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/briefing_notes_e/brief_antidumping_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: Chronological List of Dispute Settlement Cases.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (accessed March 5, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS267; United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm (accessed April 4, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS316; European Communities—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS353; United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft—Second Complaint.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds353_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS381; United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS427; China—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United States.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds427_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS430: India—Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural Products.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds430_e.htm (accessed March 31, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS456; India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm (accessed March 31, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS464: United States—Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds464_e.htm (accessed March 28, 2016).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS471; United States—Certain Methodologies and their Application to Anti-dumping Proceedings Involving China.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds471_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS477; Indonesia—Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds477_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS478; Indonesia—Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds478_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS487; United States—Conditional Tax Incentives for Large Civil Aircraft.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds487_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS489; China—Measures Related to Demonstration Bases and common Service Platforms Programmes.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds489_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS503; United States—Measures Concerning Non-Immigrant Visas.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds503_e.htm (accessed April 4, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS505; United States—Countervailing Measures on Supercalendered Paper from Canada.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds505_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS508; China―Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds508_e.htm (accessed March 5, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS509; China—Duties and other Measures concerning the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds509_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS510; United States—Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds510_e.htm (accessed March 31, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS511; China―Domestic Support for Agricultural Producers.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds511_e.htm (accessed March 5, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS514; United States—Countervailing Measures on Cold- and Hot-Rolled Steel Flat Products from Brazil.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds514_e.htm (accessed April 4, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS515; United States―Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds511_e.htm (accessed March 5, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS516; European Union—Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm (accessed May 22, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Dispute Settlement: DS517; China―Tariff Rate Quotas for Certain Agricultural Products.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds517_e.htm (accessed March 5, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA).” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/ega_e.htm (accessed March 16, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “The Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA Expansion).” Briefing note, December 16, 2015. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/itabriefingnotes161215_e.pdf .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Information Technology.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/inftec_e.htm (accessed March 14, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Information Technology Agreement––Majority of Participants Have Now Implemented ITA Expansion Commitments.” News release, November 1, 2016. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/ita_01nov16_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Information Technology: Introduction; Information Technology Agreement––An Explanation.” Trade Topics. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/itaintro_e.htm (accessed March 14, 2017).

World Trade Organization (WTO). Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the European Commission Regarding the Importation of Beef from Animals Not Treated with Certain Growth-Promoting Hormones and Increased Duties Applied by the United States to Certain Products of the European Communities, May 13, 2009. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/145357.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Ministerial Conferences––Dates Fixed for 2017 Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires.” News release, December 8, 2016. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/minis_08dec16_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Ministerial Conferences––Ministers Support Call for Increased Efforts to Find Possible Areas of Agreement for MC11.” News release, June 2, 2016. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/minis_02jun16_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Ministerial Conferences—Ninth Session. Bali, 3–6 December 2013. Agreement on Trade Facilitation––Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013.” WT/MIN(13)/36––WT/L/911, December 11, 2013. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/bali_texts_combined_e.pdf .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Ministerial Conference, Singapore—Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products—Singapore.” WT/MIN(96)/16, December 13, 1996. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S001.aspx .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Progress Made on Environmental Goods Agreement, Setting Stage for Further Talks.” News release, December 4, 2016. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/ega_04dec16_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). Report (2016) of the Committee on Government Procurement . GPA/141, November 29, 2016. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=233339,233038&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True .

World Trade Organization (WTO). Report (2016) of the Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft (Adopted 3 November 2016) . WT/L/992––TCA/12, November 7, 2016. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=232459&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “ Roberto Azevêdo Reappointed WTO Director-General; Second Term Begins in September. ” News release, February 28, 2017. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/dgra_28feb17_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Trade Facilitation––WTO Members Welcome Entry into Force of the Trade Facilitation Agreement.” News release, February 27, 2017. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fac_27feb17_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Trade Facilitation––WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement Enters into Force.” News release, February 22, 2017. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fac_31jan17_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “Understanding the WTO: The Organization; Members and Observers,” July 29, 2016. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “WTO Members Affirm Interest in New International Fisheries Subsidies Rules, but Differ on Way Forward.” News release, June 29, 2016. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/rule_06jul16_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “WTO Members Conclude Landmark $1.3 Trillion IT Trade Deal.” News release, December 16, 2015. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/ita_16dec15_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). “WTO Members Engage on New Fisheries Subsidies Proposals.” Press release, December 9, 2016. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/fish_09dec16_e.htm .

