In the Matter of:                         

ACADEMIC SYMPOSIUM:                    
THE IMPACT OF TRADE ON U.S. WORKERS: DISTRIBUTIONAL AND OTHER EFFECTS

REVISED AND CORRECTED TRANSCRIPT
DAY 2

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Wednesday, April 6, 2022
Remote Meeting
U.S. International Trade Commission
500 E Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C.

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Day of the symposium commenced, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., before the Commissioners of the United States International Trade Commission, the Honorable JASON E. KEARNS, Chairman, presiding.

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On behalf of the International Trade Commission:

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Session E: Research Value added of Access to Restricted-use Data for Distributional Effects Analysis

Moderator: Jennifer Poole, American University

Jennifer Poole, American University, “Foreign Influence: The International Transmission of Gender Equality” (2021)

Wolfgang Keller, University of Colorado, “Globalization, Gender, and the Family” (2018)


Session F: Government Datasets for Analyzing Distributional Effects of Trade among Different Subgroups

Moderator: Stephanie Fortune-Taylor, USITC

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Group 2: Individual and Household Microdata

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MR. SECRETARY: We'll turn it over to our first moderator, who is Dr. Jennifer Poole. Her panel concerns research value added of access to restricted use data for distributional effects analysis.

Welcome, Dr. Poole. We appreciate you joining us today. I turn the floor over to you.

DR. POOLE: Thank you very much. Just to let you know, I don't know if I'm the only one, but I did not have the lock participant in this position when I hovered over the clock. Also, you are still currently sharing your screen, so if you wouldn't mind. Thank you. Wonderful.

Nevertheless, let me take this opening to thank everyone for being here, welcome everyone for being here, and particularly to give a congratulations to the organizers for a nice event.

Let me introduce at the beginning our panel. I am Professor Jennifer Poole from American University. We also have Professor Wolfgang Keller from the University of Colorado at Boulder, Professor Dave Donaldson from MIT, Professor Teresa Fort from Dartmouth, and Dr. Cristina Tello Trillo from the U.S. Census Bureau presenting today on our work using restricted use data for studying the distributional effects of international trade.
I am the first presenter, so I will share my screen now to kick us off. This is joint work with my colleague, Austin Davis, I'm getting my Austins at the university mixed up, on the influence, the implications of multinationals on possibly transmitting gender equality around the world.

So I don't have to say much to, I think, many in this room and in the audience and on the panels about the research investigating the benefits of potentially a foreign direct investment to local host economies, importantly among them that there are transfers of technology, productivity, higher wages, new export markets, interesting avenues for labor training and employment opportunities.

Beyond that, anecdotally, we actually hear quite a bit about other transfers, not purely economic transfers. For example, at restaurants, washing your hands, a simple smile to greet your customers when they come to the counter, or, of course, business attire. These what you might call cultural norms have also anecdotally been suggested to be strongly transmitted through foreign direct investment.

And so, in this paper, we think as another form of culture potentially to be transferred, can multinationals, through their foreign investment abroad, also potentially transfer practice and policy toward women in the workplace and then, by extension, enhancing female empowerment, reducing poverty where women continue to be the gross portion
of the world's worth.

And so we're thinking about this paper sort of on several different levels, and I think this is one of the very unique aspects of being able to use very detailed administrative data is that we can think about these questions on several dimensions.

We know that multinational firms and domestic firms tend to be different along several dimensions, productivity, size, skills. We also know from previous research that they're different in terms of their female employment composition and gender wage gaps.

And so, the questions then become sort of threefold. First, do multinationals, when they locate in foreign countries and host countries, might they transfer their gender policies, their gender practices, lower or perhaps higher gender earnings gaps to their subsidiaries abroad, that would be the direct effect, and then indirectly, as we know for many papers on productivity or wage effects, might those subsidiary effects then spill over potentially into the domestic economy.

And then the final question that we can ask, I think one of the main benefits of having such highly detailed and disaggregated data is we can begin also thinking about the mechanisms at play, and in this particular case, we're going to think about, well, if there might be spillovers of
gender equality best practices towards women being shared by foreign firms, how does that happen?

There are several different hypotheses and theories about how that might work. We're going to focus on one in particular which is the labor mobility channel, and that is, when workers move from a multinational firm to a domestic firm, do they potentially transfer the knowledge that they gained in that multinational firm on their domestic workplaces.

So we're going to be focusing specifically on Brazilian domestic-owned firms and considering across those firms, only domestic firms, so we're not worried about the typical endogeneity concern of which firms are receiving foreign investment necessarily, for domestically owned firms across different shares of workers with previous experience in a multinational, in their employment history backwards, did they work for a multinational, how does that then impact the earnings gaps in that firm.

We think this is a great; --we make several contributions, in large part because of the data we have access to. Let me touch on that since it's the main part of what we're thinking about here.

We're going to be relying on data from the Ministry of Labor in the Brazilian economy. This data is collected for formal sector workers. This data is collected largely...
for unemployment or Social Security-like reasons, documenting every job that the worker has, even if they have multiple jobs within one year across many different sectors.

The richness of the data, including characteristics of the worker, demographic characteristics, age and education, and the occupation at a fairly disaggregated five-digit level, all of these allow us to understand the worker, and then we also know the firm and establishment in which the worker works, the industry, the location, and all of these characteristics about the firm in terms of its employment composition, for example.

So, the main benefit here is being able to trace these workers over time across different types of firms. We match this worker level administrative data to publicly available, though cumbersome in its own effect, data from the Brazilian Central Bank on firm level foreign investments from abroad. Does the firm receive any foreign investment inflows and from where? One of the main downsides of this data is we don't know the level, the amount, the value of the foreign investment, just yes or no whether you received some.

We're also going to be using some data on the source country from where the FDI comes, the gender equality from publicly available United Nations data, but given the time, let me skip to some of the other sort of key ideas and decisions we have to make.
First of all, what is a multinational enterprise at the firm level? This is data that we get the inflows at a firm by month. We made the decision to think that once you receive some foreign investment, you maintain that relationship for the purposes of policy within the firm. We thought that was the best decision.

Then all workers that ever receive foreign investment, all workers in those firms that ever in the past receive foreign investment are considered to be how many workers, workers who have any experience.

Then, when they leave their jobs and are new employed, rehired by new domestic firms, they're considered to be part of the domestic firm's share of workers with experience at a multinational company.

This gives you a bit of a recap of where Brazilian FDI is coming from and the kinds of countries that are sending FDI in terms of the gender equality in those countries.

I'm going to skip to our main results. In Brazil, gender earnings gaps are still quite large and persistent, though with a small marginal improvement over our time horizon in the mid 2000s. Women still earn roughly 30 percent less than men across all workers in the Brazilian context.

We are able to use our data to really think about
what is a fairly classic wage regression in that we can have worker characteristics and firm characteristics, several fixed effects to control for any other time and variance and some time varying effects. What we're really interested in here is this data too, right, the differential effect more workers from a multinational in your firm on the wage gap for women.

I will skip through all this and give you the main guts of it since we're finally ending in our last minute. It does look like marginally I will be very clear to say that the effect is positive and significant though economically small, right. This is, first of all, few multinational firms in Brazil, few workers then moving on beyond the multinationals, and, frankly, FDI is not out there for the purposes of expanding and enhancing gender equality, yet I think it's nice to know that it is not harming it as well.

I'll end by saying that some of our works suggest that managers, the workers who are in managerial positions in the multinational, those best poised to understand gender practice, are even better at transferring those effects.

We do think, though, that because the effects are so small, policymakers should continue to prioritize domestic policies with respect to enhancing gender equality around the world. Thank you.

I will -- oh, let's see, stop share -- at this
point turn the floor over to my colleague and co-panelist, Professor Wolfgang Keller, who will talk to us about "Globalization, Gender, and the Family."

DR. KELLER: Thanks very much, Jennifer. Can everybody see my slides? Does this work?

MR. SECRETARY: We sure can.

DR. KELLER: Very good. So, hi, everybody, and thanks for coming. I'm going to talk here about joint work with Hâle Utar at Grinnell College.

Now let's start with the child penalty. That's the well-known result that if you compare otherwise similar men and women, childbirth has a more, much more, dramatic consequence on the labor earnings of women.

Here's a graph with data for Denmark, and we see it's at about a 20 percent long run earnings difference. Now there are several explanations for that, and I'm going to pursue in the next couple of slides one of them.

So, in this paper, we will first have a gender neutral shock to labor earnings potential, and we're also going to study Denmark here, Danish data. And then second, there will be a gender adjustment difference. Simply put, men that are experiencing job loss they will tend to retrain and re-employ maybe in a new industry, new occupation; they're going to be back into the labor market.

On the other hand, affected women faced by job loss
they will to some extent shift from the labor market to
household, or the way I call it, family, and that includes
the childbirth, and so they will do several things, parental
leave, childbirth activities, and essentially new babies.

And the reason for that, that's the third point
that I want to make, is to a significant extent a woman's
biological clock.

So, putting this all together, we have a
gender-neutral shock that through this labor market household
margin translates into gender inequality, gender earnings
inequality.

Now where was the shock that we're studying here in
this paper? That was very familiar rising import competition
in Denmark's textile and clothing industry from China, and
this is depicted in this graph here, and in terms of timing,
that rising import competition started to occur in the year
2002 as China entered the WTO, and this is a trade crowd
here. So this has to do with the quasi-experiment we're
exploring as the textile quota removal of the multi-fiber
arrangement.

Now the first thing I want to do is we want to know
whether this shock was indeed gender neutral or whether women
were perhaps hit harder by this labor shock. And the way I
would look at this is to ask whether import competition
affected jobs held by male and female workers that were
present in the year '99, 1999, three years before the shock hit, differently.

Okay. So what we see here in this time event type of graph is that indeed import competition lowered employment of these exposed workers in terms of their employment at the 1999 firm, and so that's natural because, to some extent, this import competition destroyed the jobs. That's the lowest series here with the full circles, so there is in employment a negative employment effect due to rising import competition.

But what the upper series here with the hollow circles shows is that this was not differentially the case for men or women. Okay. So all of these here are statistically pretty close to zero and also quantitatively close to zero.

So, to summarize, the shock that was experienced by these female and male workers through rising import competition in the Danish textile and clothing sector was the same. The difference, if anything, is in the gender adjustment, the labor adjustment to the shock.

Okay. So what kind of adjustment did they take? Well, that's shown in this graph here. Some exposed women decided to drop out of the labor market and had babies. So what's shown here is the childbirth response. The upper series with the hollow circle is the differential effect for
women, and that tends to be positive, whereas men, affected
men, had, if anything, fewer, you know, children.

And this kind of response that we see in this graph
is confirmed if we look at, for instance, the parental leave
response. Again, the upper series here is the effect on
women, and that's positive, as was, you know, the childbirth
picture.

Now, so why do we see this response? It has to do,
we argue in the paper and we show in the paper, with the end
of a woman's fertile period or her biological clock.

Now, generally, a woman can have babies until her
low 40s, and so the way we're looking at this biological
clock explanation is we're looking at the response of women
to this labor shock by age.

And so this is shown in this picture here. Here,
we have women's childbirth responses to import competition by
age, and as we see, this is an inverted U-shape picture. So
the inverted U -- so the highest points -- the response is
highest for women that are around 39 years old when the shock
hits.

Okay. So these type of -- these women at that age
of 39, they have about two or three years remaining on their
biological clock, and after job loss they can either retrain,
reinvest to go back into the labor market, or they can have a
baby, which is female-labor-intensive childbearing, child
rearing, but they cannot do both, and so that is the dilemma that we're seeing here.

And so the inversed U comes because, if you go to the left to the ages in the earlier 30s, now these women in their lower 30s, they feel less pressure on their biological clock, and, therefore, there's a lower response, a lower differential response. And if you go to the right to the ages in the 40s, now these women have a lower response because typically they cannot have babies anymore.

Okay. So the bottom line is the argument that we're making here is that biological clock effect is strongest for women, and that's what's shown in the paper a little bit more, for two types of -- in particular, two types of women.

First of all, those that aim to switch to the most demanding jobs because these jobs -- you know, and that's typically highly educated women, high earnings women. They would require the highest commitment and the highest levels of investments. And so, for those types, the dilemma is sort of essentially strongest.

But there's a second set of women for which this type of biological clock response is really, really not as binding, the constraint is binding. Those are women that require the most retraining because of loss of industry occupation-specific human capital.
So it's not just highly educated but also machine operators or something that are switching from manufacturing to totally different industries. And as a result then, as a result of this shift from labor market to family, we have earnings gender inequality emerging as a result.

So this is the picture here, the lower series is the differential effect on women, and as we see, this is substantially below the series that applies to men.

So I think I'm almost out of time here in terms of what I can do in a relatively short presentation, so let me conclude with a couple of discussion points that are, you know, food for thought type of things.

The first is that to the extent that this biological clock explanation that we're proposing here really matters, it's going to be the case that having family-friendly workplaces is not enough for eradicating gender inequality.

So, even if we have very -- so we're thinking about that biological clock as a little bit of a technology type of explanation. And so, while childcare and family-friendly -- and, you know, every job is sort of a pharmacy-type job, that certainly helps, but it's not going to fully work.

The second point I would like to raise is that knowing about that family market margin that I've been mentioning here requires having data on non-market
activities. And, in particular, that would be in this particular case data on women, and the best that we currently have in the U.S. and in many other countries is time use type of data, but, you know, that's the kind of data that we probably need more for.

The third point is that any welfare analysis would require valuation of these non-market activities both private, as well as social costs and benefits, and in international trade, we maybe can learn something here in a way from development economics because the share of non-market activities in developing countries tends to be relatively high, and there's methods and approaches that we can perhaps take.

And last, not least, policy choices, it's also interesting to ask whether every country in the world should have Denmark's social safety net. If you compare this, for example, with the United States, then in the United States, women with job loss can afford childbirth much less than in Denmark because there's a lot of income -- essentially income replacement.

We actually show in the paper that there's no personal income loss for women or men for that matter in Denmark that are negatively impacted by rising import competition. But it might have unexpected consequences to have these type of social safety nets, as we show in the
So this is pretty much all I wanted to raise here and I think all we more or less have time for. Thanks very much. So let me stop sharing.

DR. POOLE: Thank you. Thank you, Wolfgang. We'll now turn the floor over to our next presenter, Dave Donaldson, who will be speaking on international trade and earnings inequality, or maybe something different.

DR. DONALDSON: Do you see that?

MR. SECRETARY: We sure do.

DR. DONALDSON: Thanks a lot. So, right, I'll be talking about a recent paper I've been working on with Rodrigo Adão, Paul Carrillo, Arnaud Costinot, and Dina Pomeranz. This paper, you know, starts by, you know, placing emphasis, like the other papers in this session, on, you know, unique administrative data sources from countries around the world.

I'm going to be focusing on Ecuador over this time period, and what we're going to kind of see about Ecuador's economy from their administrative data is quite amazing, I think. So this is a picture of the data if you like.

So letting L index kind of different people, you know, humans, and as employees in the economy, we have a fairly standard Social Security data set that links different types of people to the firms where they work. Not even text
people, different people, to the firms where they work.

A second thing that's quite unique to Ecuador, however, is this thing we call an ownership registry, which lets you link individuals, capitalists, people who own firms or shares of firms, to the firms that they, you know, own and that they're implicitly supplying their capital to as an input.

Third, more standard, is, you know, kind of we can link imports. I'll index that by sort of P star, imagine arbitrary different types of goods and from countries in which this country imports. Those go into the firms as well as inputs. And then, of course, the firms sell to each other as inputs. This is value-added tax administrative data that allows us to see every time a firm sells something to another firm, we see those trades as well.

Finally, then these firms in Ecuador will export to the wider world, that's standard customs data, and they'll also sell to the final Ecuadorian consumer; that's these arrows here.

So this is, you know, a fairly complete picture of the movement of goods and services among all types of firms and all types of factors and all types of buyers, foreign and domestic, in this slice of the world economy centered around Ecuador.

You know, I stress the obvious point that this is
going to be excellent coverage of the formal economy but, you know, not have any coverage of the informal economy. The paper discusses some survey data that one can bring in to try to catch that important gap.

Anyway, so, along with that data, we sort of asked ourselves, well, what can we learn from this data about the impact of trade on earnings inequality, and I'll define that as kind of, you know, this relative factor prices, you know, someone's earnings is just there, number of hours worked times their factor price, and this will always be sort of relative to two factors at home, you know, two different people in the home economy, which would be Ecuador.

So, you know, we start with a proposition that we believe is novel that sort of highlights extremely general conditions about technologies, preferences, and market structures under which the following very intuitive thing will hold, which is this sort of, you know, labor market clearing will, of course, say that labor demand on the left here is equal to labor supply, but it's an adjusted labor supply. So let's let L bar be the actual labor supply, take it as exogenous to make things simple here, of factor type F in Ecuador.

And so one needs to adjust that labor supply as in think of like how much labor is being supplied to the domestic economy, and so that, of course, requires that we
subtract off the amount of labor the F factor is supplying to
the foreign economy, which I'll call the factor content of
exports, as Leontief famously did.

So the factor content of exports, you know, it's
very intuitive, it sort of factors both direct exports but
also all of their indirect exports. So we see that, in case
we haven't seen this sort of thing before, you would sort of
multiply a matrix of how factors are actually hired inside
firms in Ecuador. And then, you know, that sets a direct use
of factors. And then we feed that through the Leontief
inverse matrix to sort of get all the indirect demands for
those factors inside the domestic economy. And then,
finally, multiply that by, you know, the extent to which
final firms using those factors directly or indirectly are
then exporting their goods and services, which would be how
these factors implicitly are being exported.

Okay. So that's the right-hand side, is sort of an
adjusted factor supply to the domestic economy. The
left-hand side is very standard. It's just the factor demand
in the domestic economy, which, of course, will be a function
of two things. One is the factor prices in this domestic
economy drawing this WT for at an observed trading
equilibrium, and another thing that will matter for factor
demand, of course, is the price of those imported
intermediate inputs or final goods imports, call that price
vector $P^{\text{star}}$.

Okay. So this is sort of factor demand equals factor supply but with an emphasis on the domestic economy. So another way of writing that is so that the relative domestic demand for any two factors, this would be like factor $F$ relative to some other factor called factor zero or something, has to be equal to the relative exogenous supply of those factors divided by sort of relative export exposure if you like where we define relative export exposure as this sort of transformation of the factor content of exports. So it's basically asking is factor $F$ more relatively exported than factor zero.

So why does that matter? Well, you can sort of picture the impact on trade in this picture thanks to that sort of equation that summarizes things, you know, and hence, summarizes all implications of trade for inequality because those will just put pressure on these factor prices, which are what matter for inequality, as follows.

So, if we had an economy starting out with a trading equilibrium here, remember, the as if supply to the domestic economy is just this line, and the demand in the domestic economy for factors is given by this arbitrary kind of function or curve here at the $P^{\text{star}}$, meaning the price of imported inputs when they're actually coming in under a trading scenario.
So, when you're going to study the effect of trade, like, for example, a move from openness to Autarky in the following kind of four steps, hopefully all very intuitive, you know, the first is very, very simple and very, very easy to measure, as I'll get to in a second, that connects very tightly to new available data sources, which is what we call just sort of an export exposure effect, which is that obviously, when we move to Autarky, that relative export exposure for any two factors has to be one because neither is exporting. So the relative extent to which they're exposed to exporting is just neutral, it's one. So that would sort of shift that as its supply curve from the one that prevails under openness to this one that prevails under closeness under Autarky.

A second step is to ask, well, what's the incidence of that shift in the supply, the as if supply curve. That, of course, requires you just to sort of know what the shape of domestic demand is, and we call that effect this kind of one plus two, a so-called export channel because it's all about exporting.

The other side of trade, of course, is importing, and that can have implications for factor inequality, as you can see in this example. So, in this example, when we take the price of foreign goods to infinity, that acts like a shift in the relative demand curve in the home economy.
This, of course, depends on cross-price elasticities between the price of foreign things and the relative price of two domestic factors, but in this picture, I've drawn it as a shift to the right.

And then, of course, the final question is, well, what's the incidence of that, and that's all about, again, knowing the shape of factor demand. So, in some sense, what the paper does is sort of try to calculate those four ingredients, those four steps. I obviously don't have time to talk about all of our conclusions about those four steps, each of those four steps, but I can show you a few pictures to give you a sense of things.

So this is what that first step, the export exposure effect, looks like when you sort of project it across the income distribution. So the blue line here is that export exposure for a factor's entire income, both labor income and capital owner's income. And, you know, what surprised us most about this is that it's very pro middle class, you know, sort of peaks here at the middle of the income distribution and bottoms out at the top of the income distribution, which, to be honest, I was really surprised.

I imagined that in Ecuador, and like in many countries, it would be the case that sort of rich people, high-skilled people, you know, and owners of the biggest firms in the economy will be the ones most involved in
exporting either directly or indirectly, but that just isn't the case. You know, it's the middle class that are most involved in exporting, that are most export-exposed in the raw data.

The second thing that I can share with you very quickly is sort of a notion of import exposure. This is a little bit, you know, this full caveat, this is more complicated, and this one is model-dependent. And the nice thing about export exposure is all you have to do is turn off this relative extent to which factors are exporting, the factor content of exports. It's kind of raw, raw, raw data if you can measure it, you know, which thanks to these kind of administrative data sets one can start to do.

Import exposure, however, is more complicated. It just depends on this cross-price elasticity effect, which, of course, depends on everything in the economy, but, you know, you'll sort of have to trust me on some of the details there. We calculate this, and we find that import exposure is very pro poor, highest for the poorest, and that import exposure is a bad thing in this context. It means you're competing with imports. And so, in some sense, the effect of this is relatively good for the rich.

So, if one were to put all those things together, one can sort of add the export channel, which depends on export exposure, plus the import channel, which depends on
the import exposure I showed you, feed those through incidents, which depends on the shape of the demand that I didn't have time to talk about, but, you know, it's fairly standard, and one can arrive at this kind of estimate of the total impact of trade.

And what we are finding is that it's relatively pro rich, you know, that import channel effect dominates. So, even though the rich aren't relatively involved in exporting, they're relatively sort of helped in a relative sense by the importing, and the gains from trade, in other words, in Ecuador are largely accruing to the top.

And as you can see, the difference between blue and red here implies that those gains for the top are -- you know, the difference at the very top is largely accrued to capitalists, you know, their return on capital income, because the red is sort of showing for everybody's labor income only, and blue is showing their total income, i.e., their capital income as well.

And the last thing I'd just mention is that, you know, this does really matter in the following sense that if we were to sort of completely replicate everything in the paper via the famous Deardorff & Staiger approach to these questions, very intuitively connected, but lots of stronger assumptions being made about the structure of the economy. One would arrive at something, you know, quite completely
different. You know, the shape would be different, it would be pro middle class instead of pro poor, and the magnitudes would be completely different.

So we've learned from this that, you know, the detailed structure of the data, the detailed structure of how we model the economy does really matter at least relative to this benchmark. Thank you. I'll stop there.

DR. DONALDSON: Appreciate that. Everyone's attention here.

DR. POOLE: Thank you, Dave.

We'll turn the floor over now to Teresa Fort who's going to tell us some new perspectives on the decline in US manufacturing employment.

DR. FORT: Thank you so much. I'm going to say that I'm not going to actually present one specific paper because I was going to talk about data sources from the US Census Bureau, so that's what I'm going to do. I'm going to motivate it with some work that I've done with a number of co-authors -- Xiang Ding, Justin Pierce, Steve Redding and Peter Schott.

Okay. I'm going to post these slides, I've got links in these slides for people who might be interested in the data and how to access them, and these are posted on my web site. I'll have to go quickly, but those are there as a resource for people.
All right. I want to start with this symposium motivates us with something that we did in the JEP with Pete and Justin. Trade and technology and are intricately linked. I think this symposium is very focused on trade and it's really important to keep in mind that trade and technology are not necessarily separable. So here's this kind of cool article that we found for the JEP. Drew Greenblatt bought a small Baltimore maker of wire baskets. He knew nothing about robotics, 1998. They're using 1950's equipment. They get really pushed to the edge of bankruptcy by Chinese import competition. They upgrade their technology to probably much less labor intensive technology, and then now all of a sudden they're booming and exporting.

So is that trade or technology that's the cause? What about changes in their competitors that are now competing with this higher skill equipment? And what if they had been importing these robots, right?

These are kind of questions that I think is important to bear in mind and I'm going to tell you a little bit about the data and how we think about using that.

I just want to emphasize one other key point that I think this symposium needs to think about, which is if we notice there's loss aversion and how we evaluate or how we feel about things in human behavior. I would say there's almost loss aversion built into our methods for identifying
the impasse. It's very easy to see that we lost certain
manufacturing jobs in which Chinese imports surged. It's a
lot harder to see where we may have had potential gains. And
I'm going to argue that I think there's a big strong role for
trade and technology to have facilitated increased U.S.
specialization and non-comparative advantage activities. And
I'm going to show you how I think the microdata are a step
towards getting at some of those things that are less
obviously easy to identify.

All right. Here is a giant page on all the firm
level data or a lot of the firm level data at the Census
Bureau that I think is relevant and I know Cristina's going
to talk about the linked employee/employer data so I've left
that off.

The Census has this giant business register. It's
all private non-farm employer establishments are in there.
That's the Business Register. The Business Register is used
to produce a whole bunch of different data sources including
some public ones I'll tell you about at the end. At the
Longitudinal Business Database is kind of a key micro dataset
where we track establishments really well over time and firms
very well as a cross-section. And longitudinal citations if
you want to go see. We actually just data infrastructure
project.

We also have the Economic Censuses that provide a
ton of information every five years that are specific to the particular sectors in which plans operate. So I'm going to show you some stuff on technology adoption that I pulled out of the economic censuses. There's sales, there's material purchases, lots of different rich data from those surveys.

Then there's a Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transactions Database which is Customs data starting in '92, so you can see what firms are actually importing, what they're exporting, the countries and products. And there's a new reference by Fariha Kamal and a co-author on those data.

Finally, very exciting, we have a recently linked in an internal project the BEA multinational data to the Census data. So now we can also start to see how the US activities of firms relate to their foreign activity. Also a cite there by Fariha and co-authors on those data.

Why are these data important? First, I'm just going to show you concurrent increases in importing and use of technology. So first I'm showing you a share of firms that are launching new import penetration for firms, and then I'm showing you Chinese import penetration by firms, and you can see that kind of growing. You can see number of importers going up a ton, especially you see that big kick-up from China right around when China joins the WTO. But you'll see that - look at use in computers -- establishments and purchasing of computers, that is rising dramatically around
that same time period, right? That's when the internet explodes. And you'll see electronic networks to control or coordinate shipments also going up.

This is just to show these things are going on at the same time and we have ways to measure them in the data.

All right. Something else we did, and this is something we did in the JEP, is to get a sense of what is going on, what are driving the employment losses? Is it trader technology? You can decompose margins of adjustment. So let me just go to the figures.

This is a well-known figure, the decline in US manufacturing employment. And we can take this and we can break it apart by margin. So what do I mean by margin? Well, this black line shows you total losses over the period at continuing firms, continuing plants. These are pretty stable. There is not a lot of employment decline here.

Okay?

Then we can say what about firm burnout? Well, that actually rises during the '90s until the 2000's that you get some employment loss in the aggregate from net death of firms. Right? And the majority, some 63 percent of the decline over this period from '77 to 2012 is accounted for by death of plants within firms. So this is kind of a different story from all the firms just disappearing. Instead it's that they're shutting down, big guys are shutting down their
manufacturing plants.

Why would that matter? Well, because it actually turns out that we saw this in the JEP and now Xiang Ding and Steve Redding and Pete and I have followed up with those co-authors showing that manufacturing firms are actually opening a lot of non-manufacturing establishments. In fact in aggregate they account for 16 percent -- this is now from '77 to 2019, of the growth in non-manufacturing employment in the United States, and here you can see I'm showing you an employment in payroll terms. They're growing a ton in wholesale/retail, but really payroll terms is business services. Again, these are mostly going to be like innovative activities, pre-production designed phase of manufacturing as they're growing in. So we think that's pretty interesting and potentially getting lost. And here that microdata gives you a new angle to see how some of the declines in manufacturing employment might be related to our concurrent rise in non-manufacturing.

Then in the JEP we also broke this stuff down by margins. So you know, David Autor and co-authors have shown a lot about how declines have been spatially concentrated. And so we did that, and we're going to find this area here really had big declines, not just in the continuing firm plant margins, but also the firm margins.

So here is the manufacturing employment margins and
how they differ across regions. So you can see, look in the
mid-Atlantic, this red now, this area here, that's net firm
births. So this is, here it's all negative. So it's firm
deaths. There was a lot of firm exit over the entire period
in this region.

This region did not actually have nearly as much
firm death until the very end, the east north central.

Then here you see some regions are actually growing
their manufacturing employment throughout much of the period.

So the Census data allows us to tease that out.

Non-manufacturing employment margins also, you can
see that differed of course there's not much adding in those
regions where the firms were dying. You don't get a lot of
non-manufacturing employment growth, but you do in those
regions where a firm may be contracting.

This is just some examples. Details on the data,
examples of how they can be used.

Now I'm going to conclude. How can people access
the data? I'm going to, my next slide has multiple links.
I'm going to say they're very helpful. You can go and find
from the Census web site the surveys and the questions that
are put there. I'll give you the link too, for how to submit
a budget proposal. Any nationality can apply to use the
Census data, just the BEA data you need to be a U.S. citizen
for. And there's actually also quite a lot I think of
underused publicly available versions of these datasets on the U.S. Census web site. There's the Business Dynamics Statistics, the BDS. This can be by firm size and age. There's Statistics of U.S. Businesses. The County Business Pattern data. All of these all come from the Business Register which is the same underlying data source that's used for the LBD.

Then I'll give you joint work I have with Pete and other co-authors where we have imputed values in the non-way not to hurt disclosure at all, from the posted County Business Pattern data, making it easy for folks to use.

Then there's also public versions of the Economic Census data available that gets really under-used because people just don't necessarily know it exists. So those are all here. This is posted and I'm happy to answer more questions about the processes of getting access to these data.

I will stop there. Thank you so much. Now I have to just figure out how to unshare again.

DR. POOLE: Thank you, Teresa.

Continuing our discussion in shift towards U.S. data, Cristina Tello-Trillo telling us about trade liberalization and labor market outcomes in the U.S.

DR. TELLO-TRILLO: Thank you. Thank you so much for the invitation. This is a great symposium, so I'm going
to present my joint work with Justin Pierce and Peter Schott about trade liberalization and labor market outcomes.

Why are we doing this paper? We're going to use a plausibly exogenous trade shock, which is a U.S. extension to PNTR to China. And we examine the fact of these permanent normal trade relationships on areas unemployment trajectory for U.S. workers between, a long period of time from '93 to 2014. So 22 years of data.

The cool thing about this data, we'll see that on a slide in a minute, is that we can track workers over time. Workers who have in 2000, we can see the workers' outcome up to 2004 and even nowadays more years.

We're going to investigate the direct effect. We have the industry of the worker employment, workers in manufacturing that will be directly affected. Non-manufacturing workers will be indirectly affected. And we will also going to investigate the indirect county affect via the location of the worker.

So like a horse race between the understood industry effect and county effect, and see which effect dominates for each type of work.

Later we're going to explore the role of firm and worker characteristics in analyzing this trade liberalization with China.

So I'm going to talk a little bit about the data.
So the PNTR shock I'm sure you're all familiar with so I'm going to talk about this really quickly. This is from Pierce and Schott, 2016. The idea was that in October 2000 the US extended the permanent normal trade relations to China. This essentially locked in this low WTO-member tariff rate from China. Before 2000 China has already this low tariff rate starting in 1980s. But this low tariff rate requires annual presentation of Congressional approval. After PNTR happened, this rate was locked in, so basically was a reduction in uncertainty from goods coming from China.

So this reduction in uncertainty of course increased Chinese trade exposure, increased U.S. firm incentives to source from China, and Chinese firms expanding to the US market.

So we measure this exposure as the difference between the non-NTR rate. This is the high tariff rate say for the (technical interference), will be the high tariff rate for the car industry versus the low MFN tariff rate that was locked in by PNTR. So the higher this gap between these two rates, the higher decreasing uncertainty which means more trade exposure for that particular industry.

Then we're going to compute the county NTR gap which is just the weighted average of the industry gap weighted by the employment in that county in that particular industry in the year 1990.
So the main dataset that we're going to use is the
LEHD database. This LEHD database is based on unemployment
insurance records. It covers around 96 percent of all
private sector employees. It's a worker establishment,
worker level database. This time starting in '93. So we can
track workers over time by each establishment, therefore by
each firm too, for each quarter.

So for each quarter for the workers we have
earnings which for most states includes salary, bonuses and
tips. And we also have employment which basically means that
if earnings are positive, the workers employed in that period
of time, that quarter. If earnings are zero, the worker's
not employed.

We match this data to some worker demographics
data. So for the Individual Characteristics file from the
Census Bureau, and therefore we can obtain worker's gender,
worker's age, race, ethnicity and also worker's education.
Also education is imputed for a lot of the observations.

We also match this data to what Teresa already
talked about which is the LBD database, like establishment
and the firm level database. And the LFTTD database which is
trade level database and data we use to obtain the trade
pattern of the firm.

We have two samples of workers. One is the high
attachment sample of workers. These are workers that work in
the same firm in the pre-period; and then a low attachment
sample of workers is workers that have positive earnings in
the pre-period but they could be switching firms suspected if
they're in the same firm or not.

So what we do in the regression, we do a simple
panel, difference-in-difference specification where we are
going to control for the NTR at the industry level. This is
the direct exposure via the industry of employment where you
have the indirect exposure be the county of employment, and
then we'll have some worker attributes here from attributes.
Then we're going to control for these counter-manufacturing
here in '99 to solve the critique by Borusyak and Jaravel,
that they have that shift-share might not be capturing the
whole picture here. So we control for them in the
manufacturing share.

And then we have worker year effects.

On the left hand side is going to be earnings. We
also do employment in the labor force if not but for this
presentation I'm just going to focus on earnings.

Okay. So what do we find here?

If we put, I'm just going to show this two
quotations of industry and county gap. I'm going to delete
the others because it's too many.

The first thing that we find here, that when put a
horse race, we put both of them together. So these are
workers that are initially in manufacturing, pre-shock. What happened?

So it turns out that the county gap seems to be much more significant than the industry gaps. So this means that the location of the workers, how the location was affected is more even important than the direct industry effect for these workers.

The magnitude is quite high. So interquartile shifts in the county exposure implies an earnings reduction of around eight percent of each hour's earnings for these workers.

So these are just for manufacturing workers. And we do the same for non-manufacturing workers, just like this. The non-manufacturing workers, they don't have industry gap because they're non-manufacturing pre-shock. They only are affected through the county of employment. These are, think about restaurant workers in Detroit. That is like more car manufacturing. Was really affected. So it will be indirectly affected because the county as a whole is doing worse. The county where he works is doing worse.

And the magnitude is also quite high, it's about the same, like similar to before around county gap affects around 8 percent decline in earnings for these non-manufacturing workers.

If you want to take a look at a year by year

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effect, we see that the effects not only in the short period. This will be 2000 where the shock begins. This is the first year after the shock, the great financial crisis. So we see shock magnified by the great financial crisis. And then we see the workers that are affected starting to come back in 2004.

But this is saying that even after four years after the shock, workers that were affected by the county gap still are worse off than the workers who were not affected via their location.

And then we go to some demographic and firm characteristics. What we do here is to do a triple interaction of the post shock period, the industry gap and some worker-level-firm characteristics to see if for example a female is more affected than a male in manufacturing or non-manufacturing, into the industry gap or due to the county gap. Okay?

So here I'm just going to show in this presentation all the county gap coefficients because the industry gaps are insignificant.

Okay. So this is a triple interaction with our county gap and female. It turns out that for manufacturing we see, do not find any statistical significance, different effects for being a female in manufacturing relative to being a male that is affected by this county gap.
Whereas for non-manufacturing we do find a positive and significant effect of being a female. This means that any decrease associated with these trade shocks were less severe for female workers than for male workers in non-manufacturing.

This is because, if you think about it, the non-manufacturing, health, and educational sector was rising post 2001. And females are more inclined to go to those sectors which are high paid jobs in non-manufacturing. So we tried to study if that's what happened with labor reallocation matrix.

The income distribution, the shock effect. People at the bottom, people at the top, for here, we see that the shock, this is by income quartile, we see that the top income quartile, so people at the top of the distribution are actually worse off than the people at the bottom of distribution for manufacturing workers.

This might be the case because the high attachment sample, the sample that is there for all the (technical interference), we mention that this might be the case because manufacturing workers may have some firm or manufacturing sector specific human capital. Those are the top, that is difficult to transfer to other sectors.

I'm going to stop there.

We do the same for importing only. Importing firms
do better off. Workers for import firms are better off than workers in non-traders.

I'll stop there.

MR. SECRETARY: Thank you so much to this panel.

Dr. Poole, I just wanted to note to you that we'll go ahead and have a 20 minute question session with your panel and we would invite those from our audience, if you do have a question or comment, please send it to DE@USITC.gov and we'll try to get to all of them.

I'll go ahead and put that in the chat.

Dr. Poole, please.

DR. POOLE: Thank you, thank you, great.

We can continue to have our 20 minute conversation.

Let me direct the first question to Dave Donaldson. The title of our session is value-added of restricted use data, to study the distributional implications of international trade. I think I'll couple this question with another one which is about what other data might you have wanted to use? Because you highlighted the differences, particularly when we're studying lower income countries or developing economies like Ecuador, of an informal economy and the extent to which that also is distributed across income groups.

So would you like to take that question first?

DR. DONALDSON: Sure.
On the value-added part, I mean for me I think just focusing on the simplest point with reiterating something I said. We want to measure who is exporting. Which people are having their sector services being exported. Conventional datasets don't measure that. In Ecuador, big firms, big oil firms export. Big oil firms make parts that get involved in exporting. But big law firms sell their law services to those oil firms. So the big law firms are also exporting big time too.

So obviously the standard datasets wouldn't see that. I guess we can try to fix that with big aggregate and input-output tables that tell us that oil firms use lawyers, but those big IO tables tell us that all firms use lawyers, so they don't tell us like the extent to which exporting firms are using lawyers, and maybe they use the richest, fanciest, highest paid lawyers too.

So I think it's quite important that we find ways to find new and interesting data sources that let us link, kind of multiple linkages I guess is the way I would say it. So not just sort of people to firms or firms to exporting, but people to firms to firms to firms to exporting.

I think that was something one can start to do, and I think there's value in countries where that's possible around the world.

The same comment would apply to importing. It's
just more of a highlighted, the effects of that are more subtle, but that doesn't mean they're any less important. It's just that the exporting one is very clean to see. Ideally with the data we would just measure it right off the data.

As to your second point, I think the three things that I think are missing are, that I would love to have on my wish list, would be actually studying the implications for the consumption side. You know, consumers that are differentially exposed to these firms, and they all have different preferences. That is a major part of inequality that earnings in equality didn't study.

The informality point that you raised, I kind of have nothing to add other than I think it's good that we can study well half the economy. It would be better if we could study well the entire economy. But caveats obviously need to apply.

And then third would be, just echoing your talk, multinationals. So major ways in which firms engage with the global economy and hence there are factors. Again, exported and in some sense and connected to the global economy is through multinational activities, and that was missing from everything I presented.

DR. POOLE: Excellent.

Do you have any different experiences using U.S.
data Cristina, on the value-added?

DR. TELLO-TRILLO: Yes. Sure. I want to point out, I attended the symposium yesterday and one of the things that Ann Harrison and John McLaren point out about the main drawbacks of the quarantine (phonetic) trade literature is lack of access to high quality worker level data that, where we can follow a worker over time and see that worker move from Establishment A to Establishment B, like Teresa was pointing out. Maybe it's not establishments that are closing that are driving this decreasing employment.

So all these things can be done with the LEHD database, right? Access, it holds true, but talking about this database, not only we can track workers, but also we can attach characteristics of the workers. So we can study the distribution aspect of trade on gender, on race, on ethnicity, and also attach all the firm characteristics.

So a lot to explore and I encourage all researchers here to ask for this data, and I know it takes time. Ask for the data and explore more the LEHD database. Yes.

DR. POOLE: Excellent.

Teresa, I was wondering if you could offer any follow-up questions, given your access to the data that you and your colleagues are hoping to answer, particularly referencing under-served communities and the distributional implications of trade.
DR. FORT: Great. Thanks. I think I'm going to follow up with two points here. So, first, I love what Dave said, and I totally -- I want to reiterate that. I think we really do need these data. And then I'm going to give you, Dave, a specific example of what you presented that I was thinking, wow, here's something you might want to look at in the data and just to highlight.

So, you know, you had those very different implications of exporting versus importing, in terms of exporting was kind of benefitting the middle class and importing was hurting the poor folks. You know, something that we have seen in the Census data -- many people, but I've got papers on this too -- is the firms that do a lot of exporting are also importing, right, and then that access to those imported inputs is a crucial part of what makes them competitive. We saw big effects on their ability to export. So I think for Fariha Kamal and co-authors, Kyle Handley and Ryan Monarch have a cool paper showing their Trump effects on that. So I think, by having, you know, the firm-level data, we can get at that and understand those links better.

And then I'm going to say, you know, here's an example of something where, I think, the data's, kind of, missing, but there is some potential with the Census data to get at it. So Andy Bernard and I have some work on factoryless goods producers, Fariha Kamal has some really
cool work on factoryless goods producers. So these are guys that are involved in manufacturing because they control, coordinate the production process, they do the design and invasion, and they're kind of absent from our setting. We're not looking to see how much these guys enter into the economy because now it's so cheap to make goods, you know, in China or other lower-wage countries. And so we're kind of missing the fact that, now, a lot more ideas can be brought to the market in the U.S. It's potentially a way of promoting innovation here.

Of course, Jennifer, to your point, there could be big distributional consequences to this. It may not be the same workers. But I think technology has a very similar redistributional consequences, and nobody's talking about we should ban or stop technology. And so, probably, again, I would just push this symposium to think about the dangers of let's use tariffs or trade policy as a way to stop, right, this movement towards U.S. comparative advantage activities when there's all these potential benefits from trade that we aren't necessarily measuring as well but which these data open the door to be able to see.

DR. POOLE: Wolfgang, for the Denmark context, are there follow-up questions you and your coauthors would like to explore to study women or other under represented communities?
DR. KELLER: Yeah. So thanks very much for bringing this up. I'm following -- you know, following up on what I heard from Teresa and also from Dave. My sense is somehow that, you know, there's a bit of a -- there's a bit of gap between what we have for a country like Denmark already in terms of data and where we're still heading, to some extent, with U.S. data. And so it seems like -- so these ideas that we can follow workers and how they're attached to their firms, they, of course, are existing in a country like Denmark or also in Norway and some other parts.

So then, from that level on, the questions then become how can we push in a way, and that's where I see our paper fitting in. How can we push, sort of, the more traditional economic analysis into -- well, maybe with a lot of carrybecka (phonetic) but into what is generally thought to be less the way homeopathic (phonetic) analysis, such as the household margin; so that the labor, the formal and informal sector.

But as we see from the discussion of your paper, Brazil and also what -- what Dave was mentioning, this informal sector can be probably thought as a little bit like the issues that exist when we talk about household -- intrahousehold allocation of time and family margins. And so in our particular case, the key step was, essentially, to combine these employer-employee data sets with growth.
registers, which basically -- and, you know, marriage -- we also study marriage in this paper to some extent. So it turns out that import competition shocks also lead to changes in marriage behavior, divorce behavior.

And so I kind of think that that's sort of the direction in which the research would be going. And as I mentioned in my talk already, I think it has a lot of overlap, in a way, what people have been trying to do in development economics, trying to, essentially, analyze non-market activity and also value non-market activity. And I think that's an interesting area of where this research could be going.

DR. POOLE: Wonderful. Excellent.

I see we have some questions from the audience. But let me take one minute.

Teresa already did a wonderful job describing a bit about the access to U.S. data. I thought I might share a bit of my experience accessing an international data set, in that much of the process is still the same. You need to write a proposal and submit it through the appropriate channels. I suspect, though, of course, I don't have the experience using the U.S. data, that connections matter a lot and persistence. It required more travel, being local, connecting with individuals, and, ultimately, we also suffered a bit of political turnover in the country to gain access to the data,
though transparency is such an important issue that some of
the data -- for example, the Central Bank data, over time,
has become public -- a bit cumbersome to use because, still,
the requirement to match the data sets that we all face is
imperfect. But once you can figure out the firm identifiers,
then you can match these multiple -- multinational data to
the worker data.

So I suspect the process is quite similar. It
takes time and connections, and persistence matters even more
so, perhaps, in the international context.

So let me pose the first question to Teresa. This
is a very data-oriented question from Laura, the Trade
Partnership Worldwide. She says, for studies using data pre
and post '97-2002, when the U.S. switched the data
classification from SIC to NAICS, how do you account for
these differences?

I'll stop there, and she has some follow up, but I
think that's a great topic that many of us who are actually
handling the data have on our minds.

DR. FORT: I love that question. If you know me,
you know that it took a massive amount of willpower not to
mention that SIC to NAICS transition, in 1997, although it
plays out differently in different data sets, it's actually
-- I usually joke in seminars and say it was like five years
of my life to put the LBD on a NAICS basis consistently
throughout the whole time period, but I realized recently
that's a lie. I think I've been working on that for the last
15 years.

So that is a huge issue. I have a paper with Shawn
Klimek on -- we call it the effect of this transition on U.S.
employment composition because there's a big change and it
affects manufacturing, which has been a big focus. It
actually affects retail, even, and more, in terms of where
employment is classified or how it's classified. And so, you
know, an establishment is -- all the employment within an
establishment is classified under the industry of the
establishment. NAICS is all about what the establishment
does. SIC had a whole bunch of different principles and
then, think about it, SIC was developed in the '40s. Right?
I mean, it did not -- there were no semiconductors. So as
technology evolved, we needed a new system to capture those
changes as well.

So the LBD, I can say we did a -- non-profit -- but
a pretty good job of trying to fix those changes, in terms of
using the longitudinal nature of the data, and I describe
this in great detail in this paper, and it's also in the new
LBD paper. So I encourage folks to go there. If you're
using the LBD, we have now taken what -- well, Shawn and I,
brazenly call these the Fort-Klimek codes, the F.K. NAICS
codes, but the Census Bureau we couldn't keep calling them
that. So they're now called the VC NAICS, vintage-consistent NAICS. That's actually in the LBD directly.

And then I've also got -- on my website, I've got some concordances posted from the publicly available Census data because, in the economic years, in 1997, they actually recorded activities on the SIC basis and on the NAICS basis. So we were able to build some concordances for people to use outside of Census as well.

So that's all there, really important, totally agree, and I know Kyle Handley, yesterday, said we have got to be analyzing stuff now on a NAICS basis. If you're still concording things back to SIC, you are just missing so much of what's going on because technology, you know, evolves and these classification systems change indigenously to capture the new activity.

Anyway, I'll stop there.

DR. POOLE: That's great. Let me just ask you directly: All of these concordances that you've drawn up, the question is, are we worried a little bit about attributing too much credit to China for WTO accession that may, in fact, have to do with the classification changes?

DR. FORT: I mean, look, the hope is that everybody knows you have to concord this stuff before you do an analysis. I do know that Bloom and coauthors have a paper where they replicate ADH internally with the LBD, and they do...
find some differences in what they analyzed when they
switched from SIC to NAICS. I think that's more about the
shock. Yeah, I do think it matters. Of course, if you
blindly did it without concording, you would be in trouble;
but I think most people recognize there's a need to concord.

I will also say we haven't published or posted it
yet, but I've worked with Melissa Chow on these NAICS codes.
It's not random who gets switched out of manufacturing and
into non-manufacturing. They have different pre-period
growth rates and stuff. So, you know, this is an important
issue that we often just kind of ignore because it's
inconvenient or annoying.

DR. POOLE: Thank you. Thank you. Great.

I'll move on now. I received a question from a
colleague, Fariha Kamal, at the U.S. Census. She's saying,
thinking about the small -- economically small effect I
found, you know, maybe some of what we're seeing -- or could
be, in fact, enhanced by, also, the different firms -- or
destinations to which Brazilian farms export. If you're
exporting to a more gender-equal country, perhaps you have to
maintain more gender equitable policies and practices in the
firm as well.

So I entirely agree. Yes, just like the United
States, there's also customs data that we could match at the
firm level, both on the export and the import side. We did
not do that for the purposes of this paper. Something that I couldn't go into detail on is there are many different, I suppose, conceptual, theoretical possibilities for mechanisms by which gender equality could translate into -- through foreign exposure, whether that's exports or multinationals.

In this particular paper, we just focused on the one labor mobility channel, but another channel that I've been speaking with colleagues in South Africa about, where they also have very similar data, matched employer-employee with the exports and imports, firm level co-variates to think about that export market access and the influence that those standard reputational effects might have as well.

Finally, a question for Teresa -- or sorry. Not Teresa. Cristina. Excuse me. I'm looking at Cristina.

The question is how long should a researcher expect to gain access to the U.S. data and might it be easier for a government employee? This is coming from Kim at GAO.

DR. TELLO-TRILLO: This is hard to answer this question because I would say it varies. It varies a lot depending on the data set that you are asking for sometimes. So, in particular, the LEHD data set that I presented today, it's -- it's a little bit harder. The access to all the states that LEHD because a state has to give approval for their data to be accessed about external researchers. And only about a handful of the states have given approval.
I don't know the exact number. I think it's around 15 to 25, but not all the states have the approval.

But I would say, from my calter affect (phonetic) more about that. I would say between six and -- up to six months to up to a year. Yeah.

DR. POOLE: Teresa, did you want to follow up with any of that and whether you are if government researchers might have any differential access?

DR. FORT: I would not care to comment on differential access. I think they're trying to judge these things based on the quality of the proposal and all that and to be fair in how they evaluate things.

I would say, just for more details, there is a process of, first, going through an RDC admin, then the admin submits the project to the Census Bureau, then the Census Bureau submits the project to the IRS for approval. And as Cristina said, there's even more steps involved with LEHD because the states sometimes -- if we -- anyway, I won't go into that.

So what will affect how long it takes is the quality of your proposal, how responsive your RDC admin is, and how quickly you respond with information. So --

DR. POOLE: Well, let me take this opportunity -- I think our time has run out -- to thank all of the audience for their great questions as well as the panelists for their
time and really insightful research, and I'll toss it to the organizers, if there's any other final comments.

MR. SECRETARY: Thank you so much Dr. Poole, and thank you to all of the panel members. We really, really appreciate all of your input and responses to the many questions.

We're going to go ahead and take a short five-minute break at this point. So we're going to set the timer for five minutes, and we'll see everybody back here at 10:33.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

MR. SECRETARY: I'd like to welcome Stephanie Fortune-Taylor, moderator of our next panel.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Good morning, everyone. If you're like me, you're interested to learn more about these data resources that many of us use or, in the case of some restricted data sets that we got a chance to hear about in the last session, would like to use, in order to estimate the distribution affects of trade and policy on U.S. workers. As you know, this academic symposium is one facet of the USITC year-long ongoing investigation on the aforementioned topic of the distributional effects of trade.

Throughout this investigation, we have heard from numerous stakeholders, including our in-house modelers working on part two of the investigation, activists and labor
union representatives at our roundtables, and researchers from yesterday's symposium -- day one -- about the clinical role that data breadth, depth, linkages, and accessibility play in our attempt to quantify the distributional effects of trade.

Today we have a stellar lineup of representatives and government data sources who will present information and answer questions about the data sets they are representing. For those of you in the audience, this is your chance to ask the burning data questions that have kept you up at night and irritated your loved ones at Thanksgiving dinner. When you have a question, make sure to e-mail de@usitc.gov. Someone will be standing by to record your question, and we will get to as many audience questions as we can.

Because we will be hearing from so many representatives, this panel will be divided into three groups. Group one will include what we're calling hyper data sets. These are composite data sets that may pull from multiple sources, including administrative and restricted data. Group 2 will feature individual and household data, and Group 3 will feature industry and firm-level data.

We'll start Group 1 with Keith Bailey from Census, who is representing Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics. And then we'll move on to Fariha Kamal, also from Census, representing Business Dynamic Statistics-Goods Traders.
After their presentations, we will have 15 minutes for Q and A before transitioning to Group 2. So let's get started.

Keith, the floor is yours.

MR BAILEY: Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to share about the LEHD program with this group of the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics program. The reality is I'm going to try to cover a 22-year-old program, covering the basics, as outlined, and I'm going to try and do it less than eight minutes. That is my goal here.

So we'll just begin here. What is the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics program? As the slide shows you, it uses administrative data to produce information about the work force in the nation at really no or little cost to those individuals providing the data. Our primary partnership, it is -- I'm sorry -- note: It is a voluntary partnership. Our primary partnership is with state labor market information bureaus. They provide, to us, on a quarterly basis, the employer -- detailed employer information from the BLS, or the Bureau of Labor Status Quarterly Census of Employment Wages program, or QCEW. And they also provide, to us, detailed, individually identifiable wage record information, which is those individuals working in a state that are covered under that state's unemployment insurance program. I want to clarify this is not claimants' data; this is
information that must be reported on a quarterly basis to the Unemployment Insurance Agencies within each state that has an unemployment insurance program. Sorry that is not supposed to be forward on me.

So we also include other administrative data to cover the federal work force from the Office of Personnel Management. We are negotiating with the Internal Revenue Service, and we are always open to additional opportunities for administrative data. Again, the LEHD program is unique in that we have worker demographics and firm characteristics. We have five core programs, which are listed here.

Moving on, these next two slides, they will be in the slide deck provided to you later. I will not read them to you, but we have some core products, and we have two experimental products, where we are leveraging the LEHD infrastructure data, which is, essentially, as much as possible, the national repository of jobs data. For our purposes, a job is an individual linked record between an employee and an employer. So if you have multiple jobs, you have multiple records in the LEHD infrastructure data.

Getting to choose from among your products, here we have a little matrix that shows you what the options are to acquire the information. You will see that there are hyperlinks here. We are expanding on two fronts here, primarily. That is our visualizations or our application.
The LEHD data can be a very complex dataset, which is challenging to navigate, even by experienced data users. These visualizations attempt to create user-friendly applications through which individuals can answer their questions about the work force or look at economic and work-force trend information.

The raw data downloads are always a perennial favorite with the true data geeks among us. I am actually not one of them. I consider myself more an administrative user of the data. I much prefer the application; however, for those who really want to get their hands super dirty with the data, the raw data downloads are the path to take. Note that anything you download from the Census LEHD website is already publicly available data. There’s no need to check with us whether you can use the data. It is all for public use.

The third column, we are developing our API capabilities at Census. We are starting to roll out these data for those individuals who want to incorporate this information into their own applications or use it for other purposes. So, again, just a short matrix to help you make the best decision based on your abilities on the information desired.