World Trade Organization (WTO). General Council (GC). “ Agenda Item 2––Report by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee––Monday, 27 February 2017––Director-General's Report at the Informal Heads of Delegation Meeting on 23 February 2017.” JOB/GC/118, March 1, 2017 . https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=234811&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True .

World Trade Organization (WTO). General Council (GC). “Declaration on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products––Communication from the European Union.” WT/L/956, July 28, 2015. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=225119,133572&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True .

World Trade Organization (WTO). General Council (GC). “Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 3 October 2016.” WT/GC/M/164, October 11, 2016. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=232581&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=False .

World Trade Organization (WTO). General Council (GC). “Minutes of the Meeting––Held in the Centre William Rappard on 3 October 2016: Annex 2––The Director-General’s Report at the Informal Heads of Delegation Meeting Held on 30 September 2016.” WT/GC/M/164, November 10, 2016. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=232581&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=False .

World Trade Organization (WTO). General Council (GC). World Trade Organization Annual Report 2016. WT/GC/182, December 21, 2016. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=233493&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True .

Zhang, Longmei. “Rebalancing in China—Progress and Prospects.” IMF Working Paper Series no. 16183, 2016. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16183.pdf .

Appendix A
Data Tables

Table A.1 U.S. total exports to the world, by USITC digest sector, 2014–16

Sector	Description	2014	2015	2016	% change 2015–16
		Million $
1	Agricultural products	164,420	146,630	148,772	1.5
2	Forest products	41,169	39,061	37,962	-2.8
3	Chemicals and related products	234,954	227,882	218,143	-4.3
4	Energy-related products	161,165	109,703	99,414	-9.4
5	Textiles and apparel	23,985	23,274	21,615	-7.1
6	Footwear	1,456	1,464	1,366	-6.7
7	Minerals and metals	152,914	135,659	128,621	-5.2
8	Machinery	145,881	138,719	128,005	-7.7
9	Transportation equipment	336,495	327,286	319,379	-2.4
10	Electronic products	267,833	264,079	260,535	-1.3
11	Miscellaneous manufactures	47,636	47,377	47,760	0.8
12	Special provisions	43,263	41,439	42,149	1.7
	Total	1,621,172	1,502,572	1,453,721	-3.3

Source: Compiled from official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed May 3, 2017).

Note: Because of rounding, figures may not add up to totals shown.

Table A.2 U.S. general imports from the world, by USITC digest sector, 2014–16

Sector	Description	2014	2015	2016	% change 2015–16
		Million $
1	Agricultural products	136,333	136,959	139,465	1.8
2	Forest products	42,212	42,378	43,147	1.8
3	Chemicals and related products	251,542	260,278	259,908	-0.1
4	Energy-related products	351,626	194,068	158,045	-18.6
5	Textiles and apparel	121,687	126,548	120,312	-4.9
6	Footwear	26,017	27,650	25,634	-7.3
7	Minerals and metals	205,502	189,255	183,618	-3.0
8	Machinery	185,530	185,858	179,627	-3.4
9	Transportation equipment	404,024	426,207	418,355	-1.8
10	Electronic products	439,079	449,865	450,110	0.1
11	Miscellaneous manufactures	114,426	124,842	125,058	0.2
12	Special provisions	78,388	84,326	85,904	1.9
	Total	2,356,366	2,248,232	2,189,183	-2.6

Source: Compiled from official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed May 3, 2017).

Note: Because of rounding, figures may not add up to totals shown.