I do want to spend some time on the nature of the microdata. I caught the tail end of the last presentation,
where, I believe, Teresa Fort was talking about LEHD and its microdata access. LEHD microdata is a restricted use data set. The confidential LEHD data is accessible through the Federal Statistical Research Data Centers. I'm not going to go through their process. We have a wonderful website that describes their process. I will note here: You see the projects require data provider consent. Teresa briefly mentioned this at the tail end of the last presentation.

The information that we receive from our state partners -- and the map shows you who is currently a partner and who is not -- that information is their data. We respect their ownership. We respect their control of that data. Yes, once Census has it, it is Title XIII protected, and we do have some capabilities to use that data internally. When it comes to external research or access, our agreements with the state explicitly spell out the process, and if you are interested in using a particular state's microdata, we, at Census, have a process by which we ask the data providers and LEHD, do you consent to the use of this data or do you decline participation. Please know that a decline is, in most cases, not personal. Many states have state laws and state regulations that prohibit or limit who can access what microdata. So in many cases, the responses are necessarily declined depending on the association of the researcher or the nature of the data being requested or, in some cases,
what the researcher intends to do. Again, it's not a simple
follow this pathway, you will get access to the data; it is a
very individualized project-specific approach.

More details about the restricted-use data -- I've
provided another hyperlink here for the information.

Just a quick snapshot -- screenshot of our LEHD
website. We do have information where we highlight the
public use information. So you will see here, we have an
LEHD and action tab on our website, and we try to scour the
environment, and where we find instances of utility of public
use data, we like to highlight those use cases here in this
link.

The research that is available that is produced by
external researchers -- I should back up one slide -- is
available, also, at the restricted-use data site. There is
sources of information on where you can find published
results of external researchers.

I will end my slide with my traditional contact
slide. You will notice here, that we have our landing page.
We have a toll-free number. We also have some general and
dedicated e-mail addresses. If you have a particular
question on a particular LEHD product, I encourage you to use
the respective "mail to" address. If you do not know to whom
your question should be directed, please use the "general
questions." They all come to my fabulous team at LEHD, and
they're prepared to answer any questions and also open to the idea of partnerships. In particular when it comes to external research, I try to make myself available to the researcher community to help them understand how best to develop a proposal in order to maximize and leverage the availability of the LEHD data.

With that, I'm ten seconds to the good, and I will turn it back. Thank you.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Keith, we will not hold it against you that you do not like to get dirty with data because you were extremely efficient. Thank you so much for that presentation. We'll now move on to Fariha Kamal.

DR. KAMAL: Hello, everyone. Give me a quick second. Let me share my screen.

So hello again and thank you for the invitation to discuss with you, today, about the new set of statistics that the Census Bureau released this past December, describing the Business Dynamics of U.S. Goods Traders.

Before proceeding, the usual disclaimer applies. All views are my own and all results passed disclosure review.

So the broader research agenda at the Census Bureau that makes the statistics possible is the agenda that centers around measuring the business dynamics of globally engaged firms. And by business dynamics, I mean annual measures of
job creation and destruction, establishment breadth and depth, towards entries and exits.

And we define firms global engagement along three main dimensions. So firms can be exporting or importing goods; these are goods traders; firms can be exporting or importing services; these are services traders; and/or firms can be engaged in foreign direct investments. These are multinational firms.

So the broad goal of this project is to understand how do firms participation in international markets shape domestic job growth. And BDS-Goods Traders is the first set of statistics from this broader research project.

So the BDS-Goods Traders is a public-use set of statistics. So this is available to anybody on the Census Bureau website, that I have listed here. And these are experimental statistics in the sense that we are still soliciting feedback from the data-user community to improve the scope of these products.

In order to construct the BDS for goods trading firms, we need to identify the goods trading status of firms in any given year. And so we categorize firms into these four mutually exclusive firm types. A firm can be only exporting goods in a given year, only importing goods, both exporting and importing goods, or not trading in goods. So these are categorized as "non-traders." And the statistics
are currently available starting in 1992 through 2019, and the plan is to make annual updates.

And we provide these business statistics for these four distinct firm types, not just for the whole economy but also by three broad firm size categories, three broad firm age categories, detailed four-digit NAICS categories -- so there's about 280 of those -- and nine Census divisions.

So today, I certainly will not have the time to show you all aspects of the data. So the statistics I'll be sharing today will rely on the first four set of tables, but I certainly encourage you to go and check out the data since I really won't be able to do it justice today.

So in order to give you a sense of the types of questions one can answer using this public-use statistics, I'm going to be sharing, with you, findings from a working paper that I have with Kyle Handley at UCSD and Wei Ouyang at the Census Bureau, where we analyze these newly released statistics. And the working paper also provides detailed information on the underlying microdata that are used in order to create these public-use statistics and other information, in terms of comparable or related Census Bureau products where you might find overlapping information.

So having said that, let me get right into the two sets of results that I want to highlight from this paper. The first is that we find one out of two jobs in the U.S.
economy are at trading firms. However, the average firm is actually a non-trader. So what this means is that employment tends to be especially skewed towards trading firms but trading itself is a rare activity, and I'll show you some statistics along these lines.

We also find that goods traders have been shifting their employment increasingly over time from goods-producing sectors -- so think manufacturing, agriculture, mining, construction -- to more services-providing sectors of the economy, like wholesale, like retail, utilities, information.

And, finally, we document that U.S. goods traders contribution to overall ledge uproad (phonetic) job growth has been increasing over time, especially in the decade after the global financial crisis.

So let me start very quickly by showing you a snapshot, in terms of the average share of firms in dark blue, share of establishments in light blue, and share of employment in gray across these four distinct firm types over this entire '92 to 2019 period. And what we can see here is that if we were to clump together these three distinct trading type of firms, that these firms account for about 6 percent of all firms in the U.S. economy but 49 percent of total employment. And within these categories, what you can see is that exporter/importer firms are especially very different, for less than 2 percent of all firms in the
economy but over a third of employment. So this is a point that we just heard from Teresa Fort and then again yesterday from Kyle Handley that firms that both export and import are especially large and especially important in the role they play in the economy. In the interest of time, let me dive right into answering questions regarding domestic job growth and how much do traders versus non-traders contribute to overall job growth and then take a look to see do we find a good straighter growth premium even after we control for firm age and size and sector.

So, before I get into the statistics, let me just define a few terms. So the Business Dynamics Statistics, as the name implies, we're looking at changes in employment over time. And we define employment at the establishment level, which is then aggregated up by these firm types and other cuts of the data. So firms, establishments can be binned into three bins essentially, so establishments that are there in both the existing year and the prior year are incumbent establishments. Births are defined as for establishments that are present in the current year but not the prior year, and then analogously, deaths are described as establishments that were present in the prior year but not the current year. And this sort of binning is important because then it allows us to essentially measure job creation and
destruction in a very straightforward manner. Job creation is essentially increases in employment at incumbent establishments plus employment at newly born establishments, and then job destruction are the decline in employment at existing establishments, as well as employment loss due to establishment deaths.

And then net job creation is nothing but the difference between job creation and job destruction. And these can be converted into rates using the Davis, Haltiwanger, Schuh growth rate measure where, essentially, these measures are taken and normalized by the average employment in the two periods.

So now let's take a look at these net job creation rates and traders versus non-traders contribution. So what this table is showing here in the first three rows are the net job creation rates, and the last row is showing the share accounted for by traders. And what I have done here is that the last column is showing the net job creation rate across all years in the time series, '92 through 2019, but then I've also broken it up by these three periods which coincide with the three business cycles during this time series.

And so what we can see here is that overall, goods traders accounted for about 40 percent of aggregate net job growth. However, there's a lot of heterogeneity if we were to look at this contribution over time. In particular, we
find that between '92 to 2000, traders accounted for about a third of total job growth, but this declined to about 10 percent between 2001 and '07 but then grew to about 60 percent between 2008 and 2019. So what we discuss further in the paper and the pattern we find is that there's the sort of survive-and-thrive pattern for traders in the data where, in this period, 2001 and '07, again, something discussed in yesterday's morning session, the U.S. economy was hit by several large global shocks, like the China shock, and what we find is that traders that survived these shocks essentially were better able to weather the Great Recession and had very strong performance in terms of net job creation.

So now let's take a look at whether there's evidence that goods traders tend to exhibit higher net job creation rates. Is there this net job creation rate premium? So what we're doing here is just running simple regressions where we're taking the net job creation rates and regressing it on a set of indicators, whether it's an exporter only firm, importer only firm, or exporter/importer firm relative to non-traders, and we're doing this for the whole economy, as well as controlling for size and controlling for firm age. And then, in this last column, we tried this hybrid approach. Because we do not have size by age tables, we essentially take the size tables and create these synthetic age controls to then look at these differences. And the reason we do this
is it's been established in the literature that age is a very important factor to control for when looking at the relationship between size and job growth.

And what we find here, really, the main takeaway is that goods traders tend to exhibit higher net job creation rates relative to non-traders, all these sets of goods traders, particularly once we control for age. And within the category, importer-only firms exhibit the highest net job creation rates and exporter/importer firms have much smaller net job creation rates, but this is not surprising given these firms tend to be the largest and oldest firms in the economy.

And I want to end by showing you if we were to even control within detail four-digit NAICS sectors, we find that this hierarchy persists. So this picture if we look at all sectors in the economy is showing this net job creation rate premia, where importer only firms tend to have the highest net job creation rates, followed by exporter only and then exporter/importer.

And then looking within broad sectors, and I'll end in just hopefully 10 seconds, retail wholesale manufacturing, which account for a third of total employment in the U.S., this hierarchy not only persists, but these net job creation rate premia tend to be especially large. So just in conclusion, what we can learn from our analysis is that goods
traders tend to be associated with higher net job creation rates relative to non-traders. And a result that I wasn't able to show you in much detail is that a large share of the service sector jobs are supported by goods trading firms. So thank you so much for your attention.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you so much, Fariha. And so I have a few questions for both you, Fariha, and for Keith. And I'll go ahead and start off with the questions, and then I'll remind the audience if they have questions to go ahead and send those to de@usitc.gov.

The first question is a question for both of you, asking for you to tell us a little bit more about the level of detail that we can get. And for Keith would be kind of occupation/industry/geographic data in the public datasets. So, for Keith, this would be something like, could we look at a production worker in the manufacturing sector, like, in a four-digit NAICS manufacturing sector in a given Metropolitan Statistical Area? Could we do that with the public data? And then, Fariha, this question, the same kind of industry question for you would be, can we look at, for example, all the firm closures in a quarter binding score in a given county? That's just a general question of, what's the level of detail that we can get to in this public sphere? So whichever of you wants to start.

MR. BAILEY: I'll jump in first while it's on my
mind here. First and foremost, the LEHD data does not contain any occupational information at present, and that is because there is no universal source of occupational data. A distinction between LEHD and other potential data sources available, it is not a survey, it is actually a complete accounting by state of jobs. So the occupational data that is available is largely derived via surveys. We just do not have the comfort level with imputation strategies to incorporate survey-type data into a product that is not a survey-based product.

That said, as far as geographic and industry detail, the level of detail varies by product. The Quarterly Workforce Indicators generally look down to, like, the metropolitan statistical area, in some cases, smaller areas of geography. The LEHD origin destination employment statistics data does look down to the census tract level for information. The industry detail varies between like a three-digit and four-digit level. And then, on one case, the post-secondary employment outcomes is actually still at the sector level of industry data. I'm sorry, it's below that, my apologies. It is available below the sector level.

So, again, going back to the matrix I shared before, I would encourage you to explore the LEHD website. The descriptions of all the datasets are readily available, and they outline the geographic levels, the industry levels,
and the public data is generally the finest level of detail that we can produce without violating the confidentiality and privacy of either Census guidelines and/or the raw data itself. So the quick answer is it varies by product, but there is a lot of information available. I would encourage you to do a little bit of homework and look at those various products and determine which one is the best one for your particular utility and then reach out to us if something more as needed.

(Simultaneous comments.)

DR. KAMAL: So the first thing to mention or state is that these Business Dynamic Statistics are annual measures. So there's certainly no quarterly information here. And as I had previewed in I think the second or third slide, we have these tables for the whole economy. So, right, we have these Business Dynamics Statistics for these four types of firms. Then we have these statistics by three broad firm size categories. So these are firms that employ between 1 to 19 workers, 20 to 499, and then 500-plus workers. So think of this as small, medium, large size categories. Then we have the statistics separately by three firm age -- I'm sorry, five firm age categories and then these detailed four-digit NAICS, so there are about 281 of them, and nine census divisions.

So there is no cross between sector by region or
sector by age. So these are all these sort of one-dimensional tables. But the novelty here is that you have the detail in terms of the goods trading status of the firms in the economy.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Got it. Thank you. All right, Keith, I'm going to go back to this question about level of detail. And I specifically am asking this in the context of this investigation that we're doing on the distributional effects of trade. Wondering about some of these demographic indicators, for example, for race and ethnicity or, like, race and gender. If we wanted to look at, for example, job-to-job transitions for black women in a certain state, is that something that could be captured in the public dataset? Would it stop there? Do we then have industry too? Like, can you give us an idea of what we can get at?

MR. BAILEY: Yes, and I'd actually like to address this also by way of sharing the screen here. So what I'm sharing with you now, this is our LED extraction tool. This is an application that specifically looks at the Quarterly Workforce Indicators. But I'm specifically looking here at the worker characteristics, and you will notice that you --

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Excuse me, Keith, just to interrupt you a second. I can't see you sharing something.

MR. BAILEY: Oh, that's right. I forgot to press
the button that says share, my apologies. Okay, let me start. Let me go back there. Are we good now? Yes, I forgot the two-step process for Webex. So, here, I'm looking at the LED extraction tool, which specifically looks at Quarterly Workforce Indicators, I jumped to worker characteristics, you will see that you can select male/female, we also have an age distribution, you can also look at sex by education. And then, in race and ethnicity, we have the standard OMB categorizations of race and ethnicity, we're looking at the firm characteristics, that is, the employer characteristics. You can see you can get at the sector level, three-digit sectors, four-digit industries, you can also look at firm age and size, or you can look at private ownership versus public and private ownership total. So that's the Quarterly Workforce Indicators.

If I go back here and as I try and navigate this environment, the job flows data, again, is a slightly different data set. The job-to-job flows are through the J2J explorer, the application listed here, and you will see that this opens up to a guided entry of analysis. And I'm just going to click on one of the examples to kind of just show information. So down here we have worker characteristics. So, again, you can look at the sex of individuals, you can look at age, race. So the publicly available data does provide a lot of this data to address those questions.
The one area to piggyback on Fariha, her comments, is there are some opportunities for the matrix of information, but when we look at these data, again, we're trying to provide the most information at the finest level of detail. And if you consider if you're looking at a very distinct industry, at a very small geography, and you're looking at characteristics of an employee, your slice and dice gets very thin. So, generally speaking, that information would not be available, again, because of privacy and confidentiality. Does that help?

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: That's super helpful, thank you so much.

I want to transition a little bit, Fariha, to talk a little bit about since you are so conversant in the BDS data, what we can think about in terms of some distributional effects things? So some recent work that we've been doing at USITC looking at women and minority-owned businesses shows that these businesses often struggle to weather shocks due to limited access to capital. And even though the BDS goods traders doesn't have access -- doesn't have demographic markers, is there anything that we can say using these statistics about distributional effects, whether it might be related to like rural counties in counties or regions where it might have been disproportionately affected by trade? Is there anything that we can say based on your knowledge of the
statistics?

DR. KAMAL: That's a great question. So one thing to iterate is that these statistics, we're looking at this business dynamics or essentially employment changes by these different trading types. So we cannot look at distributional consequences of workers. There's no workers here, right? We're tracking jobs. So that is definitely something we are not able to do with the BDS goods traders. But, on that note, I'm just going to make a quick plug for a data product where you are able to do that. And Aneta Erdie might be talking, she is going to be talking about the Annual Business Survey, and they published in 2019 demographic characteristics of people who essentially export. So there are additional sources, although those are cross-sectional data, they're not looking at business dynamics, where you could potentially look at the differences in worker characteristics in association with trade.

But what the comment I'll make here is that even though we cannot look at worker distributional impacts, what is the most readily -- what can be done most readily is compare the performance of firms that trade and do not trade and within trade, the interactions between importing, exporting, and those that do both, which has been highlighted before. And one thing, obviously, I didn't really get a chance to show you in the interest of time is that we find
that traders, particularly folks that export and import, are better able to weather shocks, so you got a flavor of that. And non-traders essentially perform or have a harder time recovering from these crisis periods.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Great. And I want to continue just with you a second, Fariha, to ask you a little bit more about small businesses. On one of your slides, you showed how small and medium-sized businesses are the disproportionate employers of a lot of workers. But I'm wondering about whether job creation and destruction varies by business size, if jobs to small businesses are more at risk for creation or destruction, if there's anything you can say about that?

DR. KAMAL: Mm-hmm. Sure. So there was one slide that I didn't get a chance to share, but one thing I just want to say up front, and we saw that, was that most firms in the economy are small firms, right? There about 5, 6 million firms in the U.S. Over 95 percent, and maybe I'm even low-balling it, are small-sized firms, so these would be like employing between the 1 to 19 workers. So, while it is true that most firms are small firms, most employment tends to be concentrated at large firms. So this is something that's been established not just the BDS for goods traders, but the Business Dynamics Statistics program, which shows the statistics for all firms in the economy and has been around
for over two, three decades. So that concentration we see
here because we see that traders tend to be the largest ones
in the economy. Most employment tends to be at these trading
firms. Well, I shouldn't say most. Half of employment are
housed at these trading firms.

Having said that, thinking about job destruction
and creation by firm size, again, this has been looked at
using just the Business Dynamic Statistics where small firms
tend to create a lot of jobs but also destroy a lot of jobs.

But let me focus on the goods traders given that
that's the new set of statistics and given we find that goods
traders tend to be large, you can sort of think of these
large/small as goods traders tending to be large and
non-traders tending to be small, where we find that goods
traders, especially importer-only firms, tend to create a lot
of jobs, and they also destroy very little jobs. On the
other hand, smaller firms, particularly non-traders, do both.
So, on net, they do not create as many jobs as goods traders.

So there's a lot of interesting dynamics that you
can look at the data through these tables. But the bigger
takeaway is that goods traders tend to be long-lived and
survive for a long time. So, in terms of firm deaths, for
instance, they tend not to shut down relative to non-traders,
and then within the establishments of these firms, there's a
lot of both going on, but traders tend to destroy less jobs
DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you. And, Keith, in the last minute or so that we have, I want to ask you about your exciting restricted data, and I appreciate that information that you gave us kind of helping us to understand more about how we know that there's 50 states and their territories, but the average researchers want to get all 50 and just be able to walk out the door with a passel of states. What I did want to know is a little bit more about what's included in terms of variables. So something that we heard from one of our roundtables is about the need for data for LGBTQIA+ persons. And just, as you mentioned, you talked about occupational things, more maybe employer variables. What type of information can you give us about the type of demographic indicators that we might be able to get in that restricted dataset?

MR. BAILEY: Yeah, so, essentially, the simple answer is the demographic data that's available in the public set is what is available in the micro dataset; it's just at an individual level. Much of the information we get from the businesses and from the state partners does not contain the demographic data. That's where we rely on a lot of additional administrative datasets, including but certainly not limited to the Decennial Census, the American Community Survey, and other sources of information about demographics.
of individuals.

So, generally speaking, if there's a resource available that contains that information that we can link to, we certainly want to explore that opportunity. But, generally speaking, the demographics that are listed in the public data are what's available in the microdata for research purposes. I will say also that as many individuals know who asked us through the FSRDCs, you are permitted to link and bring in your own datasets into that environment. So, if you have a particular area of focus and you happen to have an source of information that has identifiable information, there is the possibility of linking that to the LEHD infrastructure data through Census's process to identify individuals.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Well, Keith, you just left us like -- you left me wanting more. So thank you so much for that information that you provided on the last slide so that we can reach out. Thank you so much to both you and Fariha for your presentations. We're certainly appreciative. We're going to transition now into Group 2, which includes individual and household microdata providers. We will start with Patrick Carey from BLS will be presenting about the Current Population Survey. We also have on this panel Adam Safir, Adam Smith, and we'll hear from the Adams, Daniel Carroll and Robert Hoekstra. So we'll start off with you,
Patrick Carey, when you're ready.

MR. CAREY: Okay. Can you see my -- can you hear me first of all?

MR. SECRETARY: We can hear you, but we're not seeing the screen yet. There we go.

MR. CAREY: Okay.

MR. SECRETARY: Can you make it full screen?

MR. CAREY: Yeah, that's what I'm -- there we go.

MR. SECRETARY: Thank you.

MR. CAREY: Okay, so hello, and I'm happy here to join you and this conversation to speak about the Current Population Survey. Hopefully, data from the CPS is useful to this group and your research. I'll start by talking about the basic CPS, which is a monthly household survey of about 60,000 households. Each household in the sample is interviewed for four months, out of the sample for eight months, and then back in the sample for four months. So this is represented here with that 4/8/4 sample scheme. The sample scheme allows for a high degree of continuity from month to month and year to year, and I mention this because it allows for some longitudinal analysis, which I know is of interest to this group.

I also want to mention that the CPS allows for proxy respondents, so a person in the household could be answering for other members. In 2015 to 2017, we determined
that self-reports and proxies, the split was really about 50/50. As you're probably aware, CPS contains a wealth of labor force information, as well as information for those not in the labor force. Data on household members is included. I want to mention that CPS is sponsored jointly by the Census Bureau and the BLS. Census Bureau really takes the lead with the microdata. So you'll see later on in my contact information many of the links direct you to the Census Bureau.

Census does collect monthly occupational and industry information as part of its labor force information for multiple jobholders. In terms of occupations, the occupation and industry data will reflect their main job. That's the job with the most hours. Note that CPS does capture occupation and industry information for second jobs in the outgoing rotation group. So those are those month end samples for when they leave. And then they come back in and then month end sample eight. Those are the outgoing rotation groups. Also, for people unemployed, the survey collects data on industry and occupation information for people that completed their last job.

Always a good reminder, I think this was just a couple sessions ago, as I caught the very end, that industry and occupation data are subject to change with their SOC, the Standard Occupational Classification and the NAICS codes.
I've included a link here with information on these changes in the CPS in case that's helpful. Earnings data is also collected in the basic CPS. It's collected for one fourth the sample for the outgoing rotation units.

And there is some family income information, I know that was of interest to this group, in the CPS, but that data should be used with caution. I'm told that it didn't test very well. A better source maybe when looking at CPS data is to go to the ASEC supplement, which is the Annual Social and Economic supplement to the CPS. I'll talk about that in a minute or two.

There is some substate information that is available through the public use files. There are data suppressions. I believe the suppression level is at about 100,000 in terms of population, census 2010 population. Recently, you may be aware that Census announced some changes due to confidentiality reasons that they were going to implement maybe a higher threshold for the geographies. I think they were going to -- they've been discussing moving the threshold from 100,000 to 250,000. But right now they are reviewing these decisions and listening to data users, so we'll have to stay tuned to see what comes back.

Data variables that I think this group is interested in includes race, ethnicity, and disability, they're all included in the Current Population Survey. I've
also included a number of other variables here that weren't specifically called out in the communication that I received but may be of interest to this group. Two elements that I believe that this group is interested in were religion and SOGI, and at this time, that information is not collected in the Current Population Survey.

So why the CPS? Well, CPS is timely. Estimates are issued about three weeks after the reference period. It's very comprehensive. It has a rich source of demographic and other characteristics. I probably don't need to tell you this, but CPS is the source for the nation's unemployment rate. I mentioned earlier that with the 4/8/4 sample scheme there is some longitudinal capabilities. You can see people who have moved in and out of the different categories of employment, unemployment and not in the labor force, otherwise known as flows, the flows data. I also want to mention too that CPS has been around for decades, so there's a lot of opportunities to do some historical comparisons when looking at different elements.

I did mention the CPS supplements. There are a number of them. I've included just a handful here. So we have the ASEC I mentioned before, Annual Social and Economic supplement, that contains a lot of good information on income and earnings. I think poverty measures are derived from the data from the ASEC. Contingent workers, a contingent worker
supplement, that is a hot topic these days. We are looking
to field another version of the contingent worker survey in
the next couple years.

Disability, there's a separate disability
supplement, a displaced worker, veterans supplement. The
eveterans supplement gets at things like service-connected
disability and its effect on the labor force.

And I should say to that, with the public use data
files, that there are opportunities to link between the basic
CPS and the supplements, as well as the American Time Use
Survey, which is another program that's derived from the CPS.

So where can I find CPS public datasets? I've
included a bunch of links here. There's a homepage. Again,
these are all residing at the Census Bureau. You have one
for the basic CPS, I call out one for the ASEC, and then
there are a number of public data sets for the CPS
supplements here.

I did want to say that I believe there is
information, NBER has information on CPS, microdata files, as
well as the IPUMS site. People may be familiar with that.
That's run out of the University of Minnesota, so there may
be some good information there that researchers can use.

These are just if you have questions or inquiries,
you can go to the links here, and I also want to point out
there's some microdata information, here are some links.
It's important to look at that footnote link when looking at data because sometimes there are corrections that are made to the datasets, and people should be aware of those changes. Some other technical information that researchers may find useful, Tech Paper 77, that's really our most comprehensive document in terms of talking about the Current Population Survey and its supplements. BLS also has some good information up there, especially weighted to occupation and industry information.

And tied to research applications, I mean, it's hard to list all of the applications that are used for CPS, so I've listed a number here that maybe people may be interested in.

Okay. That was it.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you. Thank you so much, Patrick, for your presentation. We'll now move on to Adam Safir to talk to us about the Consumer Expenditure Survey.

MR. SAFIR: Great. Thank you. I'm going to go ahead and try to share my PowerPoint, and then I will make it full screen. Was I successful? Is it full screen?

MR. SECRETARY: Not yet.

MR. SAFIR: Hmm. Now my Webex tool, I seem to have lost functionality.

MR. SECRETARY: Are you still in your program?

MR. SAFIR: I have a message that says that I am
sharing the content.

MR. SECRETARY: But are you seeing your program?

MR. SAFIR: Oh, now I see it.

MR. SECRETARY: Okay.

MR. SAFIR: Do you see it okay now?

MR. SECRETARY: Yes, but we're still -- we're seeing a preview slide of the next slide as well. Can you go up to that display settings?

MR. SAFIR: Sure.

MR. SECRETARY: And then click that and do duplicate slide show.

MR. SAFIR: Okay. How about now?

MR. SECRETARY: Yep, perfect. Thank you.

MR. SAFIR: Okay. Great. Well, with that, we'll pick up. Welcome. I'm Adam Safir, Program Manager for the Consumer Expenditure Surveys Program. Today I'll provide a high-level overview of CE, our major data products, and how you can find and use some of our data.

So the mission of the Consumer Expenditure Program is to collect, process, and disseminate information that presents a statistical picture of consumer spending for the Consumer Price Index, government agencies, and private data users. This mission encompasses analyzing CE data to produce socioeconomic studies of consumer spending and providing data users with assistance, education, and tools for working with
the data.

So, in other words, our mission is not just to collect, process, and provide data about spending to users, it also includes assisting users to support good use of the data. And why is that important?

Well, to take one example, consumer expenditures make up almost 70 percent of GDP, so a huge share. And while BEA calculates the consumption component of GDP using sources other than CE, the strength of our surveys are that the CE data is one of the only comprehensive data sources to provide a complete picture of spending at the household level for very detailed categories of spending along with the socio-demographic characteristics of consumers.

So, when we see large economic shocks like the Great Recession of 2008 with the collapse of the housing market or the COVID-19 recession, it's CE data that are relied upon to better understand from a spending standpoint who is impacted, the severity of the impact on different demographic groups of, for example, the elderly, families with young children, the low income, and the effectiveness of policies enacted to address economic suffering, so, for example, most recently the stimulus checks and child tax credits.

I should mention that CE data are collected by the Census Bureau sponsored by BLS. The survey is sponsored by
BLS but collected by the Census Bureau across two different surveys throughout the year. So the surveys are administered to different samples, each designed to collect data on household spending but at different levels.

The interview survey collects income and expenditure data over the course of four quarterly interviews spread out over a one-year period, and respondents are asked to report large purchases that are reasonable to recall over a three-month period.

In the diary survey, we ask respondents to maintain a record of all expenditures over the course of a two-week period, and the diary survey is designed to focus on gathering an accurate depiction of household spending on smaller, more frequently purchased items.

And so those two surveys together allow us to estimate annual expenditures for the nation as a whole, and we provide those estimates in several different data products.

So, from an economic analysis standpoint, we provide publications that provide information related to trends and methods, and these publications include -- they'd be on the number series, the monthly Labor Review Journal, Spotlight on Statistic Series, and The Economics Daily.

We also have data tables that are released once per year and contain expenditure and income data presented in
several different ways. Along with these estimates, we also
provide public use microdata files that have record level
information for individual respondents and households without
any information that could identify respondents, of course.

The centerpiece, if you will, is our news release, so the news release is published in September alongside the
annual data release and contains notable changes in consumer
expenditures for selected demographic groups and for income
quintiles. It contains charts and tables that focus on
spending differences between the current and the prior year. So an example headline, for example, is that average
expenditures per consumer unit for 2020 were $61,000, a 2.7
percent decrease from 2019 levels.

As for the other items that were listed under the
economic analysis subheading on the earlier slide, they all
involve analysis of CE data at varying levels of detail, and
these next two slides will give you some idea of the types of
analyses that are being conducted in our office.

So this graph, for example, shows the annual
percent change in expenditures in income before taxes by
income quintile between 2019 and 2020. And what you see is
that overall spending increased in two of the five quintiles.
And what's interesting is that's there no visible
correlation, at least not here, between changes in income and
changes in expenditures.
Moving on to what the CE data can tell us about travel during the pandemic, we published an Economics Daily publication last month, and that article showed that the average household spent about $2100 on travel in 2019, and in 2020, with the pandemic raging in full force, this average dropped to $926 for the year, a decrease of 56 percent.

Now the tables are actually our most used and most requested product that we make available on our website. The tables look at many different subgroups of the population in comparison to the nation as a whole. Listed here and provided are 17 so-called bulletin tables, which provide breaks for income, for geography, for household composition. We use the term CU, which is Consumer Unit. There are also reference person tables that look at age within the household, selected age ranges, ethnicity, occupation, and race. And we also include comparisons of different groups, and we provide annual means averaged over two years of data, categorized by two socioeconomic characteristics.

Moving on from the tables to the microdata, twice a year BLS releases CE microdata for the previous data collection period to the public, generally in April and in September. The September release aligns with our annual table production. Data are available going back to 1980, and each release contains roughly 60 different files, each catering to different types of analysis. So everything from
high-level total expenditures to analyzing trade-in allowance and down payments on new cars. The sky is truly the limit with what data users can pursue, and you'll get a little of what those interests are here shortly. The files are available in SAS data, SPSS, and CSB formats.

Prior to 2016, users were interested in building weighted estimates that were -- users who were interested in building weighted estimates were limited to building them at the national level or for a number of metropolitan statistical areas.

A few years ago, a team was formed to produce experimental state weights, which allow users to develop weighted means for specific states. And so what we have available right now are state-level weights, experimental state-level weights for California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Texas, and we're looking at additional states to determine feasibility of producing those experimental weights.

And just by way of background, the Consumer Expenditure Survey is a nationally representative survey, and so there's some statistical adjustment that's needed in order to provide valid state-level estimates for households in the survey.

To give you an idea of the many different ways that users have made use of the CE data in recent history, here,
I've just looked at a handful of research topics that were discussed at last summer's public use microdata users workshop, and that is what is the spending patterns of the American --

(Technical interference.)

MR. SECRETARY: We're not able to hear you, Adam. Can you hear me?

(No response.)

MR. SECRETARY: Adam, I'm going to go ahead and turn off your video for now. Can you hear me? Adam, can you hear me?

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Mr. Secretary, while Adam is --

MR. SAFIR: Oh, no, I think I'm back.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Yeah, there you are.

MR. SECRETARY: Okay. There you are.

MR. SAFIR: Yes, yes. I received a call and tried to end the call, and it dropped both calls. I still have a minute left.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: You still have your time. Please go ahead. You left us at a precipice where it got hard to hear. Please go ahead.

MR. SAFIR: Okay. Now I'm going through the process of sharing the application again. Duplicate slide show. Do you see my screen?
MR. SECRETARY: We sure do.

MR. SAFIR: Okay. Fantastic. So, here, I was just sharing what were some of the topics that were most recently discussed at the latest public use microdata users conference, and as you can see, it's quite a diverse set of areas of inquiry, and it's made possible by the fact that the complete range of expenditures is captured within the CE survey, which enables that sort of breadth.

Now, finally, I just wanted to provide some summary information about the CE surveys that was requested by the session organizers. I wanted to reiterate that from a coverage standpoint the CE reflects estimates for the civilian non-institutional population.

It is an annual survey, so we release annual estimates, but within the microdata you can look at quarterly estimates as well as monthly spending for the respondents.

Is that the bell for my time?

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Please go ahead and finish, Adam. Go ahead.

MR. SAFIR: Okay. Thanks, yeah. And there is a longitudinal component to the survey, so we follow interview survey respondents over a four-quarterly period; however, our sample unit is actually the sample addressed, not the respondents themselves.

So, if, for example, a sampled unit participates
for two quarters and then the respondents at that address move to another location, if someone else moves into that household, we will interview those new residents for the next two quarters. And so that's something to consider if you're looking at the CE survey for a longitudinal component.

Lastly, we do collect information on race, ethnicity, and rule status. We don't ask any questions about religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity. The only disability item that we have is related to someone who reports that they are not working, and we ask why. Disability is one of the options for reporting why they're not working.

We also don't ask about the poverty level of the surrounding community, but we do provide a variable with respect to the poverty threshold of where the sampled household is according to the poverty threshold for that particular unit.

I've listed here some URLs for gaining access to restricted use microdata. The process for gaining access to restricted use microdata is not easy, but it's not that difficult either, and so, if folks are interested in looking at the unblurred, untop-coded data with full geographic information, they would want to go with the restricted use microdata route.

And then, finally, as I've mentioned a few times,
from a value-added standpoint, I would just reiterate that
the Consumer Expenditure Surveys provide information on the
complete range of consumer expenditures, as well as their
incomes and demographic characteristics, and it's fairly rare
to find a data set that contains all those elements. There
are a lot of the aggregated data sources for spending
information but very few that relate that spending
information to the demographic characteristics of individual
households.

And so, with that, I'll just say thank you and wish
everyone a great rest of this symposium.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you so much, Adam. And
now we have Adam Smith, who is going to talk to us about the
Survey of Income Program Participation.

MR. SMITH: Hello. I'm getting my slides up.

MR. SECRETARY: We see them, Adam. Thanks.

MR. SMITH: Thank you. So good morning, everyone.

My name is Adam Smith with the U.S. Census Bureau, and I'm
going to give a brief overview of the Survey of Income and
Program Participation, also known as SIPP.

So SIPP is a nationally representative longitudinal
survey that provides comprehensive data about the income and
government program participation of individuals and
households in the U.S. Chiefly, it allows us to evaluate
things like annual and sub-annual income and earnings
dynamics, movements into and out of government transfer
programs, the family and social contexts of individuals and
households, and the interactions among these and other
dynamics.

SIPP data can help us answer questions such as how
do changes in program eligibility rules or benefit levels
affect recipients, how do changes in eligibility rules affect
a program's target population, how does income from household
members affect labor force participation and their reasons
for working or not working, and something like how do wealth
and income patterns differ for various age, sex, and racial
groups.

And because SIPP is a longitudinal survey, it can
also be used to address questions like what factors affect
household and family structure and living arrangements, how
do changes in household structure affect the distribution of
income, what effects do changes in household composition have
on program eligibility, and something like what are the
primary determinants of turnover in programs like SNAP, the
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program.

The survey can be used to answer, you know, many
more questions, but these are kind of the foundational topics
that the survey was created for.

So SIPP samples the civilian non-institutionalized
population of the United States, like many other surveys
we've seen. In 2020, SIPP sampled over 50,000 living quarters from across the nation, and the survey usually oversamples low-income households in order to increase coverage of program participants.

And just a quick look at the wide range of content in the survey. I put this whole list here as a reference and just to kind of show the breadth of the data that we collect. This includes numerous forms of income and program participation, as you would expect, as well as details for employment, wealth and assets, health and well-being, and a variety of demographic characteristics.

One of SIPP's strengths is that interviewers fill out a month-to-month event history calendar with respondents. So you can use SIPP data to study precise transitions into and out of many of these topics during the year. The survey also collects data for up to seven different jobs during the year.

Just a bit about the data files themselves, SIPP data are microdata in person/month format, meaning each record refers to a single month for a single person.

The data are available on our public website at Census.gov/SIPP. They are published annually and are named according to their interview cycle year. So, for example, the 2020 SIPP file refers to data collected during the 2020 interview cycle, and note that most questions in the survey
refer to the previous calendar year, so most data in a file refers to a person's situation during the calendar year that precedes the interview.

So that's a bit about SIPP. If you have any questions in the future, please feel free to reach out to us in the SIPP Coordination and Outreach staff at Census.SIPP@census.gov.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you so much, Adam. Everybody on the team is very excited by your name, and so we are very appreciative of the presentation. Thank you.

Now we're going to transition to Daniel Carroll from Labor, who's going to be talking to us about the National Agricultural Workers Survey.

(Pause.)

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: I think you still are muted, Daniel. Daniel, I can't see your -- I saw your slides, but I can't see your slides right now, and I don't hear you talking, but I do see your cursor moving around on the screen.

(Pause.)

MR. SECRETARY: Daniel, if you can hear us, go ahead and just leave and come back in. We'll go to our next participant and come back to you if that's okay. Oh, there, we just saw something for a second.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Okay. If Daniel --
MR. SECRETARY:  Okay, yeah.  He just left.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR:  He left?  Okay.  So, Robert, you're up.  We're going to go ahead with Robert Hoekstra from Trade Adjustment Assistance Data.  We'll get Daniel when he comes back in.

MR. SECRETARY:  Super.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR:  Thanks so much.

MR. HOEKSTRA:  Hi, everyone.  Hopefully, you can see my screen fine.

MR. SECRETARY:  We can.  Thank you.

MR. HOEKSTRA:  All right.  So I'm Robert Hoekstra. I'm with the Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, that's part of the U.S. Department of Labor.  We are not a statistical group because we are actually within the Agency for Employment and Training Administration.

I'm going to talk about a couple different datasets, one of which does speak to individual level data, but it is specific to administrative data collected as part of serving participants through a Department of Labor training program.

So our program provides a number of services, including comprehensive employment and case management services, training, income support, job search and relocation allowances, as well as wage supplements.  But, as part of that, we need to assess whether individuals were affected by
foreign trade, and in doing so, we develop a fair amount of
administrative data.

So, just so you can understand the flow within the
program, we get petitions filed. Those can be filed by
groups of workers, states, local American job centers,
company officials, unions, and also things like law firms,
and they file a petition with us, and we evaluate based on
statutory criteria whether that group has been affected by
trade.

So a group, so that you can understand what that
means, it is within one firm. It may be the entire firm at a
particular location, it may be, say, just the accounting
department in a particular firm or something like that. So
it depends on exactly what they file for the scope of what we
look at.

We then render a determination on whether or not
they were affected by trade according to the statute, and
then we provide that information to state agencies so that
they can collect worker lists and provide benefits, and we
get some data on who they serve.

The first dataset I do want to talk through is our
petition and determination data set. This is publicly
available on the website. It goes all the way back to 1974,
which is actually the second iteration of the Trade Act, and
it goes through the present. The older data is relatively
sparse, so you do get firm name and usually an address and
whether it was certified or not, but the more recent data,
particularly in the last decade, is very comprehensive.

Now, that being said, I do want to remind you that
this is administrative data, so this is not a survey or a
collection on all workers who are affected by trade. This
relies on petitions being filed and is a product of those
petitions being filed.

As such, whether or not we can certify and
determine a group as eligible or affected by trade depends on
how much states are identifying those firms and filing
petitions. Large firms are easier to identify, and the scope
of what is considered foreign trade has changed a couple of
times throughout the years, and so what we can certify or
consider a foreign trade effect has changed over time.

In that dataset, you do get what our determination
was, dates related to when we issued that, the earliest and
latest layoffs that are covered, the addresses, including
counties, Congressional districts, longitude, latitude,
industry codes, the number of workers, and data on which
countries some of those shifts went to.

So it's a fairly useful dataset. This is our most
requested dataset. It has a lot of value because most
researchers rely on this as the best approximation of what
groups are being affected by trade, which is obviously
something that is difficult to identify. We do release it monthly on a one month delay. So for example we just released data through the end of March and it's downloadable on our website. There's also a little dashboard if you want to play with our statistics over time.

The second data set we get is participant data. So this is data that gets submitted to us by states. They submit data to us on a quarterly basis for all those who received benefits.

What that means is the group was certified for trade. The state workforce agencies were able to connect with that person who came in for services. And then they actually received funded services from our program. And that's how they end up in that dataset.

We collect that mostly for determining what services are provided and what their employment outcomes are. So whether they're employed in a certain amount of time and what their wages are and those kinds of things.

We release a couple of different aspects of that. We unfortunately do not give access to individual records because of privacy reasons. And our N is usually quite small so it actually makes it very difficult. We don't have a restricted data access program, although that is something we're trying to figure out how to change.

We release annual data that is state-level
aggregates based on our fiscal year which runs October to September. And it's usually timed with our annual report to Congress. There's a dashboard and downloadable data there. We also provide state-level aggregate statistics in quarterly files. Those are all posted publicly. And that is usually about 60 days after the end of the quarter. So for example, the 3/31 quarter just closed. It will be basically 60 days from now that that will go up.

We do give some demographics in that, so we get age, sex, gender. We get where they reside. We also get disability status and we also get educational achievement. However, we only release that in national level aggregates annually because those counts get very small very quickly, so just bear that in mind.

The third dataset that we do send out there is our funding. This is how much funds we provide to individual states. We do that, we provide money annually to states. That is in three different groupings. One is what we use to provide training, case management and those kinds of services, and then our income support and our wage supplement gets after the funding stream, so the total amount we give out to states is provided in that as well. We only release that annually and once again, there's a little dashboard that you can play with that data on our website.

That's all I have. If you have any questions on
this you can email me directly or our general petition box. 
All the data that we do release publicly is posted on our 
website. If you submit a FOIA request it will add two weeks 
of bureaucracy and the question will still come to me, so 
feel free to email me. That's fine. 
That's all I have. 
DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you. I can attest to 
the fact that Robert will reply to your email. He will get 
back in touch with you and he's very helpful. Thank you so 
much. 
Daniel is back. So Daniel, if you are available to 
talk to us about the National Agricultural Workers Survey 
we'd love to hear from you. 
MR. CARROLL: Thank you, Stephanie. I'm sorry for 
the technical difficulties. Hopefully this will work this 
time. 
I'm happy to be with you here today to talk about 
the Department of Labor's National Agricultural Worker 
Survey. This is a specialized survey of hired crop workers. 
Today I'm going to talk a little bit about the background of 
the survey, what it contains, how to access the public and 
restricted data files, research applications or how the data 
are used. And if I can get to it, some sample findings. 
This is a survey of hired crop workers including 
those who are brought to farms by labor intermediaries. It

It's unique because we interview respondents at their jobs, so it's an establishment-based survey. And the crop workers are interviewed in person.

Every year we speak with between 1500 and 3600 crop workers, depending on our budget, and as of the end of fiscal year 2018 we have interviewed almost 70,000 crop workers.

It's a pretty rich data source. The survey collects demographic employment and health information in the public data file that are almost 400 variables and in the restricted data file almost 2000.

So we're interviewing crop workers that employers who are in NAICS 111 which is crop production or 1151, support services for crop production.

It's considered a primary source of crop worker demographic and employment data. The data are available nationally and regionally and for California and Florida.

The survey does not include farm workers employed in animal agriculture and it also does not include H-2A workers although we're exploring the feasibility of including H-2A workers.

This is a map of the sampling regions. There are 12. And we go or we dispatch interviewers to each of these regions three times per year. So there are three data
collection cycles and 12 regions. So we have 36 strata. A
data cycle and a region constitute a stratum.

This is the map of our public use breakdown. Here
the 12 sampling regions are collapsed into six regions. And
here now California is the only single state region.

I'll talk a little bit now about the survey
content. Demographically we get information on age, marital
status, race, ethnicity, education, place of birth, all the
way down to the village where people were born. Language
ability, whether or not they speak an indigenous language,
for example. We also collect information on housing type
including a location and arrangement.

We get a lot of information on the characteristics
of the current farm job including average hourly earnings.
We also get a 12 month retrospective look at all jobs that
respondents have had whether it is in farm or non-farm
employment. We collect information on income, assets, and
use of assistance programs. We have a lot of data on health.
So we have information on lifetime health history, access to
health care and health insurance coverage.

Over the years we've collected lots of interesting
information. A lot of it has focused on health. The domains
with an asterisk indicate current supplemental questions, and
you can see that the survey has been used to collect a wide
array of information.
We have a full page of questions dedicated to wages. So crop workers might be paid by the hour, by the piece. They might be paid a combo wage or a salary. And we collect all of that.

We also ask three questions on income. Total personal income in the last year. This is U.S. income. How much of that income was from agricultural employment. Then we also have a question on total household income.

In the public data file there's a variable called Wage G1 which is a variable that reflects all payment types converted into an hourly wage. So this would be a variable that you would use to look at how much a crop worker is earning on average, or say in a particular crop or task. And again, we have three questions on income.

Occupation. Again, we're talking to crop workers. So we're looking at persons employed at agricultural establishments. Within the crop workers you can drill down and look at crop workers by the particular crop they're engaged in at the time of the interview. And the tasks that they're working in. Or you can look at crop and task together, for example food harvesters.

In the public data the crop and task variables are collapsed into five and six categories; and in the restricted data file you have access to the non-collapsed crop and task variables.
In terms of geography, in the public data file you can look at the region of interview. There are six regions. In the restricted data file there are 12 regions. You can also get the state of interview. However, findings may only be reported for California and Florida. For those states the data user would need to pull several years of data.

If justified, we can also include the county of interview in the restricted data file.

The NAWS website has the public data file for download in various formats and here you can see the URL that's highlighted.

You can download the data in Excel, SAS, or comma-separated-values format. And there's lots of information about how to use the data including analysis tips, point of contact.

The questionnaire is not available on the website, but I can send that to you if you send me an email.

Also available on the website are research reports, data tables and presentations. The data tables, we currently have tables for seven time periods that are listed here. And for the United States and for each of the six collapsed public access regions we have a table for demographic characteristics and a table for employment characteristics.

Oftentimes the public data file are not sufficient. Sometimes researchers need more detailed household or job

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information. Or they might need a finer geographic breakout. They might need data from questions that are no longer asked. Or they might need the primary sampling unit which is a farm labor area, to calculate the design track, it's standard areas of estimates.

If someone needs the restricted data file they would simply send an email to me and introduce the research project and state why the public data file is not sufficient. We also ask that the user or prospective user identify or state when the resulting findings will be disseminated. And a description of the analysis plan so we can help you figure out if the NAWS is a good fit based on what you want to do.

If the request is approved, we will ask you to submit a confidentiality procedures affidavit and a computer use form.

The data are used for lots of purposes at the federal level. The data are used by each of the Big 4 farm worker programs. I've listed those here. And again, at the federal level here are some of the other uses: scoring proposed immigration legislation; surveillance of occupational injuries; excessive pesticide handling and training. Just to name a few.

Survey directions. We have a study underway to see if it makes sense to include H-2A workers. We might want to
return to the survey's Immigration Reform and Control Act routes and add questions on labor supply. And I've started collaborating with researchers in Mexico and Canada. There might be an opportunity to make our surveys similar.

Thank you.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you so much, Daniel, for your presentation and your persistence. We much appreciate it.

Now I have some questions for the panel. My co-presenter here with me -- okay, we have 20 minutes for questions and we'll be listening for any type of questions from the audience, and I have some questions here to ask the panelists.

Let me go ahead and start. Basically what I'm going to do is ask some questions. Most of these are general. I might direct some to specific people, but feel free to just go ahead and use the raise your hand function to jump in here and to give an answer.

My first question is about transitions and how your dataset captures transitions. This could be job transitions, for example, employment into and out of employment, into and out of unemployment, or being out of the labor force. Occupation and industry transitions and geographic transitions for example, moving to another state or MSA.

What can you all tell me about your dataset and how
it captures transitions?

MR. CAREY: I can go first here.

I think I mentioned that CPS, because of the framework, the 4-8-4 framework, we would certainly have those transitions as long as they were captured within that framework. That would include employment, unemployment and labor force, also the occupation and industry transitions. So we would have that.

CPS would not have any geographic transitions.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Patrick, to follow up on your comment.

I noticed on the IPUMS website that there's a longitudinal feature to CPS that's been added back to maybe 1970, that I noticed was added around the beginning of the year.

Is that something new? Or is it something that's just been recently added? Can you tell us a little bit more about that?

MR. CAREY: I'm not familiar with the IPUMS site, so I couldn't answer.

It would have to be looking within that 16 month period, right? Between that, those 8 months that people could be in the survey and then, but it's intervened with the 8 months that they're not in the survey. But I'm not familiar with the new tool on the IPUMS site. It sounds
pretty cool though.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Extremely exciting.

Let me go to Adam Smith. Adam, could you tell us a little bit more about transitions in SIPP?

MR. SMITH: Sure. So like I mentioned, SIPP uses an event history calendar to provide person month level data. And so when a field representative is with the respondents, they are kind of going month by month and capturing what's changing during the year for many of the topics.

So, for example, for employment, again, we collect data about up to seven jobs. So for each of those jobs if a job change happens during the year, whether it be leaving that job entirely or perhaps a new occupation, we capture that down to the month level and in some instances the week level. And because there's longitudinal for usually about four years, you can kind of follow someone's journey for four years from month to month.

That goes for occupation as well. Industry, I think within a job has to stay constant. But yes, if we see occupation changes, those are, those transitions are captured. And in terms of geography, we follow people who move, so you would be able to see moving to a new residence. Our lowest geography in the public file is generally just state. So unless they moved across state lines, you wouldn't exactly kind of know where they
transitioned to, but you would know that they moved and then you can see was that related to a job transition or marital history transition or something like that.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Okay. I want to follow up on what you said, Adam, and then I want to jump back to Patrick in a second.

Just to follow up, so say for example if you had a worker who maybe lost one job or had reduced hours at one job and picked up some gig work to supplement. You would be able to capture that type of thing. Is that what I'm hearing from you?

MR. SMITH: Yes. So we number the jobs out and kind of lay it out in calendar form. So let's say you have a job from January to March and then you have a reduce in hours and you pick up some gig work, you would see a new job, let's call it job two, that describes the gig work and kind of the income from that.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thanks for that.

Patrick?

MR. CAREY: I just wanted to add, similar to SIPP I think, we also have a survey called the National Longitudinal Surveys, and that would have the geographic transitions. It would also have the job transitions as well.

You had information about what you're doing in between jobs. But the limitation there is you're limited to
certain age cohorts, so right now we have NLS 79 and NLS 97, and we're looking to build another one right now.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thanks for that, Patrick.

I want to ask you Adam Safir a little bit about the Consumer Expenditure Survey and a little bit along the lines of historical indicators. By that I mean, I know you said, you mentioned that you're following, you're getting quarterly updates from respondents. Am I remembering that correctly, that people, for people who are doing some of the diary tracking for their expenditures, that you're getting some type of regular updates. Am I remembering that correctly?

MR. SAFIR: Yes. The diary, we administer the diary, two one-week diaries to our diary sample. So those folks did not have very much of a longitudinal component at all. Through the interview survey we do bring in each sample address for four quarterly interviews. So respondent might be interviewed in January and then again in April and then again in July, so on and so forth.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you very much.

One more question for you, somewhat related to that. You had a lot of different demographics, that Consumer Expenditures had. Does it have an indicator for industry of occupations? So if a person is a production worker, can I tell if they're a production worker in automotive, like in NAICS 4, automotives, versus something else?
MR. SAFIR: No, unfortunately we don't get to that level of detail. We have essentially two questions around employment. One is that the job category which has a very limited high level set of response options, I want to say around 15 total in terms of what their profession is. And then we have a second question that asks about whether or not they're in private industry, if they work for a state, local or the federal government, or whether they're self-employed. That's pretty much it as far as employment goes.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thanks.

Robert Hoekstra, we have a question for you from one of our panelists, Fariha.

Robert, you stated that the definition of foreign trade has changed over time under the TAA programs. Could you discuss the current definition and main changes and comment on whether certain definitions make it harder or easier to demonstrate harm due to foreign trade?

MR. HOEKSTRA: I'm not going to go into a ton of detail. The various program definitions are available on the website to explain what's covered and what's not.

Broadly, it's a fairly narrow definition under the 2002 program that ran until 2009. Starting in 2009 it included some other aggregate import impacts as well as service sector workers. So prior, in the 2002 program it could only cover manufacturing sector or those who were
related to the production of a product.

There was a slight change in definition between the 2009 to 2011 programs that for the most part is just a nuance. There's an almost never used one that involves public sector workers. But for the most part it was similar.

We've had program reversions in 2011, 2014, and actually right now that refer our program back to the 2002 version temporarily and then when Congress reauthorizes the program, we go back and reinvestigate the ones that were not eligible under the reversion program. For example, if someone filed something for a service sector firm that wasn't eligible during the reversion period, we can then certify them. So it will look in the data, you'll see an indicator of that prior iteration and there will be a very long delay between the petition filing and the deciding they're certified because there was a period where we couldn't make that determination.

That's the big difference. Under the 2002 program it's just production sector and it was also limited to, for shifts, it was limited to countries where we had free trade agreements or were beneficiaries of free trade agreements; whereas under the 2009-2011 and 2015 programs, it could be net centric.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR:  Thanks for your answer.

We have a question from Kadee Russ, who was one of
our presenters and moderators yesterday. Her question is for Daniel Carroll.

Daniel, does NAWS include information on migration status of workers surveyed?

MR. CARROLL: It does. I'm not sure if the question is asking about legal status or about movement. From our 12 month look back, we collect information on all the transitions that a crop worker has had. In the data you can identify international migrants, domestic migrants, follow the crowd migrants, and you're also able to identify the work authorization status or the immigration status of respondents.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Daniel, I want to follow up that question to ask a little bit about some of the details of how the surveys are collected in the field for the workers.

Do you all work with the employers to make sure that the workers have time to answer the questions? I'm wondering about how it actually happens in the field so that the workers, of course, aren't losing income for stopping to do the survey.

Can you give us a little bit of detail on that just real quick?

MR. CARROLL: Sure, yeah. We must obtain the employer's permission to pitch the survey to crop workers.
We either do a census of all, we either interview all the
crop workers at the establishment or do a random sample of
the crop workers. Crop workers are given now $30 cash up
front prior to participating in the survey.