Table A.3 Leading U.S. total exports to the world, by HTS 6-digit subheading, 2014–16

HTS 6	Description	2014	2015	2016	% change 2015–16
		Million $
8800.00	Civilian aircraft, engines, and parts	113,130	119,453	120,784	1.1
2710.19	Petroleum oils, oils from bituminous minerals (other than crude) and products containing by weight 70 percent or more of petroleum oils, not biodiesel or waste	73,324	47,367	38,561	-18.6
2710.12	Light oils and preparations containing by weight 70 percent or more of petroleum oils or oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not waste oils	37,087	25,277	25,453	0.7
1201.90	Soybeans, other than seed	23,871	18,883	22,869	21.1
8703.23	Passenger motor vehicles with spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine, cylinder capacity over 1,500 cc but not over 3,000 cc	25,412	21,754	21,941	0.9
8542.31	Processors and controllers, electronic integrated circuits	17,461	18,151	19,851	9.4
7102.39	Diamonds, nonindustrial, worked, including polished or drilled	20,929	18,323	18,846	2.9
8517.62	Machines for the reception, conversion and transmission or regeneration of voice, images or other data, including switching and routing apparatus	17,232	18,504	18,844	1.8
3004.90	Medicaments, in measured doses, etc. (excluding vaccines, etc., coated bandages etc., and pharmaceutical goods), n.e.s.o.i.	20,824	20,870	18,816	-9.8
8703.24	Passenger motor vehicles with spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine, cylinder capacity over 3,000 cc	22,418	20,674	18,546	-10.3
7108.12	Gold, nonmonetary, unwrought n.e.s.o.i. (other than powder)	20,779	19,077	17,522	-8.2
3002.10	Antisera, other blood fractions and immunological products	11,080	13,241	16,060	21.3
8473.30	Parts and accessories for automatic data processing machines and units thereof, magnetic or optical readers, transcribing machines, etc., n.e.s.o.i.	15,856	15,699	15,510	-1.2
9018.90	Instruments and appliances for medical, surgical or veterinary sciences, n.e.s.o.i., and parts and accessories thereof	11,685	11,863	12,313	3.8
8708.99	Parts and accessories for motor vehicles, n.e.s.o.i.	10,630	11,770	10,462	-11.1
1005.90	Corn (maize), other than seed corn	10,704	8,380	10,049	19.9
8517.12	Telephones for cellular networks or for other wireless networks	11,208	10,494	9,917	-5.5
8708.29	Parts and accessories of bodies (including cabs) for motor vehicles, n.e.s.o.i.	9,432	9,091	9,350	2.9
8542.39	Electronic integrated circuits, n.e.s.o.i.	9,135	8,771	9,289	5.9
7113.19	Jewelry and parts thereof, of precious metal other than silver	9,742	9,110	9,005	-1.1
8486.20	Machines and apparatus for the manufacture of semiconductor devices or of electronic integrates circuits	7,468	8,237	8,841	7.3
8704.31	Motor vehicles for goods transport n.e.s.o.i., with spark-ignition internal combustion piston engine, gvw not over 5 metric tons	8,215	7,641	8,679	13.6
2709.00	Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude	12,184	8,769	8,251	-5.9
9701.10	Paintings, drawings and pastels, hand-executed works of art, framed or not framed	7,374	7,866	8,114	3.2
2711.12	Propane, liquefied	7,716	5,553	7,472	34.5
	Total of items shown	534,897	484,816	485,344	0.1
	All other products	1,086,274	1,017,757	968,377	-4.9
	Total of all commodities	1,621,172	1,502,572	1,453,721	-3.3

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Excludes HTS chapters 98 and 99. Because of rounding, figures may not add up to totals shown. N.e.s.o.i. = not elsewhere specified or included; gvw = gross vehicle weight.