The survey cannot function were it not for the
goodwill of agricultural employers, so we try to administer
the survey at a time that will not interfere with the
business practices of the employer.

So oftentimes the interviews are either done during
their break, or at the beginning of the work day or at the
end of the work day.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: That makes sense. Thank you
so much. Let's see. We have another question for Robert
from Cristina Tello-Trillo, who is going to be on next, in
the next group. "Robert, can you track worker outcomes over
time after they receive the benefits? It would be very
informative if we could track the long-term benefits of the
program."

MR. HOEKSTRA: To some extent. So, in the
participant data, we received three quarters of employment
data that's really data on total earnings and what their
employment was for their major employment, so, you know, in
that quarter, what their industry was for their main
earnings, for three-quarters prior and four quarters after
they exit the program.
We also get, obviously, information about their specific layoff for trade as well as, since we can crosswalk that with the petition data, industry data there. Now that level of analysis isn't available in public files. If people do have specific inquiries that don't have too small of an N, we can certainly talk those through, but we do only track out four quarters after exit.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thanks, Robert. And, Robert, this is a question for you and for Adam Smith possibly. I know that SIPP includes all types of program participation. Robert and Adam, does SIPP include information about TAA participation and help that survey respondents might be getting from a source like TAA? Is that something that's currently included in the dataset?

MR. SMITH: I'm sorry, I'm unfamiliar with TAA. Which program is that?

MR. HOEKSTRA: So TAA is a Department of Labor program. So you and I both work in the same agency, but we are different groups. And, no, the SIPP data does not include Department of Labor's Employment and Training Administration's Trade Adjustment Assistance Program flags at all.

MR. SMITH: Yeah, that's correct.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Okay, I was just wondering because I had a very lengthy list of different programs from
which people might be getting assistance. I just wanted to check on that. All right. I think -- do we have any other questions in the chat right now, Caroline? Because, if we don't, I have another question I'd like to ask.

MS. PETERS: You do. Would you like me to read it out?

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Would you, please?

MS. PETERS: Sure. This is another question from Kadee Russ for Patrick Carey. "Do you recommend any supplementary data to supplement our understanding of black workers within CPS rural areas, and that black workers observations in rural areas are generally not presented with MSA or county identified? One person suggested for this purpose using the REIS. Are there others that you would recommend?"

MR. CAREY: Yeah, that's an interesting question. I can't think of any -- I mean, I can't think of anything offhand. You start getting into some questions of data disclosure at these smaller geographies. If I think of something, I'll chime in here, sorry.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thanks. Thanks so much. We love those head-scratcher questions because that means that we're getting a chance to get down to some nitty-gritty stuff that will really evoke some good thought.

I have a question that I'd like to ask the whole
team, but I'd like to start with Adam Safir and hear from anybody else. Adam, how does Consumer Expenditure Survey, how does it play with other government datasets? Or, for lack of a better way to put it, is there any way to link the information that respondents for Consumer Expenditure Survey, the information that they have, is there any way to link it to other datasets or even administrative products? And so that's a question for Adam, and then I'll open it up to everybody.

MR. SAFIR: Yeah, that's a great question, and, actually, we've, as a program, looked into record linkage and record matching to a number of different datasets. One of the obstacles is that our address file comes from the master address file that is maintained by Census and protected under Title 13 and some other regulations.

And so any matching that occurs generally happens at the Census Bureau itself. We have to form separate memorandums of understanding and, in some cases, IAs with the Census Bureau in order to match our data at the Census Bureau to other datasets like, for example, the IRS, some of the housing datasets. We've also matched to the Economic Research Service out of the USDA, and it really extends the power of the data.

The process of doing so for a private data user, I think, would be prohibitive. You really need to be part of a
federal agency and be in a position to enter into those types of agreements that I've mentioned, and even then, the process is somewhat lengthy but I think ultimately rewarding in the end.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: That sounds good, and what a fitting statement to end with, "ultimately rewarding," because this has been an extremely rewarding panel. It was very difficult for me to restrain myself and not ask a million of my own personal questions, but thank you so much to all of our panelists for this Group 2.

And now we're going to transition into Group 3, and for Group 3 on industry and firm-level data, we have Cristina Tello-Trillo, who we've already heard from in questions and in previous talking, and we also have Aneta Erdie.

Cristina will be talking about the Longitudinal Business Database, and she will also be talking about the Longitudinal Firm Trade Transactions Database. She has quite a task ahead of her, and Aneta will be talking about the Annual Business Survey. So, Cristina, whenever you're ready, you can get started.

DR. TELLO-TRILLO: Perfect. Let me share my screen. Can you see my screen?

MR. SECRETARY: Yep, looks great, thanks.

DR. TELLO-TRILLO: Great, thank you. Great, let me get the clock here. Okay, great, perfect. So I'm going to

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first start talking about the Longitudinal Business Database, the LBD, what is the purpose of the LBD from Census perspective but also from a researcher's perspective.

So the LBD has been used plenty, I would say, in this past symposium, you've seen a lot of papers, you've seen the LBD or the public versions of the Business Register, which are using the CBP, for example, or as Fariha had just presented, the BDS global exporting firms.

But what is the LBD? So the raw LBD file is a set of data files that provide longitudinal information about business establishments operating between the period of '76 and the present. We have a unique longitudinal identifier to track establishments over time, and there is also a unique firm identifier that shows connection between establishments and the company or the firm/organization.

These are one of the several characteristics that the LBD has. So we track employment at establishment level, payroll, revenue -- we start tracking that in 1997, unfortunately, solely at the firm level, not at the establishment level.

We track industry, thanks to Teresa Fort and Shawn Klimek, we have this bin that's consistent, NAICS industry that goes back starting in '76. We also track location of the establishment, the legal form of organization and establishment start and end year.
What is the agency or the Census purpose of the LBD? So mainly right now our main purpose is to provide public product with these data, and, currently, we are providing the Business Dynamic Statistics that you can find on this website. It's basically an annual publication of job creation and job destruction for all sorts of establishments. So we can look at job creation for a continuing establishment, we can look at job creation for births or job destruction for establishments that are dead, and we can do that within a particular geography, we can do that by industry, by firm size and firm age categories, and also by trade status, as Fariha has presented.

This is, for example, one graph that we can do with the data. This is all public-level information again. This is the percentage of workers employed at startups, and we can see that this is starting in '78. We can see that the percentage of workers that are employed at startup firms have declined from the '70s up to, currently -- well, this is in rough terms 2014 -- over time.

So we can do these longitudinal effects in routine analyses using the LBD database. We can also derive some analyses at the geographic level. For example, this map shows you the percentage of total metropolitan employment that come from startups. We're interested in that.

So we see, like, California, there are a lot of
MSAs’ employment that come from startups. There in Florida in the East Coast, a lot of MSA employment come from startups too.

So that's for the Census purpose, to produce these BDS product, and the purpose for the researchers, research community, this being a clinician portion, well, there are plenty of purposes and mainly is to do, like, really great analyses with very detailed data, so we can make sure relationship between firm age and job destruction, job creation, or the relationship between firm age and exporter/importer status.

We can talk about patterns here, we can think about distinguishing the relationship by industry levels, and in particular, because we care about trade in this symposium, we can think about, like, how a trade shock that affects certain industry or certain community affects different firm outcomes, like employment, payroll, firm exit and entrance, right? That's a typical question that we can answer with the LBD database.

And in addition, we can link the LBD database with other databases at Census. For example, the paper that I present in the morning session was about how does workers in different type of firms, maybe firms that export or import, do they have different outcomes after a trade shock, right? So that's linking the LEHD database with this LBD database.
There are some limitations of the LBD database. One of the main limitations is that we only have employment as of March 12. So the frequency of employment, it's not great. It's only at a certain point in time. Then I'm going to skip a little bit, but missing revenue is another limitation. Around 50 percent of firms have missing revenue, so we don't have revenue for the other for this 50 percent of firms, but we're building an imputation model to solve for that.

Okay. And due to time constraint, I'm going to skip to the LFTTD, which is a Longitudinal Firm Trade Transactions Database. And so the LFTTD, it's a very rich database. It's the daily levels -- we have daily transaction of trade goods data with firm-level identifiers, comes from administrative data.

It's merchandise goods only, so we don't track services, only goods that are traded, and it starts in '92. The last year that we currently have is 2019. It's typically produced with a two-year lag. And regarding the export database that we have from the LFTTD, so we have all the export transactions that are valued at $2,500 or more. So any export transaction value above that threshold, we should have that in the data. Below that threshold, unfortunately, we don't track this.

And we have several key variables in the data. We
have export value, EIN, the business name, for Canadian
exports only, the HS-10 code, the destination country, the
origin state of the good, the port, and if it's a related
party transaction or not. So, overall, we have 13 million
transactions in '92, and then it jumps, like, three times
more in 2016, around 37 million transactions by that time.

And regarding the import transaction level data,
very similar to exports. The only difference is that we have
a lower threshold for the import values. So we track all
import values that are at or above $2,000 in terms of value,
and we have pretty similar key variables for the import
transaction database. We have import value, the HS-10 code,
origin country, and related party transaction too.
So we have an average, again, 60 million transactions in '92,
and then it jumps to around 81 million transactions in the
year 2016.

The limitation of the LFTTD is, unfortunately, it's
not a universe; it's almost a universe, I would say, but it
does not contain low-value traders. Again, there's a
threshold of $2,000 and $2,500 for import and export,
respectively, but we can supplement these with the Census of
Manufacturing if we're interested in low-value trading. But
the Census of Manufacturing doesn't have this, or ASM does
not have this destination product information.

Also, sometimes we cannot match all the
transactions to a given U.S. firm because some of the data that we obtained has missing EIN or missing name information, so it's harder to match. But I would say this is a minimal issue in the LFTTD.

And, finally, some data that I already highlighted before with the LBD, we don't have the contemporaneous database. Usually, the data is available with a two-year lag for both the LBD and the LFTTD, and the LFTTD only covers merchandise transactions of goods traders, not of service trade. Okay, I'm going to stop there.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you so much, Cristina. I had to prevent myself from asking you questions during your presentation because there was so much good information. Thank you. All right, Aneta, it's your turn. Please go ahead.

MS. ERDIE: All right. Let me start my presentation. Can you guys see my presentation?

MR. SECRETARY: Yes, but it's not full screen.

MS. ERDIE: It is not full screen?

MR. SECRETARY: If you go up to "slideshow."

MS. ERDIE: "Slideshow"? Okay.

MR. SECRETARY: Yeah, and do "from beginning."

MS. ERDIE: From beginning. Okay.


MS. ERDIE: Okay, great. So good afternoon. My
name is Aneta Erdie. I am the Assistant Division Chief for Business Owners and Government's Program in the Economic Reinvestable Surveys Division. I oversee the business demographics program for both employer and non-employer businesses, and today I'm here to discuss the Census Bureau's federal business ownership program.

So the goal of the program is to provide total business ownership by demographics, and this is done by asking for two components. The employer component consists of the ABS, or the Annual Business Survey, which is a mail-out survey we send to our respondents on annual basis to collect demographic characteristics.

The second component is the non-employer component. That consists of the Non-Employer Statistics by Demographic program, or we call it NES-D, which is a combination of administrative records only to determine owners demographic.

So together these two parts provide comprehensive economic and demographic business data for our uses. It's an annual program that replaces our quintennial SBO, or the Survey of Business Owners. Users are still by, you know, government officials, industry leaders, economic and social analysts, entrepreneurs.

Today, I will most be focused on the ABS or the employer components, but I will show a little bit about non-employers and how we link our data. So, as I just
mentioned, the ABS is the employer component of the business ownership program. It's a simple survey that mails annually to employer businesses in an effort to collect business owner demographics.

But the survey also measures other topics, such as research and development for microbusinesses; those are businesses with employment from one to nine. We have other business and owner characteristic topics. We collect number of owners, type of workers, age of owner, those sort of characteristics.

And on top of data such as owner demographic of the survey respondents, we also use in the final product data from other sources, from our Business Register, from the Economic Census. Those are things like NAICS classification, geographic classification, sales, employment, payroll. And this survey, ABS, is sponsored by the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics within NSF.

ABS has a mandatory authority under Title 13 of the United States Code. It's conducted on a firm entire-company basis rather than, you know, individual establishment basis. The sample sizes vary between 300,000 to 850,000 employer businesses. So, every five years, the sample sizes increase to provide more detailed demographic characteristics by more detailed industry and by more detailed geography.

In the other four years between Economic Censuses,
the sample size is reduced to 300,000 in an effort to reduce the burden on the respondents but still provide valuable summary information on the owner demographics annually. Because the primary goal is to measure demographics, the sample is specifically designed to measure women- and minority-owned businesses, and like I mentioned, it excludes the non-employers because we derive this from our NES-D program.

Although the primary goal of the survey is to measure owner demographics, we also design ABS in such a way that we can measure value-added topics by incorporating new content each survey year. This allows us to be flexible and measure what is determined to be relevant in a given year.

Each year, we collaborate with our sponsor, NCSES, but also with other internal and external stakeholders to develop new content. Some content, such as the owner demographics, are questions about the business structure we ask each year. But some content, what we call "module content," you know, we rotate from year to year. We produce data products that focus on these topics each year, and I will discuss these in the upcoming slides.

So here's our data products. The ABS produces, as I mentioned, the core demographic table, as well as selected module data each year. So these two on the left-hand side are solely produced from the ABS, but we also have hybrid
data products, and the two primary examples of our hybrid
data products are the total business ownership by
demographics that combines our ABS and NES-D for the total
business ownership.

But we also produce U.S. exporting firms by
demographics. This a combination of the results from the ABS
for demographic characteristics with the results from the
profile of U.S. importing and exporting companies for the
exports.

Let me briefly go over each program's data
products. So this shows more in full of the ABS core
demographics table. Data are provided for the number of
employer firms, receipt payroll employment by sex, ethnicity,
race, and veteran status. These data are available at the
U.S. MSA level for all years.

During the larger sample, we also provide county
and economic place. Next level, we have two- and three-digit
NAICS for all years and then two- through six-digit NAICS for
the larger sample year. Additional owner characteristics are
also published annually. Here are a couple of example of,
like, owner characteristics examples include, you know, age
of owner, highest level of education, field of highest
degree, place of birth.

And the business characteristics include things
like type of workers and whether it was family-owned and
operated. The module table -- so, as I previously mentioned, there are a few data products resulting from rotating module content on the ABS. I have listed three examples here for you guys on innovation, technology, and financing.

For the innovation, the survey provides data tables on products and process innovating companies for the U.S. and states. Innovation data are also shown by industry, demographics, and employment size. Innovation particularly in these tables are produced on behalf of our sponsor and are officially released by NCSES. Technology is another example.

We also have, you know, data specific to automation and digital technology. These data are for the U.S., states, with additional cross-tabulation by industry, demographics, and employment size. And I have listed here a last example, which is financing. We actually have recently in March established preliminary findings on the impact of COVID on businesses, collected from the financing module on the 2021 ABS for 2020 reference year.

Also included are data on credit-seeking activities during 2020, and, of course, these are crossed by demographic characteristics. These were preliminary results. We are working on the final results that are expected a little later this year, and those will be more detailed results, including state, industry side, and employment -- industry detailed unemployment side.
So let's move to our hybrid data products very quickly. So here's the, as I mentioned, ABS measure employment businesses combined with our non-employer businesses, which is ABS and NES-D. Sorry, I'm going quickly because I'm looking at the clock.

So I just wanted to mention the geography levels, which is U.S., states, and MSAs, and the NAICS levels are two- and three-digit NAICS. So the results obviously allow us to produce total firms for business demographics.

And, finally, because ABS produces data by demographics, we are able to add value to other data products from the Census Bureau. So, as a result, we have a data product that provides exporting firms by demographics. This is done by combining data from the ABS with the data from the profile of U.S. importing and exporting companies. The tables show the number of exporting firms, value of exports, as well as the export destination by sex, ethnicity, race, and veteran status. There's no additional geo or NAICS details, but the dataset provides valuable information on the, you know, demographics of exporting firms.

Very quickly, last slide, lastly, so information on the microdata available from the ABS. Currently, only restricted use microdata are available. In order to access, researchers need to have an approved project via FSRDC. You know, I ran out of time. That was my last slide and the
DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you so much, Aneta. We're not going to let you leave yet. You might get some of those extra words in because I have some questions for both you and Cristina. And my first question is -- it's kind of for both of you -- I have this kind of thought in my head after listening to your exciting presentations about linkages between datasets.

And, Cristina, you mentioned -- you talked about linking LBD to LEHD, and then I'm thinking about the scenario in which we have LFTTD linked to LBD linked to LEHD, and just my mind is just exploding thinking about the possibilities of the types of things that we could really be able to examine to really get at this distributional effects of trade question.

Could you talk a little bit about, I mean, maybe a little bit about your own work and about how possible it is to really examine these distributional effects when we're looking at all of these datasets linked together, and could you also mention just any type of things that -- any type of insight that you could give to researchers looking to get this type of clearance to look at these things?

DR. TELLO-TRILLO: Sure, yes. Yes, as you say it, it is like when you get access to this data, you're like a kid in a playground, right, you don't know where to go.
Yeah, so we can link, as I mentioned before, the LEHD, which is a worker-level database, to the LBD, which is an establishment and also a firm-level database; we can either do establishment analyses or firm-level analysis.

And also, to the LFTTD, the LFTTD is only at the firm level, right? So we don't know for a multi-unit establishment, we don't know which establishment is actually doing the export or the import. We only know that the firm as a whole is doing the export or import transactions. So that's one caveat to mention, right?

But all of these dataset can be potentially linked at the firm level because they all have a firm ID, a firm identifier, that we longitudinally track over time. So, with that, yes, you can study the distributional effects of trade. So the paper that I presented in the morning tries to attempt to do that or tries to by including worker characteristics as gender, for example, and ways to resolve that gender and race, how is a trade shock differentially impacting people of certain race, of certain gender, of certain level of education.

But not only that, because we can also use the data from the LBD and LFTTD using firm characteristics. So maybe workers working, you know, in a paper refinery, workers working at small firms, less than 50 workers, are actually less susceptible to the trade shock than workers working at
huge firms, more than 2,000 workers.

And this is because, what is it, Homer & Steven have a paper about that, that small firms tend to do more idiosyncratic or personalized products, and big firms tend to do these massive products, and Chinese import competition is competing to these massive products, more general products, than these more specialized type of products that small firms produce, right? So we do find these different types of patterns and how firm characteristics can impact differently the workers.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you. And to go to you, Aneta, I know that there's this public use feature for the Annual Business Survey that makes it accessible to just the everyday person looking to ask questions.

My question is, if we take kind of the kid-in-a-candy-store scenario that Cristina has discussed and we want to narrow this down to a public use sphere, what a researcher could go out and get information to do tomorrow, how could we use ABS to maybe answer questions about, for example, how black female business owners might choose to hire black female workers or something like that?

Can you help us out a little bit in kind of taking the ideal situation that Cristina has examined and making it kind of accessible for the everyday researcher who wants to get some answers?
MS. ERDIE: Yeah, sure. So I didn't finish my last slide. We don't currently have, like, the public use microfile available. In order for the researchers to really work with our, you know, microfile, they have to go to the approved project in the FSRDC, and I think everybody discusses, you know, it's kind of out of my control, right? You submit a proposal and there is a process for it. It's a well-defined process.

There's a possible second approach of sort of working with us on the microdata to work on some of this research, and we've done this with other organizations, with other researchers. It has to be sort of a mutual benefit, so not just a researcher benefit but also benefit to the Census Bureau. It has to be a Title 13 benefit where you sort of pitch an idea, and we sort of, you know -- it's a little bit more lengthy way of obtaining access and actually getting access to our microdata, but then we can work together.

And, you know, we tend to build these relationships generally when people sponsor our module content. So, if people generally want to measure census characteristics, we build in a module and we ask these questions, and then we have the ability to cross-tabulate them by our demographic characteristics.

Even though we show the ability to link the ABS data to other datasets within the Census Bureau -- obviously,
it's feasible -- these interactions are slightly, because it's a sample, you know, survey, these interactions are usually slightly better if we actually add these questions within the survey because, otherwise, it's just for the matched records as opposed to representative of the universe.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: That's very helpful. So there are two kind of ways to get at this. There are two ways to get candy -- to exit the candy store.

MS. ERDIE: Yes.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Okay. And then I want to continue with you for a second to ask a little bit more about just the juxtaposition between the ABS and the SBO.

So we know that the SBO have this microdata feature, but the ABS, can you tell us a little bit about the benefits that we're getting with this transition from SBO, which had the publicly available microdata, to the ABS?

MS. ERDIE: Yeah. So, for us, there are significant benefits from going from the SBO to ABS. The primary one is that these data are now available every year. With the SBO, we only had demographic characteristics every five years, and the demographic characteristics of the country was changing a whole lot quicker than every five years. So that's the major benefit.

The second benefit is that we designed ABS, like I mentioned, to rotate this content, and so we are able to
explore more topics than we have ever been able to explore with the SBO.

We tremendously improved the quality of the non-employers, which is obviously the smallest of the businesses. There is just a lot more of them. We had a fairly poor response rate from the SBO for the non-employer, so obtaining the demographic characteristics from the administrative data, not only did we essentially eliminate the respondent burden on the smallest of the businesses, we have a high-quality estimate for non-employers.

But we've lost content because we don't have this rotating module anymore, such as financing. We just don't have financing for non-employers, but we have very good-quality, robust demographic characteristics for the non-employer businesses.

There were some unintended benefits, I think, for going into this annual cycle. You know, we have core stakeholders who we've improved our relationship with these stakeholders because, you know, we used to talk to them every five years, and then there was this gap in between. Now we are constantly talking to our stakeholders about their needs, and we are constantly addressing those needs.

And we were able to create a lot of new partnerships. Like, a couple of examples are, you know, Department of Labor has reached out to us to add disability
questions on the ABS to the owners section of the ABS, and we are starting to collect this with the mail-out just a little bit later this year.

Another one I mentioned as one of my examples, we had partnered with the Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland and Atlanta, and we were able to develop this really good financing module for their, you know, access to capital during the pandemic, COVID-19 pandemic.

So building these new relationships, ABS really allows us to measure those new topics and build those relationships.

DR. FORTUNE-TAYLOR: Thank you so much, Aneta, and thank you so much to you and Cristina and to all of our participants today: Keith Bailey, Fariha Kamal, Patrick Carey, Adam Safir, Adam Smith, Daniel Carroll, Robert Hoekstra, and to my colleague, Caroline Peters, who is just the wind beneath our wings over here.

Thank you so much to everyone for your participation in this panel. I'd like to let you know that, for the audience members, the presentations that were given today will be loaded onto EDIS, so you'll be able to get access to those, I think, early next week.

And with that, I'll turn it back over to Mr. Secretary to give us our instructions for the break.

MR. SECRETARY: Thank you so much, Stephanie. So
we're going to go ahead and take a break now, and we will break until 1:55. So that leaves us 55 minutes for our lunch break, and I will get on shortly before we resume our afternoon panels to go over my Webex tips again.

(Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the symposium in the above-entitled matter recessed, to reconvene at 1:57 p.m. this same day, Wednesday, April 6, 2022.)
MR. SECRETARY: So we're going to go ahead and begin our afternoon session because I know that we have a lot to discuss. And again, if you need me, send me a chat. I will see it; I will respond to you. If you see that you have a chat, it's from me, so please make sure that you read it.

So, we're going to go ahead and move onto our first afternoon panel, which is a moderated discussion on the global research agenda on distributional effects of trade. This panel will be moderated by Dr. William M. Powers, Chief Economist of the U.S. International Trade Commission. So, Dr. Powers, I yield the floor to you. Thank you.

DR. POWERS: Thank you, Bill, Secretary Bishop, I really appreciate the introduction. And so, this morning we focused on data, and we're switching gears for the afternoon panel. This symposium and the request that the Commission received from the U.S. Trade Representative really reflects the U.S. Government's desire for trade policies to have competent and equitable effects on underserved and disadvantaged communities, and that language is straight from our request letter for this study.

But it's not just the U.S. Government that wants to better understand the distributional effects of trade and that wants to implement more equitable trade policies. That
goal is shared by many countries and many institutions around the world.

And so it's my absolute pleasure to have this panel for you today, truly a global panel. I should say good afternoon, good evening to Bob, and good early-morning to Phil there, so thank you for joining me, and thanks for everyone around the world who's watching and contributing to this panel, and I hope we get a really good discussion going.

So, this panel is organized in the order of international organizations, and then we're going to move to country-specific discussions. And so our international organizations, the speakers include Bob Koopman at the WTO, Maryla Maliszewska at the World Bank, Jane Korinek with OECD. So, great representation we have here with the international organizations.

And then, we're going to look at the initiatives the countries have specifically to apply these types of policies or these types of analyses, and we will look at Phil Mellor who is from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in New Zealand, and Shenjie Chen from the Global Affairs Canada.

So, with that introduction, I would like to turn it over to Bob Koopman, Chief Economist of the WTO. Bob, you have seven minutes.

MR. SECRETARY: You're on mute, Bob.
DR. KOOPMAN: I'm going to share my screen.

Somebody muted me. Can you see my screen? Yes?

MR. SECRETARY: It hasn't arrived yet.

DR. KOOPMAN: Okay. It says I'm sharing. Let me know when it's arrived.

MR. SECRETARY: Okay. There we go. Thank you.

DR. KOOPMAN: Interesting lag there. Anyway, on this first page here, I have a list of publications where we at the WTO have been writing on trade and labor. I'm not going to go through them all. This is more for a record for you to be able to refer to if you'd like, but one of the main ones I think is taking a look at is this joint IMF-World Bank-WTO 2017 piece making trade an engine of growth for all.

I think this piece does a very good job of synthesizing the literature and the findings around the need for adjustment policies and trying to make trade more inclusive. So, the main findings that we at the WTO have is that we essentially find that trade increases aggregate welfare by allowing for specialization, increasing availability of goods, increasing competition, raising productivity; it tends to increase growth and to reduce poverty.

It typically, though, has weak positive impact on nationwide employment, particularly in advanced economies.

In fact, I think it would be useful for you guys in the
future to think about bringing in some of the more macroeconomic folks, as macro policies tend to drive overall employment levels.

But trade does contribute to the decline in manufacturing employment, in our findings, with a reshuffling of resources, but we find generally in our analysis that other factors, such as technologies, have bigger effects. We also find that certain regions, sectors, and individuals benefit from trade, but others can be left worse-off. This has long been known in the trade theory literature, and increasingly the empirical literature, which I think you heard much of yesterday and maybe part of today, goes through and finds at a more granular level the different ways in which trade policy can have these kinds of impacts.

Now, trade also tends to increase the demand for skilled workers, including in developing countries; that goes against some of the traditional trade theory, and it's a factor that can contribute to labor market polarization, along with other factors such as swift technological change.

Now, frictions and adjustment costs are important to measure, and some estimates suggest they may be bigger than previously found but note that trade is not the only force that imposes adjustment costs. I think that's very important to put that into context. One has to look at the forces of trade compared to the other forces that also bring
about the need for adjustment.

So, to make sure that the gains from trade are shared evenly within countries, it's necessary to have complementary domestic policies to effectively deal with adjustment frictions and compensate for losses.

The raw diagnosis as to what's causing the need for adjustment or the various forces that are causing the need for adjustment all working at the same time, means that the wrong medicine might be applied.

So, let me close with some questions here. I was asked to come up with some questions, so let me see if I can do that. What are the labor market effects of trade in services, as countries of particularly advanced economies focus more on services?

What's the impact of trade in developing countries in the presence of global value chains, and I take this as a very important research topic. It's probably been influenced pretty heavily by skill versus technology change.

What's the impact of trade on the quality of jobs? I think that's a very important aspect to explore more deeply. And can we do a better job estimating the importance of frictions and adjustment costs for trade in the context of these other forces such as technology, changing consumer preferences, demographics, and economic geography shifts?

And then finally, and I think this is a gap in much
of the literature that we've looked at, what can we find out
more about the design and effectiveness of adjustment
policies in developing countries, but not just developing
countries; I think it's very important for advanced economies
to learn from one another about what kind of active labor
market policies do a better job and help cushion the blows
from the various forms of adjustment or causes of a need for
adjustment, not just trade.

And I'll stop there, Bill. I think I might've done
that within my seven minutes. Thank you.

MR. SECRETARY: You're on mute, Bill.

DR. POWERS: Thank you, Bob, and thank you for
those questions. I had some questions myself, but we could
easily use yours. Those are excellent questions. I think
we'll have more before we're done this afternoon.

So, our next panelist is Maryla Maliszewska who is
an Economist at the World Bank. Maryla, if you would take it
away?

DR. MALISZEWSKA: Okay, let me put it into the
sharing mode. Okay, can you see what you're supposed to be
seeing this time?

MR. SECRETARY: Yes, we sure do. Thank you.

DR. MALISZEWSKA: Perfect, thank you so much. So,
I'm going to answer the quick three questions that Bill has
asked me to address. The first is what is my situation in
the World Bank's mandate to look at the distributional effects of trade.

What do we mean by the underserved communities in our context, and what are the distributional effects that are key to analyze in the context of the World Bank's mission, which is to eradicate poverty and promote trade prosperity.

So, just to briefly mention that of course what we find is that trade and poverty reduction and greater integration in global markets go hand-in-hand, and that's the motivation for our work.

But due to the World Bank mission, we're mostly focused on low income countries. The role of the Bank is to provide data and tools and knowledge to inform policy responses to spread the gains from trade more widely to make trade work better for the poor.

And it so happens that recently different teams across the Bank, trade team, labor, poverty, and research have put together a report that pretty nicely summarizes what's happening in data, tools, and knowledge at the Bank in the context of the distributional impacts of trade.

And just to add a little bit more to the first question out there, what's the motivation for that work, is that while overall trade is still seen positively in many parts of the world, protectionist economics and nationalism are on the rise, and we want to stress the importance of
It's now more important than ever in its role in the production and distribution of medicine, whole vaccines, in the face of different crises facing the world, such as COVID-19, the current war in Ukraine, or in the long run and also the short and long of the climate change challenges.

And we look at the distributional impacts on the trade out of those contexts, at the Bank. So, as I mentioned, we do it through a number of activities which focus on developments in new data and tools. We also apply often country case studies, since there's so much heterogeneity in terms of the trade shocks, in terms of the labor market characteristics that you really do learn quite a lot from them.

And of course, the idea is to come up with complementary policies and how we can make the gains from trade to be spread more widely. And all this research, I think, really helps to integrate this new approach you're seeing in the World Bank projects and operations -- so, research projects and (technical interference).

Now, the second question that you asked was what do we mean by underserved communities? What do we exactly focus on? So, if you look across different teams at the Bank, we focus on ex post assessment of how imports have affected workers, and we look across the low- and middle-income
At the global level, we look across and examine national impacts when we have the data, and we look at the number of ones. So, of joining free trade agreements and the commodity shocks, and finally, we look at the variety of outcomes.

And so, of course we start with poverty and income inequality in-line with our mission, but of course we look much more thoroughly. We look at courages (phonetic), we look at conception, formal/informal employment, and we state them by gender, by educational attainment of workers, by geographic location of workers, and now increasingly we're trying to restrengthen our capacity to study the implications on informal employment.

And of course, there are huge take-up challenges related to it. We've already strengthened the focus on gender in collaboration with our colleagues from WTO, and we are also being asked by our client countries to look at the implications on the youth, especially in Africa with the growing working-age population of young workers.

Very briefly just to give you an example of the data efforts that we've been undertaking. So, we generated gender-segregated labor database to aside for WTO colleagues to have the sectoral data on wages and employment at the global level for a number of developing countries.
We did it based on the household survey data and the firm survey data, but also, recently we've expanded into national dimension. So, we have data at the sub-national level for 70 developing countries.

And in terms of the other that are used that I mentioned that analysis is in the country case studies. So, as part of the report, we've looked at a number of different questions, such as whether the adjustment costs that signified the persistency of the trade adjustment to trade policy reforms, whether with emerging economies, the adjustment wages, employment, formal, informal, what are the effects on the welfare from emerging economies of thriving exports, and what are the effects of future policy shocks, so forward-looking analyses.

Okay, 30 seconds, I'll just very briefly, wrapping it up, we've developed a policy framework focusing on three pillars, how to reduce distortions in markets, costs and what are the policy actions that need to be taken to speed-up labor market adjustment.

And we have this international policy agenda. Of course, there is a complementary policy agenda. And finally, all this work is feeding into our projects and operations.

Most recently, a lot of the distributional aspects are being analyzed as part of CCDR, Climate Change
Development Reports, but they are being done as part of independent analysis, and forward-looking studies in the context of trade facilitation, free trade and other policy shocks. Thank you very much.

DR. POWERS: Thank you, Maryla, and I give you a special thanks in this symposium for coming to us in your second panel now, so I appreciate that. And I know you had a couple slides, potentially, as follow-up for discussion, and I'll ask you questions about those when we get to the Q&A session, so thank you.

All right, we are moving right onto our third panelist of the day, or presenter. We have Jane Korinek of OECD. Jane, can you take it away?

MR. SECRETARY: You're on mute, Jane.

MS. KORINEK: There we go. Can you hear me?

MR. SECRETARY: Yes we sure can, thank you.

MS. KORINEK: Yes, thank you so much. So, I'm from the OECD. For those of you who are not too familiar with the OECD, we're an international organization, 38 member countries. Our latest member is Costa Rica, which brings our Latin American number of countries to four, and we do economic policy analysis and policy dialogue.

And one of our, you know, main working methods is through peer learning -- so, learning from different countries. I seem to have started in the middle of my
slides. Does anybody know how to go back a few?

MR. SECRETARY: Yeah, just hit the back arrow, or either arrow will take you back or forward.

MS. KORINEK: There we go, thank you. Sorry about that. So, I wanted to talk specifically about some of the work that we have done on the impacts of trade on women. We have had a work program on trade and gender for now a couple of years, and we are doing some comparative analysis, as well as taking a deep dive at the country level.

And I'll give you a few little tidbits about what we've been doing and tell you a little bit more about the framework of analysis that we have designed.

So, this graph shows us that more men work in export-oriented jobs than women. The share of men working in export-oriented jobs here in the white bars is for every OECD country greater than the share of women working in export-oriented jobs.

This data is the OECD trade and value-added data, and it looks at jobs that are directly involved in exporting. But in fact, the picture is the same if you look one step back, which is jobs that are indirectly involved in exporting.

So, the U.S. right there is the last bar on the right, so a smaller share of both men and women are engaged in trade compared with other OECD countries. This is because
it's a larger country, so the share of trade and GDP is smaller.

So yeah, I just wanted to mention that, of course, you know, why are women less engaged in trade than men? One of the main reasons is occupational. Women are more engaged in services, and services are less trade, and men are more engaged in manufacturing.

So, I mean, we heard a lot about this yesterday. You know, of course, men were more impacted by changes in employment due to trade during. For example, the 2008 financial crisis, women have had their jobs furloughed more frequently during COVID because they had been involved in more services and more kind of face-to-face jobs.

The future here is looking at gender gaps. So, this is data harmonized across all OECD countries and corrected for differences in skill levels and hours worked. The average OECD gender wage gap is 13 percent. The U.S. gender wage gap is somewhere closer to the global average of 19 percent.

And why is this important when we're looking at trade? Well, we look at this through a little bit of a different lens than some of the presentations yesterday. We know that export-oriented jobs pay better. There is an export premium, an export pay premium, for both women and men.
So, export-oriented jobs pay better, on average, than jobs that are producing goods and services for the domestic market. But we do find in a number of countries -- not the U.S.; we have not looked at the U.S. -- but in a number of European countries, and we have done our own research with New Zealand.

The export pay premium for women is less than that for men. So, what this means is that since women work less in export-oriented jobs and the export pay premium for them is less, they benefit less from one of the main gains from trade, that is, higher wages.

And then another aspect is, you know, other job characteristics. Bob Koopman just mentioned these aspects too. There's a lot less evidence here. There are a lot of knowledge gaps about what is the impact of trade on job security, on involuntary part-time work -- more of that nebulous concept of job satisfaction.

At the OECD we have looked into some of the evidence in European countries' services sectors, and we found that trade reduces the number of women in involuntary part-time work. Those women found full-time contracts.

But again, this is an area where we need to do a lot more research. At the OECD, we have designed a framework of analysis. We're looking at the impacts of trade on women in particular in our differentiated analysis.
The impacts of trade on women workers -- I've given you a few of the tidbits, but we also look at the impacts of trade on women, entrepreneurs and business leaders -- so, the barriers to trade that they face and the fact that they have smaller businesses, so there is an overlap with the MSME agenda.

And we also look at the price effects of trade, one of the main gains from trade, which has been to lower consumer prices, and how that impacts different types of household. For example, one-parent households with dependent children where women are the majority head of household.

And we have taken a deep dive and done our first country study, pilot study, of New Zealand. We're in the final stages, and I hope my fellow panelists will talk a little bit more about it. And we have come up with a number of areas for policy recommendation.

Some of those are listed here; I won't go into them, but we translate the impacts of trade that we find on women in New Zealand into policy recommendations for New Zealand to make its trade policy more inclusive and more supportive of women. Thank you.

DR. POWERS: Thank you, Jane, and I think we really appreciate the effort that you've done here and the OECD has done to put countries in contact with each other so we can see where we fit. And also, I'd appreciate your focus on
exports and price effects and the gender components to those, which is not something we've heard about very much so far in these seminars, so thank you very much for that.

And as you mentioned, you've also provided a very nice segue into our next presenter, who is Phil Mellor, who is the Lead Economist at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in New Zealand. So Phil, if you're ready, could you take it away, please?

MR. MELLOR: Thanks, Bill, and yes, very appropriate to follow-on from Jane since we've been doing a lot of work with her and her team in the past little while. I'm just going to try to share my screen. Let's see how that goes. I'm sure you can see that.

MR. SECRETARY: Phil, if you go to slideshow? There we go, great.

MR. MELLOR: So, I guess firstly just giving you a bit of context in situation and our interest and our mandate for this work, so the New Zealand government has been adopting a well-being approach to its policy-making for the past few years now, and within the trade space, it's very much embedded in our trade-for-all agenda.

And so the work that we've been doing in the space is really about building out the analytical base, the evidence base for that trade-flow agenda and how we support the policies that come under that.
And then very specifically within that we've got a very specific mandate to look at the CP-TPP trade agreement from this kind of lens as well. So, I just want to focus my remarks on a couple of things, one is a framework that we developed for how we try and catch all these different effects.

And then the second is to go through some of our data from our bottom-up approach, which will kind of help illustrate some of the groups we focus on and some of the missions that we focus on, and it brings in a few of the bits-and-pieces that Jane alluded to in her opening words there.

So, in terms of the framework, so we realized early on in our work that we didn't have an overarching, organizing kind of framework for how we think about through the different issues, and this goes beyond just the distributional effects.

We sometimes call them "inclusive effects", so we could use it as a bit of a synonym, but we're also focusing on environmental effects of trade, as well as the traditional economic ones.

So, the framework was sort of set out early on just to give us a way of organizing our thinking around the whole thing and to think about how there might be, sort of, tradeoffs in some of these areas. So maybe, you know, if
you're pristine (phonetic), your environmental impact on the distributional outcomes and how do those interactions play out.

So, this is the framework. I won't go too much more on that. In terms of the data, so New Zealand's very fortunate that we've got a really strong macro data set, and basically it breaks up into two parts.

So, the first part of it is called our Longitudinal Business Database, and basically it's a repository of all the firms in New Zealand. It has their productivity characteristics, size, industry, it looks into tax data, and importantly for our work, it looks into the customs trade data, so we can build-up a picture of our goods-trading firms.

And I emphasize "goods" here because unfortunately we don't have a good source on the services trade. So, this is just goods firms, which is a bit of a gap. The other half is the Integrated Data Infrastructure, which basically pulls in similar information for individuals.

And it brings in key things for us, like and we can link these two through the monthly payroll data. So basically, this gives us a sense of who our trading firms are and who are the people that they employ and who own those firms and lead those firms.

So, a few insights from that data to hopefully
illustrate how the undeserved groups that we are focused on. So, the first is women, and from that is too much after Jane's presentation, but needless to say, the situation in New Zealand is the same as the countries across OECD members.

You can see from those bars, in pretty much every sector, there are less women in each employment than men, and overall it's about 40 percent of our export workforce is women, whereas they make up about half of the overall workforce. So, a different underrepresentation there.

The other underserved groups that we're focused on, Maori, which is New Zealand's indigenous people, as well as Pacific peoples. Obviously New Zealand's a Pacific nation, and we have a large number of Pacific people who live and work here.

What's interesting about these two groups they are actually slightly over-represented in trade, by the numbers. So, they have a slightly larger participation as workers, at least, in trade.

But what we find with those particular groups and other groups, for that matter, is that the earnings pay gaps that they experience are actually larger in the exporting firms, and their export premium that Jane talked about in her presentation, again, that export premium is much, much lower for our Maori and Pacific peoples than it is for other groups, and particularly New Zealand Europeans, or at least
the way within New Zealand.

So, I guess from the distributional perspective, we've got both this challenge of, in some cases, we need to try and boost the participation and the numbers, but also we need to focus on making sure that the benefits of trade, in terms of those higher wages, are also coming through to those two groups.

Another kind of -- I just wanted to show you which we think is quite interesting is when we think about people in leadership roles. And so, we take a bit of proxy here where we just look at the top five percent paid employees in each firm and look at their gender characteristics.

And I quite like this chart for how it sums these up, because you can kind of see a couple of things really clearly. First, if you look on the left-hand side, you can see that man are heavily represented in leadership positions, in these top-paid positions. If you total-up those first five columns, they come to about 80 percent. So, given that roughly half of the population, it's a very big skew there.

The other interesting one to look at is if you add up the two Maori columns, you can see those two numbers add up to about 12 percent, bombard make up about 15 percent of the workforce. So again, kind of a signal of underrepresentation in these leadership groups, and this kind of skew in terms of the highest-paid positions will be
drawing a lot of the, kind of, the that we saw in the
previous slide.

So, I think I'll just wrap-up there and pass it
back to you, Bill. Thanks.

DR. POWERS: Thank you, Phil, and I have to say I
appreciate your focus on the Maori and the Pacific peoples
because it parallels one of the areas the Commission has been
asked to look into, which are Native American communities.

And there's not nearly as much on those communities
in the U.S. as we would like, so I appreciate here, at least
in some aspect, in this international, so thank you. And so,
last of our presenters, we have Shenjie Chen who is the
Director of Economic Research, Office of the Chief Economist
at Global Affairs Canada. Shenjie, please take it away.

MR. SECRETARY: We see your presentation, Shenjie,
but you're still on mute.

DR. CHEN: Can you hear me now?

MR. SECRETARY: Yes, we can. Thank you so much.

DR. CHEN: Okay, thank you very much. It's my
pleasure to be here to present Canada's approach to assist
the distribution of Federal trade policy change and what we
call "expanded impact assessment", and this is the major
modeling work that our office has done in the past few years,
and we have a price and volume framework to a few trade
agreements.
And our work consists of ex post and ex ante impact assessment of trade agreements, two components. Let me start with ex post impact assessment of trade agreement. We (technical interference) ex post impact assessment in the past few years. The one related to the labor market impact was commissioned to from the UFT and in the context of the Canada-U.S. FTA.

It's about Canada-U.S. FTA on the labor market, and the studies follow very much the standard reduced-form approach to examine the effects of one historic event, which is the Canada-U.S. FTA. It's not a dynamic trade dynamic between the U.S. and China. This study just focuses on one historical event and tries to examine those Canadian tariffs, U.S. tariff on the labor market, using longitudinal and the (technical interference) data for the Canadian workers from 1984 to 2004.

And try to answer the following question: when do we observe the job displacements, and also, do we observe the job displacement separation between the employers, the employees, under the Canada-U.S. FTA, and where did these affected workers go after separation?

Did they go to other firms in the same industry, or other firms in other manufacturing industries, or other firms outside of the manufacturing sector, or become unemployed?

And the last question is what is this separation or
displacements for lifetime earning of these affected workers. That last question is very important. If it doesn't affect the lifetime earnings, then what's the matter about -- the separation, right?

The real conclusion of this analysis is very interesting. It's kind of consistent with the classical trade theory prediction. It's different from the recent emerging literature on China shock.

So, the main conclusion says the industry effect by the Canadian concession had a high probability of the separation or displacement from the initial employer, particularly for the low-attachment worker. The worker in industry with the U.S. tariff concession had a lower probability of the separation.

The industry with the Canadian tariff concession didn't see the high rates displacement. So, it was a high probability of employment in other manufacturing industry, other firms in the same industry, as well as other industries, for example, like construction, mining, and services.

And separation and displacement did not lead to a lower lifetime earnings for both lower- and higher-attachment worker. Short-round income losses in the initial industry of employment was offset by the high earning in the other sectors, including services, construction, milling, in the
longer-term. Let me turn to that ex ante impact assessment, and I don't have the time to go through the overall modeling framework, I'll just present some, kind of, data framework use of our labor market model for the labor market impact assessment.

Here, the base that's used for our model, labor market model, it comes from the 2015 Census data. We did a new census last year, and we tried to incorporate the new data into our model this year. So, overall the census of working age population is about 29.5 million, and the employment is about 18 million.

9.1 are male, and 8.8 millions are for female. So, this is a pretty standard labor market profile data, but from the CGE model perspective, they represent a major departure from the traditional modeling framework in a fundamental way.

First, there's occupation by gender and age, as they allow for the (technical intereference) of the assists the intercountry agreement and the economic well-being of different types of workers.

And also, there's a that people not in the labor force in the labor market, labor moved out of unemployment or joined the labor force when the economic condition improved, or they could go back to the unemployment or out of the labor force when the (technical interference).
Additional notes featured from this dataset, services account for 80 percent of the total importers. So, Canada indeed is a service-based economy, and also, worker accounted for 26 percent of the total employment.

So, this data (technical interference). Then, let me turn to next one. That's occupation mobility matrix, represents the occupation by gender, different age groups from one period to the next. It represents labor market friction by occupation by gender and by age group.

And so, this is from the SLIDs data (phonetic). SLIDs means Service Labor Income Dynamic. It's the longitudinal labor service data. It charts labor mobility by occupation, by gender, the age, over time. Let me move to the next one.

So, this is our general equilibrium solution to the labor market impact assessment. This is not a reduced-form approach; it's a general equilibrium approach. And so, we're starting to trade policy shock to the model, then that translates into some jobs gained and job losses.

That job, then, we pass our information into the labor market model, then the demand for labor, first of all, we measure the involuntary (technical interference). Then after position refill, then the business has to raise the wage to hire more people, the people not in the labor force to join the labor force.
On top of that, there's an demand coming from the efficiency and the production for efficiency trade gain, and these translated into aggregated events.

When you take into account aggregated events and your final results will be, in most cases from our experience, it would be positive. I think, as that's said, I don't have time to go through our overall assessment, our overall assessment consisted of three components, economic impact assessment and (technical interference) assessment.

Initial GBA -- GBA means gender-based analysis -- and we (technical interference) for two phases. First one is for initial assessment feed into the negotiation, then once we reach the negotiation outcomes, then we re-do the assessment based on the final negotiated outcome.

And our modeling framework consists of three complementary models, the labor market model, environmental model, and they're all linked together models simultaneously. That's it for me.

DR. POWERS: I do appreciate the discussion of the (technical interference). As you may know, to make sure that we do analysis of distributional impacts, and it wouldn't surprise me if they come right out and ask us, if we're not required by Congress or USTR at some point to do as well.

Okay, at this point we have moved to the question session, and I see that Bill -- thank you, Bill -- has
already put that we have 19 minutes on the clock and our time is counting down.

So, I have got a couple questions. I want to get to at least one of Bob's questions and a couple we had in advance as well, and please, if you do have any in the audience, please, as Bill has mentioned, send those to the link.

And this is a hard question, but I have faith in this group. Bob mentioned that we need to be doing a better job for importance of frictions and adjustment costs for trade. And I think that's absolutely true.

And one thing that was heartening, Bob, was that a lot of the conversations we had yesterday was about talking about frictions and adjustment costs, at least some of it, including in the methodology panel.

I have a question for this group, though. What about the adjustment costs for other shocks? Maryla, you mentioned COVID and the war in Ukraine -- technology, of course is in the background. Shenjie, you mentioned you've been looking at adjustment costs.

Is there anything special about labor adjustment costs that we should be thinking about putting in our models, or are they similar to the costs that we have for other shocks? And maybe I'm asking the wrong group or asking a bunch of trade economists and maybe we don't know the answer.
to that question, but if we don't know, we should point that out, and perhaps we can ask it in our next session, which is asking labor economists that question.

But I'll ask this group first. I think I'll start with you, Bob, because you did bring up the cost question.

DR. KOOPMAN: Thanks, Bill. We've known for a long time that there are adjustment costs, and there was great work done in the late-'90s and early-2000s that looked at, particularly for different kinds of categories of workers, unskilled workers, workers with high school or less education, unmarried with children, that they had a hard time adjusting to almost any kind of shock and finding employment.

We've also found, you know, that lack of labor mobility, the inability to where new jobs are, is often a big challenge, and as Autor, Dorn, and Hanson have shown, sometimes you get these concentrated industries that suffer from import competition in a locality, and they have big, long, sort of, tail effects on labor transition, and that gets very, very costly.

And I think we're doing a better job of looking at those kinds of costs. I do think it's important though that we not just think about the trade shocks. Often it comes down to what's the impact of immigration, what's the impact of trade. It's much harder to find that kind of work that says, you know, what happens with a demographic shift from
the Northeast to the Southwest?

What happens with major shift in technology? I mean, there's good work like Collard-Wexler and DeLoecker.
around mini-mills and steel and the big implications that had for employment unrelated to trade.

So, I think bringing that broader literature in and making sure that you're able to decompose what are the different forces at play and recognize you have a complex organism in this economy. Don't just think it's a one-trick-pony where you've got a silver bullet.

And you want to make sure whatever policies you develop are flexible policies that can help with the adjustments depending on the shock, right? So, irrespective of the shock, not depending on any specific kind of shock. I hope that gives you some context. I'm sure our other panelists have some good insights to bring to that question also.

DR. POWERS: Maryla?

DR. MALISZEWSKA: Thank you. That trade often takes the blame for a variety of other forces that are in-play. We need to understand the whole context of what's driving changes in employment and wages. But one way in which we -- the question you asked was also how are we going to change or accommodate all these various issues in our models, the adjustment cost.
So, just to elaborate more on what we are trying to do in the nearest project is very similar to what Shenjie Chen did, his transition matching, just trying to understand which workers are likely to move, what are their characteristics, who is more likely to jump out of the labor force and move into unemployment.

So, that's critical because now our model, of course, which are of the world, everyone switches sectors, and we do use for some characteristics, but still they move within the same year. So, just trying to build that transition period, the adjustment cost, is extremely important to get a better picture of the likely implications of trade on jobs and wages. Thank you.

DR. POWERS: Shenjie, would you continue?

DR. CHEN: Well, I just tried to answer the question about adjustment costs. Adjustment costs, essentially, it's the cost associated in chance of moving from one equilibrium to the next equilibrium. So, many elements, for instance, like you're moving from one occupation to another occupation.

From the data, actually it's the transition metrics, moving from one occupation to another occupation is extremely difficult, and the majority of the people, they stay in the same occupation from one period to the next period.
And then between the age and between the different
genders, that freshens (phonetic) costs and the transaction
cost is not very high. And those are important elements that
Bob mentioned. It's a geographic adjustment that's
extremely, extremely painful. Lots of people just don't want
to move to another place.

But in our model, that element is missing. But
according to the labor economists, they say this is probably
one of the most important elements to consider in the
finished model.

DR. POWERS: Bob?

DR. KOOPMAN: Thanks, Bill, if I could just build a
little bit on Maryla and Shenjie's points, I think I would
describe it as this. It's good if you can build these into
your analytical frameworks, but I also think it's just fine
to use different analytical frameworks to supplement it.
Don't put too much pressure on any one model to solve you
know, all the interactions.

And I think there's a lot to be learned from using
different models for what their different strengths are, and
then finding ways to integrate or leverage the different
insights to tell a comprehensive story.

DR. POWERS: Thanks. Any other comments on
adjustment costs and why they might be different in the trade
space than, say, in other macroeconomic shocks? Bill's
saying nope. All right, so let's move onto my next question, actually.

And one of the things we heard a lot of in the roundtable, and a little bit in this symposium but not too much, is the importance of complementary policies. And Maryla, you put this out there in your slide that we haven't seen yet, which actually leads to complementary policies, trade globalization can perpetuate disparities.

And this has been repeated to me in our earlier events this month and last month in our roundtables. And you note, Maryla, you note that policies -- workers were more easily able to shift to new opportunities in Bangladesh, say, than South Africa.

Can you tell us about that, like what the role of policy was to mitigate some of these losses or to enhance benefits?

DR. MALISZEWSKA: Yes, absolutely. So, we have a number of case studies as part of the distributional impacts of trade report, and many found them very helpful in trying to understand different contexts across countries. And I think it also makes sense for the U.S.

You know, the conversations we had yesterday about different educational attainment or labor mobility across U.S. states. I think there are some lessons to be learned.

So, that's an example of the part of the analysis,
that the colleagues in the back have been doing, and
basically what we've found that, in Bangladesh following the
trade liberalization and export to the OECD countries, mostly
textiles, there was a big boost to wages and unemployment.

But it was really across the board. It was thanks
to (phonetic) migration barriers, and that meant that workers
quickly shifted from either other sectors or other locations
to take advantages of the new opportunities, and the
formalization of the labor force increased quite
significantly too, benefitting mostly female workers.

While, in South Africa, there was this shift, you
know, the open and the liberalization of trade actually led
to perpetuation of existing inequalities. c

And it's mostly because of the apartheid housing
and labor policies that created long-lasting bias for workers
to move across regions, sectors, and occupations. So, that's
the comparative income across two counties with very
different outcomes for specific regions and types of workers.

And even though was gaining overall, there were
large inequalities in South Africa versus the people were
kind of more equal across different types of workers and
locations in Bangladesh. Thank you.

DR. POWERS: Thank you, Maryla. I would be quite
interested in hearing from either Phil or Shenjie whether
this kind of thinking goes into your trade policies as you
try to make them more equitable?

DR. CHEN: Phil, do you want to go first?

MR. MELLOR: Yeah, I mean, it's a good question.

Maybe Shenjie, do you want to while I?

DR. CHEN: All right. The policy recently we started to introduce some new chapters into the trade agreement. One is about the gender chapter, and also, like, SME chapters starting from the 2017 under the CP-TTP agreement.

And also we have some provisions related to operational people - also (phonetic) operational people. But the basic structure, it's always they are very similar. It's always emphasized importance of sue (phonetic) issue in the community economies and global economy.