Table A.4 Leading U.S. general imports from the world, by HTS 6-digit subheading, 2014–16

HTS 6	Description	2014	2015	2016	% change 2015–16
		Million $
8703.23	Passenger motor vehicles with spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine, cylinder capacity over 1,500 cc but not over 3,000 cc	83,891	97,426	106,378	9.2
2709.00	Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude	246,969	126,064	101,848	-19.2
3004.90	Medicaments, in measured doses, etc. (excluding vaccines, etc., coated bandages etc., and pharmaceutical goods), n.e.s.o.i.	39,526	47,882	51,063	6.6
8703.24	Passenger motor vehicles with spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine, cylinder capacity over 3,000 cc	60,202	57,659	50,111	-13.1
8517.12	Telephones for cellular networks or for other wireless networks	53,026	52,706	49,797	-5.5
8517.62	Machines for the reception, conversion and transmission or regeneration of voice, images or other data, including switching and routing apparatus	33,532	40,067	45,289	13.0
8471.30	Portable automatic data processing machines, weight not more than 10 kg, consisting of at least a central processing unit, keyboard and a display	42,111	39,243	35,858	-8.6
7102.39	Diamonds, nonindustrial, worked, including polished or drilled	24,054	23,086	23,025	-0.3
2710.19	Petroleum oils, oils from bituminous minerals (other than crude) and products containing by weight 70 percent or more of these oils, not biodiesel or waste	48,793	29,320	21,785	-25.7
8542.31	Processors and controllers, electronic integrated circuits	17,762	18,171	20,887	14.9
8471.50	Digital processing units other than those of 8471.41 and 8471.49, n.e.s.o.i.	14,749	17,838	19,633	10.1
2710.12	Light oils and preparations containing by weight 70 percent or more of petroleum oils or oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not waste oils	27,631	19,685	17,271	-12.3
8704.31	Motor vehicles for goods transport n.e.s.o.i., with spark-ignition internal combustion piston engine, gvw not over 5 metric tons	12,685	13,516	15,889	17.6
8473.30	Parts and accessories for automatic data processing machines and units thereof, magnetic or optical readers, transcribing machines, etc., n.e.s.o.i.	17,188	16,617	15,203	-8.5
7108.12	Gold, nonmonetary, unwrought n.e.s.o.i. (other than powder)	12,819	10,131	15,193	50.0
8803.30	Parts of airplanes or helicopters, n.e.s.o.i.	15,185	14,467	14,406	-0.4
9503.00	Tricycles, scooters, pedal cars and similar wheeled toys; dolls’ carriages; dolls; other toys; etc.	12,157	13,519	13,914	2.9
8708.29	Parts and accessories of bodies (including cabs) for motor vehicles, n.e.s.o.i.	12,617	13,662	13,846	1.3
3002.10	Antisera, other blood fractions and immunological products	7,096	9,027	13,493	49.5
8708.99	Parts and accessories for motor vehicles, n.e.s.o.i.	13,567	13,611	13,356	-1.9
8528.72	Reception apparatus for television, color, n.e.s.o.i.	15,508	15,877	12,600	-20.6
8411.91	Parts of turbojets or turbopropellers	12,069	12,303	11,829	-3.9
8703.22	Passenger motor vehicles with spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine, cylinder capacity over 1,000 cc but not over 1,500 cc	5,592	7,016	10,962	56.2
8541.40	Photosensitive semiconductor devices, including photovoltaic cells; light-emitting diodes	6,381	8,424	10,737	27.5
8544.30	Insulated ignition wiring sets and other wiring sets for vehicles, aircraft and ships	10,103	10,741	10,475	-2.5
	Total of items shown	845,212	728,059	714,847	-1.8
	All other products	1,511,153	1,520,174	1,474,336	-3.0
	Total of all commodities	2,356,366	2,248,232	2,189,183	-2.6

Source: Official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, accessible via the USITC DataWeb (accessed February 23, 2017).

Note: Excludes HTS chapters 98 and 99. Because of rounding, figures may not add up to totals shown. N.e.s.o.i. = not elsewhere specified or included; gvw = gross vehicle weight.