And also, emphasize how to follow or stick to the international convention, like ILO and the OECD, some procedures, the conventions and the ability of the procedure something.

And then, also set up some kind of a working group, and there's always, you know, when you trade agreements, always the last two chapters are always about the corporation chapter and which area will actually expand the corporation. And finally, it's some kind of committee called a corporation committee, or it could be some gender committee or SME committee to facilitate information exchange and the
monitoring of development and such and such.

So, that's very much, from the trade policy perspective. But certainly, this issue, it's far more complicated, and we won't be able to completely adjust by trade policy. It has to be adjusting rules at the domestic region or overall regulatory cooperations between the countries. And the trade policy only, you know, touch a little bit, and these are very broad issues.

MR. MELLOR: Maybe just to build on Shenjie's points as well, so yeah, we had, kind of, similar chapters in our recent trade agreements, notably in the U.K. a trade agreement that we signed about a month ago. We also put an indigenous corporation chapter into that one as well, so that's, I guess, another group that we are focused on.

The other one I'll note is the role that trade facilitation can play as well, because we know that, for example, in New Zealand at least, lead businesses tend to be smaller. Our Maori businesses tend to be smaller, and so there we see there's kind of higher, you know, relatively higher barriers to those kind of fixed costs related to trade.

So, that kind of trade facilitation kind of aspect is important too. But I think Shenjie's last point, I think, on the domestic policies is probably the critical one. I think that's something we've been trying to message quite
clearly in our work is actually, you know, a lot of these kind of gaps, they are structural features in the economy that you need to fix with other domestic policies.

So, for example, those gender pay dips, for example, they're to do with a whole lot of, you know, corporal behavioral things, but also features like, you know, availability of child care, expectations around unpaid work, you know, all those kinds of things as well. So, yeah, trade policy only, you know, gets you so far on some of these topics.

DR. POWERS: Thanks. I want to save a little time for a question with Jane, but did any other panelists have a quick comment on that question? All right, I will turn my question to Jane next.

Jane, if I could jump a little bit beyond your presentation and then go look at your 2021 policy paper which was sort of the background for it, you did mention, in that paper you talked about the gender provisions in preferential trade agreements, and you noted that they generally contain few binding commitments.

So, that said, what evidence do we have of the effect of these provisions? And then, if that's (technical interference), can you suggest any qualitative or quantitative approaches to analyzing these effects in these provisions?
MS. KORINEK: Yeah, sure. So, one aspect that we talk quite a bit about in that paper is the importance of doing ex-ante impact assessments that are, you know, gender differentiated or, you know, differentiated by different groups that one might want to look into.

So, Shenjie touched on this. This is a practice that is very common in Canada, and this ex-ante impact assessment then feed into the negotiations, in terms of prioritizing certain sectors for market access.

So, in order to lower gender gaps, for example, or, you know, gaps in access to markets for, you know, other types of underserved groups. So, if you're talking about, you know, market access provisions, those are measurable.

And so, you know, having that feed into the negotiating process and prioritizing certain sectors according to who's working in those sectors -- I think this was brought up yesterday also by David Fortunato -- you know, this is one way that policymakers take aim to use trade to lower gender gaps.

A lot of the other provisions in regional trade agreements are more like best-endeavor or cooperation, or, for example -- so, when we did this trade and gender review of New Zealand, we suggested a number of areas in the trade facilitation area or in trade promotion for the export promotion agency, how they can be more gender (technical
interference).

It's about, you know, engaging more with women stakeholders, making sure that they are very intentional about including entrepreneurs, for example, in trade missions or other activities.

And so, I mean, you know, this, obviously you can measure the inputs, but you're not going to be able to measure the outputs very easily. So, I would say some of these are measurable, in particular market access, and some of them are more measurable on the input side than on the output side.

But this is the very beginning of this. We're at the very beginning of trying to figure out how to move forward. So, you know, I think that's why this type of discussion is so valuable.

DR. POWERS: Well thank you, Jane, I think that's an excellent place to end our thing. I do find this incredibly valuable. I want to thank everyone here again for coming and being so thoughtful with your presentations and responses.

So, thank you, and with that, Bill, can you introduce our -- oh, Bob has a final comment. Yes? Oh, Bob's just saying goodbye. Bob's waving goodbye. And Bill, can you tell me how long we have for our next break? Is it five or ten minutes?
MR. SECRETARY: Let me quickly find that out for everybody. 10 minutes. So, we'll have a quick 10-minute break. We will start our final session of the afternoon at 3:10.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

MR. SECRETARY: We will now begin our next session, which is a moderated discussion on future directions. This panel is moderated by Dr. Sandra A. Rivera, Associate Director of Economics with the U.S. International Trade Commission. I welcome you, Dr. Rivera. I turn the floor to you. You're on mute.

MS. RIVERA: Thanks, Bill.

MR. SECRETARY: You bet.

MS. RIVERA: I am so happy to see you all today. Thank you for making time to attend this panel and engage with us. I see most of the team. So, I just wanted to start off with thanking each of you and sharing that, over the past few days, we have had several panels that had areas that were very well-researched with deep dives in areas of literature such as wage and skill, gender, things that are less researched, or maybe not as extensively or rigorously as the other areas, race and ethnicity, we've looked at methodological issues, data availability and gaps.

But during this panel, we're taking a much bigger look. We're going to look with the goal of harnessing
thoughts of other fields outside of trade necessarily.

We have a remarkable group of researchers that we hope to leverage for their thoughts, and these themes are going to be very important for our investigation, revisiting from a different perspective.

You know, we want to learn more about economic equity at the quantifying (phonetic) those that are differently abled, economic history of underserved, impacts on wealth intersectionality, and the list goes on.

So, before we get started, I just wanted to introduce the panel. We have Anna Hernandez Kent from the Institute of Economic Equity at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We also have Sandra Houtenville, Direct of the Institute of Disability at the University of New Hampshire.

We have Dan Giedeman at Grand State Valley University, Dr. Sandy Darity from Duke University, Dr. Margaret Simms from the Urban Institute, Dr. Martell from Bard College, and Dr. Sonya Porter from the U.S. Census. I'm going to ask each of you to tell us a little bit about your field of study and what research, just generally, you're working on these days, and then we have a host a questions for you to answer.

You have three minutes to delve into those details, and with that, I am going to ask Dr. Ana Hernandez Kent to please start.
DR. KENT: Thank you, Sandra and Chris, and everyone at USITC that's put together this wonderful conference. Yeah, I'm Ana Kent, and I work at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at the Institute for Economic Equity.

It formed about a year-and-a-half ago now, and we really focus on exactly that -- economic equity, how families are doing in the United States, what barriers there are to their full economic participation and, you know, what we can do as the Federal Reserve to highlight those disparities that many families face, as well as opportunities for growth.

So, my research, I really focus on wealth gaps, both because it's just so importance to families' resilience, their economic mobility, but also looking at demographics. So, it's not randomly assigned whether, you know, you have a lot of wealth or not a lot of wealth, or you're in these different groups.

So, families who are black are Hispanic, who are younger, who are women, they tend to have less wealth than their counterparts. And so, we look at that history what the gaps look like today and what types of factors influence them, as well.

And, you know, it's not just about families, right? This doesn't have just an effect on families, it has broader economic effects as well. Research from our colleagues in
San Francisco have found the effects on GDP potentially lost GDP to be nearly $2 trillion per year. So, you know, it's fairly significant.

GDP is a measure of basically how we're doing, economically speaking, and we expanded this research as well to look by state, and you can find that on our Fed Communities website.

If you look at closing the gaps by race and by gender, each state and Washington D.C. stands to gain billions of dollars every year, and this is lost potential in innovation and various other things. So, I'm happy to be on this panel and to continue the discussion.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you very much. Our next panelist we have is Dr. Andrew Houtenville who's from the University of New Hampshire, Director of the Institute of Disability. Go ahead.

MR. SECRETARY: You're on mute, Andrew.

DR. HOUTENVILLE: There we go. How's that? So, my name's Andrew Houtenville. So, I'm an economist at the University of New Hampshire labor public finance health/economist. And the nature of my research is all kind of using secondary observational data; I do some primary data collection, but getting ahold of samples of people with disabilities can be quite difficult, given some of them are rare events.
I spend a lot of my research defining disability because it's a pretty heterogenous population, and it's difficult operation-wise in surveys. So, drawing together from multiple surveys. Every time we try to make a conclusion, you try to do it for every possible measure that's available.

Using administrative records as well, which was a topic earlier this morning, was these administrative records. So, I have to do a lot of that just to get the base foundation of my research. The other area is on the impact of policy on the employment of people with disabilities.

People with disabilities of working-age civilians are about half as likely to be employed than other workers of working age. And, you know, the big elephant in the room is Social Security/Disability policy, both as society (phonetic), which may or may not have implications in terms of trade and the impacts of trade on, kind of equity.

However, there's another whole side of disability policy, and that's return-to-work transitions, and that's very relevant to certainly the earlier conversation in the panel before where, if there are disruptions in an industry or an occupation or an area of the country where trade is seen to potentially disruptive.

So, you know, there are some things to be concerned about with disability and trade, and people with disabilities
seem to be loyal. There's all these old studies on the
loyalty of the worker with disabilities. However, that
actually could be reflective of their lack of opportunity and
their inability to move and relocate because they have local
supports that they depend on.

Depending on the type of disability, it can be
quite substantial. And so, people with disabilities are
vulnerable to not being able to adjust both to an occupation
and to a geographic location in order to smooth their
earnings -- in order to adjust to economic shocks.

And we do see that with the Great Recession people
with disabilities were much less likely to recover quickly --
not so for COVID, but we can talk about that more later.
I'll stop there.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you, Andrew. Next, Dr. Dan
Giedeman at the Grand Valley State University.

DR. GIEDEMAN: Hi, yes, I'm a professor of
economics at Grand Valley State. I'm also the co-editor of
essays in business and economic history. So, as you might
expect, a lot of my research deals with economic history,
looking at long-running trends of economic growth.

Also looking at institutional arrangements and how
those have affected economic growth. Most relevant for this
panel has been the work I've been doing, a series of papers
with my co-authors Gary Hoover, Ryan Compton, and Cruella
Godday in which we have been looking at racial wealth and income gaps.

And we've looked at it with respect to changes in institutional rules across states, we looked at how the great recession has played a role in wealth inequality. More recently, we had a paper that came out last year that talked about how macroeconomic shocks may affect different groups depending upon what race they are.

And so, I'm just hoping to contribute to this panel in any way that I can. Thank you.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you very much, Dan. Next, we have Dr. William Darity. Go ahead.

DR. DARITY: I'm William Darity, known better as "Sandy" Darity. I am a faculty member at Duke University, primarily in public policy on African and African American studies. I am involved in the process of building the subfield of stratification economics.

I believe that a speech that I gave in the year 2005 actually launched that subfield. A substantial amount of my work is focused on racial wealth disparities in the United States, and this is because of the impression that I have that the racial wealth gap is the premiere economic indicator of the cumulative inter-generational effects of white supremacy in the United States.

So, I'd like to provide some initial details about
some of the findings we have had about racial wealth
disparity in the United States using the survey of consumer
finances for the year 2019. We've discerned that the gap in
household wealth on average between blacks and whites is
about $840,000.

This translates into a per-person differential of
about $350,000. We focus on the average in our work, rather
than the median gap, because of two fundamental reasons.
First, 97 percent of the wealth held by white households in
the United States is held by those above the median level of
wealth.

And so, as a consequence, if you focus on the
median gap rather than the gap at the average or mean, you're
ignoring the vast amount of wealth that is held in the United
States. In addition, this differential is not due to the
presence of a handful of extremely white, rich billionaires,
although there is such a handful.

But it's as a consequence of a more widely skewed
distribution of wealth. One quarter of white households have
a net worth in excess of $1 million, while that is true for
only four percent of black households, and the black
professional class actually has less wealth than the white
working class -- two to three times less wealth at the median
than the white working class.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you very much, Sandy. I'm going
to ask Dr. Margaret Simms from the Urban Institute to introduce herself.

DR. SIMMS: I'm Margaret Simms. I'm currently a non-resident fellow at the Urban institute. Until about four years ago, I directed the low-income working families project there at Urban. My work has focused on employment and income, and also on wealth distribution.

I think one of the examples of what some of my recent work which is focused on structural racism is a study I did with my colleagues in Pittsburgh, which is a city that did undergo some economic transformation, shifting from the steel industry into finance and other areas, and looking at the impact that it had on employment opportunities for African American men in particular, both employment and business opportunity.

And I think one of the things that perhaps has not been as emphasized in this conference is not just about job loss but the failure to get into the labor market. So, some of what we looked at in Pittsburgh was how young men never were able to make an entry into the job market because of the kinds of jobs that might've been available to their fathers and uncles are no longer available, and trying to make that connection to the jobs of the present and the future have been very difficult. And I'll stop there and see how the discussion goes.
MS. RIVERA: All right, thank you. Next, we have Dr. Mike Martell from Bard College.

DR. MARTELL: Thanks. Hi, I'm Mike Martell. My pronouns are he/him/his. I'm at Bard College. I'm broadly trained as a labor and demographic economist, but my research largely concerns the economics of sexual orientation.

And so, I tend to study the causes, consequences, and the potential remedies of some of the negative differentials that lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals experience.

And so, I've been studying things such as why and what are the mechanisms, why LGB folks tend to earn less than their heterosexual counterparts, how does that translate into experiences in educational institutions and elsewhere, how effective are expansions of equal rights, such as protection from discrimination and access to legal institutions of marriage, and then I also study the way through which members of same-sex households make decisions together and organize their behavior, which in some ways lets us understand a little bit of how heteronormative biases in policy and theory circles might underserve sexual minorities. Thanks, I'll stop there.

MS. RIVERA: Okay, great. Next we have Dr. Sonya Porter from Census.

DR. PORTER: Thank you, Sandra, and thank you Chris...
for organizing this great panel. Yes, my name is Sonya Porter. I'm a Principal Sociologist and Demographer at the U.S. Census Bureau in the Center for Economic Studies, and most of my research focuses on racial and ethnic measurement, and then also, racial and ethnic inequality.

For the past 10 years, I have mainly worked on using data that is administrative records data linked to survey data or decennial census data or other administrative records data.

So, primary projects that I have -- and I try to look with a lens of race and ethnicity when I work on these projects, is that I look at intragenerational mobility and intergenerational mobility using tax records matched to decennial census and American Community Survey data so that you can actually look at race and other factors.

Also, working with the Bureau of Justice Statistics, we analyze state and federal prison records linked again to survey records and decennial census records to answer questions that are hard to answer just with some administrative records data alone.

And then, also using evictions data linked to census data to better understand demographic characteristics of those who are affected. A lot of the Court proceeding records don't have race or age or gender on them, and so linking them to census data really allows us to get a better
picture of who is evicted, and of course, there is a huge
gradient in terms of, you know, minorities, particularly
black women, who are affected by evictions.
And so, actually being able to study outcomes
related to, you know, describing the demographics but then
also looking at labor market outcomes and other things
related to evictions I think is really critical as we move
this research forward.

MS. RIVERA: Saved by the bell -- you know what I
mean. So, we have a very diverse panel, and I'm so excited
to ask you all a number of questions. I'm going to put
something out there. One thing in international trade, you
know, we can't really get a grasp of things unless we focus
it. We can't fix or even understand what we don't look at.
How has a focus of distributional effects informed
your field in particular? How are they looking at it? Who
would like to start that off?

DR. SIMMS: Well, I can start. Most of my work has
focused on distributional issues, whether it's distribution
of Government benefits or distribution of income and
employment opportunities.
So my understanding the distributional impact for
policy helps us to understand where people will end up on the
economic ladder and how specific policies can be modified to
improve outcomes.
In some cases, it may be changing the policy, but in other cases, it may be the development of compensating strategies to minimize the negative impacts of policy change.

MS. RIVERA: Mike, can I ask you to jump in?

DR. MARTELL: Yeah, absolutely. Thanks for the question, and I think you're absolutely right that we can't understand what we don't look at, and I think that is pretty characteristic of the things that I study because "."

And so, since I'm an economists really haven't started studying sexual orientation since 1985, which is longer than I actually think, but is relatively recent, and we still have very few data sources that we can actually utilize in order to try to understand the economic status of folks who are LGBTQ+.

But of the data we do have, we find that there's lots of distributional effects and inequities experienced by members of these populations, the unequal distribution of protection from discrimination in the workplace leads to worse outcomes for LGB folks -- probably transgender folks, but we don't have enough data to actually let us know.

The expansion of access to legal marriage promotes equity within members of same-sex households. It incentivizes people to invest in relationship assets that helps them spend time with loved ones and children, which is going to have some intergenerational effects and allows them
to invest in financial assets that might help them down the line.

And so, you know, most of the folks working in my area are looking at distributional effects and the negative impacts of unequal access to policies and institutions that have been long-afforded heterosexual couples.

But we're still hindered by not collecting data on LGBTQ+ people, and, you know, the data we collect reflects the values that we hold. And so, if we want to promote equity for LGBTQ+ people, which I hope is a goal we share, I hope that one of the things on our short-term goals of things to do is, you know, press forward with expanding the collection of sexual orientation and gender identity information on national surveys.

I'm really happy that I think within the last year, the Census Bureau, for the first time ever, included sexual orientation and gender identity on the household pulse survey, which is fantastic news and has been really useful to begin to understand the economic status and the disproportionate burden of the COVID pandemic in which we would have not been able to understand otherwise.

But there's also lots we should learn about trade, but we won't be able to do so until we start asking. Thanks.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you, Mike. Does anyone else want to weigh-in on that question? Sonya?
DR. PORTER: So, I think just thinking about I'm thinking as a demographer but sort of the way that I'm thinking about this question is just like based on my research, a race started working at the Census Bureau.

So, one thing that I think is really important for people to think about is that it's important, when you look at race groups, a lot of people just look at white and black, or they might look at Hispanic, too, and some of that might actually be related to the surveys and the surveys not being able to collect more information on other race groups.

But I also often find that a lot of surveys do collect information on other race groups, and people still are not inclined to report on all race groups when they're doing research, in both sociology and economics.

And I think it's important to at least mention, like, what the other, you know, disparities are among other groups, and I think looking deeper within groups is important, too.

So, for instance, looking within the Asian category, you know, Asian Indians in 2019, according to Pew, made a household income of about 119,000, but Burmese households made about 44,000, and that's a vast, like, disparity.

And so, to the extent that you can, looking at all the racial groups but then also looking within your Asian and
also Hispanic groups I think it's really important. I think place is very important as it interacts with race, as well.

We have found, we have created the opportunity atlas. It was a Census collaboration with also Harvard, with Raj Chetty, Nathan Hendren, and John Friedman, and what we found is that it's really important to think about how, you know, you can live within the same neighborhood and sub-groups, and by gender, have very different experiences.

So, you have different incarceration experiences for black men compared to Hispanic men in the same neighborhood. You have different income experiences for black women compared to black men, and we need to be thinking about those experiences within the same areas.

And we also found that even areas just a few miles apart have very different experiences. And so, I think that from maybe trade policy or other policies perspectives, understanding that locality also matters when it interacts in ways related to race and also gender.

And then I'll make two other points, if I have time. I think it's also really important for us, and this is coming from sociology, to really interrogate our statistics. Becky Tent, I'm not sure I'm pronouncing her last name right and Reese Westin (phonetic) are both sociologists, and they say that, you know, it's really important when we think about labor market statistics, when we don't include
black men in the denominator that are incarcerated, then we're skewing our statistics to make our statistics look much better than they might really be for a particular population and particular age groups.

And so, we really need to be thinking about these types of things as researchers. There might be longstanding ways that we have been doing things and creating our statistics, and I think that Sandy Darity made a good example about median versus the average.

And we need to be thinking about how the way that we present these statistics actually, like, represent progress for groups and disparities, and I'll stop there. Thanks.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you, Sonya. Sandy? We can't hear you.

MR. DARITY: Sorry. I would like to say that Sonya Porter's comments about disaggregation are vital. This applies not only to disaggregation among the gross categories that we typically refer to as Asian or Hispanic, but also within the black population there's a decided difference in experience and outcomes for those of us who are descendants of persons who were enslaved in the United States and individuals who are more recent immigrants to the United States, particularly the predominant group of black immigrants to the United States who have come in the
aftermath of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s. I'd also like to add that there is some research on the relationship between foreign trade and racially disparate outcomes. Most of that research has been empirical, done primarily by Jacqueline and Richard Agesa, where they have focused on the differential impacts of imports, or the volume of imports and types of imports, on the income position of blacks and whites in the United States and the differential impact on the degree of discrimination.

But to the best of my knowledge, there is no research that's available on the impact of exports or trade surpluses or deficits, or the changing composition of exports, or trade policy with respect to the installation of tariffs or quotas, nor, finally, its change range (phonetic) effects on racial differences and outcomes.

I will say that my prior is that these types of effects are strongest on income and weakest on wealth, but we don't really have a body of research that addresses these things. Final comment, recently I was on a panel that was exploring the impact of monetary policy on racial inequality, and I think it's high-time we also look at the impact of trade policy on operational inequality.

MS. RIVERA: Ana?

DR. KENT: Thanks, Sandra. Yeah, I want to echo Sonya's and Sandy's comments as well about -- and, really,
just the whole panel -- about why it's so important to
disaggregate.

So, for me, when I think about the importance,
really, it comes down to assumptions. So oftentimes I think,
as regular people, as researchers, we could have assumptions
about why we're seeing certain things happen, but if we don't
collect that data and we don't disaggregate importantly, then
we might come to an error in its conclusion or an erroneous
conclusion rather.

So one example is, you know, people can sort of
think of education, college education, as this great
equalizer, as the silver bullet to the racial wealth gap if
they're not, you know, seeking this literature, but, as
Sandy's work suggests, as our work at the Federal Reserve
Bank suggests, it's not -- simply put, it's not a silver
bullet.

So Black and Hispanic college grads have less
wealth than a typical White high school grad, and so, if you
look at, you know -- and that's just one level of
disaggregation within education. You can go further and look
at gender as well, you can go further and look at generation,
and, you know, you get more nuance and you get more
information the further you go. And so I just think that's
so critical when we're trying to really understand the
problem and design solutions that have an impact.
DR. DARITY: Let me just inject, Black and Latino heads of households with college degrees have less wealth than White heads of household who never finished high school.

DR. KENT: So I'm assuming you're looking at average. Yeah. So, again, another example of it doesn't --

DR. DARITY: I'm looking at -- these are medians. These are medians. These are medians. That is out there.

DR. KENT: Our work suggests something different, but we can talk offline after that. Either way, I mean, the point is that the gap's still huge and still matters.

DR. DARITY: Yeah.

MS. RIVERA: I see that two hands are raised. I don't know which one was first. Andrew, want to go first, and then Margaret? We can't hear you.

DR. HOUTENVILLE: Can you hear me now?

MS. RIVERA: Yes.

DR. HOUTENVILLE: Okay, sorry. So you guys need to get together and do some kernel densities and figure out if there's stochastic dominance of the distribution between your measures if you're having difficulties with means and medians.

But, you know, with disability-related work, we have a very difficult time doing wealth for two primary reasons. One is that age and disability go together, and so...
we'll frequently find people with disabilities have greater home ownership, right, because people aged into a disability and older individuals are more likely to potentially own a home, and so we need date of onset, and date of onset is almost always missing. It's very difficult to ask.

And then we have screening issues. So the survey of consumer spending only -- you're only identified as having a disability if you're not working, if it's a reason for your being not in the labor force, and so, if you're working, you're not considered to have a disability. So there are some issues. We have similar issues at very small cell sizes if we want to break the disability type.

And I was recently looking at health equity on a panel, one of the White House panels, and there was a real push just to increase the sample size of the national health interview survey so we could at least get state identifiers out of it and get, you know, bigger cells for specific disability types.

And most of our work focuses on younger individuals that transition from school to work, the ascension into the labor market, which frequently doesn't happen because we're kind of dealing with 1920s-style social services that are basically paying people to say it's been two years, proving to Social Security that you can't work, and then you're given a ticket to return to work and get employment services.
So there's lots of scarring that occurs during that waiting period, and so there's a lot of modernization that needs to happen, and it's really lying with Congress to do it. But this Administration knows and Social Security knows it's a problem.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you, Andrew. Margaret?

DR. SIMMS: Yeah, I have two things I wanted to pick up on. One concern, this question of disaggregating data, and I'm reminded of one of the points that was made in yesterday's discussion about women, women's position in the labor force and whether they're married to men with high income and whether that affects their withdrawal from the labor force.

But also I'm thinking about single heads of household, women who are single heads of household. When we talk about the kinds of issues and impacts, location can really be important when the industry they're in leaves their area because they are particularly dependent on support systems in order to manage work and family responsibilities. So that's one thing to think about in terms of data disaggregation.

The other thing, really picking up on one of Sandy's points about what we don't know and what we don't measure, when we think about impacts of trade on wealth, we often think of its impact on income and savings and not so
much on business formation and dissolution, because trade can create opportunities or destroy opportunities for businesses owned by people in different groups, and we don't know enough about that to know how to judge that.

MS. RIVERA: All right. Dan?

DR. GIEDEMAN: Yeah, I'd just like to say one thing. You know, I read the question, you know, how has distributional effects informed, you know, research in your field, and my kind of initial thought was not enough at all. And I think, kind of speaking broadly from the economics profession, this often seems like a niche research area where people focus on this, but it doesn't get -- it's not the focus of sort of the mainstream.

I think this is why, you know, a discussion like this symposium is really important, and I think it needs to happen across many different fields. So I just wanted to put it out there that, you know, when I do macroeconomics or something like that, you know, looking at distributional effects of monetary policy, you know, that's something that's really important, even thinking about today, you know, what's the Fed going to do with respect to interest rates, and the distributional effects are not something that most people talk about. And so I just want to bring up that it doesn't inform it enough. So thank you.

MS. RIVERA: I think we can all agree with you,
Dan. I don't think it informs it enough. As my team did extensive research to put these symposium together, it was shocking how little distributional effects were in things outside of employment or wages impacts, which goes to our next question.

Which of the literature in the effects of trade focus on outcomes such as employment or wages? Are there any outcomes that are particularly salient and important to consider in your opinion: educational attainment, wealth, marriage, family stability, mental health, physical health, generational effects, effects on other household, effects on extended households? What are your thoughts on that? Many of you have brought them, brought these -- looked at these in your research.

DR. HOUTENVILLE: Yeah. So, from disability, you know, there's not one measure that I would say is dominant as much as one important factor in how people adjust to job loss and return to work and opportunities to re-skill. I think that that -- the response to job loss, and then, also, from the school to work perspective, the ascension into the labor market. It's that first job kind of thing that is important. So maybe I would say, if there's an outcome, it's the ascension. It's the high school graduation rate ascension into either secondary ed or to a job. So I'll stop there.

MS. RIVERA: Anyone else want to add anything?
Yes, Sonya?

DR. PORTER: I think you have a good list there. I would just add that I think inequality is important to look at. And, also, to add to your physical health, also mortality is something that I think would be important to look at.

MS. RIVERA: All right. Thank you. Our next question is what --

MR. MONTGOMERY: I'm sorry, I'm going to butt in. It looked like Mike wanted to jump on. I think you're on mute --

MS. RIVERA: Thank you, Chris.

DR. MARTELL: Yeah, thanks. I'll just add one thing if you don't mind. Sorry, Sandra.

MS. RIVERA: No problem.

DR. MARTELL: Like, a related outcome that would probably be useful to think about for LGBTQ+ people in particular. So one of the things about -- like, there's a lot of intersectionality between folks who I study and folks who the rest of the people on the panel are studying, and so -- and that they're -- you know, same sex female households have a much higher risk of being in poverty than different sex households or same sex male households, and a large part behind that is that there's disadvantage due to being a lesbian or bisexual, and then, on top of the gender gap,
which is experienced twice in a same sex household, which is, obviously, unlike a different sex household where there's a male earner and a female earner.

And so I was thinking about the risk of being in poverty but also thinking about some of the additive or intersectional effects the LGBTQ+ people experience in addition to their other characteristics as something that I think would be important to keep in mind as we talk about and think about measuring these outcomes.

MS. RIVERA: Okay. Sandy, I heard that you just sent a link regarding something in the chat, that they'll just post it in the public chat. Did you want to comment on that?

DR. DARITY: No, this is just, you know, the data that my comment about the differential in wealth between Black heads of households and White heads of households by educational attainment was based upon.

MS. RIVERA: Okay, thank you. Thank you for sharing that. I know it'll help our team.

Research often cites data limitations, and I know that many of you have brought this up in your opening remarks, as barriers to being able to perform the type of research our subgroup analysis require to understand the impacts of shocks across different communities. How have data limitations acted as significant barriers to conducting
subgroup analysis in your research, and how do you recommend that we overcome these barriers? Sonya, and then -- did I see another hand? Okay, let's start with Sonya.

DR. PORTER: As I mentioned when I introduced myself, some of the work that I do with evictions and also state prison records, what we're able to do is actually link these records to Census data, which not everyone is able to do, I recognize that, but I think that one way to overcome some of the barriers in terms of having demographic characteristics for those that are evicted or having, you know, demographic characteristics on tax data is to do record linkage.

But I think it's also important to note that it's not a panacea. I mean, with record linkage techniques, at least that we're using at this time, and we're working on improving them, but they do tend to -- right now, it's, you know, a unique identifier. For a linkage, you're less likely to put one on minority groups and people that have lower socioeconomic status.

So there's bias associated with the linkage, and that's something sort of to think about as we build new methods that sort of complement survey work or other work in order to get -- you know, to be able to answer different questions. We also have to think about when you're using big data or administrative records data, what are the gaps and
what are the biases in the data that you're using?

MS. RIVERA: Thank you, Sonya.

Did I see, Mike, did I see your hand or no? Okay, go ahead.

DR. MARTELL: Thanks. Yeah, I did mention data limitations early on, and the data limitations are pretty -- make a pretty big obstruction in the study of sexual orientation and transgender identity. And so, you know, the bulk of economic research and research in other disciplines in this area has to infer sexual orientation typically via sexual behavior if you're having sex with members of the same sex or co-habitation status. Do you co-habit in an unmarried romantic partnership with somebody of the same sex? And there's some real limitations to having to infer this way.

Like, on one hand, sexual behavior. Do heterosexual people have sex with members of the same sex? And if we expect discrimination to be a key contributor to negative outcomes, we're going to get some pretty fuzzy estimates that way. And we're unable to distinguish between bisexual individuals and lesbian and gay individuals. And in, like, the rare case when we are able to distinguish between lesbian, gay, and their bisexual counterparts, it seems like economic outcomes are much worse for bisexual people.

And so the lack of recording self-identified sexual
orientation contributes to quite a bit of erasure of the experience of bisexual individuals, and it really doesn't allow us to understand the mechanisms generating their disadvantage.

And another problem is the data sets that include this information are pretty small. And, on the other hand, like, the Census surveys allow us to observe a large number of people who co-habit romantically with a member of the same sex and, like, these surveys, like, the American Community Survey, the Current Population Survey, have been pretty widely used to study the economic effects of the expansion of legal access to marriage or the expansion of protection from discrimination, but looking just at same sex co-habitants, you know, doesn't allow researchers or policymakers to understand the economic experiences or the legal impacts of policies on folks who don't co-habit.

And it turns out that so we don't have single LGB folks, and then, also, it turns out that most same sex couples are gay or lesbian, and there's a lot of bisexual -- there also. And so there's pretty severe data limitations. So it's not to say that the data aren't useful. They've helped us understand a lot of what's going on. They've helped us in foreign public policy debates, helped us understand the impact of quickly changing attitudes and legal landscapes, but it creates a big hindrance.
But the good news, like, the way we fix this is we just ask people their sexual orientation and their gender identity, right? And there's plenty of research that guides how we craft those questions, where we put them on the survey, and that shows that including these questions does not have a negative consequence on people participating in the survey and people answering other questions. Like, it's quite simple, it's quite easy, it is not very expensive. We could ask about sexual orientation and gender identity just by including it on the survey. Thanks.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you, Mike. Margaret?

DR. SIMMS: Yes, I just wanted to mention that when we talk about data, that there's some recent innovations you might see or new approaches to data collection that give us a faster turnaround on looking at impacts of policies. So the Pulse survey, for example, that the Census Bureau started fielding during the COVID situation, which allowed them to give -- you know, it doesn't go through quite the same detailed vetting that their standard surveys do, but it gives more of a real-time look at what impacts economic change and policy change are having.

The Urban Institute has done something similar using samples drawn from knowledge base, knowledge panel to do targeted surveys around issues that might be of import when looking at policy impacts, and they can have some degree
of disaggregation around demographic issues of importance, whether it's race, gender, or, in some cases, sexual orientation. So just something to think about as you look at how do you measure the impact of trade.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you, Margaret.

Any other comments on this question?

(No response.)

MS. RIVERA: If not, we will turn to a question mainly geared towards the economic historians in the group, Dan and Sandy.

DR. KENT: Sandra, can I add just one thing on the --

MS. RIVERA: Oh, sure. I didn't see your hand. I apologize.

DR. KENT: Sorry. No, no, no. No, it's no problem. I was just going to add that Sonya was talking about linkages, and I think there are a lot of, as Margaret was saying, innovative ways that researchers have started to be able to proxy for things of interest, like race, ethnicity.

So sometimes those categories, especially some of the economics research, aren't necessarily measured by the data sets just because of restrictions, but that doesn't mean that -- I think the easy answer is to say, okay, well, the data set doesn't include that, so let's move on, we can't
answer that question, but I think it's an insufficient response, especially given all of the innovations that we have in the current day.

So, you know, some people look at Census data and, you know, proxy for race or ethnicity given the share of a racial or ethnic group in a Census tract area. So that's just one way of doing it. JP Morgan Chase has linked somehow, I don't know how, but they've linked voter records with race and ethnicity to their proprietary data set that they have to be able to look at really interesting, to Margaret's point, up-to-date information on how households have saved and spent the government aid that they received during the COVID-19 pandemic.

So all I have to say is that, you know, it can be easier, certainly, to say that the data set doesn't collect the data we're interested in, disaggregating by race and other demographic categories, but that is just an example of a good reason to partner with others who have been able to do that in an innovative way.

MS. RIVERA: And this is the same data set that Sandy Darity used, right? Is that right, Ana?

DR. KENT: Not to my knowledge. If you're talking about the offline chat, no, that's the survey of consumer finances. That's a federal preserved product separate from this. It does collect race and ethnicity, and in 2022 -- so
it's a triennial survey -- in 2022, when the next wave is released, technically, in 2023, but collecting 2022 data, it will include the public data set Asian as a subcategory, which has before been grouped in this kind of catch-all other group. So that's super exciting in case others weren't aware of that.

MS. RIVERA: Okay. So what historical factors are critically important to understand when analyzing the current effect of trade policies today on different demographic groups? Dan?

DR. GIEDEMAN: Can I jump in real quick?

MS. RIVERA: Sure.

DR. GIEDEMAN: I think one of the things that's really important in terms of how trade might affect different group is just mobility, geographic mobility. And we can go as far back as, like, the repeal of the corn laws in 1846 in England or grain imports coming into Prussia in the 1870s, and one of the things that we found is that there were disparate effects across groups there and people had to move to adjust, and the people who stayed behind did not benefit as much as the people who maybe moved to the urban areas.

I think we can look at that today and say, well, you know, if people are, you know, faced with, you know, some sort of negative impact from trade, are they able to move to a new geographic location? And so there's going to be
constraints that differ across different types of groups of their ability to move.

We could talk about -- you know, Sandy talked a lot about wealth. Wealth is going to be a big determinant of whether somebody can move. So, if you have home equity, you're going to be able to maybe move to a new area much more easily than if you're renting, and so that would lead to, say, you know, Whites who have been affected by trade being able to move to a new city more easily than maybe some other groups.

Something else that's important I don't think really comes out in research is, you know, if you're going to move, are you going to move into an area that is welcoming to you, or, in many cases, are you going to be moving into an area that's hostile to you. And we can even look at that right now today. Look at different laws that are being passed around the country and would certain groups be willing to move into an environment like that? You know, so where, economically, it might be the best for them to move into this area, you know, overall, you know, they're going to be facing a lot of other constraints, discrimination, and a lot of other factors. And I think that's something that would need to be looked at while trying to think about how to do trade policy.

Now I'll keep talking a little bit. Something else
we just think about, say, in the United States is, you know, how do we affect -- how do we help people who have been affected by trade?

Historically, in the United States, we have not been very generous at all relative to other countries with respect to, say, I'll use broadly the term welfare programs or assistance in general things, and I think that does stem from the view of maybe I'll say -- I don't want to say a majority of the population but certainly a portion of the majority of the population to not want to help others, that they're saying, you know, there's something different, I might be willing to help maybe people who are similar to me, maybe they're part of my in group, but if they're part of my out group, I'm not going to be willing to help them.

And so this applies broadly, not just limited to trade, but in a lot of areas where, if we think about, say, active labor market policies, retraining programs, the United States is second from the bottom, second only -- last only to Mexico in terms of the OECD nations in terms of these active labor market policies, and the question is, well, why aren't we willing to help? And I think, you know, there's some historical factors that play into a role there. So I think those are things that are really important for researchers to study how people might respond to trade.

DR. DARITY: Yeah. The use of trade theory for the
purposes of examining inequality actually does have a fairly thick relationship to what we might call long history, that is to say the origins of the kinds of disparities that we observe today, particularly in the Americas.

When I was much younger, I wrote a paper that's called A General Equilibrium Model of the 18th Century Atlantic Slave Trade: A Least-Likely Test for the Caribbean School, and I think it was published 40 years ago in research and economic history, and it was an attempt to design a three-region trade model where you could demonstrate that the process of the trans-Atlantic slave trade would raise the growth rate for Europe above the growth rates for the other two regions in the triangle, the Americas and Europe.

So directly out of trade theory there was an attempt to actually structure a model about the economic history of inequality in the trans-Atlantic community, and I think that this is a possibility that can be extended to more contemporary research on uneven development at the international level.

But, if we're thinking about the wealth disparities internal to the United States, then I think we have to focus primarily on domestic policies and the history of domestic policies in the United States. I would begin with the immediate aftermath of the Civil War when the formerly enslaved were promised 40-acre land grants and that promise
was not kept while at the same time one-and-a-half million White households were given 160-acre land grants in the Western Territories under the Homestead Act of 1862.

I would argue that that's the origin of the racial wealth disparity in the United States. It was compounded by a wave of massacres, a hundred massacres that took place from the end of the Civil War to the beginning of World War II, where Black lives were taken and Black property was appropriated and seized by the White terrorists. And this pattern of massacres is especially relevant to Don's point about the question of where can you go, where can you migrate to to have not only a life in which you might have a higher income but also a life in which you can actually be safe.

In the 20th Century, the federal government's policies for asset-building shift away from land provision to supporting home ownership, but that's conducted discriminatorily, particularly with respect to redlining and the uneven application of the home ownership provisions of the GI Bill.

And then, finally, the federal government also supports a federal highway system where frequently interstates were run directly through the hearts of Black business districts and Black communities. And so I'm not sure the trade policy has much to do with those kinds of conditions, but, certainly, domestic policy with respect to
asset-building has a tremendous -- has played a tremendous role in shaping the racial wealth gap.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you very much, Sandy.

Appreciate that. Context is everything. Sonya?

FEMALE VOICE: Can I just say that Margaret's had her hand up for a while.

MS. RIVERA: I'm so sorry. Margaret? It keeps getting lost with your lamp. I apologize.

DR. SIMMS: That's okay. It's actually on the other side, but never mind.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you.

DR. SIMMS: I wanted to build on Sandy's point about the impact of segregation, housing segregation, which has both impacts on wealth-building because of its -- because of differential assessments, but it also has an impact on access to employment.

And as we think again about how employment shifts not just across jurisdictions but within local metropolitan areas, that being restricted to certain communities, which is historical and perpetuated today, means that as industry moves, as business opportunities move within a metropolitan area or maybe to the ex-metropolitan area in the same large area, state area, that access to those jobs is very limited for people who are in segregated communities, and, often, the public transportation systems do not support the movement
from where they are restricted in living to where the new job opportunities exist.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you very much for that, Margaret. Sonya?

DR. PORTER: Thank you. So, to build a little bit on what Margaret just said and also Sandy, so Margaret also in terms of, like, the restriction of employment opportunities is a problem, but also the restriction of educational opportunities as well is critical.

I think that also what I find is that -- so you don't have a lot of studies about these things, but you certainly don't -- if people are very quantitative and they're looking at, you know, writing a paper about something that relates to welfare or relates to housing disparities or residential segregation, you don't ever -- you don't frequently find that people are actually framing their papers in this way.

And The Urban Institute has sort of -- I think it's called real -- like, they have a team that writes blogs and other reports that talks about, you know, important things when you think about equity and race, and one of the things that I think they bring up, importantly, is that we sort of have a responsibility as researchers or government agencies, when you're putting out reports, when you're putting out papers, to have that context even if you're not able to study
it. I think that's critical. It's an important responsibility that we bear.

MS. RIVERA: Our time is getting short. I just want to give each participant any last words, an opportunity to speak for any last words, any last points they'd like to make. Can I start with you, Ana?

DR. KENT: Sure. Just continuing on on this last question too, you know, it's so important to understand that context and that history but also understand that it didn't end when that history, you know, concluded, when that year ended. It still has impacts today, and there's still plenty of contemporary policies, determinations, attitudes that people face that block, you know, the ability to talk -- all these things that we've been talking about, to get a job, to get a living wage, to build wealth, accumulate assets, and that has implications for trade too.

I'm not a trade economist, but, you know, if we're talking about these groups and we see these disparities that have systemic barriers associated with them, if some groups are more likely to be in low-wage jobs and there's certain things that are going to have an outsized impact on them, take Covid, obviously, and the affect of the economy on lower-wage, lower-educated minority groups. Currently, inflation, right? The Minneapolis Fed just had a conference on inflation on Tuesday and the outsized impact that that has
on low-wage families. So just a reminder that is probably obvious to everyone here, but I just thought I'd raise it, that, you know, these have contemporary effects as well.

MS. RIVERA: Okay. Andrew?

MR. SECRETARY: You're on mute, Andrew.

DR. HOUTENVILLE: I'm sorry. Just two things. As people think about disability going forward and looking at trade, one thing is people with disabilities are a demographic characteristic, not just some condition to be avoided. Many times, it's difficult to get through to certain different policy groups if disability is thought of not as a demographic characteristic.

And the other thing is I see a lot of -- I have a lot of colleagues involved with macro trade, and they do all these simulation models, and behind it is general equilibrium, and the idea that the endowment is just given and so the fixed point at some point in the beginning, that's always bothered me back from my days with Varian that the endowment is just this mysterious thing and everything's wonderful thereafter.

If we could improve macroeconomics and the degree to which macro trade is taking up that mantle of general equilibrium, to think about how different start points might -- radically different start points might impact their models, that would be appreciated.
MS. RIVERA: Okay. Dan?

DR. GIEDEMAN: Yeah. Just kind of tying back in a little bit to some of the factors might be, you know, influence how people can react to trade, I think it's important to keep in mind sort of network connections. Do you have familiar connections or sort of social connections? So, if your job goes away, do you have somebody there who says, hey, I can fit you in here, can I fit you in there, here's an opportunity? And I think those are definitely different across different demographic groups, and I think there's a lot of reasons why some people might be able to respond to trade in a more positive way than other people can, and I think those are something that would need to continue to be explored.

MS. RIVERA: Okay. Sandy, and then Margaret.

Unmute.

MR. SECRETARY: You're on mute.

DR. DARITY: The most widely used phrase in this day and age, you're on mute, right? I'm sorry. Returning to Sonya's point about disaggregating data, there actually is some data that's available with relatively finely defined national origin communities, but it's data for six metropolitan areas that is a product of a survey, a series of surveys that were conducted under the National Asset Scorecard for Communities of Color Project, and as a
consequence, for those six metropolitan areas, we actually do have detailed information about the specific wealth position of, say, Filipinos, Cambodians, Chinese-Americans, Japanese-Americans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and so forth.

And in one of the cities, Tulsa, Oklahoma, we actually have detailed information about the wealth position of specific tribal communities. But this is only for six metropolitan areas, and we've been trying to encourage the Fed to consider doing an annual study that actually incorporates greater detail on ancestry or national origin among respondents. I'm thrilled to see that there actually will be a robust survey including information about the Asian community, but it would be exciting if you could go below that broad aggregate category to look at specific national origin groups within the Asian community.

So the studies that I mentioned at the six metropolitan areas are called color of wealth studies, and I would love to see an extension of that type of work to a full national data set.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you very much, Sandy. Quick comments from Margaret, Mike, and Sonya.

DR. SIMMS: Okay. My comment is not about data, but it's how you use data to look at the likely impact of policy change, and then, as you think about the impact, do you then structure your policy in a way that you compensate,
so to speak, for disproportionate impacts. So just quickly, if you think about a policy that is going to take jobs away of a certain type, how do you develop policies that compensate for that through training but also connections to the new jobs, whether it's transport or different kinds of connections. So it's kind of like going the next step in policy, not just looking at the most immediate effect but also looking at what we know or should know in order to design compensating policies that actually affect those who are most impacted.

MS. RIVERA: Okay. Mike? Thank you.

DR. MARTELL: Yeah, thanks. I'll be brief. I think my last comment is it seems to me that any distributional effects of trade and related policies depend on the context of the folks we're talking about and the many, many mechanisms generating disadvantage that place people in those contexts, and so like an understanding of how do they properly define or create compensating policies to understand distributional impacts probably requires more tools than just those in, like, the way we typically think of trade, and so hopefully we can -- it is more -- it's difficult, though. We probably need several fields talking with each other and working together to actually get a better grip on reality, which is awful complex.

MS. RIVERA: Sonya?
DR. PORTER: Yeah, so recently I was reading an opinion piece by Bryan Schonfeld and Sam Winter-Levy where they were talking about the importance of thinking about post-treatment bias in our control variables, and I think it's an important point. It's something that I would like to think about more moving forward where it's something that's obvious, but it's not something that I know how to deal with statistically but that when you're looking at something like mortality and race and that relationship and you're controlling for education and occupation and maybe pre-existing conditions, that all of those variables that you're controlling for, for instance, like education, are imbued -- that race impacts all of those characteristics and controls.

And so thinking about how you characterize then your results and also thinking about the statistics more I think is really important because these aren't something that's just sort of -- these controls are imbued with race just as the other variables that you're looking at.

MS. RIVERA: Thank you, Sonya.

We have a question from the Chairman's office, so I'm just going to take a couple more minutes. One last question and then you guys are done for the day. Is there a way -- of this panel anyway. Is there any way to disentangle differential impacts from differential starting points? I
know Sandy mentioned that, you know, the disparity in wealth started right after -- right in the late to mid-1800s, right? But is there a way to disentangle that from other differential impacts today or anybody have any thoughts on those? No thoughts? Okay. Well --

DR. DARITY: None new.

MS. RIVERA: Any thoughts?

DR. KENT: So I'll just say what I think. That's kind of the, I think, the holy grail in a lot of this work, you know, the data sets like what Sandy and I have been talking about, the survey of consumer finances, which is largely considered the gold standard of wealth data in the United States, the modern term family goes back to 1989. There are efforts by Maurice Kuhn and Shulerack and others to go back further than that and some others as well, Russell Sage Foundation just got a grant to go even back into the 1800s. But barring that, there's very little data, so back to the question on data availability, at least for wealth, it's difficult do that and disentangle.

That being said, we have to rely on those innovations, research from Chicago Fed Economist has looked at the effect of redlining, for example, and tying that to more contemporary racial wealth disparities and not just redlining but yellow-lining too, which is kind of like the -- not the D but like that the difference between the A, B, so
anyway, that gets kind of into the weeds, but just to say
that there are some -- there is work on that. And, Sandy, it
looks like you have something to add?

DR. DARITY: No, no, no. I just wanted to mention
there is some work by Laura Dorincourt and her colleagues
that attempts to establish a long time series for wealth
disparities dating back to the 1860s, but they rely heavily
upon data for a subset of the states, some of the states in
the Confederacy, the former Confederacy, that have
administrative data that permit you to unpackage in some way
these wealth disparities, but, you know, that's limited, and
I think they would concede that also.

MS. RIVERA: I want to thank each and every one of
you for taking time to come on this panel that had this kind
of ambiguous title that many of you weren't sure whether or
not you'd fit in, but we value your expertise, we value your
unique perspective that you brought to the table and your
willingness to come and share your thoughts with us. We will
take your comments and we will use them for our report, and I
just wanted to thank each of you for taking your time to
spend some time this afternoon with us. So thank you very
much.

And now I'd like to turn over to Dr. William
Powers, the Chief Economist for the U.S. International Trade
Commission, who's going to be doing closing remarks. Thanks
again to the panel. Thanks again for all the panels, and I'll turn it over to Bill. Thanks.

DR. POWERS: Thank you, Sandra, and thank you for leading that fantastic panel, and thank you to our people who are here.

So I have been asked to provide some concluding remarks, and sometimes this is just like thanks, goodbye, but I hope on this occasion you'll actually grant me a few minutes to recap the event and look forward. So this symposium is actually one of a series of nine events that the Commission is holding, all of which are part of our report on the distributional effects on trade. So how did we do?

Let's think about that. Let's start by looking at what the goal for the symposium was. The United States Trade Representative asked that we hold a symposium focused on the distributional effects of trade on underrepresented and underserved communities, and they asked us to look at a whole lot of items: the results of existing analysis, evaluation of methodologies, the use of public and restricted data, gaps in data in the economic literature, and propose analysis that we could do with restricted data sets. So, if you wondered why we had 10 or so panels, you can thank the U.S. Trade Representative at the beginning, so we really had a lot to cover.

This is a huge task, and every single person on
this event contributed. I want to start by thanking the organizers of the event, and there were eight folks principally doing the work. I've got Sandra Rivera, Caroline Peters, Huyen Nguyen, Chris Montgomery, Sam Goodman, Elli Nesbitt, Jean Yuan, and, of course, Bill Bishop, so if you guys could turn on your cameras, we would not have an event without you. Fantastic, and I really want to build a sense of virtual community here at the end, so keep your cameras on.

And the next people I want to thank are the presenters, the moderators, the panelists, and I don't know if you counted, but I did. There were about 50 of us over the last two days, so huge props to everybody who came. Thank you so much for your enthusiastic response. When we reached out, about 90 percent of the people reached out to said that yes, they would be happy to be here. Thank you for your thoughtful presentations. I know it's very difficult to shape your thoughts into five minutes or seven minutes or 10 minutes or 12 minutes or whatever we gave you. We'd have loved to give each and every one of you more, but we actually had a lot of material to cover, so if any of you 50 people are still with us at this moment, please turn your cameras on as well. Join us. Join us in this virtual celebration of the event. Thank you.

The audience, I want to thank the audience as well.
You have submitted questions. You have stayed with us patiently through this event. You have either followed along as we've gone through topic after topic for two days, and we've actually still -- how many people do we have left? Fifty-seven, so not too bad for the end of the two-day experience, so thank you.

I did want to stress for those of you two unique aspects of this symposium. One is that we have this unusual opportunity to synthesize a growing body of literature on distributional effects and to highlight some innovations, some best practices and places where we need to work hard, so it's good that we can get together to talk about these things.

And the other unique aspect here is that this information is going directly to policymakers. They want to use this information and they want to design better policy and they're hungry for this information. We don't have to guess about that. We can look directly back at the request letter that we got from the USTR, and they say the USTR strives to realize the Administration's initiatives and respond to Congressional requests for trade policy to have positive and equitable impact on marginalized, underserved and disadvantaged communities. So I did want to say that your work is going to have an impact, and coming here also enabled it to have an impact, so thank you.
I hope, actually, it's not all about informing policymakers. Quite a bit of what we did this past two days is informing ourselves, and I hope you've picked up some good suggestions to improve your work in this area and figure out where we need to do more, and I thank everybody who came for the quality of the presentations.

Here's some of the things that I learned over the last two days. First of all, we need to have a good understanding about what the decline in manufacturing means in the United States. We need to account for manufacturing firms that changed their industry, for example. Many of them are warehouses. They're still there, but they're not doing manufacturing anymore, so we need to remember what that means.

On gender, we heard a number of panels today and yesterday. Men and women respond differently to economic shocks. There's prominent differences in how men and women move across industries, and there's also really important differences in how they behave within industries and within households, and so that's important for us to remember, and this isn't just responding to trade shocks. Some of those things are going to be similar and responsive to all shocks, I believe.

On race, there's actually a smaller literature on race than on gender, but the analysis is there too. It's
starting to go beyond just black and white and it's starting to focus on men's -- sorry, it's going beyond the focus on men to include intersectionality, so that's promising but still small. We have work to do.

We talked a lot today about data sources, all day long, in fact, from the first panel to the last, and this morning we talked about how to better understand the data sources, how to get access to these data sources, and in some cases, how to get access to the non-public elements, so that gives all my analysis. That's great.

This afternoon, we saw that international efforts had a lot to tell us about the impact of trade policy and have designed our policies and some of these institutions have been thinking about that in countries like Canada have been thinking about that for several years now.

In this last panel, a great perspective and I think one of the things that stood out to me was the comment that distributional effects have been understudied in many fields of economics, and so it's not just a trade problem. It's a problem for the recession and for the country and far beyond economics, but, hopefully, this is doing a little bit to do better there.

All right. So that's our recap of the event. Looking forward, what's coming next? We will have all of these presentations on EDIS on Monday. Bill Bishop, could
you put the link to EDIS in the chat, please?

MS. RIVERA: Update, on Friday.

DR. POWERS: Oh, now on Friday. It's moving even faster. You got us all excited, so we'll have them out there on Friday. Bill's going to put the link to EDIS in the chat and then the investigation number is 332-587, and if that is completely Greek to you and you want some support on getting access to it, just email the same de@usitc.gov email address that we've been using throughout the event and we will help you out.

Transcript. There's going to be a complete transcript of this event. We had a court reporter for this entire period, and that's available right now for a fee and it will be free in 45 days, and that will also be posted to EDIS.

And then, in about six months, we're going to finish our report summarizing the events that we've had, the literature, the research, and this symposium, and we'll be sending that off to USTR on October 14 and it will be released to the public shortly after that.

So that's a lot to look forward to. I wanted to just conclude here by saying thanks to everybody. Thanks to this whole team and this whole presenters and this whole group again. Please keep in touch. You know how to reach us. And we hope to see you at future events. So take care,
and thank you for a very successful event.

MR. SECRETARY: Thank you, everyone. On behalf of the Commission, thanks so much to all of our participants for both yesterday and today. We appreciate it so much. We value your input so much. So, please, I'm going to stay on a bit in the chat. I have the EDIS link for you to find the slides, and also I will post the email address for any further questions or comments that you may have. Thank you so much, everyone. Great event.

(Whereupon, at 4:32 p.m., the symposium in the above-entitled matter adjourned.)
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